In this interview, Georgi Derluguian discusses the reasons of Islamism's popularity in the context of collapse of two great projects of the West - liberalism and communism. He pays special attention to organizational peculiarity of Islam, which allows this religion to lead successful wars against powerful empires. People who find this ideology attractive are not "new barbarians"; on the contrary, we are dealing with modern socially active people, whose access to social lifts has been blocked. Islamism allows both men and women to realize strategies, which give them a chance to succeed in situation when role models of their parents stopped functioning. In the end of the interview, one finds analysis of the perspectives of the so called Islamic State, forbidden in Russia and elsewhere: the sociologist shows how it will inevitably be involved in the dynamics of contemporary world-system.

Keywords: ISIS, Islamism, Wahhabism, Islam, World-Systems Analysis, Dmitry Furman, North Caucasus.

Derlugyan G. Islamizm i novy raspad imperiy (interview) [Islamism and the New Collapse of Empires (interview)]. Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkva v Rossii i za rubezhom [State, Religion, Church in Russia and abroad]. 2016. N2. pp. 331-356.

Derluguian, Georgi (2016) "Islamism and the New Disintegration of Empires (Interview)", Gosudarstuo, religiia, tserkou' v Rossu i za rubezhom 34(2): 357-372.

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A new collapse of empires

What do you think is the reason for the rise of Islamism? Really with some of its unique features?

George Derlugyan. Islamism has existed for two hundred years. People who said that we should return to fundamental Islam have existed for a long time - Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab laid the foundations of Wahhabism back in the XVIII century. And before him were Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah. Just how many readers did these thinkers have in their time? Today they have become popular. They were marginalized then, but they are in demand today.

What is the reason for this new demand?

With the collapse of empires. And this has already happened once. After their rise in the 18th century, the Wahhabis were quickly suppressed by the Ottoman Empire. The Turks shot the Wahhabis as sectarians, because the Turks had firearms, and the Wahhabis did not. But when the Ottoman Empire becomes the "sick man of Europe", when the Persian Empire is falling apart, when the Great Mughals fall under the rule of the British, when there are no great Islamic empires left, then who takes the initiative from them? In the 19th century, jihads are breaking out along the perimeter of the Islamic world, directed both against local "feudal" rulers and against European colonialism. These are the revolt of Usman dan Fodio in northern Nigeria, Samori Toure in Guinea and Senegal, Abd al-Qadir in Algeria; these are Sufi movements in Afghanistan, the Sanussi in Libya, the Mahdists in Sudan and, of course, the Wahhabis in Arabia. In this context, the significance of Imam Shamil's epic in the North Caucasus becomes clearer.

And if we draw a parallel with what is happening today?

A new collapse of empires. By the mid-90s, the XX century was really exhausted. What we are now seeing in the Middle East is the exhaustion of the hegemony of not one, but two great powers.

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projects of the West: communism, which was certainly a Western project, and liberalism, which is also a Western project. Each of these projects provided an answer to the question of how to create a strong state that can resist anyone in the world. After all, what is modernization? Stephen Kotkin, in his seminal biography of Stalin 1, puts it bluntly: modernization is a geopolitical imperative. These are not the general humanistic norms and principles of a certain modernist community. Modernization in the era of the Great Divergence between East and West meant something brutally concrete: either you have a steel industry and engineers who can run it, or those who have this industry will come to you and they will not ask permission to enter. Because without modern military industry and engineering schools, you are barbarians, a backward country. Progress and the right for those who have machine guns, telegraph, locomotives. Marxism in the Bolshevik, Leninist interpretation gave a convincing answer to the question of creating a strong state, which is why it became so popular in the XX century. Leninism gave China the opportunity to modernize while preserving its Chinese national pride, and promised the same opportunity to India, Vietnam, Cuba, Yemen, and Ethiopia.

