Kirill Karpov

Doctrines of Predestination in Medieval Philosophical Theology

Kirill Karpov-Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia), kirill.karpov@gmail.com

The paper presents the main issues associated with the problem of predestination, outlines the basic doctrines of medieval theologies on the subject. The author focuses on the multiple dimensions of the theoretical and historical analysis: main arguments in the controversy, the transformation of its formal and argumentative structure, methods of forming and presenting reasons, logical moves of opponents.

Keywords: predestination, reprobation, free will, determinism, Divine attributes, grace, moral responsibility.

SOTERIOLOGY is one of the main themes of Latin theology. Of particular interest to Western thinkers was the problem of the correlation between divine and human actions in the work of salvation. Approaches to its solution range from the Pelagian claim that salvation depends on human effort and free will, to the teachings of Reformation thinkers about the complete dependence of people on the eternal, working divine will, and, on the contrary,

page 228
the "slavery of the human will". It seems that the source of the problem and such a variety of solutions lies in the difficulty of agreeing on three initial premises. First, according to Christian doctrine, God is one, absolutely good, just, omnipotent, and omniscient. Secondly, the broken communion of man with God through the fall will be restored through the incarnation and resurrection of Christ; but, thirdly, not all people will be saved, and God himself chooses some people for this purpose. Accordingly, a key question arises: why does an all-powerful, absolutely good and just God grant some people the opportunity to participate in the restoration of communion, and refuse others? If God does not grant this opportunity to some people because He foresees their sins, then He obviously takes human merit into account in His decision. But how can people's actions affect the eternal and unchangeable God? On the other hand, if sin is not the cause of one's condemnation, then how can divine punishment, and therefore God himself, be called just? The situation is compounded by the fact that the Holy Scriptures - the main source of Christian teaching - do not provide an unambiguous answer to this question. In the Bible text, you can find arguments in favor of both sides, even from the same author (for example, Rom 9 and 1 Tim 2: 4).

The problem of predestination presents not only theological difficulties, but also philosophical ones: How can we reconcile the doctrines of the deterministic nature of divine choice with the freedom of human action? This coordination is necessary for both religious and philosophical consciousness, because freedom of action has always been the basis for considering them from the perspective of morality: one cannot blame or, on the contrary, encourage an act if it was only a link in the chain of causal relationships.

In medieval theology, the controversy about divine predestination began with a dispute between Augustine and Pelagius about the role of free will in performing God-pleasing deeds leading to salvation. Augustine's anti-Pelagian teaching was presented mainly in five works: a letter to Sixtus and treatises On Grace and Free Decision (De gratia et libero arbitrio), On Reproach and Grace (De correptione et gratia), On the Predestination of Saints (De praedestinatione sanctorum), and On the Gift of Abiding"(De dono perseverantiae). The central idea of these works is

page 229
Augustine's understanding of divine grace as an undeserved gift, which gives them a semantic unity and determines the entire logic of the development of his teaching, and the basis of the doctrine of predestination is his understanding of the divine omnipotent will. In the course of developing and clarifying his position, Augustine establishes such a logic of the operation of grace, in which there is very little room for the freedom of human will. Moreover, while developing his concept, Augustine questioned the possibility of attributing to a person the fulfillment of a God-pleasing act, as a result of which the connection between a human action and its ultimate fate weakens (De correptione et gratia 11: 32; 14: 43). Augustine seeks to preserve a person's free will, which is expressed in freedom from the desire for evil, but by placing grace as the basis of free will, Augustine actually roots free will in the divine decision to grant grace (Ibid., 12, 38). Answering the question about the beginning of salvation, Augustine introduces the concept of "predestination", by which he understands the divine decision that took place before the foundation of the world to grant some people grace leading to eternal life(De dono perseverantiae 7,13-15). As an answer to the question about the reasons for this, and not another, divine decision, Augustine argued that they are completely hidden in God and inaccessible to human knowledge (De gratia et libero arbitrio 20: 41; 23: 45).

The Augustinian view of the operation of grace can be summarized as follows: 1) Adam originally had free will, but it was not enough to stay in the good. Therefore, Adam was granted Divine help (De correptione et gratia 11: 32). This is the first act of grace. 2) In any case, Adam fell away, and his descendants now deserve only condemnation. But God, on the basis of his just decision, again grants grace to some chosen ones (Ibid., 7,12). It is after this that merits and distinctions appear among people.3) Grace turns the human will to faith (De gratia et libero arbitrio 5,12). 4) Grace interacts with free will, helping a person to perform good deeds (De gratia et libero arbitrio 6,13; De correptione et gratia 1,2). 5) After the conversion of the human will, grace is necessary for the subsequent maintenance of a person in good. Those who are truly chosen by God will not lose the gift of faith: if they fall, faith will still be restored (De correptione et gratia

page 230
12: 34-35), 6) As a result, grace seems to reward itself, and a person is granted eternal life (De gratia et libera arbitrio 8,19-9,21). At this point, the saints gain the ability not to sin, not to abandon the good (De correptione et gratia 12: 33).

Although Augustine's writings were highly authoritative, they could not satisfy all Christians. Since 427, the debate over the role of grace in the salvation process has been raging in southern Gaul.1 Augustine was first asked to clarify his views on these issues by the monks of the Adrumentum Monastery. Later, when Augustine's writings became widespread, questions and comments about the already existing controversy about his teachings were sent to him by Prosper and Hilary, two laymen from southern Gaul. The main reason for the disagreement with Augustine's views was his teaching about grace, which almost completely destroyed the connection between people's actions and their future fate: the entire process of salvation was presented by Augustine as the result of grace, the granting of which depended, in turn, on the divine predestining judgment that took place before the foundation of the world.

