The question of Soviet-German relations in the period of the Weimar Republic has received quite extensive coverage in the works of Soviet historians and Marxist scholars abroad. Among such works written in the 60s-70s are a number of monographs by Soviet authors, the collective work "German History in Modern and Modern Times" published in the USSR, studies by historians of the GDR, France, etc.1. These and many other Marxist works on the history of Germany and the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. cover to a greater or lesser extent the most important aspects of Soviet - German relations during this period. The main purpose of this article is to examine some aspects of economic and trade relations between the USSR and Germany during the global economic crisis and to show the attitude of the German public to the development of these relations, especially that part of it that represented the interests of the business circles of this country.

The global economic crisis that broke out in 1929 was compounded in Germany, as we know, by the fact that as a result of the First World War, this country lost many sources of raw materials and lost access to traditional sales markets. Of no small importance was the fact that it had been under the burden of reparations for many years. Industrial production here in 1930 compared to 1929 decreased to 89%, in 1931-to 72%, and in 1932-to 60%2. The number of unemployed at the end of 1930 was 4.6 million, and in 1932 reached 8 million people, not counting hundreds of thousands of part-time employees 3 . Exports have more than halved, and imports have almost tripled. The country's economy was pushed back to the level of 1895.4 .

The only country with which Germany increased its trade during the crisis was the Soviet Union. Technical reconstruction of industry and transport in the USSR,

1" Germanskaya istoriya v novoe i sovremennoe vremya " [German History in Modern and Contemporary Times], vol. 2, Moscow, 1970; V. B. Ushakov. Foreign policy of Germany in the period of the Weimar Republic, Moscow, 1968; I. S. Kremer, A. O. Chubaryan. Essay on the history of foreign Policy of the USSR (1917-1963). Moscow, 1964; S. V. Nikonov A. Germany and England from Locarno to Lausanne, Moscow, 1966; A. E. Ioffe. Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1928-1932, Moscow, 1968; A. Akhtamzyan. Rapallo politics, Moscow, 1974; G. Badia. La fin de la Republique Allemande (1929 - 1933). P. 1958; E. Labor. Der Kampf der deutschen Arbeiterklasse ge-gen Militarismus und Kriegsgefahr 1927 bis 1929. B. 1961; F. Klein. Die diplomatischen Beziehungen Deutschlands zur Sowjetunion. 1917 - 1932. B. 1952; A. Andrele. Die deutsche Rapallo-Politik. Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen 1922 - 1929. B. 1962.

2 " World economic Crises. 1845-1935". T. I. M. 1937, pp. 402-405.

3 "German History in modern and contemporary times", vol. 2, p. 158.

4 " Foreign trade of capitalist countries. 1929-1936". M.-L. 1937, pp. 208-209.

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the creation of new branches of industry and the development of new technical processes made it necessary not only to acquire, but also to master in the shortest possible time the technique and rich production experience accumulated by highly developed capitalist countries, including Germany. At the beginning of 1930, that is, at a time when the crisis of sales of finished products was already acute in Germany, Soviet trade Representative I. E. Lyubimov received representatives of the press in Berlin and informed them that due to the excess of the pace of economic construction planned for the five-year plan, the USSR was also increasing the volume of its imports. "We are taking all measures," the trade representative said, " to place a possibly significant number of our orders in Germany." The fact that German exports to the U.S.S.R. almost doubled between 1929 and 1932 shows how economic, scientific and technical ties between the U.S.S.R. and Germany expanded during the crisis .6 Many hundreds of German engineers and technicians worked at the construction sites of the USSR during these years.

With the beginning of the crisis in German politics and public opinion, the confrontation between the two tendencies on the question of Soviet-German relations intensified. A significant part of the business community, state and political figures of the Weimar Republic sought to expand economic and trade ties with the USSR. They were opposed by forces that held anti-Soviet positions. The adoption of the Jung plan in 1929-1930 and the sharp increase in anti-Soviet sentiment among some Western powers, caused by the aggravated economic crisis and the futility of attempts by the ruling circles of these powers to achieve the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade of the Soviet Union in order to turn it into an open market for their industrial products, led to The reactionary forces of Germany were greatly alarmed by the progress made in the implementation of the five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., which raised the prestige of socialism, the achievements of which stood out especially vividly against the background of the deepening general crisis of capitalism, which was also plunged into the gravest economic crisis.

In an effort to prove their loyalty to the agreement reached with the West on the reparations issue, the ruling circles of Germany, supported by all the reactionary forces of the country and sharing in principle the views of the capitalist states on relations with the USSR, undertook a number of anti-Soviet actions. The purpose of these actions was clearly formulated by the great German industrialist Rechberg, who declared in the Reichstag on June 24, 1929: "We will use the agreement (Jung's plan - V. K.) of the European powers against Bolshevism." 7 He was supported by other anti-Soviet circles of the bourgeoisie. It was then that the idea of a bloc of Western powers was put forward to organize a "crusade" against the USSR .8 At the end of December 1929, the "Catholic Franco-German Congress" was held in Berlin, which was attended by such prominent right - wing figures as former Chancellor W. Marx, members of the cabinet of G. Muller-A. Stegerwald and T. F. von Gerard, a representative of agrarian capital A. Hermes, and others. All the resolutions of the Congress bore the stamp of anti-Soviet collusion .9 The statement of the German Foreign Minister J. Kurzius was also a deliberate anti-Soviet action

5 " Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR "(hereinafter - DVP), Vol. XIII, Moscow, 1968, pp. 53-54.