That is, in the XX century, another clarity was achieved: are you with the communists or are you with the capitalists? In the situation of this clarity, the question did not even arise with the fundamentalists. Review Soviet comedies about the Caucasus in the 1970s and 1980s: "The Caucasian Captive", "A Necklace for my Beloved" - about Dagestan, when religious issues were not even considered, they were resolved long ago. There are some remnants of the past that have already become comical ("We will judge him according to the law of the mountains!"). Much the same thing happened in the Middle East, where Islamists during the 20th century looked like political marginals against the background of Kemalists, Nasserists, Baathists and other "progressive colonels" who adopted and imposed successful Western models. But the Ba'athists, the Nasserists, the populists, the socialists - all the modernizers of the East - were politically and morally defeated and economically bankrupt by the end of the twentieth century. As well as the USSR itself.

And then the natural question arose: what should I do? What's left? What's left is what it was. As the anthropologist Sergey wisely pointed out

1. См. Kotkin, Stephen (2014) Stalin: Volume I: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928. Penguin Books.

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Alexandrovich Arutyunov: "When the electricity goes out in the house, it remains to go to the basement and get the grandfather's oil lamp."

But this is not just the failure of two modernization projects, it is also the widespread destruction of those states that emerged during this modernization... Iraq, Syria, and Libya are disappearing before our eyes - and it feels like this is just the beginning.

Yes, this is partly a global trend of discrediting and destroying the modern bureaucratic state. No one has ever been particularly fond of bureaucracy - but what about it? The consequences of "liberation" from the dictatorships of catch-up development are quite terrible. Imperialism in the nineteenth century tried everywhere to create modern states. Modern states meant that there were police, mission schools, and hospitals. It's all falling apart. The imperialists created Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan within their modern borders - after all, these are all the fruits of the Franco-British redistribution of the Middle East following the First World War.

In a sense, the same imperialists have destroyed everything today...

The imperialists were unable to support these States. It is too expensive, because the rapidly growing population of the colonies has developed too modern claims to civil rights, modern professions, incomes, and the very political identity of sovereign nations. The paradox is that they had to leave the former colonies not because they rejected capitalism and the modern institutions associated with it, but because the "colored" peoples and their leaders accepted the goals of modernization and wanted the same thing: after 1945, Algerians, Indians and Senegalese had to either be granted voting rights or salaries and pensions, like the French and British themselves, or grant Algeria, Pakistan and Senegal sovereign independence, so that all this becomes the concern of "their" national governments of the liberated countries, and their citizens now go to France and Great Britain to work with their national interests-

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ports. Decolonization was generally a successful maneuver, but it still cost the West very dearly both militarily (I will say only one word: Vietnam) and in terms of maintaining effective control over world geopolitics (which was financially and diplomatically worth stopping Saddam Hussein when he dreamed of becoming an Arab Bismarck). Too strong and self-confident third world states were a challenge to the West, but too weak and collapsing countries are fraught with drug and migrant flows. Slums are hardly subject to capitalist exploitation. After 2000, the American neoconservatives very ambitiously tried to overcome the dilemmas of global disorder, taking up the task of remaking the most problematic, but also the most promising states (starting with Iraq, followed by Iran and Pakistan) under the deafening "anesthesia" of military occupation. An example was how Japan, Italy, and Germany were reconstructed sometime after 1945. But this time it didn't work out. The patient died during the operation.

And here, in fact, Islamism appears as a reaction to this demodernization? Like that "oil lamp" they take out of the basement?

Let's see what other reactions people might have in response to the failure to modernize their countries. One reaction may be: "Well, to hell with it, with the whole country! We have some money ourselves, and we will use this money to create private elite schools, private hospitals, closed cottage settlements with private security, and our own private swimming pools, since the state cannot provide us with any of this." We create our own Rublevka. We are creating communism on Rublyovka only for the well-to-do. We see this trend towards self-isolation of elites not only in Russia, but also in many, or rather in the vast majority of countries of the world. The second version of the reaction to the failure of hopes for the growth of their country is familiar to Russians today: "It's time to go down, everything is falling apart here. At least give the children an education in a normal country, go somewhere in Sweden." But the first two options are not for everyone. The rest is left with the third option: "Western is not for us, it is (as they always say in such cases) soulless-

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but, we will create, we will return our own from non-existence." So they are trying to create their own, something more spiritual, mainly from what is at hand.