A prominent role in this confrontation was played by John Cassian. Cassian formulated his idea of salvation in two works: De institutis coenobiorum (On the Decrees of the Cynobites) and Collationes (Interviews of Egyptian Ascetics). Cassian's soteriology is based on the original "deal" between man and the devil. In teaching about the fall, John follows the previous Western Christian tradition, which Pelagius broke with. According to John, the fall consisted in Adam's arrogant desire to achieve glory by his own efforts alone, while the first person was forced to buy the freedom promised by the devil, and therefore a kind of "contract" took place (Collationes 23: 12). Adam's sin extends to all his descendants, and is related to the body, since only the body is transmitted from the parents, and the soul is created directly by God (Ibid., 8: 25). The effect of sin is to enslave the senses, to abandon the highest good and turn to the earthly (Ibid., 23: 11-12), and also to know evil, but the knowledge of blah-

1. This dispute has been called "semi-Pelagian" in the research literature. However, according to some scholars, this term is incorrect, since the thinkers designated by it rejected Pelagianism, accepting Augustine's arguments against the Pelagian heresy and insisting on the need for grace for salvation.

page 231
ha is not lost, otherwise man would be no different from unintelligent animals (Ibid., 13,12). Since man was deceived by the devil, but he made this" deal " voluntarily, God does not interfere in the space of human freedom and does not deprive the devil of the legal rights to fallen man. The meaning of atonement follows from this statement: God pays the devil a "ransom" for man, restoring man's freedom (Ibid., 23: 12). In addressing the question of the relationship between human will and divine grace, John Cassian rejects the teachings of Pelagius and Augustine, choosing the "middle" path. Unlike Pelagius, John recognizes the universality of original sin and the necessity of grace for salvation (Ibid., 13,3); unlike Augustine, he retains free will, capable of rejecting or accepting grace (Ibid., 13,12). Despite his infirmity, weakness of will, and the need for constant support from grace, Cassian believes that a person is capable of rejecting or accepting evil thoughts, so he is responsible for his own thoughts, otherwise the efforts aimed at perfection would not be in the power of people (Ibid., 1: 17). As the beginning of salvation, John sees the divine call to which man responds (Ibid., 3: 10). God, noticing the beginning of the good aspiration of the will, the beginning of the desire for good, which comes from man, strengthens it and promotes its development (Ibid., 3,7-8). Thus, the effect of grace depends on the specific conditions of a person's existence and character traits. St. John Cassian's teaching is not characterized by an Augustinian understanding of divine predestination: God wants all people to be saved, and the fate of those who perish is carried out against His will (Ibid., 13,7). The teaching of John Cassian is characterized by the synergy of the divine and human principles in salvation, which, as Weaver believes, was formed under the influence of the thoughts of Origen and Evagrius Pontius2. Although Cassian considered his decision to be an expression of church-wide faith, it drew sharp criticism from some Western theologians, most notably Prosper of Aquitaine. Many theologians took part in the semi-Pelagian controversy, among which Faustus of Rhegia especially stands out, emphasizing that the human fate depends on

2. Weaver R. H. Divine grace and human action: a study of semi-Pelagian disputes. Moscow: Center for Biblical and Patrological Research. Imperium Press, 2006, pp. 102-112.

page 232
and Fulgentius of Ruspius, who defended the typical Augustinian doctrine of the consequences of the fall and the many-sided converting and supporting effect of grace (On the Truth of Predestination and the Grace of God, De veritate praedestinationis et al. gratiae Dei).

The end of the semi-Pelagian controversy took place at the Second Council of Orange and is associated with the name of Caesarea of Arelatum (470 - 543), a bishop who convened a church council to resolve the dispute and reduced the influence of opponents of Augustinism. His legacy on the semi-Pelagian controversies consists of numerous sermons written initially for the purpose of instructing parishioners in faith and morals, and a short treatise on Grace (De gratia). In his sermons, Caesarea speaks more about the responsibility of those who were given grace in baptism, and in his work "On Grace" he writes about the absolute undeservedness of this gift. The Council of Orange was called by Caesarea on July 3, 529, and was attended by both clergy and laity; the decisions of the council were approved by the Pope. The Council adopted a" moderate " form of Augustinism: it combined the emphasis on the primacy and necessity of grace for salvation with the added emphasis on a clear connection between people's actions and their results for the future life. An obvious drawback in the decisions of the council was that the question of predestination (the beginning of the operation of grace) did not receive a clear solution. The decrees of the Council of Orange were signed by Pope Boniface II and entered into force on January 25, 531. The council put an end to more than a century of dispute. There was no resistance to the decisions of the council.