6 A. Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., p. 261.

7 "Verhandlungen des Reichstags". Bd. 425. В. 1929, S. 2832.

8 Ibid.; "Communist International", 1929, No. 27, pp. 33-34.

9 V. D. Kulbakin. Militarization of Germany in 1928-1930, Moscow, 1954, pp. 135-136.

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in the Reichstag in June 1930, which emphasized the" insurmountable difficulties " allegedly encountered in relations between Germany and the USSR. 10
The fact that the enemies of the Soviet Union, the White emigrants, were acquitted in 1929 was also a manifestation of anti - Sovietism. Orlov and others), who were accused of forging documents to discredit the Soviet government and its organs, 11 and another gang of White Guards (Karumidze, Sadatierashvili, etc.) " who, together with representatives of the German reaction, were engaged in fabricating false chervonets in order to undermine confidence in the Soviet currency; a provocative search of the premises of the authorized Soviet trade mission by the Munich police; statement of the German "church fathers" on joining the so-called prayer crusade against the USSR, proclaimed by Pius XI (1930) 12 . Created in October 1931, the Harzburg Reaction Front in Germany was also based on anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, the desire to call the fascists to power in order to implement the goals of this front and prepare for war in Europe, primarily against the USSR.

The government of G. Breuning did not prevent the activation of right-wing forces in the country, which led to a deterioration of Soviet-German relations. The Berlin Non-Aggression and Neutrality Treaty, which expired in 1931, was not extended by the German side, so as, according to Breuning, not to cause discontent among the Western powers .13 Lending to Soviet orders was sharply reduced, despite the fact that this caused huge damage to production and put hundreds of thousands of workers and employees out of work.

Thus, in Germany, during the economic crisis, there was a sharp separation of class forces and interests. Under the patronage of the ruling circles of the country, nationalist and Nazi forces, embittered by the success of industrialization and the construction of socialism in the USSR, and the growing solidarity of the broad masses of the German people with it, incited terry anti-Sovietism and anti-communism and launched terror against dissidents in their own country.

The Soviet Union could not ignore these hostile actions and the increased anti-Soviet propaganda in Germany. At the 2nd session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on December 4, 1929, the report of M. M. Litvinov, acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, noted that over the past year new evidence had been obtained that there were individuals, groups, organizations and even parties in Germany that aimed to radically change Germany's policy towards anti-Soviet machinations. At the same time, Litvinov, expressing the opinion of the Soviet government, emphasized :" We still follow her (Germany) with great sympathy. - V. K.) attempts to free itself from the fetters with which it is bound by the Treaty of Versailles and from which the working classes suffer most"14 .

However, neither the increased right-wing attacks on the Rapallo course, nor the pressure from the international reaction, which sought to create

10 "Verhandlungen des Reichstags", Bd. 428. В. 1930, S. 5817.

11 The newspaper Izvestia noted (13. VIII. 1929): "This fact (the acquittal of the criminal group of Orlov and Co. 0. - V. K) is neither a private matter, nor only a matter of German statehood. It deeply affects German-Soviet relations and even has international political significance, since the work of this gang has repeatedly poisoned relations with the Soviet Union, as well as other states."

12 In this regard, anti-Soviet sermons were delivered in churches in Germany for some time.

13 H. Bruning. Die Vereinigten Staaten und Europa. Dusseldorf. 1954, p. 11. Cit. by: "German History in modern and contemporary times", vol. 2, p. 147.

14 DVP. T. XII. Moscow, 1967, pp. 628-629.

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a united anti-Soviet front could not induce the German ruling circles to completely abandon economic and trade cooperation with the Soviet Union. An important role in this process was played by economic factors, the importance of which increased during the global economic crisis, first of all, Germany's de facto lack of access to Western markets and the burden of reparations on it. Moreover, even such a right-wing government as the Breuning cabinet could not ignore the objectively existing traditional economic interconnectedness of the two largest European states. The consistent peace-loving policy of the Soviet Government and the purposeful activity of Soviet diplomacy aimed at strengthening and deepening all-round ties between the two states largely contributed to the preservation of normal relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the opinion of broad strata of German society was of great importance for the development of Soviet-German relations. The working masses of the country demanded the preservation, expansion and strengthening of economic and cultural ties with the Soviet Union. The KKE carried out fruitful work in this direction, supported by progressive public organizations, trade unions and part of the local organizations of the SPD. Progressive German writers I. Becher, E. Weinert, W. Bredel, L. Renn, A. Seghers, G. Marchwitz, and the playwright F. Schulz made a significant contribution to the mutual understanding of the two peoples through their works and public speeches. Wolf.

