The question of the status of the Polish Orthodox Church had important political significance in the postwar years. The governments of the USSR and Poland were addressing the issue with great attention. The beginning of the Cold War strongly influenced the decision of granting autocephaly to the Polish Orthodox Church. The article describes how this foreign policy factor affected the communications of the Soviet and Polish officials in the matter of the autocephaly.

Keywords: Cold War, Soviet Union, Polish Republic, Polish Orthodox Church, Council for the Affairs of Russian Orthodox Church, autocephaly, Metropolitan Dionysius (Valedynskyi).

The initial period of the Cold War was largely connected with Stalin's plans to Sovietize the countries of Eastern Europe, among which Poland occupied a special place. The Soviet secret services, as a result of punitive actions carried out during 1944-1945 against anti-communist underground Polish organizations, and falsification of the results of the Polish referendum in 1946 and the elections to the Sejm in 1947, ensured the final consolidation of supporters in power

Vyshyvanyuk A. Vopros ob avtokefalii Polskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v kontekste kholodnoy voyny [The question of autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church in the context of the Cold War]. 2017. N 1. pp. 81-97.

Vishivanyuk, Anna (2017) "The Issue of Autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church in the Early Years of the Cold War", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 35(1): 81-97.

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Of the Soviet Union-representatives of the Polish Workers ' Party headed by B. Berut and V. Gomulka1.

The series of actions aimed at the Sovietization of Poland can also be attributed to the proclamation of autocephaly by the Moscow Patriarchate of the Polish Orthodox Church in 1948. Our interest in this topic is caused by the lack of research that considers this event from this perspective. The lack of research on this issue in political historiography is obviously due to the insignificant role of the Polish Orthodox Church in Polish society due to its small number, especially in the post-war years. In ecclesiastical historiography, this point is addressed in a number of works, but mainly from the point of view of church law2. However, when studying the documents of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church on the status of the Polish Orthodox Church in the post-war period, it turned out that the materials on the proclamation of autocephaly in the Polish Orthodox Church illustrate the range of such problems as: the mechanism of communication and the degree of mutual influence of the Union leadership and the Polish government on each other in the context of increasing tension in relations between the USSR and the West; implementation of contacts between Orthodox structures in the Republic of Poland (PR; since 1952 - the Polish People's Republic (Poland)), the Russian Orthodox Church and state bodies of both states; dynamics of changing approaches to solving the issue of Polish autocephaly depending on the transformation of the geopolitical situation.

1. Petrov N. V. The role of the MGB of the USSR in the Sovietization of Poland. Conducting a referendum and elections to the Seimas in 1946-1947 / / Katyn materials. 2011; Evseeva E. N. SSSR i Kholodnaya voina (1945-1953 gg.) [The USSR and the Cold War (1945-1953)]. 2004. N 10 [http://m.cyberleninka.ru/articale/n/sssr-i-holodnaya-voyna-1945-1953-gg, доступ от 24.11.2016].

2. Mironowicz, An. (2006) Kosciol prawoslawny w Polsce. Bialystok; Plonski, R. (2009) "Tomosy z 1924 i 1948 roku nadaMące status autokefaliczny Polskiemu autokefalicznemu Kościołowi Prawosławnemu: ich wydźwięk historyczno-kanoniczny", Studia Warminskie XLVI: 153-171 [http://studiawarminskie.uwm.edu.pl/home/SearchForm?Search=+roman+plonski+tomosy+z +1924+i+1948&action, accessed on 23.11.2016]; Svitich A. The Orthodox Church in Poland and its Autocephaly // Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Poland in the XX century (1917-1950). Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarchal Metochion, 1997; Tsypin V., prot. Istoriya Russkoy Tserkvi (1917-1997) [History of the Russian Church (1917-1997)], Moscow: Publishing House of the Transfiguration of the Saviour of Valaam Monastery, 1997. In 2 vols. Moscow, Russkie ogni Publ., 1994.

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Despite the fact that the Polish Orthodox Church declined by 90% in all respects in the post-war period (for example, after the Second World War, only 169 parishes out of 1,579 remained, and the number of believers was approximately 200,000), 3 it was of interest to the Soviet leadership because it was one of the few organizations that united Polish citizens who were loyal to the Soviet Union and the current government of "people's democracy" in Poland 4. During 1944-1945, there was a noticeable desire of the Soviet authorities to strengthen the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on Polish Orthodoxy.