A new surge of controversy on soteriological issues occurred in the middle of the ninth century. Gottschalk of Orbe was the central figure in the dispute. Unfortunately, Gottschalk's entire teaching on predestination has not survived to this day. The only complete, more or less complete work on this subject is the "Lengthy Confession" (Confessio prolixior). Among his other works, we can single out the" Brief Confession " (Confessio brevior)," Tomus ad Gislemarum " (Tomus ad Gislemarum)," Answers to various questions sent to Gottschalk by a certain objector " (Responsa Gotteschalci de diversis ab ipsomet alicui censori transmissa-

page 233
definition" (De praedestinatione), consisting of various testimonies. Gottschalk's teaching can be summed up in the following main points: 1) God predestined the elect to eternal life and the condemned to death. Gottschalk's main emphasis was on the fact that predestination is one, but has two consequences, which is why it should be called double: "It is said that predestination is double, so it cannot be said that there are two predestinations, but one, as they say that love is double and one "(De praedestinatione XXIV 1). When Gottschalk speaks of "predestination to evil", he means divine punishment, and not actual sinful acts, as his opponents preferred to understand it, in accordance with the definitions of the Orange Council. 2) Predestination of those condemned to eternal perdition is based on divine foreknowledge of evil deeds. Foreknowledge and predestination are carried out simultaneously until the foundation of time; 3) Neither the chosen nor the condemned can escape their fate. 4) God does not want to save all people. The words of St. Paul "Who wants all men to be saved and attain the knowledge of the truth" are mistaken(1 Tim 2:4) interpret them literally, because they, as Gottschalk believes, use the synecdoche: "For those who say that God, who universally, equally, and without distinction desires that all men should be saved, saves the elect because they desire to be saved, and does not save the condemned because they themselves do not want to to be saved certainly denies Divine grace in the elect, and denies, though they know it, divine omnipotence in the condemned" (Ibid., p. 239). 5) The Lord shed his blood only for the elect: "He who says that the Lord suffered for all, for the salvation and redemption of the elect and condemned, contradicts God, the Father Himself" (Goteschalcus. Responsum ad Rabanum Maurum). (6) Good works proceed from the grace of God, and evil ones from the will of man (De praedestinatione XV). 7) Baptism, which frees from past sins, and communion are useless for the salvation of the condemned.

Gottschalk's teachings and personality were the subject of a heated debate, in which political issues often played a much more important role than theological ones.3 Your opponent's phone number-

3. For the political side of the dispute, see, for example, Genke, V. et Gumerlock, EX. (2010) Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy, pp. 29-31, 36-38. Milwaukee: Maquette University Press; Vielhaber, K. (1956) Gottschalk der Sachse, s. 21. Bonn: Rohrscheid.

page 234
Gottschalk's friends were Rabanus the Moor and Ginkmar of Reims. Raban wrote three works on predestination: an epistle to Noting, which serves as a preface to the treatise On Predestination, an epistle to Eberhard, and an epistle to Ginkmar at the Council of Mainz. In these epistles, Raban spoke fully about Gottschalk's teachings, and later, when the same Ginkmar asked him to clarify certain points, he referred to them, and especially to the first two. Above all, Rabanus the Moor was concerned that Gottschalk's teaching severed the direct link between man's deeds and his fate, which was obvious not only to him, but also to ordinary believers who heard Gottschalk's sermon. And with the exception of this, of course, important point, the dispute between Raban and Gottschalk was limited to the interpretation of the teachings of Augustine (Hrabanus Maurus. Epistola ad Eberhardum).

We learn from the Annals of Vertin that Gottschalk was first expelled from Italy in 846 and went to Dalmatia.4 Then, two years later, Gottschalk, confident of his (the monk's) complete rightness and easy victory over Raban (the bishop), appeared at the synod in Mainz, which was headed by Louis II of Germany. On it, Gottschalk published a treatise in which he responded to the criticism and accusations of Rabanus the Moor, as well as confession 5. The result of the council was that Gottschalk was accused of heresy, but since neither he nor his supporters recognized themselves as such, they were publicly flogged, Gottschalk himself was forbidden to be in the kingdom of Louis the German, and he was sent to Ginkmar of Reims.

Before arriving at Reims, Gottschalk was awaiting a final decision in Orbay, and Gincmar, in turn, was determined to settle the matter definitively. In 849, another council was held in Chierzi. Gottschalk, in the presence of Charles the Bald, presented excerpts from the writings of the Fathers and Writings in support of his teaching, but was still recognized as a heretic, flogged and imprisoned in the abbey of Hautvillers, and his writings were burned.

Gottschalk had an active correspondence with Ginkmar, which may have given rise to rumors and misinterpretations, so in the autumn of 849, Ginkmar wrote a rather lengthy appeal to the monks and people of the diocese, in which he warned them against teaching abroad.-

4. Annales Bertiniani/MGH, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi. (1883) V. Hannoverae: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani. S. 36.

5. Excerpts of these works were preserved by Ginkmar of Reims.

page 235
key of the user. Several prominent theologians and hierarchs, most notably Prudentius of Troyes and Ratramne of Corby, later joined by Loup of Ferrieres, were critical of Gincmar's work and supported Gottschalk. Ginkmar wanted to find support from Raban, but Raban, who had little interest in this matter, sent back his previous messages. The diversity of opinions did not contribute to the Bishop of Rheims ' calmness and confidence, so he and Bishop Pardul of Laon turned to the famous philosopher and theologian Scotus Eriugen to write their own treatise on predestination.

