The transformation of Europe into a continent of lasting peace and equal cooperation between States with different social systems is one of the cardinal directions of Soviet foreign policy. The path to improving the situation in Europe based on the recognition of the results of the Second World War and the realities that have developed on this continent in the following years in an international legal order is not easy. The USSR and other socialist countries do not forget that it was from the West that world wars came twice .1 After the war, Europe became the scene of a major confrontation between two opposing social systems and attempts by imperialist circles to stifle socialism using the cold war and numerous doctrines of the struggle against communism. Until now, the main military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact member states are still facing each other in Europe, and for many years one of the main obstacles to ensuring European security was the revanchist demands of the German ruling circles raised to the rank of state policy, who wanted to revise European borders and refuse to recognize the political and territorial realities that arose in Europe as a result of World War II2. It was in the relations between the United States and Germany and the USSR that first of all "the main lines of tension passed during the Cold War, which affected the world situation as a whole" 3 .

A special place in the German policy aimed at the audit of the total? During the Second World War, it was given to West Berlin. In violation of the Potsdam Agreements, which proclaimed the elimination of German militarism and Nazism and the renewal of relations between the states of Europe, the reactionary circles of Germany, in collusion with the Western occupying powers, turned the western part of Berlin into a springboard for the struggle against communism, a center of provocations and espionage and sabotage activities against the GDR and other socialist countries. With the connivance of the Western powers, the Federal Republic of Germany took a course to use West Berlin in accordance with its aggressive attitudes and, in the course of implementing a revanchist policy, put forward unfounded claims to West Berlin as part of its territory in the 1950s. Taking advantage of the connivance of the Western Powers, it has stepped up

1 See L. I. Brezhnev. Lenin's Course, vol. 4, Moscow, 1974, p. 76.

2 See L. I. Brezhnev. On the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, Moscow, 1975, p. 224.

3 L. I. Brezhnev. Lenin's Course, vol. 4, p. 229.

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efforts to penetrate all areas of the city's life in order to establish control over its development. Bonn's illegal encroachments on West Berlin have turned the latter into a hotbed of constant tension, conflict and friction in the heart of Europe.

The struggle for the settlement of the West Berlin problem and against the illegal claims of the German reaction has become one of the main tasks of the socialist countries in their efforts to ensure peace and tranquility on the European continent, as well as conscientious mutually beneficial cooperation between European countries. During the Cold War, the Western powers repeatedly rejected the initiatives of the socialist states, which were aimed at eliminating the dangerous hotbed of ongoing conflicts around West Berlin by reaching an agreement on its special status as a territorial political unit that is not part of either of the two German states. The West Berlin settlement became possible only as a result of a radical change in the balance of power in favor of peace and socialism in Europe and on the world stage. And the most important contribution to defusing tension, which made it easier to find a mutually acceptable solution to West Berlin, was the conclusion of the USSR and Poland treaties with Germany, which, together with the treaties of other socialist countries with Germany, made it possible to fix in a contractual order the main results of the war and post-war development, and draw a line under the "The treaties and agreements concluded in recent years," L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "have legally consolidated the fruits of the victory over fascism and created prerequisites for the development of fruitful peaceful cooperation between European states." 5
Against the background of the general defusing of tension in Europe, the settlement of the West Berlin problem took place. Negotiations between representatives of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France, which began in March 1970, ended on September 3, 1971 with the signing of the quadrilateral agreement on West Berlin6 . Following the signing of the GDR-German Transit Agreement and the GDR Government's arrangements with the West Berlin Senate on 3 June 1972, the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers, in turn, signed the Final Quadrilateral Protocol of the Quadrilateral Meeting, which brought into force the entire set of agreements on West Berlin. At the same time, the Moscow Treaty between the USSR and Germany of August 12, 1970, entered into force.

The quadrilateral agreement was the result of a long and complex search for mutually acceptable solutions. It is of a compromise nature, but it does not prejudice the principle of recognition of political realities in modern Europe .7 The commitment of the parties to the agreement to "contribute to the elimination of tensions and prevent complications" in the West Berlin area created prerequisites for improving the situation in West Berlin affairs. The core of the quadripartite agreement is the provision that West Berlin is not part of Germany and cannot be governed by it. On this basis, the quadripartite agreement concluded in the fall of 1971 provided for the curtailment of the "federal presence" in the city. 8 It has contributed to the consolidation of the international legal status of West Berlin in a contractual manner as a whole.-

4 See ibid., p. 226.

5 Pravda, 9. V. 1975.

6 Pravda, 4. IX. 1971.

7 "History of foreign policy of the USSR. 1917-1975". Part II. Moscow, 1976, p. 516.

8 Pravda, 4. IX. 1971.

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In this way," in combination with agreements and arrangements on a number of issues between the governments of the GDR, the Federal Republic of Germany and the West Berlin Senate, it has basically relieved tensions "around West Berlin, creating"conditions for West Berlin to turn from a source of disputes into a constructive element of peace and detente" .9
At the same time, events following the entry into force of the agreement have shown that not all parties are equally conscientious about implementing its provisions. At present, there are enough facts to conclude that the Western side is trying to interpret the quadripartite agreement in its own way and highlight those of its decisions that can be used to "reinforce" its position in the West Berlin affairs.

Bourgeois historiography still makes efforts to justify the separate actions of the Western powers, which, in collusion with the most aggressive and reactionary circles of West German imperialism, grossly violated the agreed quadrilateral decisions of the war and post-war period, splitting both Germany and Berlin. At the same time, the works of Western authors portray in a biased light or even directly distort the proposals of socialist countries for the settlement of the West Berlin problem. Bourgeois historians deny the significance of the Potsdam and Yalta decisions of the anti-Hitler coalition for the search for principles on the basis of which the West Berlin question could be resolved. They continue to cling to the thesis that there are "original" and "original" rights of the three Western Powers over all of Berlin, which Bonn uses to "justify" encroachments on West Berlin. Because in the West, even after the settlement of the West Berlin problem in the quadrilateral agreement of September 3, 1971, The dilapidated argumentation that falsifies the parties ' position on the issue of West Berlin is once again brought to light, and it makes sense to focus on the history of the emergence and development of the West Berlin problem and on the main stages that characterize the efforts of the USSR and other socialist countries aimed at solving this complex post-war problem.

The quadrilateral status of Berlin emerged and was formed on the basis of agreements and decisions of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition of the war and post-war period and developed in the general direction of defining the main goals and objectives in relation to Germany, which were generally contained already in the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the three Powers (October 1943).), Tehran (November 1943) and Yalta (February 1945 During the meetings of the heads of government of the USSR, the United States and Britain, as well as in the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany of June 5, 1945, a comprehensive program for the post-war development of Germany was formulated in the Potsdam Agreement, which set the goal of consistently implementing measures for denazification, demilitarization, democratization and decartelization of Germany to lay the foundations for peace and security in Europe,"Germany has never again threatened its neighbors and the preservation of world peace"; the agreement stressed that the Allies do not intend to "destroy or enslave the German people" and intend to give them "the opportunity to prepare for the future reconstruction of their lives for democracy and peace."-

9 "Materials of the XXV Congress of the CPSU", Moscow, 1977, pp. 17-18.

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on a scientific basis " 10 . The Potsdam Conference concluded a historic agreement aimed at the peaceful and democratic reconstruction of Germany and its transformation into a peace-loving and democratic State .11
The realization of these noble goals could then be achieved only through the joint occupation of Germany and the assumption of supreme power by the Allies, since as a result of the defeat of the fascist state, there was no central government or authorities in the country that could guarantee the implementation of the program of peaceful reconstruction of Germany planned by the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition in Yalta and Potsdam. At the same time, the Potsdam Agreement was based on the need to preserve the unity of the country and provided for the creation of central German administrative departments in the field of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry, which were to operate under the leadership of the Control Council. Section III " On Germany "(item C: Economic principles) explicitly stated that during the period of occupation, Germany should be considered as a single economic entity. The Potsdam Agreement also formulated the main principles for the treatment of Germany in the initial period of occupation, defined the fundamental foundations for the future system of security and peace in Europe, and therefore occupied a central place in the entire set of agreements and decisions of the four Powers.

Quadripartite agreements developed by the European Consultative Commission (ECC)12 and directly regulated the issues of the order and mechanism of occupation (including Berlin), occupy a subordinate position and are filled with meaning precisely in connection with the implementation of a detailed program for the development of Germany after liberation from fascism, being "nothing more than a concretization and logical consequence of the general agreements of the four powers regarding the treatment of post-war Germany as a for the period of its occupation " 13 . As early as September 12, 1944, the "Protocol of Agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the zones of occupation of Germany and on the administration of "Greater Berlin"14 was signed, and on November 14, 1944 - the "Agreement on the Control Mechanism in Germany"15 . The Protocol of September 12, 1944, as amended on November 14, 1944 and July 26, 194516, established that " Germany... It will be divided into three zones for occupation purposes.. and a special area of Berlin will also be allocated, which is jointly occupied by the tre-

10 "Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War". Documents and materials. Vol. III. Moscow, 1947, pp. 339-340.

11 " The truth about the policy of the Western Powers in the German question. (Historical reference)", Moscow, 1959, p. 14.

12 was established in accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Britain and the United States of November 1, 1943. The ECC was tasked with developing joint recommendations to the Governments of the three Powers on post-war settlement issues.

13 " The Truth about the policy of the Western Powers in the German question...", p. 43. The Potsdam Agreement, as stated in the note of the Soviet Government to the three Western powers of November 27, 1958, is "the most concentrated expression of the obligations" of the four powers in relation to Germany, in the development of which" the remaining agreements of the four powers on the occupation of Germany" ("Pravda", 28. XI. 1958).

14 "Collection of existing treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the USSR with foreign states". Issue XI. Moscow, 1955, p. 62.

15 Ibid., p. 65.

16 On the same day, an agreement was concluded with France regarding its involvement in the occupation of Germany and in the administration of Berlin.

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between the two powers " 17 . The Protocol further provided that the "Berlin area is jointly occupied by the armed forces" of the three Powers, its territory is divided into sectors, and an Inter-Allied Commandant's Office is created for the joint administration of the "Greater Berlin" area, consisting of three commandants appointed by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. The "Agreement on the Control Mechanism in Germany" as amended on May 1, 1945,18 provided for the creation of a quadripartite control body consisting of the commanders-in-chief of the four Powers, called the Control Council, and also specified the provisions of the Protocol of September 12, 1944 concerning the quadripartite administration of Berlin and established that "The Inter-Allied Commandant's Office will operate under the general direction of the Control Council and receive orders through the Coordination Committee." In article 3, paragraph 4, the Supervisory Board was entrusted with the management of the administration of "Greater Berlin"through the relevant bodies.

The direct connection of the agreements of September 12 and November 14, 1944 with the Potsdam decisions on the aims and objectives of the occupation of Germany followed directly from the texts of these agreements themselves. The Protocol of September 12, 1944 stated that the division into zones was being undertaken for "occupation purposes", which were later most clearly listed in the Potsdam Agreement. The agreement of November 14, 1944 concerned "the organization of the Allied control mechanism in Germany for the period of fulfilling the basic requirements of 'unconditional surrender', and these, in turn, were fixed in Yalta and Potsdam. Thus, agreements on the mechanism of the occupation of Germany and the administration of Berlin could not exist without major agreements, since the occupation of Germany without a specific, time-limited program for turning it into a peaceful, democratic state had to be qualified as an annexation of Germany, which is unacceptable from the point of view of generally recognized norms of international law and was directly excluded by the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany June 1945 19 .

But this special significance of the Potsdam Agreement and its indissoluble connection with the quadrilateral agreements and decisions of the war and post-war period on Berlin are denied by the Western powers, who are trying to prove that by splitting Germany and Berlin and thereby grossly violating the obligations assumed in Potsdam, they have not lost their "original rights" to occupy West Berlin. A similar statement is contained, for example ,in a number of works by Western authors, 20 in the memorandum of the British Foreign Ministry of October 11, 1948,21 in the memorandum of the US State Department of December 20, 1958,22 this "quintessence of all such falsifications of the history of the German question" 23.

It is precisely by denying any connection between the ECC agreements and the Potsdam Agreement that the Western Powers are trying to justify

17 France joined the agreement in 1945 on the basis of the decision of the Crimean Conference to allocate the zone of occupation of Germany to France at the expense of the British and American zones.

18 Subject to the changes that made France an equal member of the Allied monitoring mechanism.

19 "Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage 1944 - 1962". Munchen. 1962, S. 10.

20 K. Loewenstein. The Allied Presence in Berlin. "Foreign Policy Bulletin", vol. 38, N 11, p. 82; R. Legien. Die Viermachtevereinbarungen uber Berlin. Ersatzlosungen fur den Status Quo? 2. Aufl. B. 1961, S. 23; D. Mahncke. Berlin im geteilten Deutschland. Munchen - Wien. 1973, S. 39.

21 "Germany. An Account of the Events Leading up to a Reference of the Berlin Question to the United Nations, 11-th October 1948". L. 1958.

22 "The Soviet Note on Berlin. An Analysis". Department of State, Publ. 6757, January 1959.

23 " The Truth about the policy of the Western Powers in the German question...", p. 3.

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The "right" to occupy the western sectors of Berlin indefinitely. They derive their non-contractual rights 24 in West Berlin only from the fact of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, without regard to the objectives of the quadrilateral agreements in relation to Germany as a whole. By deliberately falsifying the facts, the Western Powers base their "original" rights to stay in West Berlin on the "doctrine of conquest", 25 which, together with the "right of the State to war", was eliminated by modern international law as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which resolutely rejected the policy of plunder and violence in international affairs .26 Their use of their pseudo-argument was intended to prove that the presence of the occupying forces of the three Powers on the territory of West Berlin remains their eternal and inviolable right, regardless of their violation of the quadrilateral agreements on the purposes and procedure of the occupation of Germany and Berlin.

Recall that the agreement on the control mechanism in Germany of November 14, 1944, made a strict distinction between the exercise of" supreme power in Germany "by the Allied commanders-in-Chief and the" administration of Greater Berlin " by the relevant authorities. A characteristic feature of the agreements of September 12 and November 14, 1944, which defined the legal principles for organizing joint administration of Berlin on a quadrilateral basis and allowing contingents of troops of Western powers to enter the city, was that Berlin was not geographically separated from the Soviet occupation zone and did not turn into a "fifth" zone of occupation. In the Protocol of September 12, 1944, concerning the distribution of occupation zones among the three Powers, Berlin was assigned to the "Eastern Zone" of occupation, with the only remark that it "provides for a special order of occupation". The three Western Powers were allowed to enter the "Berlin special area" by agreement with the USSR only to participate in its joint administration. In this case, we are talking about the so-called management assignment27 , that is, the cession by the Soviet Union of a part of its rights specifically in the area of administrative management of the corresponding sectors of Berlin, while maintaining full territorial supremacy over the entire Soviet occupation zone in the hands of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany .28 The participation of the Western Powers in the administration of Berlin did not give them any right to separate the temporarily occupied sectors of Berlin from the territory of the Soviet zone of occupation, nor to include them in their occupation zones, nor to declare them a "fifth" zone, because this would mean violating the joint quadrilateral agreements .29
The American and British garrisons that entered Berlin on July 1-4, 1945, entered the city not by the "right of victors", resulting from the fact of the German surrender, but with the consent of the USSR, which loyally fulfilled the decisions of the relevant quadrilateral commissions.

24 "Germany. An Account of the Events...", p. 5.

25 E. Korovin. The Berlin question and international law. "New time", 1959, N 2; G. Tunkin. The Berlin question in the light of international law. "International Life", 1959, N 2; " West Berlin. West Berlin problematics in a systematic presentation", Moscow, 1961, p. 27.

26 Pravda, 8. I. 1967.

27 For the cession theory, see A. Ferdross. International Law, Moscow, 1955, pp. 236-261.

28 M. Krymsky. The Berlin Question, Moscow, 1958, pp. 30-31; N. Kroger. Zu den Rechtsgrundlagen der sowjetischen Vorschlage fur die Losung der Berlin-Frage. "Staat und Rechb, 1959, N 1.

29 Yu. A. Kvitsinsky. Germany's illegal claims to West Berlin. PhD thesis, Moscow, 1967, pp. 26-73.

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agreements establishing a special order of occupation and administration for the city. "The quadrilateral status of Berlin," the Soviet Government's note of November 27, 1958 emphasized,"arose at one time due to the fact that Berlin, as the capital of Germany, was designated as the seat of the Control Council established to govern Germany during the initial period of occupation." 30 The presence of American, British and French troops in Berlin, located in the center of the Soviet zone of occupation, was intended to provide the necessary working conditions for the Allied Control Council and was thus limited in time to the period necessary for the performance of the tasks assigned to the supreme control body of the Allies by the Potsdam Agreement .31
And the Western Powers initially recognized the fact that Berlin, which was an integral part of the " Eastern Zone "32 , was allocated to the" special area of occupation " only for the purpose of establishing a joint quadripartite administration of the German capital as the seat of the supreme military administration bodies of the four great Powers to ensure their normal activities in implementing the policy agreed in Yalta and Potsdam. A report prepared in February 1947 by the Control Council for the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM)33 (March 10 - April 24, 1947) explicitly stated that, despite the occupation of Berlin by the troops of four Powers, it "is simultaneously the capital of the Soviet zone of occupation." This is evidenced not only by the statements of representatives of the Western Powers, 34 but also by all the practical activities of the Soviet military administration, both before and after the entry of the troops of the Western Powers into Berlin. The first order of the Inter-Allied Commandant's Office of July 11, 1945, upheld "all orders and orders issued by the Soviet garrison commander and the city commandant." 35 The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG) continued to issue orders and orders on a general basis for the entire Soviet occupation zone, including the whole of Berlin, and creating the necessary conditions for the organization of a complete democratic system of local urban self-government.

On May 17, 1945, the anti-fascist Berlin magistrate headed by Chief Burgomaster A. Werner began its work. The People's Police were established under the leadership of the well-known anti-fascist P. Margraf, the court and prosecutor's office 36 , and the activities of democratic parties and trade unions 37 were allowed . In Berlin, as in the entire territory of the Soviet occupation zone, the same system of taxation, wages, supply and distribution of products was applied. SWAG also retained competence in matters related to passenger traffic to Berlin, including the western sectors of the city. &

30 Pravda, 28. XI. 1958.

31 G. Gorner. Potsdamer Abkommen und Westberlinfrage. "Deutsche Auben-politik", 1959, N 5, S. 516 - 517.

32 " The Soviet Union and the Berlin question. Documents". Issue 1. Moscow, 1948, pp. 34, 57.

33 "Report of the Control Board in Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers". Berlin. 1947, p. 44.

34 " The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", Issue 1, p. 79.

35 "Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1962", S. 16. The first commandant of the American sector of Berlin F. Howley acknowledged in his memoirs that this order meant "consent to Russian control of Berlin" (F. Howley Berlin Command. N.Y. 1950, p. 61).

36 "Berlin, Quellen und Dokumente 1945 - 1951". I. Halbband. (West)Berlin. 1961, S. 250.

37 Ibid.

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Civilians who were domiciled in Berlin and wished to travel to the three Western occupation zones were required to obtain permission from the Soviet commandant's Office .38 At the same time, it was not only about permission to transit through the rest of the Soviet occupation zone, but also about permission to leave the western sectors of Berlin. Permission to enter Berlin was also exclusively in the hands of the SVAG authorities, even after the formation of the Allied commandant's office. In addition, the Soviet commander-in-Chief retained in his hands the decision on issues related to the cargo connection of all sectors of Berlin with the western zones of occupation. Only the Foreign Trade Office SWAG could issue permits for the supply of goods from Berlin to the western zones of occupation 39 (at the same time they were permits for the export of goods). The SWAG, in exercising its right of control, compiled lists of goods whose export to the western zones of occupation was subject to restrictions .40 The need for such a step was determined by the place that the economy occupied as an important element of the entire system of the Soviet occupation zone.

The entire transport network of the city (railways and waterways) was included as an integral part of the communications system of East Germany and remained within the competence of the Soviet authorities, 41 which was not disputed by the administration of the three Western Powers. Even after the entry of the troops of the Western powers into the city, the SWAG continued to extend its orders and orders to Berlin .42 Berlin was a politically, economically and culturally integral part of the Soviet zone of occupation .43 On July 11, 1945, at a meeting of the commanders of the troops of the four powers allocated for the joint occupation of the city, the Inter-Allied Commandant's Office of Berlin 44 was created, which from August 1, 1945 received the official name of the Allied Commandant's Office of Berlin. On January 18, 1946, the Charter of the Union Commandant's Office was approved, which was based on the principle of unanimity and coordinated decisions of the four commandants in the administration of the city. The function of the Allied Commandant's Office was "to regulate all urban affairs, which are the common concern of the occupying Powers, and to control the activities of the German authorities." 45
Thus, a special system of occupation and administration was formed in Berlin, defined by the relevant quadripartite agreements and decisions of the war and post-war period. This special order of governance formed the basis for the quadrilateral status of the city, which could ensure the coherence of the actions of the four Powers in relation to Berlin within the framework of their common policy to implement the decisions of the Potsdam Conference on the eradication of fascism and militarism and the creation of a peaceful, democratic, united Germany. The sincere desire of the Soviet side to cooperate fully with the Allies, despite their as-yet hidden intentions.

38 Circular of the Chief Burgomaster of Berlin on issuing travel certificates for interzonal communication dated November 14, 1945 ("Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente 1945-1951". I. Halbband. S. 198 f.); communication of the Magistrate of Greater Berlin on the issue of interzonal passports of 1 April 1946 (ibid., S. 199 f.).

39 Circular of the Department of Trade and Crafts of the Magistrate of Greater Berlin concerning the Facilitation of the issuance of Transport permits in International Goods Traffic, dated 11 November 1946 (ibid.).

40 Ibid., S. 172 f.

41 P. A. Steiniger. West Berlin, Moscow, 1961, p. 4. 25; "Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente 1945 - 1951". I. Halbband, S. 166.

42 "Deutschlandfrage und Volkerrecht". Bd, II. B. 1962, S. 30.

43 J Rshewski. Westberlin - ein politisches Gebilde sui generis. Moskau. 1967.

44 "Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente 1945 - 1951". I. Halbband, S. 132.

45 "Documents and protocols of the Allied Commandant's Office of Berlin". Berlin. 1945, p. 7.

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the opposition has borne fruit. Following the adoption of the Charter of the Allied Commandant's Office, the efforts of the representatives of the four Powers culminated in the drafting of the Provisional Constitution of Greater Berlin, approved at the Commandant's Meeting No. 21 of August 9, 1946,46 and entered into force on October 1, 1946. The relevant committee of the Federal Commandant's Office prepared a regulation on elections to Berlin city and district assemblies, which created conditions for holding democratic and free elections in the city .47
However, already in the first months after the German capitulation, two courses and two lines in the policy of the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition became clearly visible: the line of the USSR for the triumph of a democratic world and the line of the Western powers for the triumph of an imperialist world .48 "After the final grandiose battle and the defeat of the enemy, "noted L. I. Brezhnev," the main participants of the anti-Hitler coalition did not go along the common road of building a lasting peace, but along different paths. The ink on the Declaration of Defeat of Hitlerite Germany, signed in Berlin by representatives of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France, had hardly dried up, when our former allies began to break the ties that united the main participants in the war against German fascism."49 The peace course was opposed by the capitalist states, primarily the United States50 , to refuse to cooperate during the war years, to unleash the cold war against the USSR, to form military-political blocs in order to assert the world hegemony of the United States, strengthen the position of world capitalism and prevent further disintegration of the colonial system. "Politics from a position of strength" and "nuclear diplomacy" were elevated to the rank of a state foreign policy doctrine. The hard line against the socialist countries turned into a "cold war", which declared itself in full voice with the proclamation of the"Truman doctrine "51, the"Marshall Plan "52 and the doctrine of" containment " of communism 53 .

"This is not peace, but a cold war - a pathetic substitute for real peace. It has long poisoned relations between our countries and international relations in general. To a certain extent, its dark influence remains, unfortunately, in some ways still " 54 . In Europe, the cold War resulted in a rejection of the spirit of Potsdam, in direct sabotage by the Western powers of the political legacy of the anti-fascist coalition-decisions on the post-war structure of the world, especially on the principles of treatment of Germany after the war .55 The Western powers opposed the firm line of the USSR, which was aimed at preserving the political and economic unity of Germany and its capital, the consistent implementation of the program of democratic revival of this country agreed in Potsdam, the course of preserving the former socio-economic system that nurtured fascism, countering the formation of central German bodies, and dismemberment of the Soviet Union.

46 "Berliner Zeitung", 10.VIII.1946.

47 "Berliner Zeitung", 11.VIII. 1946.

48 V. N. Vysotsky. West Berlin and its place in the system of modern International relations, Moscow, 1971, p. 85.

49 L. I. Brezhnev. Lenin's Course, vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, pp. 149-150.

50 "Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", Moscow, 1962, p. 31.

51 H. Truman. Memoren. Bd. II. Stuttgart. 1955, S. 115, 116 - 150.

52 N. Inozemtsev. American Imperialism and the German Question, 1954, pp. 115-174.

53 N. Inozemtsev. US Foreign Policy in the Era of Imperialism, Moscow, 1960, p. 429.

54 L. I. Brezhnev. On the Foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, p. 519.

55 " The Truth about the policy of the Western powers in the German question...", p. 18; "International Relations after the Second World War", vol. 1. Moscow, 1962, p. 456.

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Germany and its capital, to create a separate West German state 56 .

A special place in the plans of the Western powers was given to Berlin .57 They sought to cancel its role as the capital of Germany, the political and administrative center of the country, to split off the western sectors of the city and turn them into a bastion of anti-communism, a far-reaching springboard for subversion against the socialist countries. 58 Using the administrative functions assigned to them in the western sectors of Berlin, the Western Powers began to gradually implement schismatic measures as early as 1945, purging district administrations and police departments of democratically minded employees, 59 as well as banning the activities of anti-fascist street and neighborhood commissioners appointed by the Soviet authorities .60 Under the Western commandant's offices, German administrative bodies began to appear that were not subordinate to the magistrate .61
A new stage in the schismatic policy of the Western Powers was defined at the turn of 1946 and 194762 . After the speech of U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, which openly raised the question of creating a separate West German state as a goal of American policy, 63 and after the elections in West Berlin on October 20, 1946, which brought representatives of anti-democratic forces to the leadership of its magistrate, 64 the Western powers no longer disguised themselves they took the path of rejecting 65 previously agreed decisions and forced measures to split the country and Berlin 66 . In accordance with the instructions of the Western occupation authorities and in violation of the Charter of the Allied Commandant's Office and the regime of joint administration of the city, a separate financial and credit system was created in the western sectors of Berlin, economic ties with the Soviet sector and the Soviet occupation zone were systematically disrupted, and the previously unified city organizations of democratic parties and trade unions were split .67 The production capacities of the American and English sectors were integrated into the Buffalo production and supply planning system68 - a two-zone economic association that started functioning on January 1, 194769 . By the middle-

56 n. Inozemtsev. American Imperialism and the German Question, pp. 76-80; J. Bohm. Der deutsche Imperialisms unrl der zweite Weltkrieg. Bd. 3. B. 1962, S. 99.

57 " The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", Issue 1, p. 76.

58 " The Truth about the policy of the Western Powers in the German question...", p. 45.

59 G. M. Akopov. West Berlin. Problemy I resheniya [Problems and Solutions], Moscow, 1974, pp. 51-52.

60 "Berlin. Kampf urn Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945 - 1946". (West) Berlin. 1961, S. 493.

61 P. A. Steiniger. Op. ed., p. 32.

62 "History of Diplomacy", Vol. V, book 1. Moscow, 1974, pp. 88-89; "The Soviet Union and the question of the unity of Germany and the peace treaty with Germany", Moscow, 1962, p. 62.

63 "International Relations after the Second World War", vol. 1, Moscow, 1962, p. 458.

64 "Berlin. Kampf um Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1945 - 1946", S. 212.

65 G. Kayderling, P. Shultz. Berlin 1945-1975. Moscow, 1976, pp. 62-63.

66 "History of the German Democratic Republic, 1949-1973". Short Essay, Moscow, 1975, p. 21.

67 " The Truth about the policy of the Western Powers in the German question...", p. 45.

68 The details of the merger of the American and British zones and the split of Germany were agreed upon during the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the spring of 1946, and in August - September the organizational arrangements for the creation of separate bodies of both zones were practically completed ("History of Diplomacy", Vol. V, book 1, p. 83). December 2 in New York- An agreement was signed in New York on the establishment of Buffalo farms (N. Inozemtsev. American imperialism and the German question, p. 114). The formation of Bizonia (which after France joined this agreement in 1948 became Trizonia) expressed "the beginning of an open turn in the policy of these states from the Potsdam Agreement on the Unity of Germany to the policy of splitting Germany" ("The Soviet Union and the question of German unity and the peace Treaty with Germany", p.62).

69 Berlin. Behauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946 - 1948". B. 1959, S. 154, 191.

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In 1948, the unified system of justice, police, and many branches of city government was destroyed .70
At the same time, the Western Powers made efforts to paralyze the activities of the quadrilateral control bodies. As a result of separate decisions of the London Conference of the Three Western Powers with the participation of the Benelux countries regarding the creation of a West German state and the preparation of monetary reform in the Western zones, the Control Council 71 ceased its activities on March 20, 1948 . The Allied Commandant's Office of Berlin has not been able to function normally since 1947, which is also recognized by bourgeois authors .72 On June 16, 1948, the American Commandant, Colonel Howley, defiantly left the meeting of the Allied Commandant's Office, and from July 1 it no longer met. There was no response to the protest of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, V. D. Sokolovsky, to the Commander-in-Chief of the American troops in Germany, L. Clay, dated June 21, 1948, in connection with the provocative actions of the American side.73
The collapse of the central occupation authorities made it easier for the Western powers to split Germany and Berlin. A serious blow to the unity of the country was the implementation of a separate monetary reform in West Germany on June 18, 1948, 74 which, on June 23, suddenly and in violation of the assurances given to the Soviet side, 75 was illegally extended to the western sectors of Berlin, where the western stamp with the "B" stamp began to be introduced on June 25. The implementation of a separate monetary reform meant an open violation by the Western powers of the quadrilateral agreements. These illegal actions practically deprived them of their right to continue participating in the governance of Berlin 76, which was an integral part of the agreement on the quadripartite governance of Germany as a whole. As a result of the separate actions of the Western Powers, Berlin lost its importance as the seat of the control mechanism, and thus the military administration of the three Western Powers .77
In the face of such a treacherous and open violation of treaty obligations by the Western Powers, the SWAG took urgent measures to prevent the Soviet sector of Berlin and the Soviet occupation zone from flooding with devalued banknotes and disrupting the East German economy by introducing temporary restrictions

70 V. N. Vysotskn I. I. Op. ed., p. 142.

71 " The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", Issue 1, p. 24.

72 R. Monier. Le crepusrule du Conseil de control de Berlin. "Revue generate du droit international public", 1948, N 3 - 4.

73 "Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente 1945 - 1951". II. Halbband. B. 1964, S. 1441.

74 "A currency barrier was erected across Germany, and the country, in the words of an English publicist, was cut in two like a surgeon's scalpel" (G. Kayderling, P. Stultz. Op. ed., pp. 128-129).

75 See the letter of the British Commander-in-Chief, General W. Robertson, to Sokolovsky, in which he stated that "this decision does not affect the English sector of Berlin" (Dokurnente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1962, p.67). In Sokolovsky's reply to the commanders-in-chief of the three powers, it was noted that he was pleased to take note of the statements that the separate monetary reform announced for the western zones would not be carried out in the western sectors of the city, and stressed: "I take this for granted, as only one currency can be traded in Berlin. Everyone understands that the introduction of two currencies in Berlin would undermine the economy and money circulation not only in the Greater Berlin area, which is located in the Soviet zone of occupation and is economically part of it, but it would also undermine the economy of the Soviet zone, which the Soviet occupation authorities cannot allow due to their obligations under international treaties." ("The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", Issue 1, p. 34).

76 " The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", Issue 1, p. 24.

77 P. A. Nikolaev. The policy of the United States, Britain and France in the German question of 1945-1954, Moscow, 1964, p. 205.

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freight and passenger traffic between West Berlin and the western zones of German occupation 78 . The Western powers responded by organizing the notorious "air bridge" to West Berlin and the"self-blockade" 79 of the city, which aimed to further escalate the situation 80 . An extremely acute situation has emerged, fraught with the danger of an international conflict. However, the firm constructive position of the USSR, the voice of world public opinion and the lack of unity among Western countries forced the ruling circles of the United States, Britain and France to turn to the USSR with a proposal to hold negotiations on the situation in Berlin.

In August 1948, an exchange of views was held in Moscow with representatives of the three Western Powers. On August 2, J. V. Stalin received the Western ambassadors and during a conversation with them noted that the presence of Western powers in Berlin does not make sense after they violated the joint quadrilateral agreements and adopted the London decisions on the creation of a separate West German state. However, although the situation has changed, the Soviet government has no desire to " oust "the troops of its former allies from Berlin and considers it possible to resolve the disputed problems on the basis of replacing the" B " mark in the western sectors of the city with the currency of the Soviet occupation zone and simultaneously lifting the imposed restrictions on communications .81 As a result, the "Directive of the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France to the four commanders-in-Chief of the occupation forces in Germany" of August 30, 1948 was developed, which, along with recommendations for the abolition of "restrictions on communication, transport and trade between Berlin and the western zones" provided for the introduction of the Deutsche mark of the Soviet zone "as the sole currency for Berlin"and withdrawal from circulation of the Western mark" B " 82 . The provisions of this document, in which the Western powers explicitly recognized the fact that Berlin belongs to the Soviet zone of occupation, could be an acceptable basis for normalizing the situation in the city. However, in an effort not to overcome, but to deepen, the split in Berlin, the Western powers have evaded fulfilling their obligations. On the initiative and insistence of General Clay, the negotiations between the Commanders-in-Chief were interrupted on September 7, 1948.

Under the noise of propaganda hysteria around the "Berlin crisis", the Western powers completed the split of the city's self-government bodies. On July 28, 1948, a separate police presidium was formed in the western sectors. On August 10, an order by the Western military authorities banning money transfers from western sectors to eastern sectors was issued, which disorganized the activities of Berlin credit institutions. The order on separate tax collection eliminated the unity of the city budget 83 . Commercial and industrial firms in the Western sectors were prohibited from maintaining any industrial or commercial ties with firms in the Soviet sector and the Soviet zone of occupation .84 In September 1948, some deputies of the city Assembly moved their meetings to West Berlin, thus destroying the city's people's representation. Finally, in October

78 " The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", vol. 1, pp. 37-39.

79 G. Kayderling, P. Shultz. Op. ed., p. 136.

80 The organization of the "air bridge" marked the end of the split of Berlin, the disruption of the Berlin-wide supply system and the creation of an economically isolated part of the city, included in the supply system of West Germany (A. A. Galkin, D. E. Melnikov. The USSR, the Western Powers and the German question (1945-1965). Moscow, 1966, p. 118).

81 B. Smith. Meine drei Jahre in Moskau. Hamburg. 1950, S. 340 - 343.

82 " The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", vol. 1, pp. 37-39.

83 V. N. Vysotsky. Decree op., p. 161.

84 " The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", vol. 1, pp. 80-81.

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In 1948, some of the magistrates representing the SPD and bourgeois parties moved their residence to the English sector of the city. The unified self-government of Berlin ceased to exist 85 .

In response to the divisive actions of the Western Powers and reactionary forces in West Berlin, the provisional Democratic Magistrate of Greater Berlin was created on November 30, 1948, to prepare for elections to the city's Chamber of Deputies. F. was elected Chief Burgomaster of Berlin. Ebert 86 .

Rejecting the Soviet proposal to hold free and democratic elections throughout Berlin, the authorities of the Western sectors held separate elections on December 5, 1948, which were intended to give the appearance of legality to the split of Berlin and legality to the separate bodies of the West Berlin city government .87 On December 21, 1948, the Western Powers created the Allied Commandant's Office of Berlin on a three-way basis, 88 which had nothing in common with the former Inter-Allied Commandant's Office, since the creation of this separate body was a gross violation of the decisions and agreements of the ECC on the participation of Western representatives in the joint administration of the special area of Greater Berlin,

The situation continued to deteriorate catastrophically. The crisis around Berlin was also used by reactionary circles in the West to complete measures to put together aggressive blocs and pacts. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) was signed in Washington, D.C., the political and military concepts of which became the basis of the Cold War policy in Europe and around the world. It took the active efforts of the USSR and all peace-loving forces to defuse the tense situation to the limit and prevent a slide into military danger. In January 1949, J. V. Stalin, in an interview with the European director of the American United Press agency, K. Smith, stated that the Soviet government was ready to lift transport restrictions, provided that transport and trade restrictions were lifted by the Western powers .89 As a result of negotiations in Washington, an agreement was reached to lift the aforementioned restrictions and convene a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris "to consider issues about Germany and problems that have arisen in connection with the situation in Berlin, including the issue of currency in Berlin"90 . At the Sixth Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in May - June 1949, Soviet representatives tried to restore the Control Council and the Inter-Allied Commandant's Office of Berlin, as well as the creation of a Berlin-wide Magistrate to coordinate the administration of Berlin .91 However, these proposals did not meet with a response from the Western powers. The Paris session did not produce any concrete results. On the day of its completion, an agreement was signed on the establishment of the Supreme Allied Commission of the United States, Britain and France, which will include:-

85 V. N. Vysotsky. Op. ed., p. 173.

86 "Berlin. Elehauptung von Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 1946 - 1948", S. 713.

87 In a statement issued on December 21, 1948, the SWAG stated: "These elections are unconstitutional, since the provisional constitution of Berlin does not provide for elections in certain sectors of the city; unauthorized, since they do not express the will of the population of Berlin; undemocratic, since they were held after the prohibition of the activities of a number of democratic organizations and in conditions of persecution and terror" ("The Soviet Union and the Berlin question...", Issue 2, Moscow, 1949, p. 33).

88 "Berlin. Ringen um Freiheit und Wiederaufbau 1948 - 1951". (West)Berlin. 1962, S. 67.

89 Pravda, 31. I. 1949.

90 " Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union. 1949". Moscow, 1953, p. 99.

91 "The Soviet Union and the question of German Unity and the Peace Treaty with Germany", pp. 56-57.

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The roe was in blatant contradiction with the quadripartite agreements .92
The goal of the Western powers, according to the American author M. Gottlieb, was to " unite their sectors, tear them away from the Soviet zone and the eastern sector of Berlin, blow up the citywide government or turn it into a West Berlin government, and also be able to administer and manage West Berlin in close connection with West Germany and possibly in the future." 93. On May 14, 1949, the declaration of the Western Powers on the principles of relations between the Allied Commandant's Office and Berlin, known as the "Small Occupation Statute", was adopted. It proclaimed the establishment of the supreme authority of the administration of the three Western Powers in West Berlin and granted limited self-government to the West Berlin authorities. The Allied Commandant's Office retained "all the necessary rights... to guarantee security and order, as well as to stabilize the military and economic situation of the city"94 . The "Small Occupation Statute" preserved the occupation regime in West Berlin and formalized the split of Berlin .95
The split of the city was carried out synchronously with the split of the whole of Germany. On April 8, 1949, the Bonn Constitution and the Occupation Statute were published, which provided the Western Powers with supreme authority and control over the newly created West German State, whose Government was formed on May 12, 1949. On May 23, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany was ratified by the parliaments of the West German states. On September 7, the first Bundestag met to elect the President and Chancellor of a separate West German state, the Federal Republic of Germany.

The democratic forces of the German people responded to the machinations of imperialist reaction, which split Germany and the German nation, by creating the first state of workers and peasants on German soil - the German Democratic Republic, which was proclaimed at the 9th session of the German People's Congress on October 7, 1949. On October 10, the commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, V. I. Chuikov, on behalf of the Soviet Government, made a statement about the decision to transfer to the Provisional Government of the GDR the management functions that had previously belonged to SWAG 96 . On November 12, the administrative functions of the former Soviet Military Commandant's Office 97 were transferred to the Magistrate of Greater Berlin . Thus, Germany ceased to exist as a single state entity, both in fact and legally .98 Instead, two independent states - the GDR and the FRG-emerged, as well as a special entity - West Berlin, which was unlawfully separated by the Western powers from the GDR capital Berlin. With the formation of the GDR, the liquidation of the occupation regime on the territory of the former Soviet occupation zone, including its capital Berlin, the split of the Western powers of the unified city self-government bodies and the Allied Commandant's Office ceased to exist, and four other cities were destroyed.-

92 "History of Diplomacy", vol. V, book 1, p. 117.

93 M. Gottlieb. The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis. N. Y. 1960, p. 94.

94 "Collection of documents of the USA, England and France about Germany". Issue 2 (May 1949-December 1951), Moscow, 1959, pp. 64-66.

95 "Volkerrechtliche Aspekte der Stellung Westberlins". "Urania. Schriftenreihe fur den Referenten", 1969, N 4.

96 "The Soviet Union and the question of German unity and the Peace Treaty with Germany", pp. 66-68; "Documents on the Foreign Policy of the GDR Government", Moscow, 1955, p. 242.

97 Pravda, 14. X. 1949.

98 V. N. Vysotsky. Op. ed., p. 191.

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third-party status of Berlin. The special status of West Berlin began to take shape.

As a result of the transfer to the GDR of the entire amount of administrative functions performed before its formation by the SVAG and the Soviet city Commandant's office. The GDR, along with the rights of supremacy over the territory of the former Soviet occupation zone, also received supreme rights over Greater Berlin. Based on this, the Constitution of the GDR, approved by the 3rd German National Congress, considered Berlin as the capital of the Republic (Article 2). In the appeal of the Berlin Magistrate to the population of October 9 on the state-legal status of Berlin, it was emphasized that "Berlin is not a federal land of a West German separate state, but the capital of the German Democratic Republic" 99 . The Charter of the City Magistrate (Section 1), adopted on March 29, 1950, defined as the main task of the Chief Burgomaster of the city his duty to monitor the implementation of "the political principles in accordance with which the administration of the capital of the German Democratic Republic is carried out"100 . Such international legal documents as the declaration of the Soviet Government of March 25, 1954 on the establishment of full sovereignty of the GDR were based on the same fact that all of Berlin belonged to the GDR101 and the corresponding places in the treaty between the USSR and the GDR of September 20, 1955 102 .

After the elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the formation of a separate magistrate in the western sectors of Berlin, 103 there were their own legislative and executive bodies of state power, whose relations with the occupation authorities were regulated by the "Small Occupation Statute". The Constitution of West Berlin 104 , approved by the tripartite Commandant's Office on August 29 , 1950105, formalized and consolidated the split of the city and the entry of its western part on an independent path of development. In accordance with section 1 of Article 1, West Berlin was declared both a German land and a city. According to Article 2, the "community of Germans living in [West] Berlin" was declared the bearer of full power. The highest body of state power was the City Chamber of Deputies, which is subordinate to the activities of the government-the West Berlin Senate (Article 3).The ruling mayor of the city represents West Berlin in the international arena (Article 43). The Constitution regulates the rights of citizens of the city, defines the powers of local (district) government, courts, justice and police. West Berlin received its own coat of arms and flag (Article 5).

Thus, in the western part of the city, split off by the Western powers from its natural environment, a special state-political entity began to form, which has the attributes of statehood (borders, constitution, citizenship, authorities, courts and police, flag and coat of arms) and elements of international legal personality, the implementation of which is limited by the presence of an occupation regime in the city. This state-political entity developed alongside and in parallel with two German states-the GDR and the FRG, without being part of either of them. The existence of two independent states-

99 "Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente 1945 - 1951". II. Halbband, S. 1801.

100 Ibid. S. 1805.

101 Pravda, 26. III. 1954.

102 Pravda, 21. IX. 1955.

103 Elections were held in West Berlin on 3 December 1950. The SPD won 44.7% of the vote, the CDU-24.6%, the FDP-23%. The SED did not participate in these divisive elections. The ruling burgomaster was elected reactionary E. Reuter from the SPD (G. Kayderling, P. Shultz. Op. ed., p. 222).

104 "Collection of documents of the USA, England and France about Germany". Issue 2, p. 137.

105 Entered into force on 1 October 1950.

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As a result of the post - war development of the territorial and political status quo in Europe, 106 the German state and the special entity of West Berlin became an integral part of the post - war development of the territorial and political status quo in Europe .

The Bonn Government, already at the time of the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany, set out to revise the results of World War II, put forward territorial claims to the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and formulated an aggressive concept of solving the national question of the German people according to the imperialist recipe by absorbing the first state of workers and peasants that had emerged on German soil. For many years, Germany's revanchist aspirations have been the main stumbling block in the efforts of peace-loving and democratic forces aimed at turning Europe into a continent of peace, security and cooperation among peoples. The European continent was, " one might say, mined by the revanchist demands of Bonn. These requirements have been established... to the level of official German policy " 107 . A solution to the question of Berlin was proposed by the reaction within the framework of the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany should be considered "until full German unity is achieved, the only legitimate state organization of the German people." Bonn's claim to Berlin, especially to the western sectors of the city, was one of the most dangerous sources of friction and complications in central Europe.

The West German authorities expressed their ambitions in this matter in the decision of the Parliamentary Council to invite representatives of Berlin to its meetings "as guests with an advisory voice" .108 Then the Parliamentary Council, although it did not dare to mention Berlin among the lands listed in the preamble of the Basic Law of Germany, nevertheless included claims to Berlin in the text of the West German Constitution .109 The Bundestag statement of 30 September 1949 stated: "The Bundestag... Solemnly declares before the whole world that it is the will of the German people that Greater Berlin should become an integral part of the Federal Republic of Germany and its capital."110 At the end of 1949, the German Government decided to establish a number of representative offices and branches of federal ministries and departments in West Berlin. And after March 24, 1950, 111 began the systematic transfer of various federal services and institutions to the city. These illegal claims of the Federal Republic of Germany were also enshrined in the unilaterally adopted West Berlin Constitution .112 However, the Western powers suspended the relevant articles 23, paragraph 2 of Article 144 of the Basic Law of Germany and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the city. 113, because they could not agree to the formal incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic of Germany, since such a step would deprive them of the external signs of legality and inevitably lead to their death.-

106 "History of Diplomacy", Vol. V, book 1, p. 119.

107 L. I. Brezhnev. On the Foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, p. 34.

108 "Der Spiegel", 1961, N 51, S. 26.

109 Article 23 of the Basic Law states: "This Basic Law ... It operates in the states of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, and Greater Berlin... In other parts of Germany, it will come into force upon their accession." Article 144 defines: "2. Insofar as the application of this Basic Law in one of the lands listed in Article 23, or in part of these lands, is subject to restrictions, such land or part of it has the right to send its representatives to the Bundestag, in accordance with Article 38, and to the Bundesrat, in accordance with Article 50" ("Constitution of the Bourgeois Countries of Europe". 1957, pp. 832, 872).

110 W. Brandt. Von Bonn nach Berlin. Eine Dokumentation zur Hauptstadtfrage. Grunewald. 1957, S. 14.

111 Ibid., S. 22.

112 "Die Verfassung von Berlin". (West) Berlin. 1971, S. 27.

113 See the letter of the military governors to the President of the Parliamentary Council of May 12, 1949, stating that they do not recognize the validity of Articles 23 and 144, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, where Berlin qualifies as a land of the Federal Republic of Germany ("Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage 1944-1962", S. 123-125), and a letter from the Western city commandants of August 29, 1950 (ibid., p. 154). In the future, as Bonn's illegal claims to West Berlin grew, the three Powers regularly expressed reservations about certain statements and steps taken by Germany (ibid., p. 123, 126, 127, 154, 1931.

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I would call for an appropriate reaction from the USSR and the GDR, which has communications connecting the western sectors of the city with Germany.

By taking a course to consolidate the division of Germany, involve Germany in aggressive military blocs and turn it into a bastion of the "cold war", the Western powers gave it wide freedom of action in the city. Bonn and the West Berlin Senate tried to make maximum use of the Western powers ' condoning of illegal actions aimed at drawing the western sectors of Berlin into the state - legal system of Germany. As early as October 27, 1949, the West Berlin Chief Burgomaster Reuter outlined the plan of action that was later implemented by his successors: "We want this city of ours to be part of the Federal Republic of Germany" 114, and in the early 50s they managed to get the consent of the Western powers to develop relations between West Berlin and Germany 115 , first of all, in the economic, financial and legal fields. Immediately after the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany, its expansion into West Berlin began, which led to the integration of the city's economy into the economic system of the Federal Republic of Germany. Already in the economic cooperation treaty with the United States of December 15, 1949, the German Government pledged to provide maximum economic assistance to the Western sectors of Berlin .116 The creation of artificial advantages for West Berlin was also meant by the "Law on Assistance to Berlin", approved by the Bundestag on March 7, 1950,117 . By the third transitional law (of January 4, 1952) on the position of West Berlin in the federal financial system, the Federal Republic of Germany placed the city's budget under its full control .118 With the consent of the Western Powers, Bonn began to extend most federal laws to West Berlin, with the exception of military legislation. The procedure for extending German legislation to the city is regulated primarily by the law "On the State of Berlin in the Financial System of the Federation" of January 4, 1952,119 .

Cold War strategists were guided by the fact that the geographical position of West Berlin at the junction of two opposing socio-economic systems made it easier for them to use the western sectors as an anti-communist outpost, pushed into the "deep rear of the enemy"in the conditions of an open border in the city. Therefore, at the height of the Cold War, West Berlin became the largest center of subversive and espionage activities against socialist countries. From its territory, a hostile operation unprecedented in scale and severity unfolded, resulting in an economic, psychological and political war with socialism. Already in the summer of 1948, West Berlin received the name "front-line city" 120 . Reuter compared the city to "the cheapest atomic bomb", 121 dynamite used by the West to influence the GDR .122 The transformation of the western sectors of Berlin into a hotbed of permanent friction, their progressive isolation from the rest of the city, and the increasing penetration of Germany into all spheres of life in West Berlin could not but cause deep concern for all peace-loving forces. The use of Western sectors to inflame tensions varies-

114 "Berlin. Quellen und Dokumente 1945 - 1951". II. Halbband, S. 2064.

115 G. Kayderling, P. Shultz. Op. ed., p. 178.

116 "Bundesgesetzblatt", 1950, II, S. 9.

117 G. Kayderling, P. Shultz. Op. ed., p. 219.

118 "Bundesgesetzblatt", 1952, I, S. 1.

119 Ibid.

120 "Der Tagesspiegel", 3.II.1952.

121 "Newsweek", 16.III.1953, p. 17.

122 W. Brandt, R. Lowenthal. Ernst Reuter. - Ein Leben fur die Freiheit. Munchen. 1957, S. 609.

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many times it was the subject of the most urgent warnings and protests from the USSR and the GDR 123 .

However, at that time, the West Berlin question had not yet emerged from the complex problems that made up the German peace settlement, since the creation of a united and democratic Germany would automatically solve the question of the future of its capital. On March 10, 1952, the Soviet Union issued a draft of the fundamentals of a peace treaty with Germany, 124 which provided for the restoration of the country as a single independent state and the creation of an all-German government for this purpose. In a note dated April 9, 1952, the Soviet Government invited the three Western Powers to discuss the question of holding free elections in Germany .125 The Western powers, forcing the remilitarization of West Germany, responded to the Soviet proposals by accelerating its involvement in aggressive military and political alliances. On May 26, 1952 , the general ("Bonn") "Treaty on Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Western Powers"126 was signed , and on May 27 - the "Treaty establishing the European Defense Community"127, which provided for the participation of Germany in the "European army".

At the Berlin Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers in early 1954. The Soviet Union presented a detailed program for resolving the German question in close connection with ensuring collective security in Europe with the participation of the GDR and FRG. 128 But the West again rejected the Soviet proposals and accelerated the inclusion of Germany in NATO, which was finally decided in the Paris Agreements of October 23, 1954. These agreements, which also included the Bonn Treaty, entered into force on 5 May 1955,129 On the same day, three Western military commandants issued a Statement on the relationship between the Allied Commandant's Office and the West Berlin authorities following the entry into force of the Paris Accords .130 This declaration formally repealed the occupation statute established by the Declaration on Principles of Relations between West Berlin and the Allied Commandant's Office of 8 March 1951,131 However, the Western Powers reserved the right to exercise "supreme authority" in the city. The West Berlin authorities were granted the "maximum possible freedom" of action to the extent that it was "compatible with the special situation" of the city: "The Federal authorities reserve the right to take, if necessary, such measures as are necessary to fulfill their international obligations, ensure public order and preserve the status and security of Berlin, its economy, trade and communications"132 . The declaration of 5 May 1955 established the de facto occupation regime in West Berlin, which still exists there today.