At the beginning of 1930, in connection with the activation of anti-Soviet circles in various cities of Germany, mass rallies and demonstrations of supporters of good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union were held. The conference of the "Union of Friends of the USSR"was held in Essen on 15 . In February 1930, a group of progressive public figures issued an appeal to the government and the entire German people, warning against a dangerous turn of events in the direction of severing relations with the USSR. "To remain silent at this moment," the authors of the appeal stated, " is to take the blame for unleashing a new world war. We don't want to be held responsible for this. We consider it our duty to the entire public to oppose the unilateral treatment of public opinion on the Russian question and prevent the catastrophe that we are most likely facing. " 16
A large number of supporters of good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union also existed in bourgeois, including right-wing bourgeois parties. Although they were strongly Western-oriented, no one (some for diplomatic reasons, others for a realistic approach to assessing the country's situation) suggested that political and especially economic contacts with the Soviet Union should be abandoned. From this point of view, the Reichstag foreign policy debate in the summer of 1930 was very characteristic. They convincingly showed that not only the Communists, but also the bourgeois parties are resolutely in favor of developing Soviet-German relations in favor of deepening cooperation between the two states. Foreign Minister Curtius, though, tried to explain the deterioration of relations between the USSR and Germany by referring to "communist activities" allegedly inspired from the Soviet Union, to fictitious "religious persecution" in the USSR, and so on (in this he was supported by a number of representatives of the Soviet Union).-

15 "Die Rote Fahne", 28.III.1930.

16 Cit. by: A. Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., p. 254.

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The main conclusion of his speech was that relations with the Soviet Union are an important factor in German foreign policy and that the solution of disputed problems is possible only through negotiations in the framework of conciliation. The majority of deputies noted the vital importance of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, and spoke in favor of deepening economic ties. Member of the Catholic Center Party V. Schreiber called relations with Russia "vital" and called on the government to approach them from the standpoint of realism. MP from the People's Party R. Reinbaben said: "In view of the current trade, economic and political situation in Germany, we should think about further promoting the development of economic ties with Russia,"he said17 . National Party MP O. Goetsch warned against Germany joining the anti-Soviet front, which, according to him, would harm Germany's national interests. The Communists strongly protested against the anti-Soviet machinations of reactionary circles 18 . Right-wing Social Democrats also spoke in favor of improving and deepening ties with the Soviet Union.

The call for expanding these ties was by no means limited to the Reichstag debate. Advisor to the German Embassy in Moscow G. Hilger in his memoirs noted: "In Berlin alone, I had to receive over 200 representatives of firms within 10 days; they all wanted to know what opportunities for their enterprises existed in the Soviet market." 19 The activation of anti-Soviet circles caused a lively reaction in the press. Not only the Communist press, but also the bourgeois newspapers, which expressed the views of a certain section of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, came out in support of the development of Soviet-German relations in the spirit of Rapallo's principles. Thus, the influential newspaper of the Center Party's right wing, Kolnische Zeitung, wrote: "It is necessary to fill the old bellows of the Rapallo Agreement with fresh new wine and once again show its vitality." 20 Some other newspapers spoke in the same spirit.

Of course, such views were not shared by the entire bourgeois press. Many of the newspapers that spoke in favor of deepening relations with the USSR were not consistent in this regard. The different approach of the bourgeois press to the problem of Soviet-German relations reflected a different attitude on the part of various circles of the German commercial, industrial and financial bourgeoisie. It clearly showed significant differences on this issue between the real-thinking business circles and the reactionary bourgeois-nationalist and Nazi forces, which spoke from the positions of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. However, a sober approach to the problem of bilateral economic and trade relations that served the interests of Germany and the Soviet Union was dominant in these years.

Many industrial and commercial firms sometimes took the initiative to establish business contacts with Soviet representatives and trade organizations. In April 1929, the Soviet Union was visited by a delegation of East Prussian business circles, who were positive about expanding economic ties with the USSR, since transit flows of goods passed through Konigsberg. On April 12, the delegation was received by the People's Commissar of Foreign and Domestic Trade of the USSR A. I. Mikoyan. In the "Report on a trip to Russia" submitted to the Prussian pra-

17 "Verhandlungen des Reichstags". Bd. 428, S. 5848 - 5849.

18 Ibid., S. 5865, 5829, 5888.

19 G. Hilger. Wir und Kjemi. Frankfurt am Main. 1956, S. 231 (цит. by: A. Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., p. 284).

20 "Kolnische Zeitung", 27.IV.1930.

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In particular, it was noted that the delegation in Moscow received a good reception, and it was recognized that "the system currently prevailing in the USSR has overcome the most terrible state of chaos that no country in modern world history has ever known, and established order in the country." 21 The construction of a metallurgical plant in Magnitogorsk aroused great interest among many industrialists at that time. Well-known companies such as Siemens-Bauunion, AEG, Siemens-Schukkert, Krupp, Vereinigte Stahlwerke and Bergbau Thyssen expressed their readiness to participate in the development of the project and construction of the plant 22.