At the beginning of 851, John Scotus presents the treatise "On predestination" (De praedestinatione liber), which includes nineteen chapters. According to Eriugena, God does not predestinate people to be condemned, but because He is absolutely good, He wants all people to be saved. People who use their free will incorrectly condemn themselves to eternal damnation: "Therefore, it is necessary to firmly adhere to the fact that transgressions (for example, evil deeds) and punishments for them are generated by nothing other than their own human will, a poorly applied free choice" (De praedestinatione liber PL 122:390). Since God is timeless, it is impossible to say that He foresees or predestines anything, because these terms include a temporal component (Ibid., PL 122: 392). Since God has no knowledge of evil (evil, being a lack (diminution) of good, is not substantial, but accidental for every nature created by God), God cannot predestinate to evil, and therefore is only predestination to good (Ibid., PL 122: 369-375). Moreover, according to John Scotus, God does not punish anyone for their sins (Ibid., PL122: 423), and the evil will, whether of man or of a fallen angel, executes itself from within (Ibid., PL 122: 423 = Augustinus. Enarrationes In Psalmos 7,16. PL 36:107). The penalty is the absence of happiness, of bliss (Ibid., PL 122: 417). Prudentius of Troyes, who had accused John Scotus in his treatise On Predestination of having no basis in Scripture, and Flor of Lyons again defended Gottschalk's teaching.

The controversy continued for several more years, being marked by several more councils (Balance 855, Langre 859), and ended in the autumn of 860 with the Council of Thuy, which adopted the formula proposed by Ginkmar, according to which God wants to save all who will be saved and were predestined

page 236
(Hincmarus Rhemensis. Epistola concilii Tusiacensis. PL 126:122 - 132). According to the Annals of Vertin, Pope Nicholas initiated a new investigation into the case of "double predestination" and even summoned Gottschalk to Rome, but Ginkmar postponed the execution of these orders to find out the authenticity of these messages. In October 868, without renouncing his views, Gottschalk died.

As we have seen, while anthropology and the doctrine of the fall played a central role in the semi-Pelagian controversy, Gottschalk's writings do not raise these issues, but are presented as a given; the central place in the ninth-century polemic was occupied by the study of divine attributes in their connection with predestination and questions of a clear connection between human actions and their connection with the future life. The historical peculiarity of the ninth-century controversy is that it was fought between those who supported the extreme interpretation of Augustine's teaching on predestination and grace and those who tried to defend the decisions of the Council of Orange.

By the thirteenth century, a certain consensus had been established on the issue of predestination. The main question facing philosophers of this period was what is the cause of predestination. When answering this question, two points were taken into account: 1) divine transcendence, which means in this case that a person cannot influence God's decision to save him (otherwise, the theory of predestination can lead to Pelagian heresy); 2) the general idea that all people have free will, so the doctrine of predestination should have remained in the doctrine of predestination. a particular place, because otherwise it would lead to determinism, and a God who condemns a particular individual could be called unfair, so the concept of justice (a just God) also plays a role in solving the problem. Thus, the question of the cause of predestination was mainly reduced to the role of individual merits and shortcomings in the work of salvation. The established consensus was that God decides to save some people and grants them grace, while those whom he does not wish to save will not receive grace, and they will be judged for their sins. It turns out that the very term "predestination" refers to the divine desire to save certain people, and "condemnation" refers to the divine foresight of the sins of those people for whom God does not want salvation.

The Franciscans associated the solution of the question of predestination with the multiplicity of meanings of the term "predestination".-

page 237
nie". Thus, the author of the Summa attributed to Alexander of Gaelic and Bonaventure in the Commentary on the Maxims both begin by identifying different meanings of the term.6 In accordance with the highlighted meanings of the concept of "predestination", the divine ability to which it relates is established. Alexander of Gaelic, in Glosses on the Four Books of the Maxims, points out that if "predestination" refers to divine grace, then it refers to divine will, and if "predestination" refers to the foresight of that grace, then it refers to intelligence (Alexander Halensis. Glossa in quattor libros Sententiarum. I, d. 40, n. 10, p. b.). Bonaventura deals with this question in a similar way: in one case predestination refers to the will (and this is the preferred way), but there are also meanings of the concept under consideration that should be attributed to the divine intellect (Bonaventura. In libros Sententiarum. I, d. 40, a. 1, q. 2). For Bonaventure, the very divine desire to save the individual was crucial, which has two consequences: saving grace and ultimate glory. He makes a similar distinction in relation to condemnation - the unwillingness to save a particular individual, 7 and two consequences: hardening of the sinner's heart and final punishment. Using these distinctions, Bonaventure shows how predestination can be combined with free will, and how salvation can be both a gift and a well-deserved reward. In the process of predestination, the first place is occupied by God's desire to save a particular individual. This individual is then given grace-something that they cannot possibly earn. After death, a person acquires a state of eternal glory, this time deservedly, because he performed God-pleasing works with the help of grace (Bonaventura. I Sententiarum, d. 41, a. i, q. 1).

6. The author (s) of Summa Generale Theologia points out that predestination has three meanings: first and foremost, preparation, second, end (salvation, "glory to come"), and third, means of salvation ("grace available"). Alexander Halensis. Summa Halensis. Pars I, i, 1, tract. 5, s. 2, q. 4, p. 1. Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924. p. 316. Bonaventure writes: "It must be said that 'predestination' has two meanings, namely, precise and implied. In the exact sense, it denotes the divine essence, in the implied sense-creation, as grace and glory, and the person to be saved." Bonaventura. In libros Sententiarum. I, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1. Quaracchi: CollegiumS. Bonaventurae, 1883. P. 703.

