Recently, there has been a growing interest in the prehistory of the First World War in general and in Russo-German political and economic relations of that time in particular. At the same time, certain shifts in the interpretation of these issues are noticeable, a departure from the apologetics of German imperialism, the search for the perpetrators of the war, etc.A certain milestone in West German historiography was the beginning of the 60s, when a number of critical-realistic works appeared. Along with the research of such prominent representatives of the conservative movement as G. Ritter, G. Uebersberger, F. Haselmeier, M. Werner1, F. Fischer's fundamental monograph "Breakthrough to World Power"2 is published, which is based on documents from the archives of Germany, the GDR, Austria, as well as on materials from trophy archives returned in the late 50s.1950s West Germany. The main task of the author was to analyze the goals pursued and put forward by the government, unions of monopolies and leaders of political parties in Germany throughout the war. Briefly outlining Germany's pre-war policy and position during the July crisis, Fischer highlights the facts that show that Germany incited the war, shows how its leadership deliberately provoked the war, using any favorable moment, how it created a version of Russia as the main culprit of the war even before the Russian mobilization was announced .3 He believes that the German leadership, which went to war consciously, bears a significant part of the historical responsibility for unleashing it .4 Fischer also spoke out against the prevailing Western view of easing tensions in Anglo-German relations in 1912-1914 .5
In the midst of rampant revanchist sentiments, a bourgeois scholar dared to expose the aggressive policy of German imperialism. On the basis of new materials, he laid bare the annexationist plans of the German government, in the development of which the "business circles"actively participated. The appearance of this book caused a storm of indignation among orthodox West German historians. But, despite this, the work was published in the second and third editions. Fischer was opposed by veterans of West German historiography G. Ritter and E. Zeichlin and others. In this regard, in 1964 - 1965, a discussion broke out among West German historians on the issues of German foreign and domestic policy on the eve and during the First World War. Responding to criticism from Ritter and Ceich-

1 G. Riller. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland. Bd. I-IV. Munchen. 1959-1968. (T. II refers to the pre-war period); N. Uebersberger. Osterreich zwischen Russland und Serbien. Koln-Graz. 1958; F. Haselmayer. Diplomatische Geschichte des Zweiten Reiches von 1871 bis 1918. Bd. 1 - 6. Munchen. 1955-1963. (the first part of volume VI is devoted to the prehistory of the war, 1909-1914); M. Werner. (Hrsg). Deutsche-russische Beziehungen von Bismark bis zur Gegenwart. Stuttgart. 1964. (This biased publication was published to mark the 50th anniversary of the Society for the Study of Russia).

2 F. Fischer. Griff nach der Weltmacht. Dtisseldorf. 1961.

3 F. Fischer. Op. cit. 2. Aufl. Dusseldorf. 1962, S. 80 - 82, 28.

4 Ibid., S. 98 - 99.

5 Ibid., S. 47 - 48.

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Leela , Fischer wrote a number of writings6 in which he once again emphasized the aggressive plans of German imperialism. "There can be no question of [the government's] slipping into the path of war." 7
Thus, the introduction of new materials, the appearance of Fischer's book, the discussion of 1964 - 1965, as well as the trends towards a change in the international political climate towards detente-all this was an impetus for West German historians to intensify their study of German foreign and domestic policy on the eve and during the First World War. In Germany, the flow of literature devoted to these problems has increased dramatically recently.