Islam and the matrix of the partisan camp

While we are talking about purely structural issues - there was a modernization project, it collapsed; we had to take on something that had been gathering dust somewhere in the basement for many years. Is there any specific feature of Islam itself? Or would it be exactly the same, even if it were not Islam, but some other religion - for example, some local paganism?

Grandfather's lamp can be any device-it depends on the ancestors-as long as it works. At the same time, each of the world's religions has its own unique history and structure, although today, alas, few people study this systematically. The problem with Islamic studies, as well as with religious studies as such - I will allow myself criticism - is that it is still an extension of theology. Scientists study sacred texts: previously they were studied as sacred, and now - as traditional. The main effort, prestige of the expert and, probably, professional self-satisfaction are connected precisely with the virtuoso interpretation of the text and textual erudition. Much less effort is spent on understanding the organizational basis of these texts. Why did these texts become sacred? They became sacred because enough people recognized them as sacred. Here, a huge role is played by the works of Dmitry Efimovich Furman , a Soviet-Russian researcher, known in the post-Soviet intellectual environment mainly for serious journalism from the time of Perestroika. But now, finally, two volumes of Furman's articles are being translated into English: on religious studies and political transformations in former Soviet countries. A well-known British historian, Perry Anderson, who speaks Russian among many other languages, helped with the publication, and who consistently read all of Furman's works and was shocked by the discovery of a researcher of such magnitude. In the summer of 2015, the London Review of Books published two

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extensive articles by Perry Anderson with an overview of the main ideas of D. E. Furman. When we were alive, we used to jokingly call Furman our Weber, but it turned out that he really is on a par with the classic.

The fact is that after Max Weber, doing comparative analysis of religions in the West became somehow awkward and dangerous for the reputation - you will immediately be accused of either partiality, political correctness, or lack of scientific knowledge, and now, in the era of postmodern fears, rather of "totalizing metanarrativity". There are very few people who are engaged in comparative religious studies, that is, systematically compare Islam with Buddhism, Christianity with Islam. We were lucky precisely because of our relative backwardness that we had Dmitry Furman, who was not bound by conventions, the pressure of the professional environment and the rating of publications, who, finally, did not read Max Weber himself in time and therefore reached everything himself - and did. Dmitry Yefimovich was simply a Soviet inner genius. Like Bakhtin in an earlier generation.

What is most interesting for our conversation about Dmitry Furman?

Furman insisted that any religion, when it arises, inevitably solves specific organizational problems. For example, in Christianity, a specific and central organizational problem for this religion was that the founder of this religion did not leave any sacred texts. Jesus Christ did not write anything and did not leave a direct record, unlike Buddha and Muhammad. About him there are only stories and retellings of alleged eyewitnesses, but Jesus himself was absolutely not a writing person, perhaps illiterate. This is a huge problem: how can this person's legacy be codified? And when it is finally codified (mostly already in the Middle Ages), the problem of ossification and protestant emotional undermining of this highly ecclesiastical codification soon arises; this is where Protestantism comes from. Imperative of decodification: but the original Christianity was not like that! The first fundamentalist reaction is, of course, Protestants.

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And what is the organizational specifics of Islam? What organizational problems does it solve?