Thus, the attempts of Bishop Timothy (Schretter)5, which he undertook from March to May 1945, to establish negotiations with the Moscow Patriarchate and the Soviet Consulate in Warsaw regarding reunification with the Russian Orthodox Church, the allied authorities intended to use for subordinating the Polish Orthodox Church to the Moscow Patriarchate, having previously agreed on this issue with the Polish authorities.6 In the future, meetings on this issue were held through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

3. The reason for the decline in the number of believers and parishes of the Polish Orthodox Church in the war and post-war years was: repression by the Polish national movement and confiscation of property by the Polish leadership in favor of the Catholic Church, a natural decline in wartime conditions. But most of all, the situation of the Orthodox denomination was affected by the action of forced resettlement of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian population from Poland to the Ukrainian SSR, carried out in 1944-1946. under the agreement between the PR and the USSR of 09.09.1944: "Agreement between the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Polish Committee for National Liberation on the evacuation of the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and Polish citizens with territories of the Ukrainian SSR" (2006), in Mironowicz, An. Kosciol prawoslawny w Polsce, pp. 662-664.

4. Letter of A.M. Alexandrov to G. G. Karpov with the translation of the official note of the Minister of Justice of Poland G. Sventkovsky on the situation of the Orthodox Church in the country from 31.03.1947 / / GA RF. F. R6991. Op. 1. D. 17. L. 131-142; Volokitina T. V., Murashko G. P., Noskova A. F. Vlast i tserkva v Vostochnoy Europe. 1944-1953 Documents of the Russian Archives: in 2 vols. Vol. 1: Power and the Church in Eastern Europe. 1944-1948 гг. М.: РОССПЭН, 2009 [http:// http://scibook.net/evropyi-ameriki-istoriya/spravka-karpova-prieme-sovete-delam-rpts-35373. html, доступ от 25.11.2016].

5. Bishop Timothy (Schretter) is the only bishop of the Polish Orthodox Church who remained in Poland after the liberation from German occupation. He was appointed by the Polish leadership to manage the affairs of the Orthodox Church.

6. Materials on the Polish Autocephalous Church; l. 52-53. Reference on the state of the Polish Orthodox "Autocephalous" Church; l. 57-58. Information about the ep's request. Timothy on the reunification with the Moscow Patriarchate of 07.05.1945 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. d. 17. L. 50-51.

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Their effectiveness was low. In May 1946, the representative of Soviet diplomacy in Warsaw reported to Moscow his vision of the situation and possible options for resolving the issue of the Polish Orthodox Church. He confidently argued that Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledinsky), who had returned to Poland at the end of April 1945 and was trying to regain control of the Warsaw Archdiocese, should be arrested for collaborating with the Germans. Further, the compiler of the certificate admitted with less certainty that a bishop from Russia, chosen by the patriarch, could be appointed as the new head of the Polish Orthodox Church, but at the same time he would have to receive Polish citizenship and be excluded from the Russian Orthodox Church. The diplomat concluded his communique with the message: "Polish friends say that it is not yet a convenient time to discuss the reunification of the Polish Church with the MP."7. One of Mr. Karpov's letters indicated that the Soviet leadership did not immediately understand the reason for the desire of the provisional Polish government to delay the question of the reunification of the Polish Orthodox Church with the Moscow Patriarchate. The Council only planned to postpone it until after the parliamentary elections in Poland8.

Further contacts between the Soviet authorities and" Polish friends " on the issue of church reunification showed that after the last referendum in the summer of 1946, the Polish authorities began to show insistence on leaving the Polish Orthodox Church in the status of autocephaly (in which it had been since 1924 on the basis of the Tomos of the Patriarch of Constantinople 9, but did not have the recognition of the Moscow Patriarchate). At the same time, in presenting their demands, they no longer hid their true motives. Thus, at a reception at the Russian Orthodox Church Affairs Council, the head of the delegation of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, Minister of Justice G. Sventkovsky, said: "... because the Soviet government always emphasizes [the thesis] about the independence and independence of the Polish state, and insistent demands for the removal of autocephaly would indicate some claims and undermine

7. Reference of tov. Lebedeva iz Varshavy o Polskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi s 1944 g. ot 27.05.1946 [About the Polish Orthodox Church since 1944 from 27.05.1946].

8. Reply letter of the Chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers G. Karpov to the head of the IV European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. P. Pavlov on the situation of the Orthodox Church in Poland and the attitude to Metropolitan Dionysius from 07.06.1946 / / GA RF. F. R6991. Op. 1. D. 129. L. 286.

9. Svitich A. The Orthodox Church in Poland and its autocephaly. pp. 122-123.

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This is the basic principle underlying the construction of our Polish Republic ... if the number of people who profess the Orthodox faith in Poland became less, for example, up to 50 or even 5 thousand people, then even under this condition we will defend the autocephalous status in the same way as all other national states " 10. The conversation with G. Sventkovsky played a decisive role in changing the views of the Soviet leadership on the status of the Polish Orthodox Church Churches: the question of reunification with the Moscow Patriarchate has been lifted. In the future, this problem was considered exclusively in line with the registration of Polish autocephaly through the Moscow Patriarch. Even subsequent proposals from the Polish side, which contained options for resolving church relations between the Warsaw Archdiocese and the Moscow Patriarchate in the format of reunification, caused confusion in the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, since Council officials considered this issue resolved between them11.