7. Unwillingness to save (that is, ignoring, passive state) of an individual is not equivalent to the desire not to save a particular person (action).

page 238
For Thomas Aquinas, a representative of the Dominican Order, predestination is the divine active will to save certain people; condemnation is the desire to allow certain individuals to sin and, therefore, justly punish them. Unlike Bonaventure, Aquinas consistently contrasts predestination and its consequences (grace and glory), as well as condemnation and its consequences (hardening of the sinner's heart and his eternal punishment) (Thomas Aquinatis. Summa Theologiae. I, q. 23, a. 1-4.). Thus, Thomas draws a more subtle distinction between predestination, grace, and glory than Bonaventure, who believed that all three are involved in predestination. The same applies to the question of the cause of predestination: Aquinas suggests a distinction between general and particular causes. The general reason is that God chooses some people to be saved, and the particular reason is that God chooses specific individuals to be saved. There is no particular cause of predestination, but the general cause lies in the best expression of divine justice and goodness. Predestination and condemnation do not have a cause in the form of merit, but the effects of predestination and condemnation have such causes: glory is the target cause of grace, and grace is the active cause of glory.

The positions of Bonaventure and Thomas differ on the question of whether predestination is associated with divine reason or divine will. For Aquinas, predestination refers to the divine mind, since it itself represents God's knowledge of who will be saved. Although neither Bonaventure nor Thomas Aquinas said that predestination refers only to the will or only to the intellect (rather, their answers express a preference), their attributions of predestination to a particular divine faculty became very important for subsequent generations of philosophers: the Dominicans tended to intellectualism (Durand of Saint-Pourcain, Thomas of England) and the Franciscans - to voluntarism (Dune Scot, Peter Aureoli, William Occam). Although later generations of philosophers also turned to earlier teachers of the orders (usually Albert the Great and Alexander of Gaelic, respectively), it was Thomas and Bonaventure who were the main "authorities" for each of the order's schools.

The established consensus was again broken in the first half of the fourteenth century, when disputes about predestination flared up from the beginning.-

page 239
howl by force. There were several reasons for this. First , the conclusions reached by William Ockham as a result of distinguishing between the absolute and ordered powers of God. For Occam, the absolute power of God means that something produced by God through secondary causes, He can, by His absolute power, carry out and preserve without their participation (Ockham Guillelmus. Quodlibeta septem. VI, 1, 7). From this we can draw conclusions that God can save, for example, unbaptized people by His absolute power, without giving them sanctifying grace, or that He can command a person to hate Himself. It follows that from the absolute Divine power thus understood, the fundamental contingency of all that exists follows.

For Occam's followers (Adam Woodham, Robert Holcot, Richard Fitzralfe at Oxford, Nicholas of Hautrecourt, and John of Mirecourt in Paris), this distinction became a subject for separate study. The main question they were increasingly focusing on was what God could do with absolute power. The radical conclusions reached by these thinkers - for example, that God can deceive, save the sinner, and condemn the righteous, and that man can only do praiseworthy things by his own free will and achieve salvation without the intervention of grace as a secondary cause-led to the idea of a new form of Pelagian heresy. As a result, in the second quarter of the fourteenth century, certain aspects of the thought of both William Occam and his followers were examined three times by special commissions and were condemned. In 1346 and 1347. The authorities of the University of Paris condemned the views of Nicholas of Hautrecourt and John of Mirecourt, among which we find such propositions as: God is the cause of sin, self-hatred, and all human actions in general; Christ may have hated God; God predestines on the basis of foreseeing the correct use of free will in the future.8
Finally, the very situation of solving the problem was aggravated by the ambiguity of the terms "predestination" and "condemnation"that had developed by the beginning of the XIV century. For example, "predestination"

8. Courtenay, W J. (1972, 1973) "John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 40: 148.

page 240
it can mean: 1) God's desire to save; 2) God's action aimed at achieving this goal (giving grace and eternal life); 3) the whole process of salvation, or, finally, 4) various variants from all the previous ones.

One of the brightest representatives of the so-called "new Pelagians" was Peter Aureoli, who in the 10s of the XIV century proposed a very provocative doctrine of divine predestination. In the matter of defining the terms "predestination" and "condemnation" (i.e. associating them with a suitable divine attribute) Peter Aureoli breaks with the established tradition (the connection of predestination with divine providence and omniscience). He believes that predestination is an ordering, a predestination, and therefore belongs to the divine action, and the latter, in turn, to the will (Petrus Aureoli. Scriptum. I, d. 40, q. 67).

In the matter of defining terms, Peter enters into a polemic with Thomas Aquinas and Richard of Middletown (Richard Mediavilla studied and taught in Paris in 1278-1286). Predestination Aquinas calls " sending an intelligent creation to the goal of eternal life "(Thomas Aquinatis. Summa Theologiae. I, q. 23, a. 1 co) in accordance with divine providence-the plan of the order of directing everything to the goal (Ibid. I, q. 22, a. 1 co). Predestination is a part of divine providence for intelligent creatures (i.e., humans). Peter Aureoli's objection is based on the fact that knowledge cannot be a cause in relation to extra-mental reality, and therefore only the divine will can determine. Thus, the" order " that Aquinas speaks of must be understood as something related to the will, not the intellect.