Such contacts led to the expansion of economic ties. A number of large firms, including AEG, Siemens - Schukkert, and Stark, purchased Soviet oil, timber, and rubber products. In 1930, the USSR supplied Germany with 50% of all imported manganese, 47.2% of flax, and more than 30% of furs. If in 1929 1.6 million tons of various goods were exported from the Soviet Union, in 1930 - more than 2.5 million tons .23 As for the export of German goods to the USSR, it ranked second (after the United States) in 1930. If in 1929 it was 395 thousand tons, then in 1930 it reached 511 thousand tons. The main export items were machinery and equipment. Soviet orders accounted for more than 50% of the turnover of some firms, and for firms that supplied turbines-almost 70%. Enterprises such as the Vereinigte Oberschlesische Huttenwerke or the Becker steelworks were provided with Soviet orders for many months and could not only not lay off workers, but also recruit new employees . In November 1930, the Union of German Machine Builders openly declared to the Ministry of Economy that "trade with the Russians is now becoming absolutely necessary", since enterprises can face the alternative: "either accept Russian orders or dismiss workers" 25 . And orders were accepted and executed everywhere. As the Ministry of Economy reported, in January 1931, "entire machine-building enterprises were 80 to 100% engaged in fulfilling Russian orders." 26
The initiatives of the business and industrial circles and a certain warming in Soviet-German relations that occurred in the summer of 1930 led to the fact that a number of issues and mutual claims were considered as a result of the negotiations that took place at that time. A communique published simultaneously in Moscow and Berlin, which received a wide international response, stated that "the fundamental difference between the two states should not be an obstacle to the further fruitful development of their friendly relations."27
The way the German public reacted to the negotiations and the communique adopted by the parties is clearly shown by the materials published on the pages of newspapers. Almost all German newspapers, including those of the industrial and commercial circles, published positive reviews about the negotiations. Thus, the organ of the moderate-liberal direction of the Rhenish monopoly bourgeoisie believed that the negotiations "should lead to a far-reaching political rapprochement."28 The Frankfurter Zeitung noted that "both sides are resolutely determined to support the establishment of a new government."-

21 Cit. po: Ah Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., pp. 239-240.

22 Ibid., p. 252.

23 A. E. Ioffe. Op. ed., p. 261.

24 Там же; "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", 12.XII. 1930; "Berliner Tageblatb, 21.I.1931.

25 "Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam. Reichswirtschaftsministerium (далее - DZA), N 12663, Bl. 297.

26 S. V. Nikonova. Op. ed., page 284.

27 "Foreign Policy of the USSR", vol. III. Moscow, 1945, p. 432.

28 "Vossische Zeitung", 14.VI.1930.

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29. The Kolnische Zeitung concluded that the communique "should restore the atmosphere of trust between the two states and consolidate it." 30 On April 16, 1930, the session of the Soviet-German conciliation commission began. Mutual understanding was reached on most of the issues discussed.

The importance of normal Soviet-German relations was not limited to the benefits that these countries derived from the development of economic and trade ties between them. They also had a very positive impact on the political climate in Europe. An example is the position of the Soviet Union and Germany regarding the plan put forward in 1929 by the French Foreign Minister A. Briand to create a "pan-Europe" - an alliance of capitalist countries, directed with its sharp edge against the USSR and designed to establish France's leading position in Europe. The consistent struggle of the U.S.S.R. against this reactionary plan, the positive Soviet proposals supported by Germany and a number of other States, and the sharpened contradictions in the camp of the capitalist countries led to the thwarting of anti-Soviet plans and the collapse of the pan-Europe plan.

Soviet-German economic ties continued to develop in 1931. The interest of German business circles in expanding these ties led to the fact that the largest industrial concerns responded unconditionally to the Soviet government's proposal to send representatives to Moscow to find out the possibility of placing new large orders (in the amount of 300 million marks)31 . The German Foreign Ministry was determined to oppose this trip, but the industrialists did not take it into account. "We should not miss the opportunities that Russia offers," Kolnische Zeitung emphasized. - Industry and trade expect to receive the support of our diplomacy and banks in this matter. Political views concern the business world only secondarily"32. On February 28, 1931, a delegation consisting of representatives from the largest German firms arrived in Moscow .33 "It was really an exceptionally representative delegation," recalls German Ambassador to the USSR G. Dirksen. "Krupp, AEG, Siemens, Demag, Kleckner, Borsig, and the most influential firms in the steel, iron, electrical, and machine tool industries have sent their most prominent representatives." 34
On February 28, the delegation was received by the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council G. K. Ordzhonikidze. As a result of the negotiations, on March 10, 1931, a communique was signed stating that " negotiations between the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR and German industrialists concerning the removal of obstacles in economic relations and the discussion of the issue of expanding and deepening mutual economic relations led to a result that satisfied both sides." In particular, it was decided to ensure that "additional supplies for the USSR will be placed in Germany as soon as possible"35 . As a result of the implementation of this decision, the Soviet Union placed on German enterprises in the period from April 1.5 to August 31-

29 "Frankfurter Zeitung", U.VI.1930.