In 1969, as a continuation of the previous one, a new major work by Fischer appeared, which examines the domestic and foreign policy of Germany from the second Moroccan crisis of 1911 to the July crisis of 19148 . Succinctly repeating the conclusions of his previous work, Fischer reveals the relationship between the foreign policy trends of the pre-war and war periods. He also examines the mutual influence of the domestic and foreign policies of the ruling classes. The paper shows how the second Moroccan crisis gave rise to militaristic forces to once again sharply express their aspirations for a violent redistribution of the world. The transition from the policy of aggravating contradictions to a policy aimed at unleashing war, when it was only necessary to decide on the choice of the most favorable moment, took place, according to Fischer, at the military council on December 8, 1912 .9 Referring to Germany's economic rivalry with the Entente countries, Fischer notes that war was inevitable due to "the growing difficulties for German expansion due to the competition of France, England ,and the United States." 10 Therefore, Germany had to use weapons to get rid of competitors and pave its way to world domination. Rightly noting that the Russo-German contradictions were not of primary importance in the pan-European crisis, Fischer to a certain extent mistakenly believes that the basis of the Russo-German contradictions were trade contradictions .11
This historian writes a lot and with good reason about extreme nationalism and racism as the ideology of German imperialism, about the artificial incitement of nationalist propaganda directed against the Slavs. "The anti-French campaign," he writes, " presented no difficulties, just as the anti-Russian campaign, which had been particularly encouraged by the Government since the spring of 1912, presented difficulties."12 . Throughout 1913, the ruling circles of Germany spread the version of Russia as the main enemy of Germany, they paid, Fischer emphasizes, very much attention to the ideological preparation of the war with Russia, and later portrayed it as the main culprit of the war. In 1913, in connection with the Liman von Sanders mission, "Russia and Germany clashed directly for the first time." 13 However, Fischer admits that Germany did not defend the interests of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, but its own economic interests, and fought for its dominant position in Central Europe .14 He draws attention to Germany's economic rivalry with Austria-Hungary in Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania, and Serbia.

Unlike his previous work, Fischer used (although not always sufficiently) the research of Soviet historians and Soviet publications. He is particularly attracted to Soviet research and publications in the literature-

6 F. Fischer. Weltpolitik. Weltmachtstreben und deutsche Kriegsziele. "Historische Zeitschrift", 199/2, 1964, Okt.; ejusd. Weltmacht oder Niedergang. "Hamburger Studien zur neueren Geschichte". Bd. 1. Frankfurt a/M. 1968.

7 F. Fischer. Weltpolitik., S. 343. In these articles, Fischer outlined a number of important points, for example, that German policy in the Balkans and Turkey on the eve of the war reached a dead end, and this accelerated the transition to acts of direct aggression, that Germany was "outplayed financially by the Entente countries - England, France, the United States."

8 F. Fischer. Krieg der lllusionen. Diisseldorf. 1969.

9 Ibid., S. 232 - 241.

10 Interestingly, among competitors, Germany Fischer Russia calls.

11 F. Fischer. Krieg der lllusionen, S. 559 - 564, 535 - 541.

12 Ibid., S. 277.

13 Ibid., S. 483.

14 Ibid., S. 289.

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conflict Research Institute in connection with the Liman von Sanders mission. Fischer shows even more clearly than in his previous work that the class interests of the big bourgeoisie and the Junkers were the main reason for the expansionist foreign and reactionary domestic policies of Wilhelm Germany. "Even if we do not agree with his opinion that this book supposedly gives an exhaustive description of German pre - war politics, since the framework indicated for this is too narrow," writes the historian from the GDR F. Nevertheless, this work is a significant contribution to the critical-realistic bourgeois interpretation of the prehistory of the First World War. " 15
Fischer's students, I. Geiss, K. - D. Wernecke, and P. - K. are also engaged in the pre-war and military history of Gerhmania. Witt, B. Vogel, and D. Stegman. Geiss wrote a substantial work on German plans to seize Polish lands, published a two-volume collection of documents about the July crisis of 191416, where the indisputable responsibility of Germany for unleashing the war is documented. Wernecke studies issues related to the ideological preparation of the First World War17 . It draws widely on journalism, newspapers, pamphlets, and archival materials, and reveals the unity of the government and the reactionary press in their desire to start a war. One of the main topics of interest to him is the aggravation of German hostility towards Russia in the first half of 1914. The works of Witt and Stegmann are devoted to various aspects of domestic politics in the pre-war and war periods. Witt examines the financial policy of the German Reich in 1903-191318 , Stegmann examines the legacy of Bismarck, the parties and alliances of Wilhelm Germany in 1897-191819 . Stegman pays great attention to the relationship between the junkers and the bourgeoisie.