In Islam, the matrix of the partisan camp is clearly manifested. This is the religion of the great military campaign. Prayer, and collective prayer, five times a day-this helps maintain discipline in the camp, from wake-up to lights-out. Prohibition of drinking wine. You can't drink before prayer, and since the prayer is five times a day, it turns out that there is no alcohol. Prohibition of violence and looting inside the camp. By the way, this probably explains the modesty requirement, the hijab for women. Women inside the military camp should not wear flashy clothes, they should not cause jealousy and rivalry among the soldiers. And outside the camp, the situation is completely different - there is dar al-Islam (the territory of Islam), and there is Dar al-harb (the territory of war). War zone - there are completely different laws there, you can capture slaves, capture concubines, rob for three days, but inside-everything, excuse me, pay taxes, sacrifice to the poor and quickly civilize, moderate your belligerence. This is also a brilliant adaptation. How to direct the energy of aggression of homeless warriors, as they were called in the XIX century, outside and prohibit it inside?

And it worked really well. Islam, we note, is the only world religion that was formed outside the ancient empires. Buddhism, Christianity, and Judaism were formed within empires, so that what is God's is God's, and what is Caesar's is Caesar's. In Islam, this division does not exist, since it is formed in a situation when the ancient states of Arabia collapsed-around the VII century AD. e. Either a climate catastrophe occurred, or it is part of the general collapse of the Roman Empire, but there is a collapse of regulatory organizations. As a result, the religion that emerges as the religion of a tribal community is preserved. Moreover, it captures empires. Empires couldn't defeat it - it was the empire that defeated it. Byzantium and the Sassanid state exhausted each other in more than a century of wars. And as soon as the Islamic army hit them, first the Sassanids began to fall, and then Byzantium. There is a certain miracle episode here that technological determinists cannot explain, because they need to have some new weapon. The new camel cavalry still doesn't look like a new all-conquering weapon. Therefore, it is not a new weapon that works here, but rather the old problems that Perry Anderson wrote about when explaining the fall of the Roman Empire-

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perii 2. Why is the empire successful? It draws all its subjects into the empire-by military force, by trade advantages, by participation in the much larger world, in its cosmopolitan culture. The empire "civilizes" the elites of the periphery in its own way and makes them imperial. And here, precisely from success, over time, big problems begin - after all, successful elites have more children. Demographics are starting to work. What will happen in just three generations, when children's children will have children and all these children will claim their grandfather's status and income as learned from childhood? Children's children will do what their grandfather did. They will be the elite, they will not work, they will collect taxes. But the peasant could not feed such a large number of generals. Perry Anderson calls it the" elite overloading " of late Rome. Apparently, the demographic overflow of elites also explains why the Sassanid state collapsed so quickly and why the Byzantine provinces collapsed so quickly under the onslaught of Muslims. Over time, Muslims also had the same problem. After three or four hundred years, there were too many descendants of the original host. How much could the peasants feed, given the environmental constraints on fertility? And the Islamic Caliphate collapsed under the onslaught of the Turks and Mongols. More and more waves of harsh and unspoiled steppe dwellers came and took over the centers of imperial civilization.

Search for new role models

Before that, we talked mainly about global shifts and organizational forms, but in the end, we are talking about specific people who make a choice in favor of an ideology that does not look particularly attractive from the outside. What do young people find in Islamism?

Very simple. The Soviet Union provided a convincing answer to how a man should be a man and a woman should be a woman. Reproduction of traditional roles at a new and prestigious stage of modernity: men, even if they are not superiors, do not care

2. Anderson P. Perekhod ot antichnosti k feodalizmu [Transition from antiquity to feudalism], Moscow: Territory of the Future, 2007.

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they will be mainly engaged in some kind of hardware, they will be drivers, modern military personnel, they will be part of the modern Soviet army; and women will be part of the modern Soviet house, which has a kitchen, hot water, a dishwasher. Go to the city, become an engineer, a doctor, and return as an important boss to your village, or don't come back at all, stay in the city. Marry not a local girl, but a Russian or Ukrainian woman who is from afar. It worked very well in the 1950s and 1960s, continued to work in the 1970s, began to slip in the 1980s and collapse in the 1990s. What was I supposed to do?