30 "Kolnische Zeitung", 14.VI.1930.

31 A. Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., p. 263.

32 "Kolnische Zeitung", 8.II.1931.

33 The delegation was headed by a prominent industrialist, member of the Center Party P. Kleckner, head of the company "Kleckner".

34 H. von Dirksen. Moskau, Tokyo, London. Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen zu 20 Jahren deutscher Aussenpolitik. 1919 - 1939. Stuttgart. 1950, S. 109.

35 "Foreign Policy of the USSR", vol. III, p. 484; Izvestiya, 10. III. 1931.

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hundred 1931 additional orders worth 300 million marks 36 . As noted by Die Rote Fahne, as a result of this step, 250 thousand people got 37 jobs .

Even some bourgeois newspapers have begun to calculate how many unemployed people will be able to work thanks to Soviet orders. Berliner Tageblatt, which was close to the Democratic party and represented the interests of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, gave the figure of 175 thousand, and the left - wing newspaper Berlin am Morgen-300 thousand people .38 The overwhelming majority of newspapers praised the results of this trip of industrialists to Moscow. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, an organ of the big industrial bourgeoisie, noted that "trade with Russia remains a real factor that every person who really thinks in politics must take into account", and that if Germany refuses to make business deals with the USSR, they will immediately be concluded by other countries .39 "Vossische Zeitung" stated that after the industrialists ' trip to the USSR, there was an increase in the share price associated with it. It was especially noticeable in relation to the securities of machine-building, mining and construction enterprises .40 Even many in the business community who had previously been staunchly opposed to establishing mutually beneficial relations with Soviet Russia became convinced that only cooperation with the Soviet Union could improve the German economy. An employee of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Henke, wrote about this, in particular, to the Ambassador to the USSR, Dirksen 41 .

Only a few newspapers close to the government, while not denying the serious significance of Soviet orders for Germany, suggested that the development of trade should not be linked to the improvement of political relations between the two countries, and that they saw only the business side of the industrialists ' trip .42 But this position was not popular at the time.

Over time, an increasing number of representatives of the business community came to the conclusion that it was profitable and economically necessary to have close commercial and industrial ties with the USSR, with a country that had inexhaustible opportunities for this. The Berliner Tageblatt noted at the beginning of 1932: "The Soviet Union was the best buyer of our machines in 1931, while other European industrial countries showed a reduced ability to purchase German means of production." 43 The idea expressed by the newspaper was also confirmed by official statistics. In a special note of the Soviet mission in Berlin dated August 14, 1931, data are given that show especially convincingly the accelerating growth of Soviet orders. In 1929. they reached 447 million marks, in 1930 - 569 million, in the first half of 1931-500 million marks, in total for 1931-800 million marks 44 .

Many large enterprises could function only thanks to Soviet orders. The German Consul General in Danzig reported to Dirksen at the end of October 1931: "It can be said directly that the Schichau shipyard, whose rehabilitation was carried out by large

36 DVP. T. XIV. Moscow, 1968, pp. 246-248.

37 "Die Rote Fahne", 15.VI.1931.

38 "Berliner Tageblatt", 11.III. 1931; "Berlin am Morgen", 8.III.193I.

39 "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", 12.III.1931.

40 "Vossische Zeitung", 11.III.1931.

41 DZA Potsdam, Nachlass Dirksen, Bd. 7, Bl. 192.

42 "Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz", 11.III.1931; "Kolnische Zeitung", 14.III.1931.

43 "Berliner Tageblatt", 19.I.1932.

44 A. Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., p. 266.

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However, it would inevitably have had to close its gates in the near future if it had not received Russian orders. " 45 In Halle, the director of the Wegelin Huebner A. G. machine-building plant, Kalthoff, based on his anti-communist position, initially opposed the acceptance of Soviet orders. With the onset of the crisis in 1929, he himself took the initiative in establishing contact with the Soviet trade mission and, in the course of further negotiations, agreed to the proposals of the Soviet side regarding the terms of payment and supplies. The total amount of Soviet orders for this plant in 1931 was 2.3 million marks46 . As a result, all workers and employees of the specified enterprise were provided with work. At the beginning of 1932, the Association of Saxon Industrialists addressed a letter to the government, which ended with the following eloquent words:"Russian orders are the last means of salvation for the large branches of the Saxon metal industry, which the drowning man clutches at" 47 . Assessing the significance of Soviet - German cooperation for Germany, Die Rote Fahne rightly pointed out: "The economic crisis in Germany would have been even deeper, and unemployment even greater, if the country of victorious socialism had not given German workers work and bread." 48 The indisputability of this is now recognized by many West German historians (G. Rasch, D. Poser, P. Plak, etc.).

Trade and economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany could have developed more successfully if there had not been a discrepancy created by the German side between the rapidly increasing Soviet imports from Germany and the declining exports from the U.S.S.R. to Germany. Soviet exports of agricultural products again encountered the protectionism of the German government dictated by the interests of large landowners - high customs tariffs on imported wheat, barley, peas, timber, sugar, etc. As a result of this policy, only in 1931 the passive trade balance of the USSR with Germany amounted to 1.2 billion rubles .49 As a result of negotiations in Berlin on December 22, 1931, the German side, at the insistence of representatives of the USSR, agreed to minor customs privileges for Soviet goods and pledged to facilitate the additional import of 100 thousand tons of rye .50 However, the agreement was never ratified. In the future, Soviet exports were invariably confronted with various obstacles raised by the German authorities. In the autumn of 1931, the second session of the Soviet-German conciliation Commission was held, which resolved some practical issues.

In 1932, Soviet-German relations again became complicated, which was a direct result of the growing reactionary policy of the country's ruling circles, a consequence of the growing influence of the Nazi party. In March 1932, terrorists associated with counter-revolutionary circles in Poland attempted to assassinate the German ambassador in Moscow, Dirksen. The mercenary, believing that he was shooting at the ambassador, wounded Von Twardowski, an adviser to the German embassy. Even according to Dirksen's own admission in his report to Berlin, this was a pre-arranged plan.-

45 Ibid., p. 271.

46 G. Gorski. Das "rote Halle" an der Seite der Sowjetunion. Halle. 1968, S. 168.

47 Cit. by: "The Treaty of Rapallo and the problem of peaceful coexistence". Proceedings of the scientific conference dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Rapallo Bishop (April 25-28, 1962). Moscow, 1963, p. 137.

48 "Die Rote Fahne", 8.XU931.

49 " Foreign trade of capitalist countries. Statistical handbook of 1929-1936". Moscow-L. 1937, p. 140.

50 Там же; J. Kuczynski, G. Willkowski. Die deutsch-russischen Handels- beziehungen in den letzten 150 Jahren. B. 1947, S. 73.

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a prepared act intended to cause foreign policy complications for the USSR.

In the middle of 1932, provocative anti-Soviet attacks by the Nazi press (the Angriff newspaper, etc.) became more frequent. In Konigsberg, the Soviet Consulate General was attacked by police. The actions of the Nazis directed against Soviet representatives in Germany were not stopped by the authorities. Chancellor Breuning actually refused to mark the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Rapallo, fearing to provoke dissatisfaction with the Western powers, from whom the ruling circles of Germany sought to obtain consent to "equal rights" for weapons. At the 1932 Geneva Conference on Disarmament, German representatives tried to persuade the French delegation to conclude an anti-Soviet economic and political agreement. The Breuning Government and the succeeding Government of Fr. The Pa - Pena pursued a policy of discrimination against the Soviet Union in the field of foreign trade. As before, no measures were taken to lift restrictions on Soviet exports to Germany, as a result of which the Soviet Union was forced to pay for a significant part of German exports to the USSR in gold and mottoes. The German side remained deaf to the proposals of the Soviet foreign trade authorities to increase the supply of oil, timber and agricultural products51 .
But even under these conditions, the line of complete withdrawal from the Treaty of Rapallo was not consolidated in Germany until the establishment of the fascist dictatorship. Following the anti-Soviet course, the ruling circles of Germany, however, did not dare to break Soviet-German relations, because, firstly, they did not want to lose the "Soviet trump card" in bargaining with the Western powers on the issue of the abolition of the Versailles regulations, and secondly, they still could not ignore considerations of economic interest Germany is interested in maintaining and expanding trade relations with the USSR.

The Soviet Union did everything in its power to prevent the collapse of the Rapallo course. J. V. Stalin, in an interview with the German writer E. Ludwig, declared on behalf of the Soviet Government that the USSR, as before, would pursue a friendly policy towards Germany. 52 On December 12, 1932, Litvinov had a conversation with German Foreign Minister Karl Neurath, in which the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs once again confirmed that the Soviet Union made maintaining good relations with Germany one of its main foreign policy goals. There are a large number of other facts that testify to the consistent and purposeful course of the Soviet Socialist Republic aimed at strengthening Soviet-German political and economic ties.

It was also impossible to ignore the opinion of the general public in Germany, which actively advocated the development of cooperation with the Soviet Union. The preservation and consolidation of normal relations with the USSR was demanded not only by communists and working people, but also by many representatives of bourgeois business circles. The motives and reasons for such actions were different, but the common goal was to prevent a break in relations, maintain and deepen contacts between both states. The opinion of the general public was clearly expressed by many newspapers in the materials devoted to the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Rapallo. There was a lively discussion around this date. Nine major newspapers published articles in April 1932 describing Litvinov's speech in Geneva

51 A. Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., p. 272.

52 I. V. Stalin, Soch. Vol. 13, Moscow, 1951, p. 117.

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on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the treaty 53 . Die Rote Fahne printed the full text of this speech, accompanied by a lengthy editorial. The entire bourgeois press highly appreciated the importance of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany in the spirit of the Treaty of Rapallo, and condemned the Government's policy of concealing this important event for decades. The Berliner Tageblatt, which for several years published materials containing anti-Soviet fabrications, published an article entitled "10 years of the Treaty of Rapallo", which gave evidence in favor of the fact that thanks to this treaty, Germany was able to strengthen its international position and achieve success in its foreign policy. 54 The Berliner Borsenkurier newspaper emphasized the economic benefits of relations with the Soviet Union: "Russia today has become the main buyer of German industrial goods by volume. Agriculture also indirectly benefits from the export of German goods to Russia. Without these exports, unemployment would have been even greater and agricultural sales would have fallen even more significantly. " 55
Many newspapers argued for an increase in Soviet exports to Germany, arguing that the reduction would negatively affect German exports to the U.S.S.R. 56 Even Deutschland, which is usually extremely hostile to the USSR, was forced to recognize both the successful course of industrialization of the USSR and its enormous importance for the development of German exports. Concerning, in particular, the problem of sales of machine-tool industry products, the newspaper reported that German exports of machine tools to the USSR increased from 10.6 million marks in the first half of 1929 to a record figure of 89.5 million marks in the first half of 1932, that is, by almost 750%. while the export of machine tools to other countries during this time fell by about 2/3 - from 89.3 to 30.6 million marks. Accordingly, the share of the USSR in total German machine tool exports increased from 10.6% in 1929 to 18.5% in 1930, 33.6% in 1931, and 74.5% in 193257 .

Press statements in favor of strengthening Soviet-German relations continued throughout 1932. The largest number of them belongs to the autumn of this year. Almost all the newspapers emphasized that normal relations with the USSR would help Germany achieve independence in its relations with Britain, France, and other Western countries. "The great political significance of the Treaty of Rapallo was and still is," the Berliner Borsenzeitung noted, "that the conclusion of the treaty was the first step towards achieving German foreign policy independence." 58 The Kolnische Zeitung expressed its attitude to this problem in the form of a reminder question addressed to the Papen Government: "Can't they remember the presence of the "Russian card" in their game?" 59 . Somewhat later, the same newspaper stated: "The upheaval of the Versailles system (referring to the Jung plan and the USSR's non - aggression treaties with France and Poland) creates a new situation not only in Germany's relations with the victorious countries, but also a new situation for the idea of Rapallo. Signatories of the Rapallo Treaty

53 "Vossische Zeitung", "Weser Zeitung", "Berliner Tageblatt", "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", "Berliner Borsenzeitung", "Hamburger Nachrichten", u. a. 16, 17.IV.1932.

54 "Berliner Tageblatt", 16.IV.1932.

55 "Berliner Borsenkurier", 16.VI. 1932. Цит. by: A. Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., p. 271.

56 "Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War". Vol. II. Moscow, 1948, pp. 233-239

57 "Deutschland", 30.VI.1932.

58 "Berliner Borsenzeitung", 6.XI.1932.

59 "Kolnische Zeitung". 22.X.1932.

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both countries should ensure that their relations are constantly revitalized. " 60 This idea was developed in detail in an article published in the Berliner Borsenzeitung. In particular, it said: "Friendly relations between the two countries can be considered as strong, since they correspond to the real interests of both sides. This fully corresponds to traditional German-Soviet relations. For both Germany and the USSR, the "Rapallo policy"... was an essential component of their efforts to ensure peace in Eastern Europe. Therefore, we have no reason to fear that our relations with the USSR will end. The USSR has relations with us... at least as important as our relations with the USSR... For us, the Rapallo policy forms the necessary balance. " 61 The same newspaper again emphasized the economic benefits of relations with the Soviet country for Germany. In an article on the Treaty of Rapallo, she noted that its meaning "goes far beyond its content." According to the author of the article, the agreement was the basis for the development of trade turnover between the two countries, which became especially necessary due to the deepening economic crisis .62
Some prominent representatives of the military community also spoke in favor of maintaining normal relations with the USSR. For example, General G. Seeckt, who is close to the People's Party, noted in a book published back in 1931 that "our position between France and Poland forces us to strive for long-term contacts and possible agreements with Russia, so as not to become completely dependent on the West." At the same time, he stressed that such agreements help to improve the country's economic situation, which was undermined by the crisis .63
All this could not but affect the policy of the official circles of the Weimar Republic towards the Soviet Union, and the state of bilateral economic relations. On June 15, 1932, representatives of both countries signed a new trade agreement on mutual supplies of goods and German loans to the Soviet Union. The USSR placed an order for rolling equipment with a volume of 350 thousand tons. The German side resolved the issue of loans on more favorable terms. Commenting on the agreement on Soviet orders, the Berliner Borsenzeitung made a well-founded conclusion: "The German metal industry exists mainly at the expense of Russian orders." 64 In the same month, the German Foreign Ministry sent instructions to the staff of its embassy in Moscow stating that Germany's policy towards Russia was based on the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 and the Berlin Treaty of 1926. "Good German-Russian relations,"the instructions said," are of great importance for German politics and economy. " 65
Thus, despite the general strengthening of the anti-Soviet orientation of the government's policy in the last years of the Weimar Republic, the objective conditions of these years (the world economic crisis, the burden of reparations, the restrictive provisions of the Treaty of Versailles), the movement of the masses for the development and strengthening of Soviet-German relations, and the insistent demands of influential business and industrial-

60 "Kolnische Zeitung", 29.XI.1932.