A recent work by B. Vogel is devoted to German policy towards Russia and the failure of Bulow's expansionist plans .20 Foreign policy in general, and in particular of Germany, in relation to Russia in 1904-1906. Vogel sees as a policy of "missed opportunities" that arose in connection with the Russo-Japanese war. "The idea that the favorable moment for the expansion of German continental politics had finally passed was a widespread trend in German government circles from the spring of 1906." 21 Bethmann-Hollweg believed that the German military situation in 1905 was more favorable than in July 1914. The panicked fear that Germany would eventually lose this power competition determined the foreign policy combinations of the German government after 1906. In July 1914, his care not to miss a favorable moment played a major role in his decision to start the war. "The failed maneuvers of 1904-1906," writes Vogel, " were also a cautionary example for Bethmann-Hollweg. The unrealized Treaty of Björk and the inconclusive outcome of the Algeciras Conference for Germany signaled the failure of Bulow's concept of world politics, which was based on German hegemony in Europe. " 22
German diplomacy failed to bind Russia to Germany and to use its wealth in the interests of the German political and economic development.

15 F. Klein. Neuere Veroffentlichungen in der BRD zur Geschichte und Vorgeschich-te des ersten Weltkrieges. "Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft". 1972, Hf. 2. S. 211.

16 I. Geiss. Das Polnische Grenzstreifen 1914 - 1918. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Kriegszielpolitik im ersten Weltkrieg. Lubek-Hamburg. 1960; ejusd. (Hrsg.). Julikriese und Kriegsausbruch 1914. Eine Dokumentensammlung. Bd. 1-II. Hannover. 1963 - 1964.

17 K. - D. Wernecke. Der Wille zur Weltgeltung. Aussenpolitik und Offentlichkeit in Deutschland am Vorabend des ersten Weltkrieges. Dusseldorf. 1969; 2. Aufl. Diissel-dorf. 1970.

18 P. - C. Witt. Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1903 - 1913. "Historische Studien". H. 415. Lubek-Hamburg. 1970.

19 D. Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks. Parteien und Verbande in der Spat- phase des wilhelminischen Deutschland. Sammlungspolitik 1897 - 1918. Koln- (West). B. 1970.

20 B. Vogel. Deutsche Russlandpolitik. Das Scheitern der deutschen Weltpolitik unter Biilow 1900 - 1906. "Studien zur modernen Geschichte". Bd. II. Dusseldorf. 1973.

21 Ibid., S. 232.

22 Ibid., S. 233.

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While the volume of trade between the two countries increased, political alienation also grew in parallel. The refusal of German banks to participate in an international loan to Russia was an expression of impotent reaction to this political alienation. "After German foreign policy had made a new leap towards achieving continental dominance in the two Moroccan crises, " Vogel notes, " it ventured in July 1914 to take a decisive test of strength with France, without trying to insure itself against Russia."23 . For Bethmann-Hollweg in July 1914, the alternative to World War II was a local war, or at the very least, the collapse of the Entente if Russia did not want to fight. This is how Vogel draws the concept of German foreign policy. Much space is devoted to Russian-German trade relations, customs policy, and the conclusion of the 1904 trade treaty. Vogel writes about its great benefits for Germany, but does not sufficiently clarify its significance for Russia. She attributes Russia's conclusion of a trade treaty with Germany to the defeat of tsarism in the Far East .24
The liberal West German historian A. Gasser, who belongs to the older generation of scientists, also exposed Germany's aggressive plans. In his work, he claims that the German General Staff in April 1913 set a course for the outbreak of World War II. In justification, he cites the fact that since the spring of 1913 in Germany, large maneuvers in the east, which had previously been held annually, were canceled 25 . In an article published in 1973, Gasser elaborates and elaborates on his earlier thesis. On the basis of new materials, he, following Fischer, claims that the war orientation was adopted at the Kaiser's war council on December 8, 1912 .26 Gasser draws attention to the notes of Wilhelm II, from which it is clear that in order to "force the war on three fronts", the German leadership provided, first, for the concentration of German naval forces, second, for the outbreak of war in the west, and third, for provocations in the east. Gasser reveals the main goals of Germany in the war, as well as ways to disguise them with the help of all sorts of legends and versions 27 .

In addition to generalizing works (Fischer), which deal to varying degrees with Russian-German relations, recently there have been publications specifically devoted to this problem. This is the work already described by Vogel. B. Bonvetsch's research on the plans of economic expansion of England and France in Russia also gives a lot of space to Russian-German trade relations .28 The historian analyzes the 1904 treaty and dwells in detail on the preparations in Russia for its revision in 1912-1914. He rightly notes that the Russo-Japanese war did not have a significant impact on the course of the Russo - German trade negotiations and the conclusion of the 1904 treaty. The version of the trade treaty that Germany imposed on Russia, taking advantage of the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war, appeared in Russian public opinion, according to Bonvech, after the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909, in connection with the support that Germany provided to Austria-Hungary during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The trade agreement was generally beneficial for both sides, but due to the further separation of political forces in the international arena, Russia sought to slow down the development of trade relations with Germany and develop those with England and France. During the First World War, Russia became very dependent on England and France, which pursued certain economic goals. However, Bonwetsch writes nothing about Germany's economic goals in Russia and German preparations for the revision of the trade treaty in the previous period.

23 Ibid., S. 235.

24 Ibid., S. 234.

25 A. Gasser. Deufschlands Entschluss zum Praventivkrieg 1913 - 1914. Discordia concors. Frankfurt a/M -Basel. 1968, S. 171 - 185.

26 A. Gasser. Der deutsche Hegemonialkrieg von 1914. "Deutschland in der Welt-politik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts". Hrsg. von I. Geiss und B. Wendt. Dusseldorf. 1973, S. 311.

27 Ibid., S. 314 - 341.

28 B. Bonwetsch. Kriegsallianz und Wirtschaftsinteressen. Russland in den Wirtschaftsplanen Englands und Frankreichs 1914 - 1917. Dusseldorf. 1973.

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Russian-German political relations are considered in the works of A. Hill-Gruber 29 . Economic and trade relations are discussed in the works of H.-U. Velera, H. Boehme 30 . These works are written with official-protective positions. Obviously, the reports presented by Hillgruber and Boehme at the first colloquium of Soviet and West German historians, held in Mainz, Germany in 1973, can be considered as a concentrated summary of the results of research in the latest West German historiography in the field of Russian-German relations .31
Hillgruber's idea of Bismarck's favorable policy for Russia should be recognized as fair, bearing in mind that this German chancellor tried to avoid a war with Russia and in general a war on two fronts. The historian also correctly examines the goals of German imperialism in the war with Russia, while taking into account the results of Fischer's work. Hillgruber also admits that it was Germany that was most advantageous to start the war in 1914, and not later. However, when analyzing Germany's foreign policy concepts in general, and in particular in relation to Russia, the reasons why this or that concept was chosen, this or that idea of Russia, its military power, this or that concept of Germany's relations with other countries remain insufficiently disclosed. It is also not entirely clear who was the bearer of the various concepts, what interests were underlying them.

In Hillgruber's report, there is no sufficiently precise correlation between the economic and political aspects of the Russo-German contradictions. The West German historian tries to present as equivalent two concepts of Bismarck: reliance on Austria-Hungary and the course of creating and strengthening the Austro-German and then the Triple Alliance, and along with this - some of the Chancellor's thoughts about dividing Austria-Hungary with Russia. In reality, these thoughts did not occupy any significant place in Bismarck's foreign policy concepts. Hillgruber gives contradictory coverage to the question of a particular threat that allegedly came from Russia. He insists on the existence of the "Russian danger complex", the fear of Russia, which, in his opinion, played such an important role on the eve of the war. At the same time, he notes that German public opinion considered Russia a "colossus with feet of clay." Hillgruber prefers to keep silent about what was the basis of this "complex" and when it arose. As shown in Fischer's latest paperFor example, fear of the "Russian danger" and hatred of Russia were spread by the German government itself for the purpose of ideological and psychological preparation for war.

Hillgruber failed to link the consideration of Russo-German relations with the whole complex of international relations, although he recognizes the need for such an approach. It does not pay due attention to the Anglo-German and Franco-German contradictions. His report gives the impression that the main cause of the First World War was the Russo-German contradictions, which cannot be agreed.

Boehme's report on Russian-German trade relations in 1878-189434 reveals the connection between the foreign policy of German imperialism and the conservative-protective tendencies of the ruling classes - large farmers and industrialists, and shows that a certain role in this policy was played by fear of the possibility of aggravation of social contradictions. Boehme rightly points out that Herma-

29 A. Hillgruber. Zwischen Hegemonie und Weltpolitik. Das Problem der kontinuitat von Bismarck bis Bethrnann-Hollweg. In: M. Sturmer (Hrsg.). Das kaiserliche Deutschland. Politik und Gesellschaft. 1870 - 1918. Dusseldorf. 1970; ejusd. Bismarck Aussenpolitik. Freiburg. 1972.

30 H. - U. Wehler. Bismarcks Imperialismus und spate Russlandpolitik unter dem Primat der Innenpolitik. In: M. Sturmer. Op. cit.; H. Bohme. Politik und Okonomie in der Rechsgrundungs - und spaten Bismarrkzeit. In: M. Sturmer. Op. cit.

31 V. T. Fomin. The first colloquium of historians of the USSR and Germany. Voprosy Istorii, 1974, No. 4.

32 A. Hillgruber. Die deutsch-russischen politischen Beziehungen (1887 - 1917). Grundlagen, Grundmuster, Grundprobleme.

33 F. Fischer. Krieg der Illusionen.

34 H. Boh me. Die deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen unter dem Gesichtspunkt der deuischcii Iiandelspolitik (1878 - 1894).

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Like Russia, Russia has tried to combine the opposing interests of farmers and industrialists in its trade policy. However, his claim to create a new model or method for studying international relations and foreign policy in the period of imperialism is objectionable. Boehme offers a model of a self-preserving system with conservative-protective tendencies, which for its preservation leads to trade expansion. Meanwhile, the trade and customs contradictions between Russia and Germany cannot be reduced to a desire to avoid possible social upheavals. Here, first of all, we are talking not so much about the preservation of the system as about the direct economic benefits of influential bourgeois - landowner circles. Boehme exaggerates the Russo-German trade contradictions and separates them from political and military considerations.

Similar explanations of Germany's aggressive foreign policy can be found in other West German historians (Wehler, Stegmann). However, they are not original, and are only a repetition of E. Ker's ideas expressed in the 1930s about the "primacy of domestic policy" and the role of foreign policy in connection with the growing conflicting interests in society. Vogel believes that" since 1965, one can speak of a renaissance of Ker " among young scientists in Germany .35
The increased interest of German historiography in Russian-German relations is not accidental. The change in the world political climate, the growth and influence of the international authority of the USSR, and the improvement of relations between our country and Germany have a significant impact. However, we should not overestimate the positive developments in recent West German historiography on the issue of Russian-German relations. In recent works by historians of the Federal Republic of Germany, this problem is considered mainly in relation to the 80s-90s of the XIX century, that is, a period of considerable acuteness in relations between the two states. This approach, dictated by the desire to transfer ("retroactively") the severity of imperialist contradictions from the west to the east, still prevails among most historians of Germany. On the one hand, they recognize the aggressive aims of German imperialism, and on the other hand, they portray the Russo - German contradictions as if they were the main ones on the eve of the war.

Many German historians who study Russian-German relations use Soviet publications and research in their works. Such are, for example, the studies of Fischer, Vogel, Boehme, Bonvetsch, and others. But still, even these authors are not sufficiently familiar with the achievements of Soviet historical science in the field of studying Russian-German relations on the eve of the First World War.

Despite the success of the realist trend, the positions of nationalism and apologetics are still strong in the historiography of Germany. The defeats of German imperialism in the two World Wars are still regarded as a" tragedy"," fate", and" doom " that cannot be rationalized .36
35 V. Vogel. Op. cit., S. 236; E. Kehr. Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsatze zur preussisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. (West). B. 1965.

36 In this spirit are written, for example, the works of K. Schwabe, F. Wende (K. Schwabe. Wissenschaft und Kriegsrnoral. Die deutschen Hochschullehrer und die politischen Grundfragen des ersten Weltkrieges. Frankfurt/M. 1969; F. Wende. Die belgische Frage in der deutschen Politik des ersten Weltkrieges. 1969). Both authors are students of Ritter and followers of his concept. The articles of the above - mentioned collection edited by M. Sturmer, published on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the German Empire, are written from a nationalist-protective position.

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