Richard of Middletown argued that predestination refers first to the divine intellect, and only then to the will, since the practical knowledge of God is the cause of extra-mental events, and the will and power of God only carry out what is prescribed by reason: (Ricardus de Mediavilla. Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones. I, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1). The position of Richard Mediavilla especially did not suit Peter. Aureoli believed that with regard to the divine attributes, "effectiveness "(the possibility of practical activity) is what distinguishes the will from the mind, so Peter sees the reason for Richard's delusion in the fact that God has knowledge of what He is going to do.

page 241
However, if this were the case, then, firstly, divine foresight would be active, and secondly, everything would happen out of necessity. On the contrary, according to Peter Aureoli, God knows the state of things as it was realized, and as it really is. In other words, the extra-mental reality is given to the divine mind, and his mind cannot act in any way in relation to it. Therefore, the divine will plays a primary role in predestination in comparison with divine reason (Petrus Aureoli. Scriptum. I, d. 40, q. 67).

The next question Peter addresses is why some people receive the gift of grace from God and will be saved, while others will not. To answer this question, Peter Aureoli refers to the interpretation of 1 Timothy 2: 4. Since it is obvious that not all people will be saved, Peter believes that God's will to save all people is limited to something that prevents the realization of this common intention. This limitation is an obstacle to the operation of grace (obex gratiae). Thus, he interprets this verse as follows: God wants all people who are not hindered by grace to be saved and attain the knowledge of the truth. In turn, this obstacle (or lack thereof) to grace was foreseen by God. Having received these two statements, Peter compares predestination to a syllogism: the larger premise is the divine will to grant grace to all who have no obstacle to its action; the smaller premise is the confirmation by Divine foresight that a given person has no obstacle to grace; the conclusion is that God grants grace to a particular individual, and he will be able to do it. saved (Ibid.).

Condemnation can also be described by a syllogism, that is, as a logical process. In this case, divine foresight confirms that a person has an obstacle to grace and, therefore, God cannot grant him grace, and the individual will be condemned. However, " condemnation "does not mean" not predestined, "for" condemnation "stems from a just desire to punish sinners, and therefore" condemnation " must be described by its own syllogism. The larger premise is that God will justly punish those who will remain in sin until death; the smaller premise is that God knows through His foresight that this person will die

page 242
Each term of the syllogism corresponds to a certain divine attribute: the larger premise corresponds to the divine loving will, the smaller one-to the divine foresight, the conclusion corresponds to the divine acting will (Ibid.). At the same time, it should be remembered that Peter Aureoli used the syllogism as an analogy, as a convenient logical model that helps us understand what prerequisites predestination consists of, what divine attributes are involved in predestination and in what relation they are, but Aureoli does not tell us that predestination or condemnation are the corresponding three parts syllogisms taken as a whole.

After finding out what the terms "predestination" and "condemnation" mean, and that God wants all people who are not hindered by grace to be saved, Peter Aureoli goes on to ask what the reasons for predestination and condemnation are. Peter states that just as the cause of rejection is contained in what is rejected, so the cause of predestination is contained in what is predestined. The reason for this lies again in the contradiction that God wants to save all people, but in reality not all will be saved: this is why there must be something in both the predestined and the condemned, on the basis of which God either grants them grace or not. As the reason for the condemnation, Peter Aureoli believes that there will be a foresight that there will be some obstacle to the operation of grace in a person. In relation to children, such an obstacle is an original sin, and in relation to adults, it is an actual sin. The reason for predestination is to foresee the absence of such an obstacle to the operation of grace (Ibid.).

To explain how human nature and divine grace interact, Peter Aureoli draws on the traditional scholastic theology distinction between prior (gratia gratis data) and sanctifying (gratia gratumfaciens) grace. A person cannot, based on his natural abilities alone, prepare to receive grace. This becomes possible only after a person receives the preliminary grace. The receipt of this grace is not due to merit, since it is not bestowed on a person through the good use of free will. In general, merit becomes possible only after giving a person sanctifying grace (Ibid.).

page 243
So, for Peter Aureoli, sins create an obstacle to grace. It turns out that the obstacle to receiving and working grace is the reason for a person's condemnation. According to 1 Timothy 2: 4, God communicates grace to all people, but a person can either accept this grace or resist it. The first action is passive (a person does not need to do anything for grace to work in him), the second is active (since a person must create an obstacle to grace by his actions resulting from free will). Therefore, there is no act of free will on the part of the predestined, and therefore no merit on the basis of which God can bestow grace. To this we can add that the reason for judgment is positive: in the sense that the presence of something-in this case an obstacle-is a positive factor; and vice versa: the reason for predestination is negative, because it consists in the absence of something, in this case an obstacle.

As can be seen from the arguments of Peter Aureoli, in the traditional teaching (the cause of predestination is God, and rejection is man) he was not satisfied with the "asymmetry". Aureoli asks a logical question: on what basis are the various causes of predestination and condemnation based, and why does condemnation depend on the human will, but predestination does not. For the Aureole, this dilution of the causes of related phenomena does not have a sufficient basis. However, this traditional theory emerged as a result of the struggle against Pelagianism, and for a long time in Latin theology, this approach was considered most successful in linking people's freedom with their future fate and at the same time distancing themselves from the Pelagian heresy. These two circumstances are taken into account by Peter, and he directs all his efforts to ensure that: 1) both predestination and condemnation have a cause of the same order, 2) there is a strong connection between human action and its subsequent fate; but at the same time, the possibility of salvation only on the basis of a free decision of the will is denied. The solution to this difficult problem was found by Peter using the concept of "obstacles to grace."