The Paris Accords created a new environment in German affairs. The question of German unification has also been raised in a new way .133 The inclusion of Germany in NATO and its increased militarization, undisguised revanchists-

123 V. N. Vysotsky. Op. ed., p. 212.

124 Pravda, 11. III. 1952.

125 "History of foreign policy of the USSR", Part II, p. 181.

126 "Vertrag iiber die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den drei Machten". Bonn. 1952.

127 "Documents of American Foreign Relations, 1952". N. У. 1953, pp. 234 - 248.

128 Pravda, 26. I and 19. II. 1954.

129 "Die Pariser Vertrage". R. 1956.

130 "Der Tagesspiegel", 6.V.1955.

131 "Collection of documents of the USA, England and France about Germany". Issue 2, pp. 64-68.

132 "Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage...", S. 217.

133 Izvestia, 22. VI. 1956.

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The demands for a revision of the European borders and the policy of absorbing the GDR as a means of resolving the German question closed the way for German reunification. Now it could only be a question of ensuring the peaceful coexistence of two independent German states and establishing normal good-neighborly relations between them. The old prerequisites for solving the German question have radically changed. The question of German reunification fell entirely within the competence of the two German States themselves .134 Recognition of the GDR was now the number one issue in the creation of a security system in Europe, since it was possible to open the way to European cooperation and the creation of relations of trust only by recognizing the political and territorial realities that had developed in Europe as a result of the war and post-war development.

In these circumstances, the problem of the West Berlin settlement began to emerge more clearly through the recognition and international legal registration of the special status of West Berlin as a political entity that is not part of the two German states. The problem of West Berlin has practically merged with the problem of ensuring European security. The new situation in German affairs was taken into account by the Soviet Government's proposals for a post-war settlement in Europe made at the Geneva Meeting of the heads of Government and Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France in July 1955,135 The Soviet proposals referred to the need to take into account existing circumstances and resolve the German question within the framework of the collective security system in Europe, which should also include the GDR and Germany. Due to the unrealistic position of the Western powers, who insisted on solving the German question according to the Bonn recipe - by absorbing the GDR, the Geneva Conference did not lead to a solution to the problem.

An important step towards further strengthening the international legal position of the world's first German workers 'and peasants' state was the signing of the Treaty on Relations between the USSR and the GDR of September 20 , 1955,136 which established bilaterally the principles of relations between the two states set out in the Soviet Government's statement of March 25, 1954,137 The USSR and the GDR emphasized in the treaty that relations between them are based on full equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs (Article 1). Article 2 emphasized that the GDR is free to resolve issues of its domestic and foreign policy, including relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the development of relations with other States. The GDR was given the functions of protection and control at the borders of the GDR, on the outer rim of Greater Berlin and on the borders with the western sectors, as well as on communications running through the territory of the GDR and connecting West Berlin with Germany. In the communication attached to the agreement on the exchange of letters between the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. A. Zorin and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GDR L. Boltz, the parties agreed that the GDR will settle issues related to the transit of transport and citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany and residents of West Berlin, as well as foreigners Control over the movement of military personnel and cargo from the West Berlin garrisons of the United States, Britain, and France through communications remained in the hands of the Soviets. In the Statement of the Soviet Government of September 20, 1955 The post of High Commissioner of the USSR in Germany was abolished. From now on, funk-

134 A. A. Galkin, D. E. Melnikov. Op. ed., p. 178.

135 Pravda, 13 and 16. VII. 1955.

136 Pravda, 21. IX. 1955.

137 Pravda, 26. III. 1954.

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The USSR Ambassador to the GDR was responsible for "maintaining appropriate relations with the representatives of the United States, Britain and France in Germany on issues concerning Germany as a whole", resulting from the decisions of the four powers.138 In September 1955, at the initiative of the USSR, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Germany .139 The Soviet Union was then the only power in the former anti-Hitler coalition that maintained official relations with both German states.

After the conclusion of the Paris agreements and the admission of Germany to NATO, Bonn sharply increased its activity in order to expand its "presence" in West Berlin. In June 1955, the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany decided to open the seat of the Ministry of General German Affairs in the city. 140 On January 29, 1957, a resolution of the Bundestag followed on the need to take measures to "restore Berlin as the capital of Germany", in particular by creating federal bodies in the city, placing a second residence of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany here, etc .141 The Federal Administrative Court was located in West Berlin. Federal Cartel Agency, Department of the Federal Clearing House, Federal Office for Employee Insurance, and other federal agencies. In 1957, 12,000 West Berlin officials were employed in 34 federal departments and institutions .142 In 1959, by decision of the Bundestag, work began on the restoration of the former Reichstag building 143 .

Taking advantage of the connivance of the Western powers, Germany has stepped up the activities of its parliamentary bodies in West Berlin. They began to gather in the city almost immediately after the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany. As the first such parliamentary body, the Berlin Committee of the Bundestag met in the city on November 14-16, 1949. Plenary sessions of the Bundestag were held in West Berlin on 19-20 October 1955, 8 October 1956, 15 October 1957, and for the last time on 7 April 1965. The German Bundesrat met there eight times between 1956 and 1959. Federal meetings for the election of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany were held twice in West Berlin (1954 and 1959). As for the meetings of committees and factions of the Bundestag, they were organized there dozens of times, and in 1956 the first meeting of the federal cabinet was held in the city .144 The number of visits to West Berlin by each of the German presidents and chancellors was also measured not in units, but in dozens. In their speeches, they did not hesitate to declare that they were performing their official functions "in accordance with the Basic Law" in the "land of Berlin"145 and in relation to it. In their trips to West Berlin, West German officials tried to give the character of an ordinary phenomenon, which does not differ from the nature of relations between the lands of Germany.

At the same time, subversive activities from the territory of West Berlin increased. Spies and saboteurs were sent in droves to the GDR .146 Millions of leaflets were distributed by means of balloons, calling for demonstrations against the socialist system .147 In autumn

138 Pravda, 21. IX. 1955.

139 Pravda, 14. IX. 1955.

140 W. Brandt. Op. cit., S. 45.

141 "Bundestagsprotokolle", Drucksache N 3116, S. 10836.

142 W. Brandt. Op. cit., S. 134.

143 "Dex Spiegel", N 49, 1.XII.1959.

144 "Berlin-Regelung", XII, 1971, S. 233.

145 "Der Tagesspiegel", 25.I.1967.

146 "The Book of facts about subversive activities from West Berlin against socialist countries", Moscow, 1962, pp. 14, 18.

147 Only from January to November 1956, 8,5 thousand balloons were registered from Germany and West Berlin with more than 12 million leaflets (Kayderling, P. Shultz. Op. ed., p. 262).

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In 1956, West Berlin was directly assigned a striking role in the plans to organize a counter-revolution in the GDR "on the Hungarian model" .148
In the face of Germany's increasing illegal claims to West Berlin and the latter's growing role in plans to forcibly eliminate the social gains of the first German state of workers and peasants, the USSR and other socialist countries continued to struggle for normalization of the situation in and around West Berlin. On November 27, 1958, in notes to the governments of the three Western powers, the Soviet Union, in coordination with the government of the GDR, made proposals to eliminate the abnormal situation by turning West Berlin into a free demilitarized city. Along with the USSR, the United States, Britain and France, both German States and the United Nations would have to take part in observing this status of West Berlin .149 Such a solution to the problem would not affect the state structure of the city, would allow its population to free themselves from the hardships that the preservation of the occupation regime in it and the lack of orderly normal relations with the natural environment of West Berlin - GDR entailed. On January 10, 1959, the USSR repeated the proposal for the demilitarization and neutralization of West Berlin in the Draft Peace Treaty with Germany: "Until the restoration of the unity of Germany and the creation of a single German state, West Berlin will remain in the position of a demilitarized free city on the basis of its special statute."150
These proposals showed a real approach to the complex problem of the German and West Berlin settlement. Of course, it would be fairer to return the western part of the city, artificially separated from the GDR, to its composition 151 . However, in order to achieve an all-German peace settlement and eliminate on this basis a dangerous hotbed of tension in the center of Europe, the GDR was ready to go to a certain infringement of its interests. 152 But the three Western powers did not show a willingness to contribute to the normalization of German affairs and again rejected the proposals of the USSR. At the same time, given the interest of the world community in the new Soviet initiatives, they were forced to agree to discuss the issue of a German peace settlement at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France in Geneva from May to August 1959, which was also attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GDR and

During these negotiations , the Western side rejected the Soviet proposal to grant West Berlin the status of a demilitarized free city and withdraw the occupation forces from the city .153 The West also rejected the Soviet compromise proposal for a temporary agreement on West Berlin until progress was made in the unification of Germany and the preparation of a peace treaty, which provided for the duration of the work of the General Assembly.-

148 Ibid., pp. 263-266.

149 Izvestiya, 28. XI. 1958.

150 " The Truth about the policy of the Western Powers in the German question...", p. 126.

151 J. Rshewski. Op. cit., S. 89; V. N. Vysotsky. Op. ed., p. 413; A. A. Galkin, D. E. Melnikov. Op. ed., p. 208.

152 "History of the Foreign Policy of the USSR", Part II, p. 317. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, O. Grotewohl, speaking in the People's Chamber on December 8, 1958, said on this occasion: "Of course, in the interests of preserving peace, it would be better if the western sectors of Berlin united with its democratic part in order to The German Democratic Republic could also exercise its sovereignty on this territory. But since we are fully aware of the difficulty of such a step, during the negotiations with the Soviet Union, we agreed to establish the status of a demilitarized free city for West Berlin. Thus, a dangerous hotbed of military threat in Germany would be eliminated "("Dokumente zur Aubenpolitik der Regierung der Deutsrhen Demokmtisrhen Republik". Bd. VI. B. 1959, S. 127.

153 Pravda, 24. V. 1959; Izvestia, 6. VI. 1959.

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reduction of the number of garrisons of the three powers in the city, cessation of hostile activities against the GDR and other socialist states, prohibition of placing atomic and missile weapons on the territory of the city .154 The Western side responded with a comprehensive "Herter plan" 155, which was based on the goal of uniting Germany by absorbing the GDR, consolidating the occupation regime in West Berlin and extending the occupation order to the entire city. 156 Representatives of the USSR and the GDR strongly rejected attempts by the Western side to extend the discussion about West Berlin to the capital of the GDR.

The situation around West Berlin continued to escalate. He justified the characterization given to him at the time of the "easternmost bridgehead" of NATO. It was home to more than 90 different intelligence organizations in Western countries, more than 60 revanchist and militaristic groups and organizations, 157 and, according to a West German newspaper, it became "a collection of all sorts of secret agents that can not be found anywhere else."158 Numerous radio and television stations operated from the territory of West Berlin, which carried out ideological and propaganda processing of the population of the GDR, as well as managed the agency abandoned in the socialist countries. If in 1951 Reuter called it "a thorn in the GDR's body" 159, while in 1955 the American High Commissioner to Germany, Conant, spoke of "the point of a spear that reaches to the very heart of East Germany" 160 . And by the end of the 1950s, West Berlin was beginning to play an increasingly active role in preparing for German aggression against the GDR .161 It was then used as the main springboard for waging a broad economic war against the GDR by artificially undervaluing the GDR brand in relation to the German brand, recruiting qualified labor in the GDR and luring technical intellectuals, economic espionage, and using grenzgengers ("border crossers"). According to some sources, the damage caused to the GDR by this illegal activity amounted to 3.5 billion rubles. marks per year 162 . The total losses of the GDR from the economic "cold war", conducted mainly through West Berlin, amounted to $ 83.3 billion in 1949-1961, according to the calculations of the American economist Apel. marks 163 . The "Frontline City" fulfilled this function, and its ruling burgomaster, returning in 1958 from a trip to the United States, did not hesitate to declare that "the task of West Berlin is to make the stabilization of the GDR as difficult as possible, to slow it down as much as possible. And let West Berlin be a troublemaker rather than a city that has slept through everything in the world."164
By the summer of 1961, it became clear that the provocations from the West Berlin side were intended to prepare a counter-revolutionary putsch in the GDR, more dangerous than the attempts to raise an insurrection in 1953.165 . The West German and West Berlinian press authorities sharply increased the publication of podstra-

154 Izvestia, 30. VI. 1959.

155 H. Siegler. Dokumentatition zur Deutschlandfrage. II. Hauptband. Bonn - Wien - Zurich. 1961, S. 217 - 227.

156 Document of 18. V. 1959.

157 " The Book of Facts...", p. 14.

158 "Schwabisches Tageblatt", 7.VIII. 1954.

159 "Zur Lage in Westberlin. Eine Information hrsg. vom Ausschuss fur deutsche Einheit". B. 1962 S. 11.

160 "Neues Deutschland", 6.XII.1955.

161 " The Book of Facts...", pp. 116-144; "Unsere Zeit", 1962, N 1, S. 5.

162 G. Reintanz. Der kalte Krieg. Westberlin und das Volkerrecht. "Staat und Rechb, 1962, N 1, S. 36.

163 "Neues Deutschland", 5.III. 1964.

164 "Westberlin. Ein Handbuch zur Westberlin-Frage", S. 73.

165 "Unsere Zeit", 1962, N 1, S. 19; "Val mira". Dresden. 1967, p. 21.