61 "Berliner Borsenzeitung", 30.XI.1932.

62 "Berliner Borsenzeitung", 6.XI.1932.

63 H. von Seeckt. Wege deutscher Aussenpolitik. Leipzig. 1931, S. 15 - 16, 27.

64 Cit. by: J. Kuczynski, G. Willkowski. Op. cit., S. 74-76.

65 A. E. Ioffe. Op. ed., p. 267.

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The Soviet Union's political relations with the USSR forced its ruling elite not to abandon Soviet-German cooperation. Therefore, if political relations sometimes deteriorated sharply, then economic ties not only did not stop, but, as a rule, strengthened. According to the results of trade turnover in the first half of 1932, the export of German goods to the USSR increased from 262 million marks in the first half of 1931 to 356 million marks in the first half of 1932. In German exports, the Soviet Union moved from second to first place. In 1930, Germany accounted for 23.7% of Soviet imports, in 1931 - 37.2%, and in 1932 - already 46.5%66 . For certain types of products, Soviet orders covered 70-90% of the products intended for export, among which a large part belonged to steam and gas turbines, presses, cranes, various machines, etc.According to Soviet estimates, in 1932 the fulfillment of Soviet orders in Germany was limited.about 300,000 workers were employed 67 .

Skeptics ' doubts about the expediency of expanding trade and economic ties with the USSR were refuted by life itself. Despite the opposition of anti-Soviet circles, German exports to the USSR increased by 176.8% between 1929 and 1932, while exports to France, Holland, and England declined to 51.6%, 46.8%, and 34.3%, respectively .68 The volume of trade might have been large, but the German ruling circles, following the demands of the reactionary forces of the country, took the path of artificially restricting the import of Soviet goods and thereby put a certain obstacle to the further expansion of economic cooperation. In 1929-1932, Germany was quite willing to reach an agreement with the West at the cost of worsening relations with the USSR. However, in the end, although not without hesitation and internal strife, the ruling circles, having soberly weighed the real facts, remained mostly in the position of normal relations with the Soviet Union until 1933.

An important role in this was played by the public opinion of a wide circle of the German population. Describing the position of the masses of the people, Dirksen wrote: "The general point of view of the average German in relation to Russia can be summed up in the following words:: "When we were on good terms with the Russians, it was good for both countries, when we were at enmity-both sides suffered from it equally." 69 The prominent German diplomat Count W. Brockdorf-Rantzau, referring to the question of the attitude of the progressive German public towards Soviet-German cooperation, stressed that " the German people know how to highly value free access to the east, secured by friendship." If Germany and the Soviet Union mutually supported each other, he believed, it would only benefit both peoples. 70
Analyzing the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union during the Weimar Republic and comparing them with the growing multilateral ties between the USSR and Germany today, one cannot but recall the words of G. V. Chicherin, who in one of his speeches said:: "Economically, Germany and the Soviet Republic make up for each other to such an extent that objective economic conditions compel them to pursue an economic policy of close cooperation."71 . Over the years,

66 "Trade relations of the USSR with capitalist countries", Moscow, 1938, p. 141.

67 A. Akhtamzyan. Op. ed., p. 271.

68 Ibid., p. 261.

69 H. von Dirksen. Op. cit., S. 61.

70 "The Treaty of Rapallo and the problem of peaceful coexistence", pp. 263-264.

71 G. V. Chicherin. Articles and Speeches on international policy Issues, Moscow, 1961, p. 356.

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Since the time when these words were uttered, the situation has changed significantly, but the main conclusion contained in the statement of an outstanding Soviet diplomat remains valid. During the Weimar Republic, the Soviet Union was only developing socialist industrialization and was interested in establishing stable economic ties with a highly developed capitalist country like Germany. Today, the Soviet Union is a powerful industrial power. Its relations with Germany became those of two highly developed industrial countries. Despite the difference in social systems, both countries are still interested in strengthening mutually beneficial ties, which were initiated in the 1920s by the Treaty of Rapallo and subsequent agreements between the USSR and Germany.

The experience of implementing the Rapallo policy provided a convincing confirmation of the conclusion of the founder of the Soviet state, V. I. Lenin, about the possibility and necessity of peaceful coexistence of states with different socio - economic systems. The analysis of this experience shows the mutual benefit of normal relations between States, regardless of their social systems, and the need to strengthen these relations in the name of peace and security of peoples.

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