In 1994, when enthusiastically naive journalists wrote that the Dudayev movement in Chechnya was Muslim, this caused a grin from people who understood something about Dudayev. What was worth his proud recognition of those years: "As a Muslim, all my years in the Soviet military service, I secretly prayed three times a day." But by 1995, an Arab militant internationalist Khattab appeared in Chechnya. And yet, even back in 1997, I remember Shamil Basayev in a mink hat and white scarf saying that in peaceful life he was going to become a computer programmer. In 1998, he leaves it: the new Shamil did not succeed in being a computer programmer, nor did he succeed in being a convincing minister of state. He probably felt the failures as a humiliation, and what else could he do?

In a deep sense, this is a real tragedy of the era. Here is a story from the same 1990s, when I took one of my Caucasian friends to a restaurant - then there was a collapse, people didn't have any money at all - and I said: "Listen, tell me, how's it going?" -" Yes as-as! The son comes in this white cap from school, with the Koran and says: "I will fast on Eid," he declares to his mother. I take him into the room and say, ' Listen, son, sit down and let's talk.'" My son is fifteen years old. ""What is it? You couldn't see this in your family, it's not a tradition, you couldn't take it from me, I'm a graduate of Leningrad University, a scientist. Your grandfather was the chairman of the collective farm, and he also blew up the mosque in the village in the thirties." - "You understand, Dad, my grandfather then blew up a mosque in the village and became the chairman of the collective farm. You went to Leningrad and came back as a prominent scientist. When I finish school, where will I go, what will I become? After all, money is now made in the drug trade. What if I want something pure in my life? What do we have in the city? What's left?""By the way, a few years later I met the same Caucasian friend

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I asked him how his son was doing, and he gave me a thought-provoking answer: "Nothing, he's fine, he's married, he has an apartment, he's a counterterrorism investigator."

Is jihad a social elevator?

Not just a social elevator. It allows you to feel connected to something that is extremely important, to feel that you mean something in this world.

What kind of people are they anyway? How would you describe them?

Islamists are very well adapted to modern times. This is probably the most modern part of society - people who would be activists in any environment. They are activists of any society. If the North Caucasus had maintained the Soviet society of the 1930s, they would have been young activists, including women. These are activists who build themselves up against the authority of old people. As one insightful Kabardian interlocutor, who contrasted tradition and fundamentalism, told me about this: "Do you understand what tradition is? The tradition is when a North Caucasian man in his forties decided - and it was a decision - to become an old man. He bought himself a stick, a papakha, grew a beard, became somewhat bent, he began to go to the mosque, drink tea with the old people, play backgammon with them, talk like an old man - the man became an elder. And suddenly he comes to the mosque and sees that there are some very young guys, in the 1990s, who went to some courses and say that you don't know anything about Islam at all. That is, the eggs begin to teach the chickens, the impudents allow themselves to correct the old people!"

A generational conflict begins, and at the same time there is a very strong attraction of new charismatic preachers, to whom the old people cannot oppose anything, because they do not preach, they rely on the authority of the old people, on the authority of religion as part of what has always been. For old people, religion is just a tradition, it's just a way of doing the same things as before.

It turns out that these are those who can not find themselves in the new realities? And who isn't ready

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for one reason or another, go the way of your parents?

These are the ones for whom modern attractive roles are closed. Very often, they are the central people for their communities. And it's scary. You interview, for example, people in Nalchik who have known the dead terrorists since childhood. And you hear - and not in a situation where people lie: "You know, I don't understand how this could have happened, but it's a pity, because he was a good guy, helped his grandmother cross the road, studied normally at school, and behaved very politely." The victims were not misfits or hooligans.

I will give you another observation. I once asked an Irish sociologist: "Please tell me, who is the Irish Republican Army made up of? What material are these people made of?". Like Irish terrorists are a completely different kind of terrorists, not Islamic. "You know," an Irish colleague tells me, " there is a characteristic type of Republican action movie. These are guys who would otherwise make excellent constables." But they couldn't become constables, they became terrorists. That is, this is a guy who was able and would like to be a pillar of order in his district. Such is Uncle Styopa, who did not find a place in the police.

That is, they are not new barbarians who hate everything modern, as is often claimed?

Here we need to get rid of this talk about barbarism. Islamists enjoy using European technologies. There is a very famous work by Olivier Roy, who writes that when in France Muslims open some fast food, they do not sell falafel, but the same hamburger with cola, only halal 3. They are already quite Western people. This is their way of entering capitalism. This is their way of "taming" modernization. Modernization is not on other people's terms, but on their own.

3. Roy, Olivier (2004) Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press.

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What Islamism gives men is more or less clear. But what is attractive about these role models for women? Why do they consciously impose restrictions on themselves that they should naturally push as far away from themselves as possible?

I think that Islam gives women as much as it gives men, if not more. We find it hard to find female researchers who can understand this from the inside, but there are some: for example, Ivona Kaliszewska, a Polish anthropologist who conducted an amazing included study in Dagestan and Chechnya. Her Polish book "Matryoshka in a Hijab" was recently published in English4. What was Yvona doing? She traveled to Dagestan from Poland by Russian train, and most of the way with a reserved seat. And one day Mrs. Ivona came with her 10-month-old daughter. When the riot police stopped her at the checkpoint, they were clearly perplexed: clearly not a local blonde, and she speaks almost fluent Russian, but not Russian (Ivona was once asked about her passport: "What region of Russia is Poland?"), which seems to be European, but not Western. And suddenly she starts crying baby, which is time to change the diaper and feed. Immediately, women's solidarity and Caucasian hospitality work in mutual reinforcement, unknown Dagestani women shame the police ("The child needs to change diapers!") and they take Yvona to their house. A Polish anthropologist has achieved an insight into the environment that I, for example, as a man would never have been able to achieve. Yvonne, as the mother of a child, is led into the Muslim house from the women's side, through the kitchen.

Kalishevskaya wittily and catchingly titled the book of her travel notes "Matryoshka in a hijab". (By the way, her script was also used for the documentary "Strongman", shown at the Cannes Film Festival 5.) When the exoticism flair subsides, we see quite recognizable family-gender collisions. Rural women, matryoshka dolls-only in hijab.

4. См. Kaliszewska, Iwona and Falkowski, Maciej (2016) Veiled and Unveiled in Chechnya and Daghestan. London: Hurst.

5. See the movie Silaczka [http://sub.festival-cannes.fr/SfcCatalogue/MovieDetail/ 895c1b6b-b1cc-4098-bea4-9f7376d205aa, accessed 01.05.2016].

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Traditional society is different everywhere. The Arabic kinship system assumes, for example, that a young man marries the daughter of his uncle. Let it traditionally be a world of armed clans, a world of strict proud morals and blood feuds, a world of extreme masculinity. But an Arab girl is not so afraid to be married into a large Bedouin family, because she goes to the familiar family of her own uncle, that is, she will not be treated as a slave. And the Russian peasant woman in the old days faced a difficult test: she was often given out to an unfamiliar family in another village, where the owner of everything was the father of her husband, who also became her master. She potentially becomes a servant to her husband's mother-in-law, and she will be a servant at least until she gives birth to a son. Her hope is to raise this son, he will marry and her daughter-in-law will become her servant in the next generation. This is, in general, female hazing. Muslims, we note, in the traditional Arab family did not have this.

Now imagine what is happening to Caucasian families, for example-what conflicts there are today due to polygamy, because this is an innovation that is barely regulated by traditions. Until recently, there was no financial opportunity for a simple Chechen to marry four women. And suddenly they start to appear on their cool foreign cars "new Russians", that is, new Avars, new Kabardians, who begin to marry several girls. How should a Caucasian woman behave in such times? At this point - nothing strange - many people will want to put on a hijab and say: "I behave morally, unlike you." Hijab should very often be considered as a very effective social protest and a form of moral pressure. Or, for example, having many children is also largely a social gender strategy for entire families and individual women. These are strategies for reaching the highest social level available to a woman in this kind of society. For example, to become the mother of a shahid, the mother of a son who sacrificed himself for the sake of society. This can be very honorable, for example, among Palestinians. Systematic sociological and ethnological studies of these strategies are required.

Does Islamism have a future?

How realistic is the alternative offered by the Islamists? What do we need

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wait for a new alternative project to emerge, similar to communism in the 20th century?

This is an illusory alternative, which persists only for the reason that it was not allowed to fully unfold at the time. With the exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, paradoxically, is probably already the most secularized country in the East today. There, according to many sources, the same thing is happening that happened to Catholicism in Spain for decades under the Franco dictatorship. Iran has been an Islamic Republic for thirty years, so in some ways Iran is beginning to resemble the Soviet Union of Brezhnev's time. But many people and social groups in Arab countries still have illusions and hopes for a righteous rule that will restore both the former prosperity and greatness of the Baghdad Caliphate.

Is it possible to outline a certain trajectory to get rid of this illusion? In particular, with regard to ISIS...

We're not romantics, so we know what's coming next. We know, because we have experience of communist life. After all, the first transnational movement of our time was the Second International-men and women of different countries united by a single socialist ideology. We know that if an anti-system state appears, it will also have its own Central Committee with internal factional contradictions ("parochialism", "nepotism" - how many wonderful words there were in the Soviet language for just such phenomena!) and simultaneously with the growing bureaucracy (and once again recall the domestic lexicon: "red tape", "fraud", "citationism"). However, this is the best case scenario, because there are also worse cases... It is somehow forgotten today that North Korea, China, and Albania are failed cases of Stalinism, failed Stalinism. In China, for example, 45 million of its peasants were starved to death, but the industry was never built. Only now they are industrializing.

So the best thing for the Islamists is the Soviet Union and their own perestroika on the horizon. At worst, however, their anti-system projects are fraught with something like Kampuchea under Pol Pot. What can I really do? What neoha will look like-

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lifat, if it can be stabilized and defended? Even an anti-system state will have to have a foreign policy, because it will not be able to conquer the whole world, which means there will be a "hostile environment". He will have to create his own armed forces, these will be professional armed forces. Now they are some kind of partisans, there are not so many of them, they are fighting at the tactical level-at most a few hundred Makhnovist fighters with machine-gun "wheelbarrows" based on Japanese pickups. They were successful against the completely corrupt and demoralized official soldiers of post-occupation Iraq. But as soon as you have to create your own regular army, all the same problems that were with all the armies will arise. We will have to create a tax system, introduce conscription, train career officers somewhere, and, after all, we will have to conduct foreign policy - because without diplomacy, we will have to fight on all fronts.

So they are on their way from Lenin to Stalin?

If there is indeed a rudimentary state in ISIS, then no matter how much they resist, they will still have to act according to the rules of the modern world system. This is what Wallerstein said long ago and quite correctly about communist states.6 It's the same as workers taking over a factory during a strike and proclaiming that there is no more capitalism here. But if the plant continues to operate according to the market principles of the surrounding market environment, then it is forced to work for profit. This means that this plant will have its own management layer, which will manage this plant according to the external rationality of the market. At some point - it will take time-the management layer will be able to tell all the other employees: "Let's face it, socialism has failed, and we are actually ruling you." And privatize the enterprise. That is, what happened to the USSR in 1991.

Alexander Aghajanyan and Dmitry Uzlaner talked

6. See: Wallerstein I. Social Science and the Communist Interlude, or to explain the history of modernity. 1997. N2; Wallerstein I. The end of the familiar world: Sociology of the XXI century. edited by V. L. Inozemtsev. Postindustrial Society Research Center, Moscow: Logos Publ., 2003.

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