Secularization... meant... each time, a profound "unmirling" of the Church, which in the course of this process was freed from earthly wealth and again returned to complete poverty in this world.
Benedict XVI, 2011 1
...The idea that the modern world is irrevocably destroying its religious foundations in favor of secularism is a product of Europe in the mid-nineteenth century, while the concept of "secular", specific to European civilization, is much older.
JOHN KEEN, 2000 2
I been all around the world, boys
Now I'm trying to get to heaven before they close the door.
Bob Dylan, 1997 3
Introduction
In POLITICAL science, the standard work on the relationship between religion and politics is Sacred and Secular 4 by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. These cars are-
The article was sent to the editor by the author.
1. Umstrittene Sakularisierung: soziologische und historische Analysen zur Differenzierung von Religion und Politik / Gabriel K., Gartner Ch., Pollack D. (Hrsg.). Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2012. S. 9. (link to the speech in Freiburg v Breisgau that the Pope delivered during his visit to Germany in 2011 - http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/papstbesuch/papst-benedikt-xvi-die-entweltlichung-der - kirche-n370087.html).
2. Keane J. The Limits of Secularism // Islam and Secularism in the Middle East/Esposito J. L., Tamimi A. (eds.). London: Hurst & Co., 2000. P. 29.
3. I've traveled all over the world, guys. Now I try to get to heaven before the doors are closed. Dylan B. Tryin' to Get to Heaven//Time Out of Mind. Sony Music, 1987 (track #5).
4. Inglehart R., Norris P. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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They work with the binary opposition of sacred and secular and even distinguish between "sacred and secular societies around the world", roughly identifying secular societies with rich, modern and industrialized, and sacred societies with poor, traditional and agrarian 5. Although this position reflects a widespread perception of the current world and allows us to structure a significant body of empirical data, it still remains a question whether "sacred" and "secular" are really opposite to each other. Norris and Inglehart are clearly opposed to former secularization thesis proponent Peter Berger. However, the latter, as we know, not only changed his position and came up with the concept of "desecularization"; he also proposed a different opposition: "Today the world, with some exceptions... as fiercely religious as it has always been"; " the current world is massively religious and in no way the secularized world that was predicted... so many modern analysts", and "experiments with secularized religion in general have failed" 6. This last point means that the opposition between the secular and the religious is not absolute, since "secularized religion" would be its removal (Aufhebimg), but it also means that it retains its meaning: "religious movements with beliefs and practices imbued with reactionary supernaturalism (which are beyond the perception of self-respecting academic scholars) they are becoming more and more successful" - an ironic (?) statement, contrasting with his own statement that "all the judgments I give here are "unappreciated"...7 Of course, as Philip Gorsky points out, "secularization theory is more like a party-political program than a' value-less ' social theory."8. Can the same be said about the theory of desecularization? Does the discourse of desecularization remain true to the religious/secular opposition and how does it relate
5. Norris P., Inglehart R. Sacred and Secular. P. 26.
6. Norris P., Inglehart R. Sacred and Secular. P. 4; Berger P. The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview//The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics/Berger P. L. (ed.). Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999. P. 2, 9.
7. Berger P. The Desecularization of the World. P. 4, 5.
8. Gorski Ph.S., Kim D.K., Torpey J., Van Antwerpen J. The Post-Secular in Question// The Post-Secular in Question/Gorski Ph. et al. (eds.). New York: New York University Press, 2012. P. 6.
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with the sacred / secular opposition? Can these two oppositions be reconciled? Is it possible to say of a "secularized religion" that there is "nothing sacred" for it - and that it thus deprives the "sacred", if not of its meaning, then at least of its reference?9
In Discussing the Postsecular, 10 written by sociologists of religion and historians, the juxtaposition of "religious" and "secular" is used to structure a different body of empirical evidence, but the editors also note that "the barriers separating the religious from the secular are increasingly seen as fluid, and the view that the religious and the secular are not the same as the secular." that these two spheres mutually constitute each other is becoming increasingly common. " 11 Are these spheres simply mutually constituting? One of the panelists of the last two decades, Jose Casanova, put it this way in 2007: "It may be too early to talk about a post-secular Europe, but it is impossible not to feel significant changes in the European Zeitgeist."12 What does it mean for Europe to be "post-secular"? Finally, the main source of the concept of "post-secularism" is Jurgen Habermas, who points out a kind of conceptual conundrum when he writes about " a post-secular society that adapts (sich einstellt auf) to the continued existence (Fortbesthen) of religious communities in a continuing secularized environment (fortwahrend sakularisierender Umgebung)"13. Does this make society "post-secular", or does it mean that at the very moment when the current owl of Minerva, Charles Taylor, theorizes about a "secular age", we are already entering a post-secular one?
Before trying to understand the meaning of desecularization or postsecularity, you should try to come to a clearer understanding of the meaning of desecularization or postsecularity.-
9. I use here" meaning "(Sinn, Meaning) and "reference" (Bedeutung, Reference) in the generally accepted meanings that we find in Gottlieb Frege (Frege G. Uber Sinn und Bedeutung/Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik. 1892. S. 25 - 50).
10. See the review of this book in this issue. Gorski Ph. S. , Kim D. K., Torpey J., Van Antwerpen J. The Post-Secular in Question.
11. Ibid. P. 15.
12. Casanova J. Die religiose Lage in Europa // Sakularisierung und die Weltreligionen/Joas H., Wiegandt K. (Hrsg.). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007. S. 342.
13. Habermas J. Glauben und Wissen (Friedenspreis des deutschen Buchhandels 2001). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001. S. 13. Habermas Yu. Faith and knowledge// Habermas Yu. The Future of Human Nature, Moscow: Vse Mir Publ., 2002].
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understanding what is"secular". It is precisely this clarification that is the main goal of this article-in accordance with one of the central tasks of philosophy: strive to minimize nonsense. Therefore, the proposed text should not be taken in the genre of the history of ideas, but as a contribution to the current discussion, during which we meet with a multiplication of concepts related to the concept of "secular" - concepts that always assume, but rarely clearly express its meaning.
In five only partially overlapping discourses, the concept of "secular", together with its derivatives such as secularism, desecularization, and post-secularism, plays a major role: the sociology of religion, the history of ideas, political philosophy, religious discourse proper, and politics. Examples that fall into each of these categories are, respectively: texts by Jose Casanova and Marcel Gaucher; historical studies by Hermann Lubbe and Robert Marcus; a discussion between Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas; documents published by the Russian Orthodox Church and Al-Azhar University in Cairo; public debates in Turkey, Israel, and France. The sense of significance of this topic and the recognition of its complexity are attested to by relevant interdisciplinary studies, which are reflected in such publications as "Controversial Secularism"14, "Diverse Secularism in the Secular Age"15, "Reasoning about the Post-secular"16 and the already mentioned book "Discussing the Post-Secular". Finally, an Internet search shows that the term post-secular is rapidly becoming fashionable.
Given these circumstances, some questions should be asked. What do we mean when we use the term "secular" or its derivatives? How do the meanings of such concepts as "desecularization" or "postsecular"relate to the answer to this question? Do the semantic changes associated with these latter concepts and the shift of emphasis to the old question of the relationship between religion and politics, or more specifically, church and state, affect and, if so, how do they affect the relationship between religion and politics?-
14. Umstrittene Sakularisierung: soziologische und historische Analysen zur Differenzierung von Religion und Politik.
15. Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age/Eds. M. Warner, J. Vanantwerpen, C. Calhoun. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2010.
16. Discoursing the Post-Secular: Essays on the Habermasian Post-Secular Turn // Losonczi P., Singh A. (eds.). Wien & Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2010.
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all at once? Does the concept of "post-secular" indicate something that is not relevant to the debate about secularization, secularism, and secularism, or does it bring us back to these debates, albeit in a new way? In this paper, we focus on the conceptual dimension of these questions, leaving the remaining aspects for future research.17 In the first section, we will discuss the actual concept under consideration, in the second-about the general meanings of secular and related terms, and in the third we will consider all these concepts more systematically. The fourth section is devoted to finding the root meaning of a group of related terms. In the fifth section, we will discuss some of the implications of our analysis and the remaining problems.
1. X, Xnity, X-ization, X-ism: preliminary remarks
To begin with, I would like to introduce a general distinction between three types of concepts that are derived from a certain main word and form different forms in European languages; in particular, in Russian they are forms with the following endings:: - nost, - ization and-izm. The first form indicates a certain quality, the second-a process, and the third-an evaluative positive understanding of this quality. All these forms can be attributed to some root concept, which, as a rule, is a noun-Greek, Latin, Church Slavonic, etc. Here are some examples::
X
X
x-ity
x-ization
x-ism
- -
modern
modernity
modernization
modernism
urbs
urban
urbanity
urbanisation
[urbanism]
radix
radical
radicality
radicalization
radicalism
- -
plural
plurality
pluralization
pluralism
17. См. мои статьи: Permanente Asymmetrie: Kirche und Staat, Staat und Kirche// Osteuropa, 59. 2009. P. 47 - 62; Church and State Beyond Orthodoxy// Nadia al-Bagdadi, Ionut Biliuta, Anca Sincan (eds.). Eastern Christianity in Post-Imperial Societies. Budapest: Central European University Press (в печати); Confronting the Confrontation - Europe Beyond Secularism? // Brian Black, Gavin Hyman, Graham Smith (eds.). Confronting Secularism in Europe and India. London: Bloomsbury (in print).