The reason for the" deflection " of the Allied authorities to their Polish colleagues from the pro-communist Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland, who at that time were heavily dependent on Soviet assistance in maintaining their power in Poland, can be explained primarily by the tense foreign policy situation. After the large-scale actions carried out by the Soviet special services in Poland in 1944-1945 to eliminate supporters of the "London" emigrant government, the USSR was loudly accused of violating the Yalta agreements in connection with the imposition of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe by I. Stalin. The Soviet leadership realized that in a confrontation with the economically and militarily strong West, it was necessary to act cautiously. The head of the USSR had to change his tactics in Poland and other Eastern European countries. For example, instead of direct intervention by the MGB of the USSR and openly carrying out acts of suppression of resistance in this region, the focus is on-

10. Volokitina T. V., Murashko G. P., Noskova A. F. Power and the Church in Eastern Europe. 1944-1953. Documents of the Russian archives: in 2 vols. Vol. 1: Power and Church in Eastern Europe. 1944-1948

11. A letter from G. G. Karpov to A. M. Alexandrov (Head of the Fourth European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) regarding the proposals of V. Volsky on the reorganization of the leadership of the Orthodox Church in Poland. 21.05.1947 / / GA RF F. R6991. Op. 1. D. 17. L. 161-164.

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He referred to the subtle methods of working with the state security Service. Poland strengthened its own state security services, subordinating them to the Communist Party, and the Soviet bodies performed only "advisory functions". Stalin's tactics in the Sovietization of Eastern Europe also became more cautious. It was supposed to create broad coalitions of "democratic" parties in the countries of "people's democracy", in which non-communist elements would gradually dissolve. And after that, they were going to unite their close parties on a communist platform12. Obviously, similar methods were applied to the solution of the ecclesiastical question in Poland by the Soviet authorities in charge of the religious sphere. Having agreed with the idea of autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox structures, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took an unequivocal and firm position in refusing the Polish authorities to recognize bishops from other local churches (in particular, from the Serbian and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches)as the head of the autocephalous Polish Orthodox Church13.

As for the interests of the leadership of the Polish Republic regarding the status of the Polish Orthodox Church and its position in the state, there was no single line in the Polish state apparatus. This situation reflected the complexity of internal government relations in Poland and their difference from the Soviet system of power. For example, we know three people who were involved in solving problems with the Polish Orthodox Church: the Minister of Justice G. Sventkovsky, the Deputy Minister of Public Administration V. Volsky and the head of the Department for Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs a certain Demchuk. They had different opinions on a number of issues. Sventkovsky insisted on the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Poland, but considered it desirable to have a bishop from the Russian Orthodox Church as the head of this church. While Volsky was investigating the possibility of involving a bishop from Yugoslavia in the management of the Polish church, who would have "democratic beliefs and spiritual authority", but recognized the possibility of reunification with the Moscow Patriarchate. In his opinion, it would be important for this to happen without

12. Petrov N. V. The role of the MGB of the USSR in the Sovietization of Poland. Holding of referendums and Seimas elections in 1946-1947

13. G. G. Karpov's letter to A. M. Alexandrov.

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publicity. Their positions, communicated to allied functionaries at various times, were a bit like a game, since each time Polish politicians appealed to the point of view that "it is not necessary to act in such a way that the Poles can think that Moscow is pulling the Polish Orthodox Church by force, because the Polish reaction will raise a howl and link the issue with imaginary dependence." Demchuk was a representative of the Polish legal opposition, led by Michalczyk, and, unlike his colleagues, supported Metropolitan Dionysius 15 in his efforts to establish himself as the head of the Polish Orthodox Church16. This situation demonstrated the lack of absolute control by the Communists in Poland and the strong role of the opposition. It should be noted that it was only thanks to the colossal falsifications in the 1946 referendum and the 1947 parliamentary elections that the Polish left-wing parties were able to retain power. 17 Therefore, the Polish Communists had to take into account the sentiments of the majority even in the problem of the small Orthodox Church. As we can see, the danger of this moment was also understood in Moscow.

In fairness, it should be noted that the Polish leaders were guided not only by considerations of the political situation. It was equally important for them to have independence in resolving internal issues in Poland. Researcher of the history of the Polish Orthodox Church A. Mironovich claims that the Polish authorities were interested in the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Poland, since this allowed them to independently establish rules in mutual relations.-

14. Letter from A. M. Alexandrov (Head of the Fourth European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to G. G. Karpov about the proposals of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Minister of Public Administration of Poland, V. Volsky on changing the composition of the Orthodox Church in Poland. 20.05.1947 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. d. 17. L. 158-160.

15. After the return of Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledinsky) from exile in Warsaw, the communist circles of Poland and the Soviet leadership looked for ways to remove him from the political and social arena of post-war Poland. The reason for this was his anti-communist position during the administration of the Polish Orthodox Church in the interwar period and cooperation with the Germans during the occupation. In addition, his support from Western leaders was unpleasant for the Polish and Soviet authorities.

16. Volokitina T. V., Murashko G. P., Noskova A. F. Power and the Church in Eastern Europe. 1944-1953. Documents of the Russian archives: in 2 vols. Vol. 1: Power and Church in Eastern Europe. 1944-1948

17. Petrov N. V. The role of the MGB of the USSR in the Sovietization of Poland. Holding of referendums and Seimas elections in 1946-1947

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relations with a church located within their country 18. This is also evident in the local situation that took place in the Bialystok Voivodeship in 1944-1945. In the conflict that arose between the clergy who supported reunification with the Russian Orthodox Church, who were received into communion with the Moscow Patriarchate by Archbishop Vasily of Minsk during a visit to Bialystok in December 1944, and Bishop Timofey (Schretter), who was entrusted with the administration of these regions by the Lublin government, the Polish authorities confidently defended his right to lead church life in the They considered it impossible for the Moscow Patriarch to interfere in church affairs on the territory of Poland 19. It is interesting that the Poles paid such attention to the Orthodox Church only in the matter of jurisdiction. To all other appeals and requests of Orthodox christians (to return Orthodox churches taken by Catholics, to open a theological department at the University of Warsaw, to admit Orthodox chaplains to the army, etc.), the Polish authorities remained deaf: when representatives of the Soviet leadership were interested in solving these problems, the Polish side managed to get along with little meaningful replies. 20
During 1947 and the first half of 1948, negotiations were held between the authorities of the USSR and Poland on how to implement the proclamation of autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church by the Moscow Patriarchate.

The first problem was the figure of Metropolitan Dionysius (Valedinsky), who persistently demanded Moscow's recognition of Polish autocephaly in 1924 and the return of the right to govern Polish dioceses. Options for arrest or transfer to retirement were considered. Interestingly, the Polish side took a tougher stance than the Soviet side. The Russian Orthodox Church Affairs Council considered that the arrest of Metropolitan Dionysius would cause a wide negative response.21 In early 1948, after unsuccessful attempts by the Polish government to sway Mitro-

18. Mironowicz, An. Kosciol prawoslawny w Polsce, p. 678. Bialystok.

19. Report of the Commissioner for the BSSR to the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church on the situation of the Human Rights Center in Poland. 18.03.1946 / / GA RF. f. R6991 Op. 1. D. 17. L. 77.

20. Report on the attitude of the Vice Minister of Poland V. Wolski to the issue of oppression of the Polish Orthodox Church. 12.05.1949 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 577. L. 34.

21. A letter from G. G. Karpov to A. M. Alexandrov (Head of the Fourth European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) regarding V. Volsky's proposals for the reorganization of the RU-

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When Polit Varshavsky was forced to retire, he was placed under house arrest. Despite this decision of the Polish authorities, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church continued to petition its Polish colleagues, suggesting that if Metropolitan Dionysius changed his position in these circumstances, he could be retained as the head of the Orthodox Church in Poland.22 It is obvious that such a divergence in positions regarding Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledinsky) can be explained, on the one hand, by the extremely negative attitude of the Polish communist authorities towards the metropolitan's ties with the Polish emigrant government, while the Soviet leadership was more concerned about publicity in connection with the metropolitan's arrest in the context of the growing propaganda war with the West, on the other hand. Disagreements between friendly Governments on this issue persisted thereafter.23
The second question concerned the circumstances and mechanism of settling relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Orthodox Church in Poland. The Polish Orthodox Church was to be represented by the Provisional Council for the Administration of the Orthodox Church in Poland, headed by Archbishop Timothy (Schretter), which was created by the Polish government after the arrest of Metropolitan Dionysius. 24 On how the issue of autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church should be resolved, the proposals of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church were adopted, which reflected the wishes of Patriarch Alexy 25. They were reduced to the following provisions: The Synod cannot make a decision on the decision of the Synod.-

leadership of the Orthodox Church in Poland. 21.05.1947 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D.

17. L. 161-164.

22. Letter from the Deputy Chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky on the preparation of a meeting of the heads of autocephalous Orthodox churches in Moscow and the need to establish a link between the Orthodox Church of Poland and the Moscow Patriarchate. 29.03.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 4-4 vol.

23. Certificate of the senior inspector of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church Ananyev about the conversation of Mitr. Dionysius with the first secretary of the USSR Embassy in Poland, Ye. I. Dluzhinsky, on the Metropolitan's trip to Moscow to meet with Patriarch Alexy.

11.12.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 65-65 vol.

24. Letter of A.M. Alexandrov to G. G. Karpov on the composition of the delegation of priests of the Orthodox Church of Poland. 08.05.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 621. L. 16-19.

25. A letter from G. G. Karpov to A. M. Alexandrov (Head of the Fourth European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) regarding the proposals of V. Volsky on the reorganization of the leadership of the Orthodox Church in Poland. 21.05.1947 / / GA RF. F. R6991. Op. 1. D. 17. L. 161-164.

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the Synod can only do this after receiving a delegation from the Orthodox Church in Poland and hearing its request; during the visit of the delegation, all issues related to the legal status of this church will be resolved. In this case, the Soviet functionaries supported the request of Patriarch Alexy, who sought at least in formal moments to observe the appearance of canonical purity of this act, since in the fundamental question of the status of the Polish Orthodox Church a few months earlier, he expressed readiness to accept the authorities ' line on this issue, recognizing that the solution of the issue is of political importance.26
The last decision before the proclamation of autocephaly concerned choosing the best reason for this. As in the previous case, this issue was obviously of little interest to the Polish authorities, so coordination on it was conducted mainly between Soviet departments. In mid-April 1948, Deputy Foreign Minister V. A. Zorin presented a version of the solution to the issue of legalizing Polish autocephaly proposed by the Charge d'affaires of the USSR in Warsaw V. G. Yakovlev. Its essence was reduced to the following provisions: 1) during the visit of the delegation of the Polish Orthodox Church to the Patriarch, only a promise of autocephaly should be given; 2) autocephaly should be issued after the Polish clergy, among whom there are many proteges of Dionysius, choose "democratically minded and friendly to the Soviet Union metropolitan and his assistants"27; 3) autocephaly is best issued during the visit to the Russian Orthodox Church. participation of the newly elected head of the Polish Orthodox Church in the Pan-Orthodox Meeting of Heads of Orthodox Churches, which will be held in Moscow in the summer. According to V. G. Yakovlev, resolving the issue of Polish autocephaly in this way "will be an important friendly gesture on the part of the Russian Church and a great political achievement."-

26. Letter of Patriarch Alexy to the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the attitude to the issue of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Poland. 21.03.1947 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 17. L. 144.

27. Letter of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. A. Zorin to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. G. Karpov with a request for assistance in organizing the trip of the delegation of the Polish Orthodox Church to Moscow. 14.04.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 5-7.

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the war of the Orthodox in the new democratic Poland " 28. In a reply letter from G. G. Karpov, a different version of the scenario of autocephaly was proposed, which dealt not only with Polish problems, but also had to serve to implement Stalin's plans to solve geopolitical problems by spreading his influence on universal Orthodoxy. The Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR considered that it was necessary to take advantage of the removal of such an obstacle as Metropolitan Dionysius to resolve the issue of Polish autocephaly as soon as possible in order "to ensure the participation of the Polish Orthodox Church in the upcoming meeting of the heads of autocephalous Orthodox Churches in July 1948 as an equal participant in the meeting and thereby strengthen the position of the Moscow Patriarchate"when voting 29. As you know, this option was implemented. During the first visit of the delegation of the Polish Orthodox Church to Moscow, which took place less than three weeks before the Pan-Orthodox Conference of 1948, its autocephaly was announced. On June 22, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, accepting from the delegates of the Polish Orthodox Church the refusal of autocephaly, received in 1924 from the Patriarch of Constantinople, as illegal and uncanonical, as well as the announcement of the break in prayer communion with its primate, Metropolitan Dionysius, because of his errors, restored liturgical communion with the latter. And by the same act, he granted her the blessing of the "Mother Church" for full-fledged autocephaly, which was now presented as canonical 30. At the Pan-Orthodox Conference in Moscow on July 8, the autocephalous Polish Orthodox Church was represented by a delegation headed by Archbishop Timothy (Schretter), which, as planned, somewhat strengthened the position of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, this did not matter in principle, since the essential issues of interest to the Soviet government were not resolved due to the absence of the primates of the main local churches.

28. Ibid.

29. Letter of the Deputy Chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. G. Karpov Deputy. To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. A. Zorin with a request for assistance in organizing the trip of the delegation of the Polish Orthodox Church to Moscow. 16.04.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 8-8 vol.

30. The Act of June 22, 1948 on the reunification of the Polish Orthodox Church with the Russian Orthodox Church and on granting it autocephaly / / GA RF. F. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 34-35.