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Some of these articles clearly called for the "liberation of Eastern Europe" 166 . Back in January 1961, Karl Adenauer made a provocative statement of this kind, 167 and Bonn and the Senate forced the integration of West Berlin into the state monopoly system of Germany.. A statement issued by the Soviet Government on July 8, 1961, drew attention to the fact that "attempts by the Federal Republic of Germany to use West Berlin for subversive work and hostile propaganda against other states exacerbate the already abnormal situation in this city. Peace-loving forces, of course, cannot tolerate such a situation. " 168 When the Wallenstein IV maneuvers of the Bundeswehr began in August 1961 and 20 thousand reservists were called up to the Bundeswehr, the Berlin slaughterhouses "suddenly" caught fire on August 7, and arson attacks began on August 11 at Humboldt University 169 . Everything suggested that the instigators of war could move to even more aggressive actions from day to day. Chairman of the State Council of the GDR Ulbricht stressed that Bonn's plans "are limited to pushing its subversive activities to the limit and creating conditions that, after the elections in West Germany, will unleash an open attack on the GDR, civil war and open military provocations." 170
In this situation, at the Moscow meeting of the First Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist and Workers ' Parties of the Warsaw Pact countries in August 1961, it was decided to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of the socialist countries .171 The Conference appealed to the People's Chamber, the Government and all the working people of the GDR to "establish on the borders of West Berlin such a system as will reliably block the way for subversive activities against the countries of the socialist camp, so that the entire territory of West Berlin, including its border with democratic Berlin, will be reliably protected and effectively controlled"172 . Measures to close the GDR's border with West Berlin were implemented on the night of August 13. The usual border regime was established along it. "Revanchist politicians and agents of West German militarism," said the Resolution of the GDR Council of Ministers of August 12, 1961, "are not allowed to enter the territory of the GDR capital (Democratic Berlin)." 173
This event thwarted the aggressive plans of the Bonn militarists, who dreamed of revising the post-war borders, primarily by absorbing the GDR. With the creation of a defensive wall that passed through Berlin, the dream that "the Bundeswehr will pass through the Brandenburg Gate to the sound of a ringing march"was put to an end .174 The workers of the GDR did not allow their socialist gains to be encroached upon. The West had to recognize the fact that there were two sovereign states on the territory of the former Germany, that their borders were inviolable, and that the improvement of the situation in Europe was possible only on the basis of recognition of the realities that had developed on the continent as a result of the war and post-war development. The event on August 13 significantly strengthened the sovereignty of the GDR, once again demonstrated the strength and cohesion of the countries of the socialist community, and marked another positive shift in the balance of power in the region.

166 " The Book of Facts...", p. 103-105; "Val Mira", p. 21.

167 Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 1961, No. 11, p. 147.

168 " Foreign policy of the Soviet Union and international relations. Collection of documents, 1961", Moscow, 1962,: tr. 143.

169 "Neues Deutschland", 14.VIII.1962, 12.VIII.1964.

170 "Neues Deutschland", 13.VIII.1961.

171 Pravda, 6. VIII. 1961.

172 Pravda, 14. VIII. 1961.

173 Ibid.

174 "Neues Deutschland", 14.VIII. 1961.

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on the world stage. The GDR newspapers wrote that "since our defensive rampart showed where the border runs, things have become much calmer in the center of Europe," and rightly stated that " August 13, 1961, will be considered in the future as a turning point, as one of the days when the struggle between imperialism and socialism was decided." on German soil"; as the future President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Heinrich Heinemann, was forced to admit, "the actions of the GDR government were a response to the Bonn government's 12-year wrong policy on the German question." 175
The Western Powers realized that it was not in their interests to try to further escalate the situation around West Berlin and that it would be better for them to "negotiate with Russia on a peaceful settlement of the Berlin crisis." 176 In the autumn of 1961, an exchange of views between the USSR and the United States on the German problem , including the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, began, and in New York, the USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko met with Secretary of State D. Rusk. From January to March 1962, negotiations were held in Moscow with the American Ambassador L. Thompson, then the exchange of views was continued by the USSR Ambassador to the United States A. F. Dobrynin and Rask. In the summer of 1962, the President of the United States met with Dobrynin in Washington, and the head of the Soviet government-with Thompson in Moscow. In the autumn of 1962, Kennedy and Raek again had conversations with A. A. Gromyko and A. F. Dobrynin. In the spring and autumn of 1963, negotiations were held between A. A. Gromyko and J. P. Blavatsky. Kennedy, and between A. A. Gromyko and Rusk 178 .

Although the Americans did not accept a number of compromise proposals from the Soviet side concerning the West Berlin settlement, 179 they were forced to recognize the explosive nature of the West Berlin problem and the need for such a settlement, as well as the fact that the sovereignty of the GDR was taken into account in resolving these issues. During the exchange of views, there was mutual understanding on the expediency of refusing to use force in order to change European borders, as well as that Germany should not be allowed to use nuclear weapons .180 However, Soviet-American contacts did not produce concrete results at that time. But they played a positive role in resolving the Caribbean crisis and in further seeking a four-Power agreement on the status of West Berlin. This exchange of views also had an impact on Bonn and the West Berlin Senate. Despite the fact that the closure of the border on August 13 , 1961 caused a number of provocations and sabotage against the GDR 181, the new situation in the political, economic and social life of the city could not really be ignored by Bonn and the Senate. Money-changing offices in West Berlin were closed, a significant outflow of capital, labor, and specialists began, as well as the transfer of large enterprises and research centers to Germany, and the city's revenues decreased due to the disappearance of the Grenzgengers .182 Pessimism has increased in public circles in West Berlin over its uncertain future and political isolation.

175 "Neues Deutschland", 13.VIII.1962.

176 "Documents on Germany 1944 - 1961". Washington. 1961, p. 801.

177 "Foreign Policy of the USSR", Moscow, 1965, p. 337.

178 A. A. Galkin, D. E. Melnikov. Op. ed., p. 235.

179 In particular, the Soviet government agreed to the presence on the territory of the city of symbolic military contingents under the flag of the United Nations, which would take on certain obligations in West Berlin ("International Relations after the Second World War", Vol. 3. Moscow 1965, p. 213).

180 Pravda, 25. IV. 1962.

181 From 13 August to 30 April 1962 alone, 124 attacks were carried out on the territory and border of the GDR, including 93 cases of shooting at border guards ("The Book of Facts...", p. 106; "Dokumentation der Zeit", Hf. 305. 1964, S. 30 - 32).

182 "Berliner Zeitung", 2.II.1967

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After August 13, the problem of relations between relatives on both sides of the border with West Berlin was raised again. The West Berlin Senate's support for Bonn's revanchist aspirations towards the GDR and its unwillingness to respect its sovereignty have long hindered the issue of West Berliners visiting their relatives in the GDR capital .183 Immediately after August 13, the GDR Government invited the West Berlin Senate to hold appropriate negotiations. However, the Senate, true to its previous policy of non-recognition of the GDR, refused for two years to enter into direct negotiations with it, bypassing the FRG, 184 and only under pressure from the city community was forced to agree to the GDR's proposal 185 . The negotiations over family passes were further evidence of the GDR's peaceful foreign policy and dealt another blow to the expansionist ambitions of the reaction.

An important contribution to the fight against Bonn's illegal claims to West Berlin was the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between the USSR and the GDR of June 12 , 1964,186 which is a document of truly historic significance .187 The Treaty marked not only a qualitatively new stage in relations between the two sovereign socialist states, but also summed up the efforts of both countries to solve the West Berlin problem, fixing the real situation here - the transformation of West Berlin into a special entity that is not part of the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. In Article 6 of the treaty, the USSR and the GDR agreed to "consider West Berlin as an independent political unit" .189 The Treaty "consolidated the lessons of August 13 in international law and developed them further." 190 Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR V. Stof noted that "for the first time an international treaty takes into account the situation that developed as a result of the Second World War and the status of West Berlin is fixed in international law"191 . The inclusion of Article 6 in the treaty meant that the GDR and the USSR assumed an obligation not to recognize Germany's illegal claims to West Berlin in any form. At the same time, the wording describing the status of West Berlin left the possibility for a later more precise definition of it .192 As the GDR Foreign Minister O. Winzer emphasized, the provision that the USSR and the GDR will consider West Berlin as an independent political unit "contributes to the peaceful settlement of the West Berlin question at an appropriate time."193
The status of West Berlin as a special political entity is also reflected in the new treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance that the GDR concluded in 1967 with Poland, which included the following agreements:-

183 "Neues Deutschland", 16.II.1967.

184 Proposal of the Chief Burgomaster F. On the opening of two branches of the GDR tourist office for issuing passes for visiting democratic Berlin (Dokumentation zur Westberlinfrage, V. 1964, pp. 154-155), and the declaration of W. Stauf, dated December 21, 1961, that he was ready to start negotiations on this issue with the ruling Burgomaster of West Berlin (ibid., S. 155), W. Ulbricht's statement to the People's Chamber on 24 January 1962 on the GDR's readiness to open such bureaus (ibid., pp. 160-161), etc.

185 Ibid., S. 213 - 214.

186 Pravda, 13. VI. 1964.

187 Pravda, 26. IX. 1964.

188 V. Boldyrew. Volkerrechtliche Aspekte der Stellung Westberlins. "Dokumentation der Zeit", 1969, N 1/2.

189 Pravda, 13. VI. 1964.

190 "Neues Deutschland", 13.VIIL1964.

191 "Neues Deutschland", 25.IX.1964.

192 "Deutsche Auflenpoliiik", 1964, N 16, S. 913.

193 O. Winzer. Der Freundschafts- und Beistandsvertrag zwischen DDR und UdSSR. B. 1964, S. 43.

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Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria 194 . However, the efforts of the socialist countries aimed at defusing tensions around West Berlin did not meet with understanding from the three Western powers and, of course, Germany, which continued to cling to the former bankrupt policy with even greater tenacity. The basis of this policy was laid out by the Bonn Foreign Minister G. Schroeder: "We should always remember the benefits that are more expensive than gold and consist in the fact that the Western powers have settled on the very front line, that is, in Berlin, and not only indirectly, through an alliance with NATO, as is the case in Germany, but quite directly. It would be dangerous to give up this benefit. " 195 Although the countries of the socialist community emphasized the need to respect the special status of West Berlin in the Bucharest Declaration (1966), the Karlovy Vary Declaration (1967), the Budapest Proclamation (1969), and bilateral communiques and statements, Bonn did not consider it necessary to moderate its illegal activity.

The diversity of relations between West Berlin and Germany, the city's connection to the economic, financial and legal system of the federation, its consideration as an object and subject of Germany's international obligations, and the expansion of the "federal presence" in West Berlin were used by Bonn as grounds for asserting that this part of the city is "the land of Germany". West Berlin's ruling burgomaster, Karl Schutz, argued that over the past two decades "relations have developed between the city and the Federal Republic of Germany that practically correspond to the state of West Berlin's membership in the federation".196 He acknowledged that these "growing close ties" between the city and Germany had to be developed, sometimes even overcoming the resistance of the three Western powers, "in whose opinion we may have gone too far"; 197 but "there is no doubt about this inclusion in the federation, this de facto affiliation of West Berlin to the Federal Republic. Our three protecting Powers, fully aware of their supreme power in [West] Berlin, have step by step and point by point approved of our close ties with the federation."198
As you know, there is not a single international legal agreement in which you can find a reason for breaking off West Berlin from its natural surroundings. On the contrary, all quadrilateral agreements and decisions unequivocally confirm the territorial affiliation of Berlin to the former Soviet occupation zone, and thus to the GDR. Not a single document mentions the separation of the entire city or its individual parts from the territory of this zone or turning it into a "fifth" zone of occupation. Having received permission from the USSR to participate in the joint administration of Berlin, the three Western Powers did not acquire the rights of supremacy over this part of the Soviet occupation zone. Therefore, they could not transfer the non-existent rights "step by step" and "point by point" to Bonn. Moreover, fearing to lose the last semblance of legitimacy of the continued occupation of West Berlin, the three Powers continued to insist on their reservations about the city's status, rejecting Bonn's legal claim to West Berlin while encouraging German penetration through numerous channels.

But the development of actual ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany does not entail the recognition of the city as a "federal land" as a result of the "growth of its status". West Berlin remained what it was.

194 "Neues Deutschland", 16. III and 18. III. 1967.

195 "Die Zeit", 17.XI.1961.

196 "Der Telegraf", 23.X.1973.

197 "Die Zeit", 13.XI.1970.

198 "Berliner Stimme", 24.XII.1970.

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It was and is, in fact, a special political entity with a "unique international legal status" 199 . And the USSR and the GDR have repeatedly stated that they are determined to take "all necessary measures to prevent provocations by revanchist and militaristic forces of the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin, as well as against all attempts to illegally incorporate West Berlin into the Federal Republic of Germany."200 The annexationist activities of Bonn were the subject of protests by the Soviet ambassadors to Vice-Chancellor W. Brandt on January 6, 1968,201 and the ruling Burgomaster Schutz on January 18, 1968,202 as well as in letters to the ambassadors of the three Western Powers to Germany dated February 14, 1968,203 in a statement to the press dated March 4, 1968,204 and May 9, 1968.205, etc.