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cives
civil
civility
civilization
civilizationism
West
western
westernness
westernization
westernism
individuum
individual
personality
individualization
individualism
It is clear that this matrix does not always work, some words in Russian, and in other languages, simply do not exist, and some look strange. But even if the concept of "urbanity" does not exist (as there is no equivalent in Russian), and the word "civil" does not really fit in with the meaning of "civilization", the general idea of the matrix is clear. We see that in many cases x-ness (a certain quality) is the result of x-isation (a process or policy) and is accompanied (theorized, legitimized, motivated) by x-ism (meaning and /or ideology).
As can be seen from the previous section, I distinguish between two meanings-ization: for example, urbanization can also be a social process, but also an active policy of a political regime. Similarly, deurbanization has two meanings: a general tendency for people to leave cities and settle in rural areas (a process), or an active policy of moving people from cities to the countryside; we know at least one example of the latter type - when the Khmer Rouge regime in Kambodh forced people to leave their urban homes and move to rural areas. he settled them in rural labor communities.
Similarly, ism implies, on the one hand, a positive assessment of something (for example, cosmopolitanism in the sense of a positive assessment of belonging to the future "cosmopolis"), or on the other hand, a legitimizing ideology (for example, liberalism as an ideology that describes and justifies a society built on the principle of individual freedom).
Counter-concepts make the situation very clear: the opposite of modernity is non-modernity, the opposite of modernization is demodernization, in a double sense both as a process and as a policy; the opposite of modernism is antimodernism - in its various forms, depending on what is meant by "modern". The differences between these counter-concepts repeat the differences between the positive concepts from which they are derived, and the intersections lead to constant confusion.
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This confusion is not as innocent as it may seem at first glance. For example, the concept of "pluralistic society" blurs the distinction between "plurality" as a quality of a particular society and "pluralism" as a positive assessment of this quality and as an ideology. As a result, the normative expression takes on a quasi-actual meaning, thereby turning the concept of "pluralistic society" into an influential ideologem18. Positive evaluation here leads to the fact that we begin to say about society that plurality is good for it. The same mechanism applies to the terms "multiculturalism", "individualism", and, by the way, "secularism". Of course, the phrase "plural society" sounds clumsy in English, but this only emphasizes the fact that natural language is a public language (societal)19 and always contains hidden ideologemes that are instrumentalized by a given society for self-preservation. If the reader finds this reasoning too artificial, it means that he is already "inside" the given ideology. In fact, -nesses and-isms are not the same thing, and obscuring this distinction serves precisely ideological purposes, such as legitimizing and justifying a particular policy: to present something controversial, something that can, in principle, be the subject of a political choice, as something "historically" wrong. "eternally", "naturally" given-this is what it means to create an ideologeme 20.
The main idea of this article is precisely to show how such mechanisms work in discussions about "secular"; moreover, the very word "secular" is part of different concepts, which in itself is a source of confusion. As Hermann Zabel writes, "Multifunctionality, or elasticity (of the concepts "Sakularisation, Sakularisierung" - E. Z.), often leads to contradictions that reduce the cognitive value of this category for constructing a concrete scientific theory."-
18. We use the concept of ideologeme as defined in the works of: Jameson F. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca NY: Cornell UP, 1981 and Huseynov G. Karta nashey rodiny: ideologema mezhdu slovo i telyu [Map of our Motherland: Ideologeme between word and Body]. Moscow: O. G. I., 2005.
19. The very expression " natural language "is deceptive, unless it is referred to in the sense that a person" naturally " lives in society.
20. Ср. Thompson J.B. Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. P. 52 - 73.
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rii. On the other hand, this elasticity makes this category very suitable for ideological and political polemics"21. In such cases, we are not only dealing with the" construction of a concrete scientific theory " or with various political ideas, but also with the politics of ideas (Ideenpolitik), as Hermann Lubbe calls this phenomenon, i.e., with politics in the field of theory itself. 22 After all, concepts not only describe social reality, but also "work" within it.
2. The ambiguity of the "secular"
If we apply the above scheme to the concept of "secular", we get a set of technical concepts:
root
key concept: x
quality [x-ity; - ness]
the [x-ization; -operation]process
making sense of [x-ism; -ism]
saeculum
secular
secularity (quality)
secularization (process)
secularism (reflection)
secularity (principle)
secularization (politics)
secularism (propaganda, ideology)
nonsecularity
desecularization
antisecularism
All this in itself has no empirical implications, even if the reader would like to fill some of these concepts with content. In addition to specific references, we are dealing here with linguistic difficulties. In English
21. Zabel H. et al. Sakularisation, Sakularisierung // Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. Bd. 5/Brunner O., Conze W., Koselleck R. (Hrsg.). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, [1984] 2004. P. 828: "The multifunctionality and elasticity of the category 'secularization' sometimes lead to contradictions that reduce the cognitive value of this category for theorizing within individual disciplines; on the other hand, the same elasticity encourages the use of this category in debates in the space of the politics of ideas."
22. Lubbe Н. Sakularisierung: Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs. Freiburg & Munchen: Karl Alber Verlag, [1965] 1975. P. 21; а также Joas H. Einleitung // Sakularisierung und die Weltreligionen/Joas H., Wiegandt K. (Hrsg.). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007. p. 17. These works point to " Sakularisierung "as a polemical concept (Kampfbegriff); the idea of" struggle at the level of history " refers to the works of Louis Althusser.
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In English," secularity "is often referred to as" secularism": for example, Jocelyn McLure and Charles Taylor use the term as the English equivalent of the French laicite23 In Russian, suffix-ness (as well as other similar suffixes) clearly expresses two dimensions of this form: concepts such as nationality, science, partisanship, or tolerance can indicate both a characteristic of something and a principle. In Russian, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between these dimensions, for example, in the case of tolerance, which means both a tolerant attitude and a manifestation of tolerance (Michael Walzer in this case clearly distinguished between attitude and practice)24. The accuracy and flexibility of natural languages vary, but these differences are extremely important, and the resulting misunderstandings are not just misunderstandings, but affect the field of practice in each case. So, first of all, we must distinguish between secularism, secularization, and secularism25. So, Gudrun Kramer complains that often these distinctions are not made: "The terms 'secularization' and 'secularism' (which are rarely distinguished in political debates, and the relationship between 'secularism' and 'laicism' is worse) are in a difficult position, and their defenders are also suffering from it. "26 Secularism means the qualitative characteristic of 'being secular': if we say If we say that a certain state is "secular", we mean that it is characterized by "secularity". Secularization-
23. Ср. Maclure J., Taylor Ch. Laicite et liberie de conscience. Montreal: Editions du Boreal, 2010, and an English translation of the same text: Secularism and Freedom of Conscience. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2011. Here the word "secularism "is used as a translation of the French" laicite " in the original.
24. Walzer M. On Toleration. New Haven, CT & London: Yale University Press, 1997. P. xi.
25. Casanova J. Eurozentristischer Sakularismus und die Herausforderung der Globalisierung // Politik, Religion und Markt: Die Ruckkehr der Religion als Anfrage an den politisch-philosophischen Diskurs der Moderne/Guggenberger W, Regensburger D., Stockl K. (Hrsg.). Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press, 2009. S. 19; Turner B. S. Religion and Modern Society; Citizenship, Secularisation and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. P. 128; Asad T. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. P. 164; Keane J. The Limits of Secularism. 29ft; Lubbe H. Sakularisierung: Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs. Freiburg & Miinchen: Karl Alber Verlag, [1965] 1975. S. 131; Kramer G. Zum Verhaltnis von Religion, Recht und Politik: Sakularisierung im Islam//Sakularisierung und die Weltreligionen/Joas H., Wiegandt K. (Hrsg.). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007. S. 176.
26. Kramer G. Zum Verhaltnis von Religion, Recht und Politik.
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on the contrary, it may indicate an objective process of formation that is subject to observation, analysis, etc., for example, when we speak of the "secularization of society", meaning the "decline of religion", which resulted from an increase in wealth and a decrease in instability (a view peculiar to the "classical theory of secularization" 28); or secularization can mean active politics, for example, when it is said that " Ataturk secularized Turkey." There is probably a third meaning: to become secular, as Turner gives us an example of: "In the context of European religious history, the concept of secular was originally applied to monastics who committed themselves for a certain period or permanently to live in the world (saeculum)"29. In this case, "secular" is the opposite of "regular", that is, life in accordance with the rules (or charter - regula) of a monastic order. It is also possible to transfer this meaning of the term to the level of the political community, which, through a democratic procedure, decided to adopt a secular (secular) constitution and thus "became secular". In any case, "secularization" rarely has a neutral meaning, if at all possible.
A historically important example is the alienation of church property by a "secular" state in Europe in the 17th century and in Russia in the 18th century, as well as the re-alienation in Germany around 1803. Habermas remarks on this point: "The word' secularization ' (Sakularisierung) originally had a legal meaning: forced alienation of church property.
27. The concept of " secularization (saecularisatio)" is often dated to 1648. (Westphalian World; Vocabulaire europeen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles/Cassin B. (dir.). Paris: Editions du Seuil/Dictionnaires Le Robert, 2004. p. 1119), but this date was changed to the time before 1559 (Zabel H. et al. Sakularisation, Sakularisierung// Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland/Otto B., Conze W, Koselleck R. (Hrsg.). Bd. 5. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, [1984] 2004. S. 792 - 794).
28. Cp. Norris P., Inglehart R. Sacred and Secular. P. 25: "We show that 'modernization' (the process of industrialization, urbanization, and rising levels of education and wealth) has significantly weakened the influence of religious institutions in rich societies, reducing attendance at religious services and making religion subjectively much less important in people's lives".