For many Parisian magisters who commented on the Maxims, after Peter Aureoli, his critique of the traditional approach and his attempts to avoid the Pelagian heresy

page 244
were not convincing 9. Therefore, his arguments could not be ignored for these two reasons and served as a kind of springboard for further development of the problem. In many commentaries on the Maxims of the first half of the fourteenth century, we find sharp responses to Peter's approach, the most significant of which are the works of Landulf Caracciolo, Francis of Marche, Gerard Odonis, and Thomas of Strasbourg. The final critique of 14th-century Pelagianism was formulated by Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1290/1300-1349) in his treatise On Divine Causation against Pelagius (De causa Dei contra pelagianos) and by Gregory of Rimini in his Commentary on the Sententiae (Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum).

The teaching of Gregory of Rimini on predestination is traditionally divided into several parts.10 The first of them is devoted to the definition of the terms "predestination"and " condemnation". According to the Riminian, predestination is the desire to grant eternal life; the results of predestination are the giving of eternal life, vocation, and justification; condemnation is the desire not to grant eternal life; and the results of condemnation are the non-giving of eternal life (Gregorius Ariminensis. I, d. 40-41, q. 1, a. 1). To Gregory, these definitions alone are sufficient to answer positively the main question: are all eternally predestined or condemned by God (Ibid., q. 1, a. 1). Gregory attributes both predestination and condemnation to the working will of God. While the former does not distinguish Gregory from the previous tradition of Latin theology, the latter, on the contrary, shows that he breaks with it in the most radical way. He supports this conclusion with references to Scripture (Rom 9-23, 98, 9-231 Mal 1: 2-3) and Augustine (Augustine. "Enchiridion", 24, 95/PL 40, 276], "On the Trinity", XV, 20,38 /PL 42, 10877). Thus, to support his new definitions, Gregory reinterprets the relationship between divine will, foresight, and predestination: predestination and condemnation have become indistinguishable from the point of view of divine will (Ibid.). With this statement in mind, sta-

9. Schabel, C. (2002) "Parisian Commentaries and the Problem of Predestination", in Evans, G. R. (ed.) Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Vol. 1, pp. 221 - 265. Leiden, Boston, Koln: Brill.

10. Karpov K. V. Uchenie Grigori iz Rimini o predestinenii i svobody volya [The Teaching of Gregory of Rimini on predestination and Freedom of Will]. Moscow: IF RAS, 2012.

page 245
The truly radical conclusion reached by Gregory in Latin theology becomes clear: "God has prepared or foreknewed an eternal kingdom or eternal punishment for any person from time immemorial. Therefore, every human being is eternally predestined or condemned " (Ibid., q. 1, a. 1). As we have seen, this is not a new conclusion at all, but the way to reach it, the subtle interpretation of Augustine's teaching on grace, and the avoidance of extremes make us look at it as a kind of discovery.

Turning to the crucial question of the cause of predestination, Gregory argues against two misconceptions:: 1) there is a positive reason for predestination on the part of the predestined (Thomas of Strasbourg); 2) there is a negative reason for predestination on the part of the predestined (Peter Aureoli). He formulates five statements that express his position and are directed against the traditional solution of the problem, the innovative teaching of Peter Aureoli and its interpretation by Thomas of Strasbourg: 1) no one is predestined because of the correct use of free will; 2) no one is predestined because there is no obstacle to his final foresight. of the created and actual grace; 3) whomever God predestinated, He predestinated only on the basis of His mercy and gift; 4) no one is condemned because of the bad use of a free decision, [of those] for whom God foresaw such use; 5) no one is condemned because of the fact that for his final foresight there is a need for a free decision. a hindrance to grace (Ibid., a. 2).

The general nature of the teaching of Gregory of Rimini on predestination (the dependence of predestination and condemnation on the divine active will), as well as the discussion of whether predestination can be rejected by God, lead to the question of whether Gregory's teaching on double predestination is deterministic (fatalistic). If every human being is eternally predestined or condemned without regard to the use of his free will, then it follows that the fate of the individual is determined from the very beginning, and the individual himself will necessarily be condemned or predestined (Gregorius Ariminensis. I, d. 40 - 41, q. 1. III, 320, 23 - 24). But this conclusion means that the moral responsibility of the individual is removed, and also that no merit corresponding to eternal happiness is possible.-

page 246
I believe that the punishment of a person can be wrong and unfair, and prayers and exhortations have no meaning. Gregory was well aware of the implications that follow from the fatalistic concept of predestination, which is what his teaching appears to be, but nevertheless he consistently adheres to it and defends it. However, it seems that the Riminian has identified one feature in his teaching that significantly weakens its inherent determinism - the unlimited free will of God and the absolutely contingent nature of all human decisions and actions.

Reducing predestination and condemnation to a free, eternal divine will means that the divine will is equally free at every conceivable moment in time, because for God there are no "moments in time", but only the eternal present. Therefore, It can decide the fate of a particular person not only at the beginning of time, but also at every moment of historical time, since His freedom does not consist of segments and cannot be understood in terms of time. God's decision to predestine or reject man is forever timeless, and therefore not definitively accepted, not fixed. Because Of Its absolute power (potentia Dei absoluta) God is not bound by anything and could have made a different decision (Ibid., III, 350 16-20). That is, God may at any moment wish to reject or predestinate a person, and since He can now wish it, He could always wish it.