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During the second half of 1948, contacts were made between the Polish and Soviet authorities regarding the candidate for the head of the Polish Orthodox Church. As before, the Polish leadership considered the existing Orthodox bishops in Poland - Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledinsky), Archbishop Timothy (Schretter) and Bishop Michael (Kedrov)31 - unsuitable for the position of head of the Polish Orthodox Church because of their pre-war ties to Poland's right-wing political elite. Therefore, a proposal was put forward to invite a candidate from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as Metropolitan. It was presented by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR for consideration by the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The Council rejected this proposal, explaining that most of the Bulgarian bishops are supporters of ecumenism, and many are also compromised by their links with Reaction32. Subsequently, the question of a candidate for metropolitan of the Polish Orthodox Church faded into the background and was resolved only in mid-1951 with the election of Archbishop Makariy (Oksiyuk) of Lviv to this position. His figure as a candidate for this position began to be considered as early as 1950. 33 Obviously, for the Polish authorities, by that time

31. Bishop Michael (Kedrov ) is a cleric of the Polish Orthodox Church. He was consecrated bishop on June 25, 1948, during the visit of a delegation of Orthodox Christians from Poland, when the Moscow Patriarchate declared autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church. Previously, he was considered as a possible candidate for the position of Metropolitan of Warsaw. Representatives of the Polish Orthodox Church about their visit to Moscow / / Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (ZHMP). July 1948. N 7. pp. 16-17; Reference on urgent changes in the composition of the Polish delegation. 25.05.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 25.

32. Letter from Comrade Alexandrov from the 4th European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. G. Karpov about the opinion of the Vice Minister of Poland V. Wolsky regarding the candidate for metropolitan. 03.07.1948 / / GA RF. F. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 39; Letter of G. G. Karpov tov. Alexander in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 4th European department of 02.09.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 54. By the way, the topic of ecumenism also came up separately in the dialogue between Polish and Soviet bodies. Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was informed that the Polish government will not be able to deal with the liquidation of the ecumenical Council in Poland in the near future due to the planned offensive against the Catholic Church, so as not to create the impression that it has begun a campaign against religion in general. Obviously, this was a reaction to the anti-ecumenical initiatives of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, which the Soviet government considered untimely. Information about the upcoming Polish government offensive on the Catholic Church. Message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Chairman of the Council G. G. Karpov. 18.11.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 62.

33. Verbatim note about my stay in Warsaw at the Second World Peace Congress. Comp. mitr. Nikolai (Yarushevich). 27.11.1950 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 732. L. 63-74.

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Since then, the figure of the head of the Polish Orthodox Church has lost its special significance, so there were no objections about the bishop from the Moscow Patriarchate. Interestingly, the intensity of correspondence between the departments of Polish and Soviet authorities about the Polish Orthodox Church noticeably decreased by the beginning of the 1950s, and later almost stopped.

But before the Polish leadership lost interest in the Polish Orthodox Church, its attention, together with the Soviet services responsible for religious policy, was again focused on the person of Metropolitan Dionysius (Waledinsky) and the recognition of Polish Orthodox autocephaly by other local Orthodox churches. These issues had a significant political background and, however, also influenced the delayed election of the head of the Polish Orthodox Church. The arrest of Metropolitan Dionysius provoked a reaction from the West. In the summer of 1948, the Council received information about publications in the bulletin of the Information Bureau of the World Council of Churches and in the American press about the situation of Metropolitan Dionysius. In addition, in October 1948, Archbishop Timothy (Schretter) was visited by the 2nd Secretary of the American Consulate to discuss various issues of the Polish Orthodox Church, including the position of Metropolitan Dionysius.34 Such attention of political opponents to this incident alarmed the Soviet authorities, so it was decided to use the penitential letter of Bishop Dionysius to Patriarch Alexy, sent back in June. By releasing him from custody and lifting church restrictions, the Soviet leadership hoped that this would calm public opinion abroad. At the same time, they planned to publish a penitential letter from the Metropolitan in order to highlight the situation in the right way.35 The Polish authorities supported this idea, although later they again criticized Patriarch Alexy and the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church for their soft stance against Metropolitan Dionysius, who, after his release (16.11.1948) and the decision of the Moscow Patriarchate to accept him into the liturgical communion (09.11.1948), again began to make attempts to regain control of the Polish Orthodox Church. And once again

34. Reference on the bulletin of the Bureau of Information of the Ecumenical Council / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 41; Reference on the visit of the Archbishop. Timothy was the second secretary of the American Embassy in Warsaw. 24.10.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 55.

35. Reference to the letter of Metropolitan Dionysius (Valedinsky) to Patriarch Alexy of Moscow. 08.10.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 51.

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both sides had to discuss options for resolving the issue with the recalcitrant Metropolitan Dionysius. In the end, the "Polish friends" option was adopted, which proposed by a decree of the Provisional Church Council of the Polish Orthodox Church to settle the metropolitan outside Warsaw, thereby eliminating him from active activity.36
In the course of discussions about Metropolitan Dionysius in late 1948, Karpov drew the attention of colleagues from the Foreign Ministry to the fact that a serious omission was that information about the granting of autocephaly by the Russian Orthodox Church to the Polish Church had not yet been officially published.37 Through the church line, the official notification of the heads of the Eastern Orthodox Churches was made by Patriarch Alexy only on the first anniversary of autocephaly 38. After that, the Patriarch of Constantinople and other heads of local churches with Moscow began an active correspondence on the topic raised. The Patriarch of Constantinople and his supporters wrote to the Moscow Patriarch with indignation that the autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church was legally established in 1924 and since then the canonically elected head is Metropolitan Dionysius.39 The discussion between the heads of churches on the Polish situation did not stop even after the consecration of Makariy (Oksiyuka) as Metropolitan of the Polish Orthodox Church40. The Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church actively monitored the discussion between the heads of churches, which continued in the first half of the 1950s, and the Polish side, obviously, did not care much about this issue by that time. Attention to the same Soviet op-

36. Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church about the release of Mitr. Dionysia iz-pod arresta ot 16.11.1948 // GA RF. F. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 60, 65-65 ob; Volokitina T. V., Murashko G. P., Noskova A. F. Vlast ' i tserkva v Vostochnoi Evrope [Power and Church in Eastern Europe]. 1944-1953 Documents of the Russian Archives: in 2 vols. Vol. 1: Power and the Church in Eastern Europe. 1944-1948

37. Recommendations of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 01.12.1948 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 421. L. 64.

38. Letter of Patriarch Alexy to Patriarch Athenogoros of Constantinople on granting autocephaly to the Polish Orthodox Church to the Russian Orthodox Church. 22.06.1949 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 577. L. 35-36.

39. Letter from Patriarch Athenogoras of Constantinople to Patriarch Alexy of Moscow on the Polish Orthodox Church. 23.02.1950 / / GA RF. f. R6991. Op. 1. D. 732. L. 13-14.

40. Letter from Patriarch Athenagoras to Patriarch Alexy concerning the election of a new head of the Polish Orthodox Church. 26.09.1951 / / GA RF. F. 6991. Op. 1. D. 856. L. 15-17; Letter to the Synod of the Polish Orthodox Church from the Office of the Ecumenical Patriarch. 01.19.1952 / / GA RF. F. 6991. Op. 1. D. 989. L. 18.

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This attitude of the Eastern patriarchs not only contradicted the plans of Stalin's religious policy, but also aroused suspicion that it (i.e., the position of the Eastern Orthodox Churches regarding the religious initiatives of the USSR) was dictated by the West. Evidently, in this connection, the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate published articles by A. A. Abramovich in 1949 and 1950. Vedernikova and Sv. Troitsky, hinting at the alleged "unlearned lesson" of the Patriarch of Constantinople from the history of the autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church 41. However, this plot reflected the confrontation not between the allies (the USSR and the Polish Republic), but political opponents in the growing Cold War. The above material illustrates the peculiarities of communication between the Polish and Soviet regimes at the beginning of the Cold War. Of course, the issue of autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church was not the most important point of their interaction. However, it reflected their overall tone to a certain extent. First, communication was close and fairly open. The Soviet leadership was very attentive to the position of its Polish colleagues and showed uncharacteristic flexibility, while the Polish authorities could insist on their own point of view. This was reflected, first of all, in the choice between the reunification of the Polish Orthodox Church and its autocephaly and in the decision on the fate of Metropolitan Dionysius. Secondly, the Soviet and Polish sides, when forming their attitude to a particular problem, proceeded from different circumstances. For Soviet officials, the decisive factor was the foreign policy factor, which required more cautious behavior in Eastern European countries, which was noticeable not only in the rejection of the desire to subordinate Orthodoxy in Poland to the controlled Moscow Patriarchate and in the soft attitude towards Metropolitan Dionysius. Also, based on the foreign policy interest of the USSR, the relevant Soviet authorities accelerated the registration of Polish ecclesiastical autocephaly in the first half of 1948 in order to strengthen the position of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Pan-Orthodox Conference held in Moscow in July of the same year. The delicacy of the Soviet government's policy in Poland was influenced by the danger of-

41. Troitskiy S. V. Po povorozhu neudachnoi zashchity false teorii [On the occasion of the unsuccessful defense of a false theory]. ZHMP. 1949. N 12.P. 49; Troitskiy S. V. Let's fight together with the danger. 1950. N 2. P. 37; Vedernikov A. Vnutrennoe delo Polskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi [Internal affairs of the Polish Orthodox Church]. ZHMP. 1950. N 8.pp. 40-51.

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We believe that with strong pressure on the Polish Communists, they can be pushed to join the opposition bloc. The Polish authorities were guided in their decisions by the internal interests of Poland. And most importantly: the commitment to the communist ideology did not prevent Polish politicians from defending their internal independence from the USSR.

The state-church dialogue in Poland was carried out along two lines: 1) between the Episcopate of the Polish Orthodox Church and representatives of the Polish authorities; 2) between the Episcopate of the Polish Orthodox Church and employees of the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw and the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church through the Patriarch of Moscow. There was no real direct dialogue between the Polish Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarchate at that time, since Patriarch Alexy and the Synod were completely dependent on the directives of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church in resolving Polish issues.

Bibliography / References

Archive materials

State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF).

F. 6991 - Council for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Literature

Vedernikov A. Vnutrennoe delo Polskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi [Internal affairs of the Polish Orthodox Church]. 1950. N 8. pp. 40-51.

Volokitina T. V., Murashko G. P., Noskova A. F. Power and the Church in Eastern Europe. 1944-1953 Documents of the Russian Archives: in 2 vols. Vol. 1: Power and the Church in Eastern Europe. 1944-1948 Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ., 2009 [http://scibook.net/ameriki-evropyi-istoriya/vlast-tserkov-vostochnoy-evrope-19441953.html, accessed from 25.11.2016].

Evseeva E. N. SSSR i Kholodnaya voina (1945-1953 gg.) [The USSR and the Cold War (1945-1953)]. 2004. N 10 [http://m.cyberleninka.ru/articale/n/sssr-i-holodnaya-voyna-1945-1953-gg, доступ от 24.11.2016].

Representatives of the Polish Orthodox Church about their visit to Moscow / / Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (ZHMP). 1948, N 7 July, pp. 16-17.

Petrov N. V. The role of the MGB of the USSR in the Sovietization of Poland. Conducting a referendum and elections to the Seimas in 1946-1947 / / Katyn materials. 2011 [, accessed 12.11.2016].

Representatives of the Polish Orthodox Church about their visit to Moscow / / Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (ZHMP). July 1948. N 7. pp. 16-17.

Svitich A. The Orthodox Church in Poland and its autocephaly / / Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Poland in the twentieth century (1917-1950). Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarshoe Podvorye, 1997

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Skurat K. E. History of Local Orthodox Churches: Training manual. In 2 t. Moscow, Russian lights. 1994.

Troitsky S. V. Let's fight together with danger / / Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 1950. N 2.

Troitsky S. V. On the occasion of the unsuccessful defense of a false theory / / Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 1949. N 12.

Tsypin V., prot. The ninth book. Istoriya Russkoy Tserkva (1917-1997), Istoriya Russkoy Tserkva v 9 tomakh [History of the Russian Church (1917-1997), History of the Russian Church in 9 volumes]. Moscow: Spaso-Preobrazhensky Valaam Monastery Publishing House, 1997.

Archival materials

The State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF). Fund R6991. Council for religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Literature

Evseeva, E.N. (2004) "SSSR i Kholodnaia voina (1945-1953 gg.)" [USSR and Cold War (1945-1953)], Novyi istoricheskii vestnik 10 [http://m.cyberleninka.ru/articale/n/sssr-i-holodnaya-voyna-1945-1953-gg, dostup ot 24.11.2016].

Mironowicz, An. (2006) Kosciol prawoslawny w Polsce. Bialystok. Petrov, N.V. (2011) "Rol' MGB SSSR v sovetizatsii Pol'shi. Provedenie referenduma i vyborov v Sejm v 1946-1947 gg" [The role of MGB of USSR in the Sovietization of Poland. The referendum and SeMm elections in 1946-1947], Katynskie materialy [http://katynfiles.com/content/petrov-sovietization-of-poland.html#_ftnref8, accessed on 12.11.2016].

"Predstaviteli Pol'skoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi o cvoem poseshchenii Moskvy" (1948), Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii (ZhMP) 7: 16-17.

Skurat, K.E. (1994) Istoriia Pomestnyh Pravoslavnyh Tserkvei: Uchebnoe posobie. V 2 t. [History of local Orthodox Churches: a tutorial, two volumes]. Moscow: Russkie ogni.

Svitich, A. (1997) "Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' v Pol'she i ee avtokefaliia" ["The Orthodox Church in Poland and its autocephaly"], in Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' na Ukraine i v Pol'she v XX stoletii (1917-1950). Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarshee Podvor'e.

Troitskii, S.V. (1949) "Po povodu neudachnoj zashchity lozhnoj teorii" ["About failing to defend a false theory"], Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii 12.

Troitskii, S.V. (1950) "Budem vmeste borot'sia s opasnost'iu" ["We'll together fight with danger"], Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii 2.

Tsypin, V., prot. (1997) Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi (1917-1997), History of the Russian Church (1917-1997). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Spaso-Preobrazhenskogo Valaamskogo monastyria.

Vedernikov, А. (1950) "Vnutrennee delo PolskoM pravoslavnoM tserkvi" [Inner affairs of Polish Orthodox Church], Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii 8: 40-51.

Volokitina, T.V., Murashko, G.P., Noskova, А.F. (2009) Vlast' i tserkov' v Vostochnoi Evrope. 1944-1953 gg. Dokumenty rossiiskikh arkhivov: v 2 t. T. 1: Vlast' i tserkov' v Vostochnoi Evrope. 1944-1948 gg. [Power and Church in East Europe. 1944-1953. Documents from Russian Archives, 2 vol. Vol. 1: Power and Church in East Europe. 1944-1948] [http://scibook.net/ameriki-evropyi-istoriya/vlast-tserkov-vostochnoy-evrope-19441953.html, accessed on 25.11.2016].

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