29. Turner B. S. Religion and Modern Society. P. 128; cf. Joas H. Einleitung//Sakularisierung und die Weltreligionen/Joas H., Wiegandt K. (Hrsg.). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007. S. 16; Zabel H. et al. Sakularisation, Sakularisierung. S. 7961.
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property for the benefit of secular state power " 30. In Germany, this became known as "Sakularisation", so that as a result the distinction between Sakularisation and Sakularisierung basically corresponds to the difference between "make secular" and "become secular".31 In Russian, on the contrary, due to the absence of any other form of the word, there is no such difference.
As Lubbe has shown, such "secularization" was not necessarily illegal or forcible, 32 but for the most part, the involuntary transfer of church property into lay hands explains why the term secularization has acquired the meaning of hostility to the church or religion - especially in the use of believers themselves - and similar connotations have emerged in other terms of the same root. For example, the Russian Orthodox Church understands secularization in this way; the Basic Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church states: "Many influential social mechanisms use this principle [of prioritizing the interests of the earthly life of a person and human communities over religious values. - E. Z.] in open opposition to faith and the Church, aimed at ousting them from public life. These phenomena create a picture of the secularization of the life of the state and society. " 33 At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church managed to "desecularize" a significant part of its former property in the period after the celebration of the millennium of the Baptism of Rus in 1988.
Finally, let's move on to the third category: we can understand "secularism" either as a positive assessment or as an active promotion of secularism and secularization (as a process and as a policy)34. How to promote and promote secularism soput-
30. Habermas J. Glauben und Wissen. S. 12.
31. Cf. Joas H. Einleitung. S. 16; Lubbe H. Sakularisierung. S. 23 - 32.
32. Lubbe H. Sakularisierung. S. 24; in some cases (his example is the University of Munster; today in Western countries many monasteries voluntarily transfer property to "secular" institutions), the church itself renounces its property rights. These cases should be distinguished from the transfer of State ownership from one church to another, as was the case with the Church of England or in Galicia in Soviet times, when entire parishes were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Greek Catholic Church to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate.
33. Osnovy sotsial'noy kontseptsii Russkoy pravoslavnoi tserkvi [Fundamentals of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church]. 4; cf. IV. 3 and IV. 7.
34. Historically, "secularism" is associated with the names of Charles Bradlaugh (1833-1891) and George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906), co-
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It is consistent with secularization policies. In this sense, secularism was an integral part of the official state ideology of Turkey, kemalism: The secular nature of the Turkish state was actively asserted by the state and defended by the military. This significance of secularization can be contrasted with the actual secularization of Turkish society, that is, a social process that has affected not only the traditional religion, Sunni Islam, but also its traditional enemy - the militant and even military secularism of the state and a significant part of the administrative and intellectual elite. In his study of the Turkish case, M. Hakan Yavuz distinguishes "three types of secularism in Turkey: ...a rigid Kemalist version of militant secularism with its emphasis on" freedom from "religion; a conservative Turkish-Muslim understanding of secularism as control over religion [by the state - E. Z.]; and a liberal concept of secularism that emphasizes the separation of politics from religion (freedom of religion)." 35
The first of these types, called laiklik in Turkish (from the French laicite), is similar to" militant atheism", which was part of the official ideology in the USSR and was expressed in the CPSU's attempts to speed up the process of the inevitable disappearance of religion through propaganda, persecution of clergy, expropriation of church property, closure of monasteries and churches, and so on. In Turkey (as in the USSR), it was partially compensated by the second type, i.e., the subordination of religion to" secular " authorities, which is typical for many Muslim-majority countries.36 Finally, the third type is close to the position of many liberals in Western countries, especially in the United States, for whom freedom of religion (or more broadly: worldviews, including secularism) is more important than freedom from religion. -
who founded the "Secular Society" in 1846 and claimed to have invented the term (Lilbbe H. Sakularisierung. S. 49; Tamimi A. The Origins of Arab Secularism//Islam and Secularism in the Middle East/ John L. Esposito, Tamimi A. (eds.). London: Hurst & Company, 2000, P. 14; Smith G.A. Short History of Secularism. London & New York: Tauris, 2008. P. 172ff).
35. Yavuz M. H. Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 2009. P. 153.
36. Cp. European Muslims and the Secular State/Cesari J., McLoughlin S. (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. P. 4.
37. For example, when Michael Walzer writes that " the wall between church and state creates a sphere of religious activity... in which politicians and bureaucrats may not interfere," he ignores the fact that for many Europeans, " this is not the case."
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This means that if we can talk about secularism in the case of France, Turkey, India, and the United States, we should be aware that we are not talking about the same thing: French laicite is actually Catholaicite(secularism in Catholic terms). Similarly, Turkish laiklik is a form of Muslaicite (secularism in the Muslim way), North American secularism is a form of New Englaicite (secularism with origins in New England), Indian secularism is New Delhaicite (secularism in the spirit of New Delhi), and so on. 39
Finally, there is a historical dimension that influences the relationship between secularism and secularization. Charles Taylor distinguishes common ground secularism, which he associates with the name of John Locke and which has become a kind of" comprehensive doctrine", from the" counter/actual " statement etsi Deus non daretur ("if God did not exist"), which gives rise to an "independent religion". ethics", which he associates with the name of Hugo Grotius 40. The second model becomes problematic when Christians, who are ready for a thought experiment with counterfactual etsi ("if"), gradually come to terms with the existence of "real atheists" in their society, that is, citizens for whom it is not an assumption, but a fact. The former model may in principle include and attract new groups, but when the latter become more diverse - as in modern "multicultural" and "secular" societies-the common ground becomes more shaky. 41 Then a third model emerges - John Rawls ' idea of "overlapping consensus, which, unlike the other two, "is quite suitable - or rather, can be reinvented - in almost all situations", since it is sufficient to-
The purpose of this separation is exactly the opposite and is to oust the church from politics (See Walzer M. Liberalism and the Art of Separation // WalzerM. Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory. New Haven CT & London: Yale University Press, [1984] 2007. P. 53.).
38. Calhoun C. Time, World, and Secularism//The Post-Secular in Question/Gorski Ph. et al. (eds.). New York: New York University Press, 2012. P. 336.
39. On India, see Secularism and its Critics / Bhargava R. (ed.). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, [1998] 2010.
40. Taylor Ch. Modes of Secularism//Secularism and its Critics. P. 331.
41. Ibid. P. 35f.
42. Ibid. P. 37.
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exactly "baseless" to leave open questions about faith 43. All three models mix secularism and secularism. Moreover, we note that Taylor's models, with the exception of the third one, have little in common with the types of secularism that Yavuz speaks of. This shows that we are faced with a region of very different values, and our task is to create an overview picture of this entire field.
3. Secularism, secularization and secularism: an overview of the conceptual field
Trying to understand the many different meanings in this area, we proceed from the fact that they are all connected through a reference to the "secular" (see section 4). Let's start with the" classical "meaning of secularization as the transition of people and property from the ecclesiastical sphere to the "secular" sphere [1] (here and further, the figures in square brackets will indicate different meanings of secularism, secularization, and secularism). Now let's add the values that occur during the current discussion. Jose Casanova distinguishes three meanings of secularization (and, as a consequence, secularism and secularism): differentiation of secular spheres from religious institutions and norms [2]; decline of religious beliefs and practices [3]; marginalization of religion, its attribution to the private sphere [4] 44. The first of these three meanings [2] is partly a process called functional differentiation in sociology, being part of active politics: for example, the separation (in various forms) of church and state (including education, the army, etc.). Often a "weak version" is distinguished,which "divides the state and religion and believes that the state and religion are different." what is the state... should... maintain a strict indifference to religion", and a "strong version" that also "separates politics and religion and believes that political debates and discussions should be conducted only in terms of secular reason"45. The corresponding ideology [secularism2] is most clearly and "officially" expressed in the form of a political theory.-
43. Taylor Ch. Modes of Secularism. P. 38.
44. Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. P. 211; cp. Kramer G. Zum Verhaltnis von Religion, Recht und Politik. S. 178f.
45. Bhikhu P. Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. P. 322 (цит. по: Hashemi N. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2009. P. 110f.).
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in France, Turkey, and the USSR, but also, in a less formal form, in some political movements and civil society associations in the West.46 An obvious example of the policy of forcibly marginalizing religion [4], which was accompanied by the imposition of non-religious views [secularism4], was what Ioas calls "communist forced secularization, first in the USSR, and then in the part of Europe dominated by the USSR, and in communist societies outside of Europe": the closure and destruction of churches and other places of worship. In the West, the marginalization of religion [4] was more a process than a policy, and it was accompanied by social rather than official "secularism", but at the same time it was clearly different from differentiation [2] or discrimination against religious groups. decline [3]. By the way, we note that "aggressive secularism" aimed at undermining the credibility of the church and clergy should not be confused with "militant atheism" that promoted an alternative comprehensive doctrine, even if they could complement each other.
Charles Taylor, agreeing with the first two meanings of secularization outlined by Casanova, adds another: "a movement from a society in which faith in God is not questioned and therefore not a problem, to a society in which this faith is perceived as one of many possibilities and often not the simplest" [5].. This form of secularization corresponds to special, historically changing forms of secularism: "If the main event in the history of the growth of secularism... over the centuries, the creation of an inclusive and humanistic alternative to faith, then it was at this time [XIX century - Ed.] that the set of such alternatives became wider and richer."49 Graeme Smith, like Casanova and Taylor, speaks of three understandings of secularization: the decline of institutional Christianity, that is, "church religion" [3], the privatization of religion and its benefits-
46. See examples in: Lilbbe H. Sakularisierung. S. 34-55.
47. Joas H. Wellen der Sakularisierung//Unerfiillte Moderne? Neue Perspektiven auf das Werk von Charles Taylor/Kiihnlein M., Lutz-Bachmann M. (Hrsg.). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2011. S. 72if.
48. Taylor Ch. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA & London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Ptess, 2007. P. 3.
49. Ibid. P. 322.
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the absence of alternative worldviews in the public space [4] and the displacement of the Christian worldview by liberalism, consumerism, individualism, and materialism [5]50.
In addition, Taylor points out another meaning related to the idea of homogeneous time: "This very clear, unambiguous notion of simultaneity is connected with the understanding of time as exclusively secular [emphasis added-E. Z.]" 51. And Taylor adds: "A purely secular understanding of time allows us to imagine society 'horizontally', without any connection with any 'peaks', when the usual sequence of events corresponds to a higher time... It is precisely this radical horizontality that is assumed in the direct access society, where each member is "directly connected to the whole" " 52. The disappearance of the vertical in society gives us another meaning of secularization [6]: religious faith in itself is not a problem and can be widespread, but it is a choice people who live in a homogeneous time and are indifferent to the essence of religious worldviews. Horizontal time corresponds to the "direct access religion", examples of which we see in all major traditions: "light Islam" in Egypt, "popular Buddhist charismatics selling magic talismans and amulets via the Internet"53 and a wide range of TV and "worldwide" forms of Christianity.
This points to another meaning [7] that Brian Turner draws attention to (who agrees with some other meanings-2, 4, 6): the transformation of a religion that "adapts to new conditions" - whether it is a more institutionalized aggiornamento (modernization) The Roman Catholic Church or other new forms of religiosity, such as Thomas Lukman's" invisible religion"; Grace Davey's" faith without belonging "and" vicar religion"; Robert Bell's "Shailaism"; religion pour memoire or "belonging without faith" by Daniel Hervier-Leger culturally "disembodied" religions marked by "holy ignorance" -
50. Smith G. A Short History of Secularism. P. 3 - 6.
51. Taylor Ch. A SecularAge. P. 209.
52. Ibid.
53. Turner B.S. Religion and Modern Society. P. 12.
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guy Olivier Roy - if you mention at least some 54. The key word in all these new phenomena is individualization. It remains unclear whether in this case these forms should be considered as adaptations of traditional religions to new circumstances, or whether we should speak of new forms of resurgent religion, that is, some form of desecularization. Here it would be interesting to understand how adaptation and innovation are related. According to Marcel Gaucher, it can be assumed "that after reaching this critical stage, religious consciousness finds a stable form adapted to the world that has gone beyond religion." 55
There is a widespread idea that secularization of this type [7] is inherent in Christianity from the very beginning: some Western theologians of the 20th century have said this-for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Rudolf Bultmann. 56 Graham Smith, independently of Gaucher, argues that "we should understand secularism as the last expression of the Christian religion"57. In this connection, we can also refer to Gianni Vattimo with his" non-religious Christianity " (cristianesimo non religioso) as a hyperadaptation to the new times; or on the ideal of complete "churching" in such Orthodox thinkers as Vl. Solovyov and S. Bulgakov. So we find ourselves in an extremely difficult situation: complete secularization means that everything, including religion itself, can be talked about without reference to religion, as if the latter has disappeared. At the same time, complete secularization also means that everything of value in religion becomes a quality of the only reality, which indicates a strengthening rather than a weakening of religion and leads "to such saturation of society and the state with the Christian ethos that the church as a separate institution turns out to be a unique reality."
54. See reviews in: Turner B. S. Religion and Modern Society. P. 11; Casanova J. Die religiose Lage in Europa. S. 329f; Smith G. A Short History of Secularism. P. 51, 127ft; Wils J. - P. Is de religieuze burger slachtoffer van de neutraliteitsdoctrine? Habermas over religie en moderniteit//Dwarse interventies/Zweerde E. van der, Kwaad G., Linssen J. (eds.). Amsterdam: Parresia, 2011. P. 201; Roy O. La sainte ignorance: le temps de la religion sans culture. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2008; Joas H. Einleitung//Sakularisierung und die Weltreligionen/Joas H., Wiegandt K. (Hrsg.). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007. S. 18.
55. Gauchet M. La religion dans la democratie: parcours de la la'icite. Paris: Gallimard, 1998. P. no.
56. Cp. Turner B. S. Religion and Modern Society. P. 129.
57. Smith G. A Short History of Secularism. P. 2.
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redundant"58. Secularization and its" romantic " parallel - the full realization of religion-ultimately coincide. A fully secularized religion will be "of this world" as well as "of these times," but the world and time will become a complete embodiment in the sense of kenosis - which is the exact meaning of immanence.59
In light of the significance of secularization that Taylor and Turner point out, it is clear that we cannot confine ourselves to discussing the degree of "religiosity" as sociologists do to define it, that is, to concern ourselves only with church attendance, belief in a transcendent God or in life after death, and so on, whatever the circumstances. such data is interesting 60. As soon as we are confronted with the problematic or need to actively identify ourselves in religious or non-religious terms, and not just experience the corresponding identity as something already existing, secularization ceases to be an objective process that can be studied by historical and social sciences, and is related to how we actually perceive the world, normatively and cognitively that is, the concept of "secular" and its derivatives become reflexive. Hans Joas 'observation that" to overcome secularization is not to ignore secularization, but to take into account all its multiplicity " has a profound meaning, since it includes, among other things, reflection.61 Joas points to this reflexive dimension when he says that we need to understand not only why and how "secular choice" became possible, but also "why this choice, once made possible, turned out to be attractive to some and unacceptable to others." 62
If we live in a world in which sociology has replaced theology as the dominant discourse about social reality, then the sociological discourse about religion is not just an academic discourse about one particular part of it
58. Joas H. Einleitung. S. 16; cf. Hervieu-Leger D. La religion pour memoire. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1993. P. 32.
59. Vattimo G. Dopo la cristianita: per un cristianesimo non religiose Milano: Garzanti, 2002. P. 85.
60. For an overview of Europe, see: Casanova J. Die religiose Lage in Europa.
61. Joas H. Wellen der Sakularisierung. S. 719.
62. Idid. S. 72of.
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society, but a discourse about a society of which religion is a part.
The perception of religion as just a social fact is a theoretical secularization [8]. Regardless of whether sociology is hostile, friendly, or neutral towards religion, and whether sociologists themselves are religious people, sociology itself, as Daniel Hervier-Leger points out, remains implicitly secularist: "Sociology comes into conflict with it [religion - E. Z.]. first of all, religion is a form of social construction of reality, a system of reference points that allows people to understand the world in which they live. From this point of view, the critique of religion necessarily implies the flattening (la raise a plat, that is, the "horizontalization" [6] - E. Z.) of the direct data of social experience, which is imbued with sociological facts. " 63 The implicit secularism of sociology explains not only the harsh reactions to Robert Bell in the United States, which Hervier-Leger mentions 64, but also the heated discussion that John Milbank provoked when he proposed theology as a radical alternative to the sociological understanding of religion, namely, " theology as a social science and the queen of sciences for the inhabitantsaltera civitas, another city on a journey in this temporary world. "65 Milbank's critique alone is unlikely to change the mindset of the global academic community, but his anti-secularist strategy highlights the fact that secularism has indeed become" academic orthodoxy: secularism, or the belief in an objective description of human life, free from [religious] belief. " 66
The sociological interpretation of religious facts can itself be an element of secularization, as people increasingly think of themselves in sociological rather than theological or religious terms. So, Casanova writes: "In this respect, the theories of secularization in Europe are self-fulfilling pro-secularization systems.-
63. Heruieu-Leger D. La religion pour memoire. P. 25L Cp. Joas H. Wellen der Sakularisierung. S. 722, 726.
64. Hervieu-Leger D. La religion pour memoire. P. 30.
65. MilbankJ. Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. Maiden, MA & Oxford: Blackwell, [1990] 2006. P. 382.
66. Smith J.K.A. Introducing Radical Orthodoxy; Mapping a Post-secular Perspective. Grand Rapids, MA: Baker Academic, 2004. P. 74.
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the majority of the population accepts them as a description of the present and a project of the future. The assumption that the more modern a society is, the less religious it is has become self-evident in Europe, both in the sociology of religion and in public opinion. This postulate has real implications in the religious field"67. This is a consequence not only of the theory of secularization, but also of the spread of "sociological" perception of reality in the West (in other parts of the world, it may be limited to the academic elite). People who are secular in the sense that Turner describes [6/7] often describe themselves as religious because they believe that those who believe that human life is not limited to such mundane things as sex, career, and entertainment are right. They speak about themselves in terms of social functionality: they may belong to Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism in religious terms, but their social metaphysics are those of Emile Durkheim or Max Weber, that is, those that seek to replace the lost vertical.
All this leads to the conclusion that the sociological discourse on secularization has theological, or rather Christian, roots. Hervier-Leger points out exactly this when he says that Artur Vidic and Stanford Lyman "showed well... how much American social science depends on the Puritanical heritage in which it is rooted. For the first generation of American sociologists, religion was such an important source of inspiration that its representatives could not treat it as a subject of research for a long time. Only gradually, in the early years of the twentieth century, did American sociology break its original ties with religion. And in the course of this process of "secularization", social science has already reanimated on new grounds the Protestant attitude towards improving society by rationalizing its governance. " 68 From the point of view stated by Hervier-Leger (who, however, is "suspected" of sympathizing with Catholicism), sociology is-in the words of Marin Terpstra - "the same theology but by other means"69. Are there different interpretations of secularization
67. Casanova J. Die religiose Lage in Europa. S. 338.
68. Hervieu-Leger D. La religion pour memoire. P. 31f.
69. Terpstra M. Democratie als cultus: over politiek en religie. Amsterdam: Boom, 2011. S. 11.
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from the side of theorists of different confessional orientations, only a continuation of disputes between Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox?
Finally, something similar is true of political philosophy: recall Karl Schmitt's idea that "all meaningful concepts in modern political science are secularized theological concepts", with his key examples: sovereignty/omnipotence, emergency/miracle 70. Claude Lefort's question concerning "permanence du theologico-politique"is also relevant. Lefort's consideration of the simultaneous process of subordination of the church to the state and the sacralization of the power of the king, which was later transferred to the People, Nation, State, Proletariat, Humanity and Race, led him to conclude that " everything that moves towards immanence also moves towards transcendence; everything that moves towards the explication of social relations, simultaneously moves towards the interiorization of unity... The concatenation of the mechanisms of embodiment meant the interweaving of religion and politics, even in cases where it seemed that the practices and ideas in question were purely religious or purely secular. " 71 Since these cases are not simply "metaphorically consistent incorporation of non-religious content into previously formulated religious utterances or systems of utterances"72, we are dealing here with an "underground" continuation of theology in the sense of "divine discourse" in its various forms, and these forms are constantly haunting us, as Derrida would say - especially when "we" - society, politics, the academy-think that we have got rid of them.
Based on Casanova Taylor, Smith, and Turner, we find six different meanings of secularization dominating the current debate [2-7]. To this we add the original meaning indicated by Lubbe and others [1], and, in addition, "theoretical" secularism as a continuation of the theology of others-
70. Schmitt C. Politische Theologie: vier Kapitel zur Lehre der Souveranitat. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, [1922] 1996. S. 43.
71. Lefort C. Permanence du theologico-politique? // Lefort C. Le temps de la reflexion. Paris: Gallimard, 1981. P. 59f.
72. Lilbbe H. Sakularisierung. S. 95.
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by other means [8]. If we then systematically distinguish between secularism, secularization, and secularism, and understand the terms secularization and secularism in their two meanings, we get the following table:
1. [Lubbe]
Secularity 1 [transfer of people [1a] and property [1b] from the Church to secular jurisdiction]
Secularization 1 process
Secularism 1 positive assessment
Desecularization 1a [return to church or monastery]
Secularization 1 policy
Secularism 1 promotion
Desecularization 1b [return of church property]
2. [Casanova 1 = Taylor 1 = Turner 1]
= Secularity 2 * [societal differentiation]
Secularization 2 process
Secularism 2 assessment
Desecularization 2 [societal (re) totalization]
Secularization 2 policy
Secularism 2 promotion
3. [Casanova 2 = Taylor 2 & Smith 1]
Secularity 3 [decline of faith]
Secularization 3 process
Secularism 3 assessment
Desecularization 3 [growth of faith]
Secularization 3 politics
Secularism 3 promotion
4. [Casanova 3 (+Turner 3 & Smith 2)]
Secularity 4 [privatisation]
Secularization 4 process
Secularism 4 assessment
4a desecularization [return of religion to public space]
Secularization 4 politics
Secularism 4 promotion
Desecularization 4b [private becomes public]
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5. [Taylor 3 = Smith 3]
Secularity 5 [problematic faith]
Secularization 5 process
Secularism 5 assessment
Desecularization 5? [returning to the original purity of faith]
Secularization 5 politics
Secularism 5 promotion
6. [Taylor 4 (+Turner 2)]
Secularity 6 [isolation from the "higher time"]
Secularization 6 process
Secularism 6 assessment
Desecularization 6? [return of the transcendent frame]
Secularization 6 politics
Secularism 6 promotion
7. [Turner 4 (+ Smith 4)]
Secularism in [adaptation / adjustment of religion]
Secularization 7 process
Secularism 7 assessment
Desecularization 7 [return to old forms]
Secularization 7 politics
Secularism 7 promotion
8. [Hervier-Leger; Schmitt]
Secularity7 [secular appearance of theological concepts]
7 Secularization 8 process [sociological discourse on religion]
Secularism 8 [academic mainstream]
Desecularization 8 [theological turn/discourse reteologization]
Different meanings of secularism, secularization, and secularism give different, and in some cases even opposite, meanings and forms of nonsecularism, desecularization, and antisecularism. The scope of this article does not allow us to discuss all possible values, as well as the question of whether it is possible to fill all the cells in the table. Therefore, we will limit ourselves to a few obvious examples.
The countries of the former Soviet bloc experienced a process of desecularization, in which churches regained their property rights and clergy regained their functions, and monasteries were rediscovered and populated by monastics [desecularization-1]. Vivid examples of societal dedifferentiation are-
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The Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan under the Taliban: even if the corresponding policy was not always quite successful, the goals were clear, and we can speak in this case of an anti-secularist ideology [desecularization-2]. Desecularization in the sense of the growth of faith is difficult to imagine as a policy, but new forms of religiosity fall into this category as a process; the growth of religious practices can be perceived both as a process and as a policy: the development of religiously based family law in Western and non-Western countries will be an example of a process, and mandatory religious dress code [desecularization-3].
The return of religion to the public domain [desecularization 4] is too obvious to argue about. This" public space "has changed its face: as Casanova rightly points out, only now, for example, can the head of the Roman Catholic Church speak urbi et orbi-to" the city and the world", because the whole orbs (world) has become one urbs (city). At the same time, this "cosmopolis" is not a single global city or village, but a fragmented and multi-layered whole, to which the pope can refer "as a whole", but which he can in no way regard as "his own": the pope's voice is one of many global voices, along with the voices of the Dalai Lama- lama, Nelson Mandela, Madonna and Bono. Marcus admires the fact that Pope John XXIII had "the courage and vision to put an end to the church's desire to define a world in which it will be safe."73 Other churches, returning to the public space, seek state protection in order to "determine the world in which they will be safe" - and this is a different shade of the meaning of secularization [compounds 2 and 4]. Marcel Gaucher correctly points out that Casanova's idea of" deprivation "solves only half of the problem:" The concept correctly reflects a significant shift, but it hides the other half of the phenomenon. It misses the paradoxical tension inherent in the phenomenon. It is not so much a question of "deprivation" as of the private becoming public, when faith, while playing a public role, nevertheless seeks to preserve its freedom and identity."74 Gaucher also emphasizes that if "civil society becomes more and more independent, it is not only a question of "deprivation".-
73. Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. Notre Dame University Press, 2006. P. 91.
74. Gauchet M. La religion dans la democratie. P. 101, n. 1.
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it should be considered "public" ... while the state is being "privatized"... this "double movement" of discovery and projection in no way leads to any leveling of the difference between the two systems. " 75
Desecularization is often associated with transformations of religion, or society, or the state structure: what is being desecularized is not necessarily the same as what has been secularized, because it may have changed in the process of secularization. This applies to the return of religion to the political field [4]: Christian democracy in a number of European countries, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other Muslim countries, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) in India or the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey. Even if they come up with an "anti-secularist" agenda, they enter a "secular" reality and are forced to accept the language of democracy, religious freedom, pluralism, etc. The same is true when religious organizations, including traditional churches, return to the old forms of ritual, dress, or practice, abandoning their previous adaptations [desecularization-7]. An obvious example in this case is, for example, traditionalism of the Roman Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church: a conscious return to traditional forms, which results in "separation" from society, is not the same as simply turning back. Traditionalism is not the same as tradition, and it is somewhat cynical to assume that traditionalism is an element of rebranding, through which traditional religions try to strengthen their presence in the religious market. Desecularization can be a new form of adaptation: the fact that among young people, for example, religion can be considered "cool" and gain popularity can be attributed to desecularization, but it cannot be considered as an unconditional return to traditional church life.
The same can be said about the "religious turn" in political philosophy and the new interest in "political theology" [desecularization-8]. Here again, what comes back is not the same as what has been forgotten, if only because the returning theology actively engages in discussions that are not being discussed.
75. Ibid. P. 100.
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she used to be wary. Lubbe cites the example of the Church in Germany after World War II - a situation "in which the Church, in its relations with the secular socio-political community, no longer plays the role of a threatened individual, but at the same time, at least in some aspects, the role of a potential winner"76. An example is a discussion between Slavoj Zizek and John Milbank moderated by Creston Davies 77. Davis begins with the statement :" If in the age of Western secular modernity the theological was marginalized, now it is returning with revenge. " 78 Milbank and Zizek are united by a common enemy, Davis shows, referring to political theology (more precisely, to the political potential of Christology, which, by the way, has always been present in the Christian tradition, starting with Nagornaya sermons [Mt 5-7]): "The scandalous challenge of Christ is love expressed in paradox or dialectic. In my opinion, it may well be the path that will lead us away from the current populist-absolutist realm of finance, spectacle, and surveillance. " 79 Davis opposes the sacralization of the People, the Market, and Security, that is, cases of giving a secular regime a religious quality. The sacralization of the secular is criticized in the name of religion.
Finally, desecularization involves various manifestations of antisecularism, from the social doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church to the radical orthodoxy of Milbank. Antisecularism can be reactionary and revolutionary, traditionalist or revolutionist, but its common denominator is a protest against secularism as a legitimizing ideology of a complacent, "secularized" world, or as a desire to "embrace the secular and recognize its value, its autonomy, and even its power"... its sacredness or sanctity, " as Robert Marcus writes 80.
76. Lilbbe H. Sakularisierung. S. 97.
77. Zizek S., Milbank J. The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?/Davis C. (ed.). Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 2009.
78. Ibid. P. 3.
79. Ibid. P. 21.
80. Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 91; Weigel G. Roman Catholicism in the Age of John Paul II //The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics/Berger P. L. (ed.). Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999.
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4. Going back to the root
Despite the well-known complexity of the proposed scheme, a significant part of its elements indicate a real, specific phenomenon, or position, or dispute. Some of them require specific research, either empirical or in the field of the history of ideas. Together, such studies can serve as a starting point for the hermeneutics of secularism discourse. Note that the scheme is still not very complex: "desecularization" mostly appears as the" reverse " of secularization, although it often refers us to new phenomena and results of development. Similarly, the concept of" post-secular " is absent from the scheme: in my view, it indicates any phenomena that go - or tend to go-beyond the manifestations of "secularism", or a combination of them.81 My main conclusion is that any blurring of these elements in the discussion of secularism/secularization leads to confusion. However, such confusion is not just confusion, and this becomes clear if we focus on the concept that is central to all the other concepts included in the table-the concept of secular.
Is there a core meaning of "secular" present in all these shades of secularism and secularization? Here we are faced with the essence of the problem. I believe that the term "secular" and its derivatives, as they appear in intellectual and public discussion, are firstly unclear, secondly, rarely neutral, and, thirdly, they are used biased due to their connection with the "western" Latin Christian tradition. Therefore, when using these terms, we must be careful, especially if we are talking about other contexts, outside of (post)Latin-Western Christian. Casanova points to the source of the concept of saeculum: "The starting point for any discussion about secular, secularization and secularism should be the understanding that all these concepts are derived from the Western Christian theological and canonical categories, namely, saeculum, which has no correspondences not only in other world religions,
81. For more information, see мою статью: Confronting the Confrontation - Europe Beyond Secularism?//Confronting Secularism in Europe and India/Black B., Hyman G., SmithG. (eds.). London: Bloomsbury, 2013 (in print).
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but even in Byzantine Christianity"82. The concept of "secular" originated in Latin Christian theology, and its classical source is the work of Augustine of Hippo (354-430) De Civitate Dei (On the City of God)83.
The hypothesis of Robert Marcus and Mathias Riedl, which I rely on here, is that the concept of "secular" was invented on the African fringes of the Roman Empire by (Latin) church fathers such as Tertullian of Carthage (c. 160-c. 220) and Augustine, and its first mention is found in the Acts of the Scyllitan Martyrs". The reason for this invention was what is the cause of all conceptual innovation: inconvenience. The Roman Empire was based on a religion that, like all religions, divided reality into the sacred and the profane, the latter meaning "that which is outside the sanctuary." 84 Christianity used the same opposition, but it had a different idea of what is sacred and what is profane: its sacred domain." it coincided with the sphere of Christian religious faith, relevant practices, institutions, and cults, " while the profane for Christians included much of what was sacred for the Romans.85 Christians denied - and had to deny-both the divine status of the emperor and the idea of the Pantheon, which created a "polytheistic" space where other religions found their place.86 Although Christianity "for three centuries felt like a foreign body in Roman society" and it was difficult for Christians traveling from Jerusalem to Babylon to adapt to this, still "even in a world where the Christian community was considered a sect and saw itself as such, the problem of distinguishing the sphere of the secular and the sphere of the profane - that is, the problem of distinguishing the sphere of what was acceptable, and what should be rejected, could not be avoided. As Tertullian knew and sometimes said, Christians had much in common with their non-Christian neighbors... What was acceptable and could be shared with the Gentiles was considered secular; and what went beyond the latter was condemned as religious.-
82. Casanova J. Eurozentristischer Sakularismus und die Herausforderung der Globalisierung. S. 19.
83. Augustine. On the City of God, XVIII. 54; XIX. 17. 84- Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 5.
85. Ibid. P. 5.
86. Ibid. P. 2of.
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but pagan, or profane"87. According to Riedl, it was a group of Christians from Scillium who in 180 A.D. recognized the political authority of the Roman Emperor, while at the same time refusing to put him in the place of "the Lord our God who is in heaven "(dominus Deus noster qui est in caelis). and paying their taxes to Caesar 88. The recognition of the Emperor as Emperor had two sides: it meant acknowledging the Emperor, but refusing to see him as an Emperor. These are the two sides of the blade of the concept of "secular", which, like a knife, cuts through the concepts of sacred and profane that are not subject to revision, which for Christians in a non-Christian empire has always meant conflict. This concept of "secular" allowed Christians to live in the world without identifying with it.
If, together with Markus, we define "what is secular" as "what is common [for Christians] with non-Christians", 89 then the concept of secularness is an innovation that has complicated the already well-known opposition between the sacred and the profane: "Let us assume that we consider "sacred" and "profane" as mutually exclusive regions. From the Christian point of view," sacred " will roughly coincide with the sphere of Christian religious faith, relevant practices, institutions, and worship. What is" profane " is what should be rejected in the surrounding culture, including practices and institutions... "Profane" is something that a new convert must give up in the process of his conversion. The "secular" is not so radically opposed to the sacred; it is more neutral and can be accepted or adapted... It is possible to speak about it apart from religion, whereas both the "sacred" and the" profane "necessarily imply some relation to religion [emphasis added-E. Z.]" 90.
This situation changed radically after Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century, and the Empire itself was sacralized as Christian, to which, as is known, Eusebius of Caesarea had a hand. According to
87. Ibid. P. 21, 18f; unfortunately, Markus does not give precise references to Tertullian's writings.
88. Riedl M. The Secular Sphere in Western Theology: A Historical Reconsideration//The Future of Political Theology/Losonczi P., Luomaaho M., Singh A. (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012. P. 14 (цит. по: Acts of the Christian Martyrs: Introduction, Texts and Translations/Herbert Musurillo (ed.). Oxford, 1972. P. 86 - 89).
89. Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 6.
90. Ibid. P. 5f.
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Jean Bethke Elstein, such "identification of the city of God with the earthly order leads to the sacralization of human institutions and to dangerous idolatry" 91. Modifying the position of Tertullian and the Scyllitan martyrs, Augustine refused to identify "Roman" with "Christian", since this would have meant such idolatry: "During the century in which Constantine's conversion to Christianity took place, 'Roman' became almost the same as 'Christian'... Augustine's voice sounds like a cry of protest against this fusion of Christian and Roman identities"92. This protest proved futile, as its "trichotomy [of the sacred, secular, and profane]... overshadowed the simpler but morally harsh dichotomies "93, namely, the dichotomy of the Christian empire and the pagan "remnant", which served to sacralize the existing order 94, as well as the opposition of the "pure" Church and the fallen world, which contributed to the profanation of what is "outside the sanctuary" - the entire sphere of politics, everything related to economics, etc.
Augustine did not become an overnight authority on Latin Christianity - on the contrary! Together with Jean Betke Elstein, it should be emphasized that Augustine is often "normalized" into something like a light version ("Augustine-lite"), and then praised for "political realism" 95. Together with Jan van Oort, we must beware of attributing to Augustine the idea of a third, "neutral" city, or later ideas, such as Thomas Aquinas ' Aristotelian conception of man as a social being, and therefore of the city and the State as a good (bonum) In the city of real historical time, two cities, the city of God and the city of earth, co-exist in essential opposition to each other and in the field of tension between good and evil: if there is this third, tertium quid,
91. Elshtain J.B. Augustine//The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology/Scott P., Cavanaugh W.T. (eds.). Maiden, MA & London: Blackwell, [2004] 2007. P. 42; cp. Oort J. van. Jeruzalem en Babylon. Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1995. S. 129; Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 21.
92. Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 71f; cf. Oort J. van. Jeruzalem en Babylon. P-133-
93. Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 74.
94. In this case, it is difficult not to recall the Huntington scheme.
95. Elshtain J. B. Augustine. P. 351 (with reference to: Elshtain J. B. Augustine and the Limits of Politics. Notre Dame, ID: Notre Dame University Press, 1995).
96. Oort J. van. Jeruzalem en Babylon. P. 1271.
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then it is something mixed, not neutral 97. A Christian person is a citizen of two cities, not a third city, and he is torn apart by this dual citizenship. Peace in saeculo (in this age), including the Empire that keeps peace, is a (relative) good, it deserves attention, care, and protection from enemies-but this relative good is also a relative evil, and it cannot in any way be identified with the Civitas Dei, the City of God. 98 Duality continues to prevail, but a third space has been created, creating "obstacles to the absolutization and sacralization of any political structure", but also opening the way for a positive assessment of "worldly duties, since the earthly world (temporal peace) is good, whether it is the world of the body, or fraternal relations with one's own kind, or the provision of food.", clothing and care " 99. Thus it becomes possible to live together with people of a different faith - the remaining pagans, Jews, etc., and it is obviously not excluded that they can be or are "good", just as it is impossible not to distinguish between good and evil emperors. Finally, by virtue of the fact that the worldin saeculo can be relatively good, to varying degrees, questions of justice - a just war, a just government, a just law-become relevant, even if they do not displace true divine justice and should not lead to "victory parades" or "triumphalism."100
These thoughts of Augustine, through the mediation of Thomas Aquinas, were reflected in the reasoning of the greatest Catholic thinker of the XX century, Jacques Maritain: "As civil society, or political society, became completely separated from the spiritual kingdom of the Church (this process in itself was nothing more than the development of the evangelical division of what belongs to Caesar and God), civil society began to be based on a common good and a common task, which belonged to the earthly, "temporary"world or a "secular" order in which citizens of different backgrounds or belonging to different spiritual groups participate equally. " 101 If " secular-
97. Ibid. P. 127.
98. Augustine. On the City of God, XIX. 17; cf. OortJ. van. Jeruzalem en Babylon. P. 136.
99. Elshtain J.B. Augustine. P. 43.
100. Ibid. P. 46; Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 9.
101. Maritain J. Chelovek i gosudarstvo [Man and State], Moscow: Ideya-Press, 2000, p. 103.
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If the "secular choice" goes back as far as Augustine, then we are tempted to see the history of the part of the world that was influenced by Latin Christianity as the history of the gradual emergence and final confirmation of this choice, as well as the gradual "legitimization" of the "secular city" as a bonum in se-good in itself, and not as a whole. a relative good. However, the same story can also be seen from another angle - as a series of critical speeches against this approach, inspired by Augustine and proclaiming the refusal to justify the existing order. The history of Latin (Western) Christianity, then, is a constant struggle between adherents of the Augustinian line, which is potentially critical and change-oriented, on the one hand, and Thomists who are inclined to justify and adapt to this order. Joas criticizes Taylor for speaking of "a long-term Reform vector in Latin Christianity that begins somewhere with the reforms of Pope Gregory VII Hildebrand in the eleventh century and is particularly evident in the Catholic and Protestant Reformations." 102 In reality, there is no such direct (or" dialectical") vector, and we must distinguish the obvious victory of this vector, achieved as a result of several "waves", from the idea that it was a permanent "choice" within Latin Christianity.
To find out the hypothetical root meaning of "secular", I will turn to three authors. The first is Markus, who set himself "the task of first clarifying ... the 'secular'" by placing it in a "cluster of ideas... the 'profane', the 'sacred', and the 'secular '" 103. The second is Lefort. When he writes: "coupling mechanisms... incarnation meant the interweaving of religion and politics, even in cases where it seemed that the practices and ideas in question were purely religious or purely secular. " 104 He speaks specifically of the secular. The concatenation that Lefort writes about and creates res mixtae - a space of confusion that is neither sacred nor profane, since it is both - can only be imagined if we recognize a third category, which is also called res mixtae.
102. Taylor Ch. A Secular Age. P. 786, f. 92; Joas H. Wellen der Sakularisierung. S. 721.
103. Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 4.
104. Lefort C. Permanence du theologico-politique? P. 59f.
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it makes possible the very confusion, and this category is the secular, which is located between the sacred and the profane. The third author is Wendy Brown, who distinguishes between the sacred, the secular, and the profane in her commentary on Taylor's Secular Age and applies this triad to a new reading of Marx: modern capitalist economics uses the division of social reality into two spheres - "celestial" and "terrestrial". the sacralization of capital (more precisely, money as Capital) leads to the profanation and destruction of "what is most sacred to man and the world" 105-a process that is mediated, as Marx perceived in Hegel, by the secular state. Such a dialectic is possible only if we consider the sacred, the secular, and the profane in their dynamic interaction, and the middle element supports the reality that it ultimately destroys.
Accordingly, the general hypothesis will be as follows: every culture relies, among other things, on the constitutive binary opposition of the sacred [heavenly, taboo, untouchable, indisputable, haram, etc.] and profane [mundane, accessible, consumable, debatable, halal, etc.] 106. This constitutive binary opposition is provided by religion. At the same time, any particular form of community needs mediation between these spheres, and this mediation is provided by religion, which, following Emile Benveniste, Jacques Derrida, and Brian Turner, has the double meaning of "connecting together" and "connecting (with the past)."107 Then the "secular" is a way of communicating with the world, which is neither Christian (and therefore sacred in the full sense) nor profane, but which is "in the middle"; the secular appears as if on the border of the sacred and the profane. But this means that "secular" is a religious concept.
105. Brown W. The Sacred, the Secular, and the Profane//Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age/Warner M., Vanantwerpen J., Calhoun C. (eds.). Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2010. P. 100.
106. Cp. Casanova J. Eurozentristischer Sakularismus und die Herausforderung der Globalisierung. S. 20; Durkheim E. Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: Librairie Generale Francaise, [1912] 1991. P. 921.
107. Benveniste E. Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-europeennes. Vol. 2. Paris: Minuit, 1969. P. 268; Derrida J. Foi et savoir. Paris: Editions du Seuil, [1996] 2000. P. 98; Turner B. S. Religion and Modern Society. P. 4.
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In the dualistic perspective of the sacral civitas terrena ("earthly city" - whether it is the Roman Empire, the national state or something else) the sacred and the secular become opposites, and the secular and the profane merge. "Secular" can avoid this dichotomy between the sacred and the profane, but it only makes sense within the same religious space. This brings up an interesting parallel between Christianity and Islam, in which the well-known haram-halal dichotomy is mediated and mitigated by the notion of "five judgments" (al-ahkam al-khamisa), which include haram (forbidden), but also add the other four categories: undesirable (makruh), indifferent or neutral (mubah), encouraged (mustahabb), and mandatory (fard). Between what is sacred and what is forbidden (for Muslims), there are three more categories that facilitate different types of interaction with non-Muslims, including, in some cases, the general sacred. Most likely, there are similar schemes in other religious traditions.
There are many attempts to actualize the "Augustinian" position, the essence of which is to conceptualize a certain area that is different from both the sacred and the profane, which is considered worthy of respect, maintenance and even care, and, accordingly, is evaluated positively, although it is part of the "world of this" and "time of this" (not " high time, but also not the "low" time of material processes). In this case, the term "secular "refers to the dimension of reality that is located - or" inserted " - between the sacred and the profane and therefore can be shared with others and positively evaluated, while not being sacralized. Then the root meaning of "secular" will be-in saeculo, in the sense of "being in this world and in this time", but in such a way that the explosive reference to the possibility of "being not of this world and not of this time" is preserved: the tension contained in the expressions "in the world" and "from the world", is specifically (though not exclusively) Christian, while the relatively positive assessment of what is "secular" is specifically Latin Christian and therefore Western. The first element assumes that the "secular" always retains a double potency: one can go up or down, and to the extent that the dualistic perspective of reality is affirmed, the "secular" must either be sacralized or identified with the profane.
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Why and how "secular" took on an even more positive meaning in Western Christianity, to the point where it absorbed the other two meanings and obscured its religious basis is another question, but the fact remains.
In "our" (post -) Latin Christian culture, the concept of "secular" that the Latin Church fathers created slowly and gradually destroyed the original dichotomy, becoming, like any subversive third, a substitute for both-either in the sense of complete profanation or in the sense of complete incarnation. Today, the term "secular "can and should be used against those conceptions of secularization that ultimately make the whole of reality" secular". If everything is secular, then the concept itself becomes meaningless-this is reminiscent of the German proverb that Hegel uses in his critique of Schelling: "at night, all cows are black." The problem is that at night all cows appear black, although in reality they are brown or red, and their color is somewhat mixed with white. Perhaps there are versions of secularism - as well as pluralism and multiculturalism-that ultimately reveal a complete "blackness". In the light of day, on the contrary, the differences appear not only for the observer, but also for the cows themselves. I think Charles Taylor feels this very well: we need to see the differences, not cover them up." And then our main task may be to update the "Augustinian" position in that society and in that era, which we cannot deal with-whether they are secular or post - secular-without taking a certain position in them.
5. A few more issues concerning the "secular": concluding remarks
A significant part of the problems associated with the concept of" secular " arise from a combination of its specifically Western Latin-Christian origin and the quasi-obvious nature of the concepts that are derived from it. This is true in non-Latin Christian contexts. Home issue-
108. See especially his discussion with Habermas in: The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere/Mendieta E., Vanantwerpen J. (eds.). New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. e.g., p. 48: "The problem is that a truly diverse democracy cannot transform itself into a civil religion or an anti-religion, however convenient, without giving up its principles. We are doomed to live in an environment of overlapping consensus."
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ma, of course, arises in connection with Islam. On the one hand, the terms "secular" and" secularization " constantly appear in discussions about the (non -) compatibility of Islam with the liberal democratic Rechtsstaat( rule of law); about the alleged conflict between secular principles and Islamism in the Muslim Brotherhood; about the tension between the secularist state and the ruling party (AKP) in the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey; on a new constitution in Egypt or Tunisia. In fact, the concept of "secular" hardly fits into the Islamic tradition, as well as, according to some, into the Hindu one, 109 and the term itself cannot be translated. Abdu Filali-Ansari suggests three possible translations: dahri ("temporal" from dahr, century or time period), ladini ("unbelief") and ' almara ("worldly")110. These words, individually, express some aspect of the" secular", but even together they cannot express its essence. John Keane, referring to the second and third words, speaks of " symptomatic... There is no term in Arabic to describe secular, secularization, or secularism. "111 Azam Tamimi points out the same problem:" Secularism, in Arabic 'ilmarayah (from' ilm-science) or ' almarayah (from'alam - peace) may be better rendered by the word dunyawiyah, meaning that which is mundane, mundane, or temporary." 112 Again, some of the meanings of "secular" are conveyed here, but their connection is not reflected. Tamimi continues :" Although secularism is usually understood as the liberation of the political from the power of the religious [secularization-2 according to our classification. - E. Z.], this term, along with others [modernity, Westernization, modernization. - E. Z.], has been used in various contexts to describe the political and the religious.-
109. Bhargava R. Introduction //Secularism and Its Critics/Bhargava R. (ed.). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011. P. 22: "For Madan, secularism... it's still hard to get along with the local worldviews.... Secularism is culturally alien in India because the hierarchy that exists in Indian culture includes the secular with the religious, and also because it is too public a thing to privatize."
110. Filaly-Ansary A. Muslims and Democracy // World Religions and Democracy/Diamond L., Plattner M.F., CostopoulosPh. J. (eds.). Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 2005. P. 1541.
111. Keane J. The Limits of Secularism. P. 35.
112. Tamimi A. The Origins of Arab Secularism // Islam and Secularism in the Middle East/John L. Esposito, Tamimi A. (eds.). London: Hurst & Company, 2000. P. 13; cf. Hashemi N. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy. P. 136.
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a process aimed at marginalizing Islam or excluding it from the process of restructuring society in both the colonial and post-colonial periods [secularization-4. - E. Z.] " 113.
Indeed, if it is true that in the Islamic tradition, as opposed to the Christian one, religion and politics are intrinsically linked, then this explains that"secularization in the Middle East implied a break from cultural roots; its goal was a complete break with the past" .114 If within Latin Christianity the concept of secular becomes meaningful only against the background of a specific culture, then the concept of secularization If there is a dichotomy between the sacred and the profane, then in a context where the Islamic tradition is conceptually dominant, the "secular" is necessarily opposed to religion. Thus, Hamid Enayad contrasts " secularists "and" religionists " in a way that is difficult to imagine in a (post-)Latin Christian context.115 Probably, secularity-2, 5, 6 and 8 can hardly be understood from the Muslim point of view except as an exclusion of religion, while secularity-4 will mean limiting the Islamic faith to the sphere of internal spirituality. 116 The values 1, 3, and 7 remain, of which the former may indicate differences between clergy and laity (which, however, does not fit in with the Christian example of clerics living in rural areas).secularism in the second sense can be perceived simply as a deplorable fact that needs to be opposed by a profession of faith; and the third meaning is deeply controversial for a tradition in which it is much more difficult than in Christianity to go against the letter of Holy Scripture.117
These difficulties are related to the fact that the terminology is exclusively Western Christian in its origin: "Is secularism a reaction or protest movement, a doctrine or an ideology, and its ultimate goal is the denial of God and the complete destruction of religion, or only a restriction
113. Tamimi A. The Origins of Arab Secularism. P. 13.
114. Ibid. P. 13.
115. Enayat H. Modern Islamic Political Thought. London & New York: I.B.Tauris, 2008. P 57.
116. It is no coincidence that the Syriac-German scholar Bassam Tibi believes that a necessary condition for the adaptation of Islam to the liberal-democratic Rechtsstaat (state governed by the rule of law), which he mainly understands in the spirit of Habermas, is a turn towards the interiorized religiosity of the Sufi type.
117. Here we can recall the efforts of Nasr Abu Zayed and Tariq Ramadan.
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religions are a private sphere, while recognizing the existence of a "god" who does not interfere in the worldly or secular affairs of people - in any case, this concept [secularism] cannot be understood outside of European evolution and its Christian reform movements. " 118 Speaking about some of the concepts discussed in this article, Tamimi points out how on the contrast of" God "and" God", which is common to Christianity and Islam, as well as on the exclusively Christian nature of the concept of secular, which he interestingly connects with " reform movements that... they had it... an almost obvious secularizing effect. Reform movements such as Renaissance, Humanism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, Deism, and Unitarianism were all secularizing forces within Christianity. " 119
Brian Turner criticized Talal al-Assad for saying that "secularism and secularization are purely Western 'problems'. " 120 Indeed, the West has long influenced the rest of the world through colonialism, missionary work, the export of Marxism-Leninism, and, one might add, the spread of the global free market combined with liberal democracy. However, this only exacerbates the problems in non-Western parts of the world, where similar discourses of resistance to secularism and secularization have spread. Taylor rightly observes that while "it is true that secularism has Christian roots, [but] it is wrong to think that this fact restricts the possibility of applying its formulas to post-Christian societies."121 However, if he is also correct in saying that "it is not entirely clear what is meant by secularism" and that "secularism is not fully understood", then " secularism is not fully understood." this name implies quite different formulations " 122, we still need to clarify what we are talking about: some meanings really fall outside the (post-)Latin-Western Christian context, while others do not. This is not to say that the use of the term "secularization" in relation to non-Western contexts is wrong in itself, but we are missing something important if we ignore the fact that in these contexts the very concept of "secularization" is placed differently and more widely. Tamimi A. The Origins of Arab Secularism. P. 13f.
119. Ibid. P. 14.
120. Turner B. S. Religion and Modern Society. P. 135.
121. Taylor Ch. Modes of Secularism. P. 31.
122. Ibid.
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srt with great difficulty - even if because it is usually perceived as Western and, accordingly, not only as potentially alien, but also as potentially eliminated.
Another problem is related to the third main branch of Christianity - Orthodoxy, which is often ignored when discussing secularism, desecularization and post - secular (and there is also a fourth branch-the so-called Eastern churches of the Middle East). Sometimes this problem is recognized, but usually not noticed 123. Markus, while admitting that "he cannot touch this topic in relation to Eastern Europe", notes that "most likely the problems of the secular are characteristic only of Christianity in its Western versions" .124 The question of how and how Orthodoxy reveals differences when confronted with the "secular" and its derivatives deserves a separate discussion. Yes, but two things seem certain. First, there are several names that can be associated with secularization as a "turn to this world": Alexander Bukharev (1824-1871), Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900), Sergey Bulgakov (1871-1944), " mother Maria Skobtsova (1891-1945), Pavel Evdokimov (1901-1970); but they are rare exceptions to the large-scale movements in Western Christianity.125 Secondly, although Augustine is known in the Orthodox world, his status is very far from that which he has in Western Latin Christianity. If this does not fully explain the predominance in Orthodoxy of a dichotomous understanding of the relationship between the church and the world as sacred and profane, respectively, it does point to differences in attitudes towards "secularization" and "secularism" on the part of the Western and Eastern Christian Churches.
123. Orthodoxy is recognized, for example, by Hans Joas (Sakularisierung und die Weltreligionen / Joas H., Wiegandt K. (Hrsg.). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007. p. 21), but is ignored in the book published by Berger (The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics/Berger RL. (ed.). Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999.), where in the chapter on Europe, Grace Davey mentions "Slavic peoples" as one of "seven interconnected and overlapping blocks within the European whole", but then discusses only the situation in Western Europe (Ibid. P. 6sf).
124. Markus R.A. Christianity and the Secular. P. 11, n. 26.
125. Cp. Valliere P. Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov. Grand Rapids, MI: William Eerdmans, 2000; Plekon M. Eastern Orthodox Thought//The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology/Scott P., Cavanaugh W.T. (eds.). Maiden, MA & London: Blackwell, [2004] 2007. We should also note the absence of Christian democracy as a political movement in the Orthodox world.
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These examples do not imply that "secular" cannot make sense for a social or political reality outside of the (post -) Latin-Western Christian context, even if as a concept it is "unique to [Western - e. Z.] European civilization" .126 However, they suggest that its conceptualization is related to with Latin Christianity, including "secularization", which can be described both as a social phenomenon and as an intellectual tradition [secularization 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8]. From any other point of view than the (post-)Latin Christian one, there is no "secular age", much less a "post-secular society". This does not mean that the relevant concepts and discussions are wrong or false: they may reflect real problems, such as the intrusion of religion into politics. However, the formulation of these problems in terms of secularity and their corresponding derivatives turns them, strictly speaking, into particular, purely "local" problems. However, "place" is today essentially global. Those parts of the world that have had a decisive influence-culturally, politically, and intellectually-on the Latin Christian religious tradition and its "secularized" forms will, in one way or another, face the problem of the "secular"over an unpredictably long (horizontal) period of time. And those parts of the world that have been defined by other traditions may also face similar problems, but to articulate them in terms of "secular" and its derivatives is, at best, to introduce confusion and often provoke conflict, because it is perceived as imposing alien categories. The real global problem is that these two "parts" of the world are not clearly separated from each other.
Therefore, any discussion of the "secular" must involve an awareness of the relevant historical background and roots, otherwise it will not make sense outside of its context: "secular" and its derivatives do not mean the same thing, even if they refer to the same phenomena and processes. Charles Taylor's Hegelian approach suggests that even if the concept of saeculum with its specific meaning originated in the West, it can be seen as an invention that, at least in principle, can have value for all societies, including those that have never been influenced by the West.-
126. Keane J. The Limits of Secularism. P. 29.
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Latin) Christianity. This is in agreement with Taylor's earlier statement that "all human cultures that have animated entire societies for a considerable time have something important to communicate to all people."127 This "something important" can therefore not only "deserve our admiration and respect", but also be seriously considered for inclusion in a general framework appropriate to our current situation, when "there are other cultures and we must live together with them both on a global scale and in separate mixed societies" .128 this may require the abolition of the concept of "secular" - but wouldn't that mean a final secularization?..
Translated from English by Alexander Aghajanyan and Alexander Kyrlezhev
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