Thus, it is clear that Gregory contrasts the fatalistic understanding of his teaching with the idea of an omnipotent, free divine will. It is precisely because the fate of man is entirely in the power of God that it cannot be understood as the result of blind fate or absolute necessity. This divine will is the foundation of both the necessity and the efficacy of prayer: even when God condemns someone to eternal torment, He does not do it in vain, since He can always have mercy on them out of His infinite goodness (Ibid., III, 350 20-30). So, Gregory of Rimini clearly positions the contingent nature of predestination and condemnation, but this contingency belongs to the divine, and not to the human will.

Thus, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as in the ninth century, the problem of predestination was closely connected with the interpretation of the divine-

page 247
these attributes. In the fourteenth century, the problem has a new dimension - it is solved from the broader context of the relationship between God and creation: creationist and, after it, anthropological approaches become those general themes that fit a specific soteriological problem.

As we have seen, the general anti-Pelagian movement found its expression in the figure of Gregory of Rimini, and his teaching was not isolated. He almost immediately becomes one of the most influential and respected authors and receives the honorary title of "Authentic Doctor" (Doctor Authenticus). The question of the connection (influence) of the theology of the Augustinian school on the thought of the Reformation is widely discussed in historical and philosophical science. Such a connection may well have existed, and among the followers of Gregory of Rimini, Huglino of Orvieto (d. 1374) and Dionysius of Modena (d. 1400) are often singled out. Some of the ideas of this school during the early Reformation were also adopted by Johann von Staupitz (c. 1480-1524), Vicar General of the Augustinian Order in Germany. Thus, according to Staupitz, divine election is the gracious decision of God to redeem certain people, not due to any merit on the part of the redeemed; on the contrary, merit is the result of election. The condemned will perish, not because they were not chosen, but because of their sins. Thus, condemnation is an act of divine justice.

In addition, the Wittenberg University Library had Simon Fidati's" Works of Salvation "and Huglino of Orvieto's "Commentary on the Maxims". It is likely that during his lectures on the Psalms (1513-1515) Luther used the corresponding commentary of the Augustinian Jacob Perez of Valencia (d. 1490, Jacobi Perez de Valentia. Commentaria in Psalmos. Valencia, 1484), who in his doctrine of sin and grace was very close to the thought of Gregory of Rimini 11. In general, researchers (especially German-speaking ones) agree that the new Augustinian school (schola Augustiniana Moderna), initiated by Gregory of Rimini, developed by Huglino of Orvieto, which played an important intellectual but also spiritual role in Erfurt, transformed by Staupitz, became one of the most important schools in the world.

11. Werbeck, W. (1959) Jacobus Perez von Valencia: Untersuchungen zu seinem Psalenkommentar. Tubingen: Mohr.

page 248
of the forces contributing to the emergence of Luther's Reformation in Wittenberg 12.

However, other researchers urge not to exaggerate the significance of these circumstances, since the influence of Staupitz and schola Augustiniana Moderna on Luther has not yet been revealed.13 Of course, the origin of certain themes and even Luther's ideas were initiated by the works of Staupitz (for example, reflection on the pastoral importance of the wounds of Christ), but it is obvious that these themes were "commonplace" in the space of late medieval thought. In addition, Staupitz's affiliation with the schola Augustiniana Moderna is also questioned (McGrath believes that he was rather a follower of the old Augustinian school, dating back to Aegidius of Rome). In any case, it is clear: the ideas of Luther and schola Augustiniana Moderna overlap with each other, but the direct connection and borrowing have not yet been established.

Bibliography/References

Karpov K. V. Uchenie Grigori iz Rimini o predestinenii i svoboda volya [The Teaching of Gregory of Rimini on Predestination and Freedom of Will]. Moscow: IF RAS, 2012.

Weaver R. H. Divine Grace and human Action: a Study of Semi-Pelagian Disputes. Moscow: Center for Biblical and Patrological Research. Imperium Press, 2006.

Annales Bertiniani/MGH, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi. (1883) V. Hannoverae: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani.

Courtenay, W J. (1972, 1973) "John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medieuale 39, 40: 224 - 256, 147 - 174.

Genke, V. et Gumerlock, F. X. (2010) Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy. Milwaukee: Maquette University Press.

Karpov, K. (2012) "Uchenie Grigorija iz Rimini o predopredelenii i svobode voli" [Gregory of Rimini on predestination and free will]. M.: IF RAN.

McGrath, A. (2004) The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Oberman, H. A. (1992) "Headwaters of the Reformation", in The Dawn of the Reformation. Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought, pp. 39 - 83. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

12. Oberman, H.A. (1992) "Headwaters of the Reformation", in The Dawn of the Reformation. Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought, p. 77. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

13. McGrath, A. (2004) The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation, pp. 104 - 115. 2nd ed. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

page 249
Schabel, C. (2002) "Parisian Commentaries and the Problem of Predestination", in Evans, G. R. (ed.) Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Vol. 1, pp. 221 - 265. Leiden, Boston, Koln: Brill.

Vielhaber, K. (1956) Gottschalk der Sachse. Bonn: Rohrscheid.

Weaver, R. H. (2006) Divine Grace and Human Agency. A Study of the Semi-Pelagian Contriversy. Macon, Georgia.

Werbeck, W. (1959) Jacobus Perez von Valencia: Untersuchungen zu seinem Psalenkommentar. Tubingen: Mohr.

page 250

Permanent link to this publication: