Gunter ROSENFELD. Sowjetunion und Deutschland 1922 - 1933. Berlin. Akademie-Verlag. 1984. 512 S.

Professor of the Humboldt University of Berlin G. Roseyeld, a well-known researcher of Soviet-German relations in the interwar period, presented a new book "The Soviet Union and Germany 1922-1933". At the same time, his work on Soviet-German relations in 1917-1922, published for the first time in 19601, was published in the second edition . So, here is a large, two-volume study of one of the key problems of European politics in the interwar years, which remains of acute political relevance. The Rapallo salary represented the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and was a convincing historical example of not only the possibility, but also the enormous importance of cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Republic for preserving European peace.

The political relevance of Rapallo's policies has consistently attracted the interest of Marxist scholars. A considerable number of studies on certain problems of Soviet-German relations have been published in the USSR and the GDR. However, with the exception of the monograph by A. A. Akhtamzians2, there were no works recreating the entire period of Rapallo politics. The reviewed work is based on a solid source base: a large number of documents in German, Russian, English and French, including those stored in the archives of the GDR, Germany and the USSR, have been studied. Many of them are put into scientific use for the first time. The author is up-to-date with all the literature on Rapallo politics.

In his new work, Rosenfeld set himself the task of creating a generalized picture of Soviet-German relations in 1922-1933. In the center of his research is the struggle of the USSR for the implementation of Rapallo's policy, the preservation of normal, friendly relations with Germany. Its results in the field of political, economic, diplomatic and cultural relations are also considered. Without specifically highlighting the positions of political parties and the social forces behind them, the author includes them in the outline of the presentation during the analysis of various actions of Rapallo politics.

Soviet-German relations are considered against the general background of world politics in the 1920s and early 1930s. The international situation, the balance of power in Germany - "for" and "against" Rapallo-are among the most important components of the success of Rapallo's policy. Rosenfeld paid great attention to diplomacy and outstanding diplomats. Masterfully written pages are devoted to historical portraits and state-political activities of Lenin school diplomats, especially G. V. Chicherin and M. M. Litvinov. Of great interest are the characteristics of German diplomats, especially the Ambassador to the USSR W. Brockdorf-Rantzau.

The overall design of the work also determined its structure. The first two chapters are devoted to the period from Genoa to Locarno (1922-1925). The third covers cultural cooperation between the USSR and Germany. The fourth and fifth chapters describe the growing military danger and anti-Soviet behavior-

1 Rosenfeld G. Sowjetrussland und Deutschland 1917 - 1922. Brl. 1960.

2 Akhtamzyan A. A. Rapalle politika, Moscow, 1974.

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the imperialist forces ' attempts to put together a "crusade" against the U.S.S.R. with the participation of Germany. The sixth chapter analyzes the economic relations between the USSR and Germany during the global economic crisis. In the seventh, the final stage of the Rapallo policy is recreated: the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany was its end.

Throughout the study, the idea runs through that the implementation of the Rapallo policy was primarily the result of the Soviet state's persistent struggle to preserve peace. This struggle was often complicated by provocations of anti-Soviet forces, open or hidden sabotage by opponents of the 1922 treaty. The author traces a clear pattern: as Germany's imperialist forces consolidated their positions and strengthened its relations with Western powers, the anti-Fallist course prevailed, the German authorities did not abandon various kinds of anti-Soviet actions; and, on the contrary, whenever German extortions regarding the "weakening" of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles did not have the expected success, both the Soviet Union and the the Russian map pressure device.

The years 1922-1926 - from the Rapallo Treaty to the Berlin Treaty - generally refer to Rosenfeld's period of materialization of the Rapallo policy and deepening of all-round German-Soviet cooperation (p. 68, 89 p.). At the same time, the author notes, already from the end of 1923, opposing sentiments were clearly marked in Germany, which significantly increased in subsequent years. He considers the first major anti-Soviet action to be the attack of the German police on the Soviet trade mission in Berlin in May 1924 - "not without the knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (p.95). The conflict was resolved when attempts to undermine the monopoly of Soviet foreign trade were found to be unsuccessful (p. 69). In addition, Germany, in the "year of recognition" of the USSR, was threatened with losing not only a profitable economic partner: it would have found itself alone with the victorious powers, without being able to resort to the "Russian map" (p.101).

The May conflict, the author writes, was "a grim prologue to future fateful events... a major offensive against Rapallo's policies has actually already begun" (p. 109). He is referring to the Westward orientation of Germany, which became stronger after the adoption of the Dawes Plan, and which was reflected in the Rhenish Guarantee Pact and Germany's entry into the League of Nations (pp. 116, 119). Rosenfeld explains the "Western" orientation to a large extent by the actions of Foreign Minister G. Stresemann and the political forces and industrial circles that supported him, who pinned their hopes for the revision of Versailles on the concessions of the Western powers. Unlike Brockdorf-Rantzau, whose activities as ambassador to Moscow promoted a policy of peaceful coexistence, he considers Stresemann's position towards the USSR to be "negative and hostile" (p.121), although he notes that he was "smart enough to recognize" Rapallo's importance as a "trump card in the game". In this regard, Rosenfeld believes that Stresemann was not inclined to evaluate Rapallo from the point of view of a policy of peaceful coexistence and that, moreover, "he was ready to pay for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles" by Germany's participation in "anti-Soviet combinations of Western powers" (p.121). However, Stresemann did not want to be just a tool in the hands of Western powers, he counted on an "independent role" in the event of a war against the USSR. Here, Rosenfeld writes, was the" point of application of forces " of Soviet diplomacy to disrupt the anti-Soviet front (p. 121).

Rosenfeld's remark is undoubtedly true. The USSR, while remaining the only socialist State, could not ignore the conflicts within the capitalist system in its foreign and domestic policy. However, inter-imperialist contradictions were neither the main nor the only basis of Rapallo's policy. In this sense, the author's characterization of Stresemann's foreign policy seems somewhat one-sided. Regardless of his personal ambitions, as the Ruhr conflict of 1923 showed, Germany in those years needed allies to preserve its sovereignty. The policy of peaceful coexistence corresponded to the interests and views of the broadest, albeit class-contradictory, social forces. In addition, German military revenge in the 20s was impossible. The coincidence of interests of Germany and the USSR in a number of vital areas for both states stimulated the search for ways of mutually beneficial agreement and cooperation. That is why V. I. Lenin considered Rapallo as a model.-

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social policy of the socialist state 3 . It had objective foundations. "The German bourgeois government furiously hates the Bolsheviks," he noted, "but the interests of the international situation push it to make peace with Soviet Russia against its own wishes." 4
The situation of 1925-1927 can also be adequately assessed from these positions. In mid-1925, the forthcoming signing of the Locarno Agreements and Germany's entry into the League of Nations was assessed in Moscow as "the actual destruction of the Rapallo Treaty", given that in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of the League of Nations, Germany would automatically become a member of the anti-Soviet coalition (p.140). However, these negative consequences were largely averted as a result of a series of "reinsurance" actions: the conclusion of the Soviet-German trade treaty (1925), the Berlin Neutrality Treaty (1926), and German reservations regarding the application of these articles of the League of Nations Charter (pp. 162, 167, 168). The effectiveness of the countermeasures taken was already evident in 1927, during the Anglo-Soviet conflict. Hopes that Germany would support London's plans were not realized (p. 260, 285). "Anti - Soviet plans," writes Rosenfeld, " remained unfulfilled. They have encountered the harsh reality of imperialist contradictions" (p. 263).

Rosenfeld also sees a reliable basis for German-Soviet cooperation in the economic relations of both states. The author specifically examines the importance of economic and trade relations during the implementation of the first five-year plan by the Soviet country and during the global economic crisis (p. 372). Mutual economic contacts continued between the Weimar Republic and the USSR and during periods when the value of other "stimulators" was falling. They withdrew their restraining influence on those "pro-Western" circles that did not give up hope of creating an anti-Soviet front. The author considers the German working class, first of all its vanguard, the KKE, as well as the workers organized in the SPD and trade unions, part of the intelligentsia and bourgeois circles that supported the preservation of peace, to be the driving forces of Rapallo's policy. For more than a decade, cultural and scientific ties and cooperation between public organizations had a positive impact on Soviet-German relations in the spirit of a policy of peaceful coexistence.

In the last chapter, the author analyzes the conditions and circumstances of the end of the "era of Rapallo" (p. 421). This milestone, Rosenfeld believes, was marked both by a change in the balance of power in Germany, the situation in other states of the capitalist world, and in international relations. Having achieved inclusion in the "concert of European powers", Germany stubbornly acted in the direction of loosening the Versailles system. As these goals were realized, as well as the restoration of the military - industrial potential in the country, the positions of those forces that no longer counted on a peaceful revision of the results of the First World War, did not want to put up with the "shackles of Versailles", and made plans for its violent elimination strengthened. In this situation, the Rapall policy, which contradicted the plans of its military revenge, also lost its meaning for Germany. In addition, the Nazi Party considered "the crushing of Bolshevism"as its main goal. After the establishment of the fascist dictatorship, the influence of realistic-minded politicians on the formation of foreign policy decisions was reduced to nothing. The Rapallo policy of Germany has lost crucial components of its driving forces.

Rosenfeld's research presents a wide range of different problems. The work is distinguished by meticulous writing out of details, lively sketches of the most vivid events of the "Rapallo decade" rich in fruitful cooperation. It convinces that the policy of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems is possible and fruitful.

Unfortunately, the author did not consider it necessary to focus specifically on the historiography of the Rapallian policy, although in some cases he criticizes some points of view, primarily those of West German historians (p. 44, 52, 422, etc.). Given, however, the acute and very relevant controversy in the historical literature about the nature and significance of the Rapallian policy, the existence of a new approach to the history of the Rapallian state is its various assessments and points of view on key issues, and it is not enough to limit ourselves to cursory comments addressed to individual historians. It would be important-

3 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 45, p. 193.

4 Ibid., vol. 42, p. 105.

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We would also like to examine, in a problematic way, the forces that promoted and opposed the Rapallo policy. In general, the peer-reviewed research of the GDR historian is an important contribution to the study of Soviet-German relations in the 1920s and to the ideological struggle in international politics at the present stage.

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