Due to the reluctance of the Western Powers to take action against the rampant Bonn provocateurs, the GDR, in the exercise of its competence regarding communications running through its territory, banned NDP members and persons engaged in neo-Nazi activities from entering West Berlin on March 10, 1968. 206 On April 13, government members and responsible officials were banned from traveling through communications to West Berlin. government officials of the Federal Republic of Germany 207 . Since February 8, 1969, access to the city was prohibited for all German military personnel, as well as members of the Bundestag Defense Committee. On March 1, 1969, the public got acquainted with the article "Secret and explicit", which pointed out violations of allied military legislation in West Berlin and reported on the appeal of the Soviet government to the government of the GDR (note of February 28, 1969) with a request "to take appropriate measures in order to prevent attempts by the authorities and citizens of Germany, as well as the Western Berlin to abuse GDR communications " 208 . On the same day, the GDR government banned the transportation of any military communications materials between Germany and West Berlin."209 In February 1970, the Soviet Embassy in the GDR reiterated its determination to "respond appropriately to attempts by the Bonn authorities to unlawfully extend their competence to West Berlin." 210 Since West Berlin continued to be a" powder keg "and poison the political atmosphere on the continent, A. A. Gromyko noted at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 10, 1969, that" there is a point in the very center of Europe that requires close attention of Soviet foreign policy. This is West Berlin. " 211
Meanwhile, the trend of development towards defusing international tensions, ensuring peace, security and cooperation among all European countries, regardless of their social system, was gradually gaining strength. The idea of creating an effective system of collective security in Europe, based on the Bucharest Declaration, the Budapest Proclamation and other documents of the Warsaw Pact member States, was supported by the broadest circles of the European public. Within the framework of this system, based on the recognition of territorial and political realities in Europe, West Berlin was to take its place. In Washington, Lon-

199 Pravda, 11. VII. 1969.

200 Pravda, 28. IX. 1965.

201 "Frankfurter Allgemeine", 29.I.1968.

202 "Die Wahrheit", 27, 28.I.1968.

203 Pravda, 15. II. 1968.

204 Izvestia, 5. III. 1968.

205 Pravda, 10. V. 1968.

206 "Neues Deutschland", 11.III.1968.

207 "Neues Deutschland", 13.IV.1968.

208 Pravda, 1. III. 1969.

209 Pravda, 2. III. 1969.

210 "Pravda". 2.II.1970.

211 Pravda, 11. VII. 1969.

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understanding of the need to normalize West Berlin affairs was maturing in the Don and Paris. This process of rethinking the Western position was largely facilitated by the removal of the CDU/CSU bloc from the leadership in Bonn as a result of the September 1969 elections. After all, the Christian Democratic Union, a party of large monopolistic capital, "bears direct responsibility for the revival of revanchism and militarism in West Germany"212 and throughout the post-war period was the main initiator of conflicts over West Berlin.

In the summer of 1969, the Soviet Government considered the situation ripe enough to call on all interested parties to take a course to defuse tensions in and around West Berlin. 213 "The policy of the Soviet Union, like that of the GDR, in relation to West Berlin is clear," Gromyko said. We are committed to ensuring that the population of this city and its authorities have all the conditions for activities that ensure the normal existence of West Berlin as an independent political unit. However, it cannot be allowed that our interests, the legitimate interests of our ally, the GDR, are infringed and the special status of West Berlin is violated. If the other powers, our allies in the war, who bear their share of responsibility for the situation in West Berlin, approach this issue taking into account the interests of European security, then on the part of the Soviet Union they will find a willingness to exchange views on how to prevent complications around West Berlin now and in the future."214 In August 1969, the ambassadors of the three Western Powers in Moscow reported on their Governments 'desire to" improve the Berlin situation. " 215 In the course of subsequent diplomatic contacts, 216 an agreement was reached to hold talks "with a view to improving the situation in West Berlin and eliminating difficulties and tensions in the area".217

The GDR made a great contribution to the efforts to resolve the West Berlin problem. Its important steps in this direction were the proposals to conclude a treaty on the establishment of equal relations between the GDR and the FRG, 218 the meetings of V. Stof with V. Brandt in Erfurt and Kassel, 220 as well as numerous statements by the GDR government about its readiness to establish good-neighborly relations with West Berlin and to conclude relevant agreements with the Senate for this purpose.

On March 26, 1970, negotiations between the four Powers began in the former Control Council building in West Berlin. In a speech at the eighth Congress of the SED on June 16, 1971, Leonid Brezhnev described the main goals of the USSR and the GDR in the negotiations on West Berlin as follows: "Joint, coordinated efforts of the Soviet Union and the GDR are aimed at ensuring that West Berlin ceases to be a detonator of tension and crisis situations and that normal living conditions are provided-

212 L. I. Brezhnev. On the Foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, p. 225.

213 "History of foreign policy of the USSR", Part II, p. 473.

214 Pravda, 11. VII. 1969.

215 "Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung", N 127, Sonderausgabe, 3.IX.1971, S. 1308.

216 J. Nawrcki. Ja nach langem Streit. "Die Zeit", 27.VIII.1971; "Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation". Deutscher Bundestag, 11.I.1970, Drucksache VI/233, S. 8.

217 Pravda, 28. II. 1970.

218 In the draft treaty sent by W. Ulbricht to G. Heinemann, it was proposed to recognize the status of West Berlin as an independent political unit and build relations with it accordingly (Neues Deutschland, 18. XII. 1969).

219 "Neues Deutschland", 24.III.1970.

220 "Neues Deutschland", 19.V. 1970.

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neither this city nor its population-of course, with due regard for the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic. " 221 The negotiations were significantly influenced by the exchange of views between the Governments of the USSR and Germany on the non-use of force and the normalization of contacts between the two states, which began shortly after the government of W. Brandt came to power and ended with the signing of the treaty of August 12, 1970,222 The West German columnist D. Kramer noted that "a decisive turning point in the negotiations came after the signing of the Moscow Treaty." 223 According to Brandt, "the Berlin settlement would have been impossible without the Moscow Treaty of August 12 last year." 224
This treaty, followed by the Polish-West German Treaty of December 7, 1970, allowed for a radical turn in relations between the countries of the socialist community and the Federal Republic of Germany. The era of "normal peaceful relations"has begun in Europe .225 A political and contractual framework has been established for establishing normal relations between Germany and the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Emphasizing the importance of the Moscow Treaty, Leonid Brezhnev said: "The conclusion of such a treaty undoubtedly has a certain positive impact on the situation in Europe." 226 However, the ratification of the German treaties with the USSR and POLAND was delayed for almost two years due to the opposition to defusing tensions in Germany and the not always consistent position of its government. Under pressure from the Free Democratic Party, the Brandt Government established an interdependence ("unctim") between the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties and the achievement of a"satisfactory"West Berlin settlement .227 The delay in ratification was intended to influence the negotiations of the four ambassadors in a way that was beneficial for Bonn and to force the Soviet side to make concessions. This position hindered progress towards a mutually acceptable agreement.

By the end of 1970, there were signs that the meeting of the four Ambassadors in West Berlin had passed a significant stage of the difficult road, 228 and that a "recovery of the situation in connection with West Berlin" was achievable; but for this to happen, "all interested parties" had to show good will .229 At the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member States on December 2, 1970 in Berlin, confidence was also expressed that the negotiations would lead to an agreement .230 There was a clear willingness of the USSR and the GDR to contribute as much as possible to the success of the negotiations. This was reflected in the Soviet proposals of December 10, 1970,231 . The Western side, in its draft agreement of February 5, 1971, again tried to take a tough stance.-

221 L. I. Brezhnev. Lenin's Course, vol. 3, Moscow, 1972, p. 403.

222 "History of foreign policy of the USSR", Part II, p. 517.

223 "Frankfurter Allgemeine", 25.VIII.1971.

224 "Das Viermachte-Abkommen iiber Berlin vom 3. September 1971" Press- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, IX, 1971, S. 83.

225 L. I. Brezhnev. Lenin's Course, vol. 4, p. 226.

226 L. I. Brezhnev. On the Foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, p. 295.

227 See Brandt's statements of 12 August 1970 (Die Welt, 13. VIII. 1970) , 14 August 1970, etc. ("Die Vertrage der BRD mit der UdSSR vom 12. August 1970 und mit der VRP vom 7. Dezember 1970". Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, III, 1971, S. 29).

228 "Der Tagesspiegel", 5.XI.1970.

229 L. I. Brezhnev. On the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, p. 311.

230 Pravda, 4. XII1970.

231 V. Wyssozki. Westberlin. Moskau. 1974, S. 211.

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section 232 . But the USSR showed firmness and, at the same time, on March 26, proposed a draft comprehensive agreement on all the issues discussed, which became the basis for the final stage of the work of the ambassadors .233 Speaking at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev warned that " the ongoing negotiations can be successfully completed to the mutual benefit of all interested parties, including the West Berlin population itself," only if "the United States, France and Britain will, like us, proceed from respect for the allied agreements that define the future of the Soviet Union." special status of West Berlin, out of respect for the sovereign rights of the GDR as an independent socialist state " 234 .

Six months later, the difficulties associated with reaching an agreement on the West Berlin issue were mostly overcome. On August 23, 1971, the four ambassadors were able to report that they had reached "agreement on the entire draft agreement" .235 Reaching an agreement was made possible mainly due to the constructive position of the USSR and the GDR. The successful conclusion of the negotiations was also facilitated by the fact that the Western powers were finally forced to approach the West Berlin settlement from real positions. After the draft agreement was approved by the Governments on September 3, 1971, in the building of the former Control Council in West Berlin, the Ambassadors of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France signed the agreement 236 , initialed two protocol notes and the final protocol to the agreement that put the settlement into effect. This agreement could not fail to be a definite compromise between the positions of the parties .237 It is called a carefully balanced and reasonable balance of interests of the parties, 238 the violation of which will lead to the failure of certain parts of this complex international legal mechanism. 239 The four Powers declared that they would maintain the quadripartite agreements and decisions of the war and post-war period, while stipulating that individual rights and responsibilities of each party in the area should be preserved. This provision should be understood taking into account the conditions for the formation of the quadrilateral status of West Berlin in the context of the Cold War against the socialist countries and the rejection of the Potsdam decisions by the Western Powers. But the decrees on the demilitarization, democratization and denazification of Germany continue to operate in West Berlin, and the USSR uses its rights to influence the situation in the city and in connection with it.

Representing an important step forward in eliminating the dangerous hotbed of tension and conflict in central Europe and in improving the international situation as a whole, the quadripartite agreement essentially included all the main elements of the socialist countries ' position on West Berlin: recognition of the special international legal status of this part of the city, which is not a German state, and therefore the need to there is no illegal political activity of Bonn; respect for the sovereign rights of the GDR; ensuring the interests of the West Berlin population on this basis. The core principle of the agreement is the provision that "the western sectors of Berlin do not have to be closed".

232 "Vertragsentwtirfe der Westmachte vom 5.II.1971 und der Sowjetunion vom 26.III.197b. "Quick", 4.VIII.1971, S. 8 - 11; W. Wagner. Das Berlin-Problem als Angelpunkt eines Ausgleichs zwischen West und Ost in Europa. "Europa-Archiv", 1971, N 11, S 375 - 382; "Zycie. Warszawy", 16.IV.1971; "Generalanzeiger", 28.IV.1971.

233 V. Wyssоzki. Op. cit, S. 211.

234 "Materials of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU", Moscow, 1971, p. 26.

235 Pravda, 24. VIII. 1971.

236 Pravda, 4. IX. 1971.

237 "History of foreign policy of the USSR", Part II, p. 516.

238 "Das Viermachle-Abkornmen", S. 51.

239 J. Kotow. Das Westberlin-Abkommen und seine Kritiker. "Neues Deutschland", 30.X.1973.

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They are an integral part of the Federal Republic of Germany and will not be governed by it. " 240 This principle knocks the ground out from under the feet of those who try to justify Germany's illegal claims to West Berlin by referring to "German law" and give the reservations of the three Western powers the temporary character of a "political event". The Western powers were forced to confirm the cancellation of certain articles of the Basic Law of Germany and the Constitution of West Berlin and to fix the fact that the city did not belong to the federation system in an international legal order and in a binding contractual form. With the achievement of the quadrilateral agreement, the hopes of the Bonn revanchists for the annexation of West Berlin collapsed. The three Western powers, the West German newspaper complained, " allowed the implementation of the acts of the supremacy of Germany in Berlin, and it depended only on them to recognize the qualities of the federal land for him at a certain moment. This is now over, as the Western allies... a contractual commitment was made that West Berlin is not a German land. " 241
But the quadrilateral agreement is not limited to stating that the city does not belong to the federation system, it contains clear decisions on curtailing the illegal activities of the state, parliamentary and judicial bodies of Germany in West Berlin. The same newspaper noted: "The Western Powers have now agreed to a mandatory international legal restriction on the city's membership in the federation system and a reduction in federal activity." 242 Fixing the special status of West Berlin opened the way to solving practical issues of the West Berlin settlement. For the first time, transit regulations for GDR communications between West Berlin and Germany, as well as the city's relations with the GDR, were established on a mutually acceptable basis. This settlement is based on full respect for the sovereignty of the GDR over its highways, railways and waterways used in international transit traffic. 243 The four Powers considered it possible to recognize the existence of certain links between West Berlin and Germany in the economic, financial, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields .244 An important element of the implementation of the agreement was the obligation of the parties not to take actions that could lead to a unilateral change in the current situation. Germany's unilateral actions aimed at changing the status quo in the area were now made illegal. There was a commitment by the three Western Powers to take measures to ensure that West Berlin was no longer used to inflame tensions and strengthen Bonn's illegal claims to it, to carry out subversive activities against socialist States, or to organize any actions that endanger peace and security.

The agreement's provision that "the western sectors of Berlin are not part of the Federal Republic of Germany and cannot be governed by it" caused a huge international response. According to even the Western press, it confirmed the special international legal status of the city. An influential West German newspaper wrote with exasperation that West Berlin was now "more like a free city."

240 Pravda, 4. IX. 1971.

241 "Die Welt" 26.VIII. 1971.

242 "Die Welt", 1.IX.1971.

243 For more information about West Berlin's relations with the outside world, see: V. N. Vysotsky. Ukal, op., pp. 380-408; R. Arzinger, W. Poeggel. Westberlin - selbstandige politische Einhert B. 1965, S. 19; P. A. Steiniger. Nachhilfeunterricht fur Imperialisten ira Grenzund Transitverkehr. "Auftenpolitische Korresppndenz", 1968, N 26, S. 219 - 220.

244 Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 1971, No. 10, p. 17.

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an occupation area with a special status than the land of the Federal Republic of Germany, since the international legal status is higher than German law " 245; another newspaper stated: "West Berlin is indeed made in the treaty with the communist power a 'special political unit', even if not an independent one. " 246 The fact that the leading Powers of the former anti-Hitler coalition have for the first time concluded an international treaty on issues related to West Berlin is significant. The definition of "basic elements of relations between West Berlin and West Germany, East Germany and the four occupying powers" 247 meant that in the changed balance of power in the world, the Western powers could not bypass or change the existing objective realities in the face of the GDR and its capital, as well as West Berlin as a special political entity and "the only artificial relic occupation time"248 .

The agreement was also a reflection of the increased international prestige of the GDR. L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his message to the First Secretary of the SED Central Committee, E. Honecker, that the agreement "creates good prerequisites for improving the situation in the center of Europe, eliminating tensions and complications in connection with West Berlin, which in the past have repeatedly poisoned the political situation in this area. The Agreement is based on the existing territorial and political realities on the European continent and fully takes into account the sovereign rights and interests of the German Democratic Republic. It helps to increase the international prestige of the socialist German state, its role and influence in international affairs. " 249 In an interview with the newspaper Neues Deutschland, E. Honecker also noted the fact that the agreement takes into account the legitimate interests of the GDR 250 .

The agreement was met with great satisfaction all over the world. The Vienna gazette wrote that "the agreement of the four Powers on the Berlin settlement is a historic event." 251 The Danish press agency was relieved to state: "The Berlin problem is settled" 252 .

After the completion of the activities of the four ambassadors, a new stage of negotiations began, already between representatives of the GDR, Germany and West Berlin, to develop agreements on issues directly within their competence. As A. A. Gromyko stated, " both German states did not take a direct part in the negotiations of the four powers, but they were constantly consulted, and a lot depended on them. Now the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany will have to complete the negotiations between themselves provided for in the quadripartite agreement. I would like to express the hope that this stage of the settlement concerning West Berlin will also be successful. " 253 On 17 and 20 December 1971, the "Agreements between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Transit of Civilians and Goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin (West)"254 and the "Agreement between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany" were signed in Bonn and Berlin.-

245 "Frankfurter Allgemeine", 24.VIII. 1971,

246 "Die Welt", 24.IX. 1971.

247 "New York Times", 25.VIII.1971.

248 D. Mahncke. Op. cit., S. 94.

249 Pravda, 11. IX. 1971.

250 "Neues Deutschland", 6.IX.1971.

251 "Arbeiter-Zeitung", 24.VIII.1971.

252 "Dagens Nuheter", 24.VIII.1971.

253 "Pravda". 29.IX.1971.

254 "Vertrage im Dionste der europaischen Sicherheit. Vom Mosteauer bis zum Berliner Vertrag". B. 1973, S. 33 - 45.

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Agreement between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Senate on facilitation and improvement of travel and visits"255 , as well as "Agreement between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Senate on the settlement of the question of enclaves through the exchange of territories"256 .

In mid-December 1971, Germany began the process of ratifying the treaties of Germany with the USSR and Poland 257 . It was complicated by the position of the CDU/CSU leaders, who set out to complicate or even prevent ratification. The Soviet Government was forced to pay attention to the fact that, despite the absence of a direct formal and legal link between the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties and the quadripartite agreement, these documents nevertheless constitute a single political whole and should be considered as an indissoluble settlement complex. 258 The German government still managed to break the opposition's opposition and achieve the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. On May 17, 1972, the treaties with the USSR and the People's Republic of Poland were approved by the Bundestag 259, on May 19, the draft laws on ratification of the treaties were approved by the Bundesrat 260, and on May 23, they were signed by German President Heinemann and entered into force 261 .

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified the Treaty of the USSR with the Federal Republic of Germany on May 31, 1972. When discussing the issue of ratification, Mikhail Suslov stressed the importance of the treaty ,which "undoubtedly makes an important contribution to improving the entire political climate in Europe"; we can only hope that "after the ratification process is completed... This will open the way to solving a number of other issues that are important for establishing constructive cooperation between European states. For example, the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin will enter into force. " 262 On June 3, 1972, the USSR and Germany exchanged their instruments of ratification of the Moscow Treaty in Bonn and the Final Protocol of the Quadripartite Agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France in the former Control Council building in West Berlin. At the same time, the agreements and arrangements of the GDR Government with the German Government and the West Berlin Senate came into force. "The Quadrilateral Agreement on West Berlin," said a statement from the West Berlin SEP Board, "is of world-historical significance and is a great success of the consistent policy of peace and defusing tensions pursued by the Soviet Union, the GDR and the entire socialist community." 263 The entry into force of this agreement summed up an important stage in the struggle of the socialist countries for the settlement of one of the most complex and dangerous post-war problems, and was a major victory for Soviet foreign policy.

The U.S.S.R. and the GDR have faithfully begun to implement part of their obligations under the agreement. Officials of the Western powers and the authorities of West Berlin have repeatedly stated that the USSR and the GDR have loyally implemented the regulations on transit traffic between Germany and West Berlin, on trips and visits by West Berliners to the territory of the GDR and its capital:"The agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Senate of West Berlin is being fulfilled quite satisfactorily" 264, and

255 Ibid., S. 51 - 54.

256 Ibid., S. 54 - 57.

257 Pravda, 12. XII. 1971.

258 Pravda, 14. IV. 1972.

259 "Die Welt", 18.V.1972.

260 "Frankfurter Rundschau", 20.V.1972.

261 "Frankfurter Allgemeine", 24.V.1972.

262 Pravda, 1.VI. 1972.

263 Pravda, 9. VI. 1972.

264 "Der Tagesspiegel", 25.VI.1975.

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Thus, until June 29, 1976, residents of West Berlin visited the GDR and its capital 12960000 times in 4 years, and taking into account visits on religious holidays-14 million times 265 . In 1975 alone, more than 18 million people were transported between West Berlin and Germany via the GDR transit routes .266 As for the Western side, life shows that the German government and the West Berlin Senate are trying to circumvent the 267 agreement . In the speeches of representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senate 268, as well as in a number of works by Western authors 269, attempts are made to use it against socialist countries 270 .

Of the dozens of actions aimed at undermining the core resolution of the quadripartite agreement, it is enough to point out only a few to be convinced of the political danger of such a course. In 1973 and 1974, the Federal Constitutional Court, the highest court in the Federal Republic of Germany, decided that all federal agencies should treat West Berlin as the"land of the Federal Republic of Germany" .271 A number of German laws were extended to West Berlin, in which the city was unlawfully included in the "scope of the Basic Law" 272 . During the negotiations on normalization of relations with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary, representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany put forward claims to universal representation of West Berlin. These claims by Bonn led to the suspension of negotiations in September 1973, 273 which were brought to an end only after the Federal Republic of Germany withdrew its illegal demands .274 A blatant manifestation of the attempts of the Western side to replace the key provision of the quadrilateral agreement on the non-affiliation of the city to the federation and the need to reduce the federal presence in this regard 275 was placed in West Berlin in 1974. Department of Environmental Protection of the Federal Republic of Germany, directly subordinate to the West German Ministry of the Interior 276 . The process of such" multiplication " of federal agencies in West Berlin was .terminated by drastic measures of the GDR government 277, which were fully supported by the Soviet Union 278 ,

265 "Der Tagesspiegel", 30.VI.1976.

266 "Der Tagesspiegel", 6. I and 14. III. 1976.

267 "Neues Deutschland", 3.IX.1976.

268 Speech by W. Brandt in West Berlin in connection with the signing of the quadripartite agreement ("Berliner Stimme", 11. IX. 1971) , government statement by Brandt in connection with the entry into force of the quadripartite agreement ("Der Tagesspiegel", 8.VI. 1972), Brandt's State of the Nation report (Berliner Morgenpost", 25. I. 1974), government statement of Chancellor G. Schmidt ("Die Welt", 18. V. 1974) , statement of Schutz in the West Berlin Chamber of Deputies ("Der Tagesspiegel", 8. V. 1975).

269 "Die Entkrampfung Berlins oder Eine Stadt geht zur Tagesordnung uber". Reinbeck bei Hamburg. 1972; K. Doehring, G. Ress. Staats- und volkerrechtliche Aspekte der Berlin-Regelung. Frankfurt am Main. 1972; H. Schiedermair. Der volkerrechtliche Status Berlins nach dem Viermachte-Abkommen vom 3. September 1971. (West) Berlin-Heidelberg - N. Y. 1975.

270 Yu. Cats. Lunch in Oslo and respect for agreements. Novoe vremya, 1976, No. 23, p. 12.

271 "BVerGE", 1974, N 36, S. 1; "Der Tagesspiegel", 5.IV.1974; "Frankfurter Allgemeine", 8.V.1974; "Der Tagesspiegel"., 8.V.1974.

272 Law on Cooperation between the Federation and the States in Matters of the Protection of the Constitution (Gesetz-und Verordnungsblatt fur Berlin, 23. VIII. 1972, S. 1619), Introductory Law to the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrat. Drucksache III / 73 vom 9. II. 1973), Consular Law (Bundesrat. Drucksache 336/74 vom 26. IV), the Law on Imperial and State Citizenship ("Bundesgesetzblatt", I. 1975, S. 3714), the new Electoral Law (Bundesgesetzblatt, I. 1975, S. 2327), etc.

273 "Die Welt", 29/30.VII. 1974.

274 "Frankfurter Allgemeine", 12.XII.1973; "Der Spiegel", 24.XII.1973.

275 Izvestia, 6. VII. 1974.

276 Izvestia, July 6, 1974, called it a political demonstration "aimed at undermining the quadrilateral agreement".

277 The Government of the GDR prohibited the use of communications located on its territory by employees of the department (Pravda, 22. VII. 1974).

278 Pravda, 2. VIII. 1974.

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Then forces interested in creating new tensions in West Berlin affairs launched a campaign for the creation of the German National Fund of the German Ministry of the Interior in the city .279 Some international organizations are also being drawn into the plans for the city's safe integration into the German system. Since the end of 1975, the countries of the European Economic Community have been discussing the possibility of participation of representatives of West Berlin as part of a group of deputies from Germany in the European Parliament, which should be endowed with supranational rights. In connection with the relevant decision of the European Community countries adopted in Brussels in July 1976, and the statement of the German delegation on extending this decision to West Berlin, the USSR Foreign Ministry protested 280 on August 3, 1976 .

And yet, "from a distance of five years, today we can rightly say that the overall outcome of the quadripartite agreement is definitely positive. It has stood the test of time. " 281 However, West Berlin is not the place for dangerous experiments on a quadrilateral agreement. Faithful implementation of the quadripartite agreement is key to reducing tensions between all stakeholders .282 The" strict observance and full implementation " of the quadripartite agreement is "an essential prerequisite for a lasting detente in the center of Europe and for improving relations between the States concerned, in particular between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany" .283 This point of view was included in the Joint Statement on the visit to the USSR of Federal Chancellor G. Schmidt and Deputy Federal Chancellor G. Genscher of October 30, 1974284 .

Drawing the attention of the German government to the inappropriateness of actions aimed at distorting the quadrilateral agreement and hindering its implementation, Leonid Brezhnev warned against piling up obstacles to mutual understanding in connection with the West Berlin issue, which was resolved at the conclusion of the quadrilateral agreement.: "This agreement admittedly allows us to successfully solve practical problems related to West Berlin. A better agreement is hardly possible under the current circumstances. Strict compliance with the agreement is what is required for the West Berlin issue to completely stop clouding the political atmosphere in the center of Europe. " 285 The quadrilateral agreement laid the political foundation for building a new future in West Berlin: "The Soviet Union for good business relations with the city, for ensuring the viability of the city and respect for the legal rights of its residents. We are in favour of all parties adhering to and respecting every letter and general spirit of the quadripartite agreement, and we firmly believe that only on this basis will West Berlin be able to solve its problems and turn from a source of disputes into a constructive element of peace and detente."286
279 "Der Tagesspiegel", 10.IV.1976, "Kurbiskern", 1976, N 2, S. 70.

280 "Pravda", 4. VIII. 1976; Yu. Kotov. This is an inappropriate and dangerous idea. Novoe vremya, 1976, N 33, pp. 14-15.

281 "Neues Deutschland", 3.IX.1976.

282 Pravda, 22. V. 1976.

283 Pravda, 22. V. 1973.

284 "Pravda", 31X1974.

285 L. I. Brezhnev. Lenin's Course, vol. 5, p. 194.

286 L. I. Brezhnev. On the Foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, p. 850.

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