The tragic end of the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for many years negatively influenced the opinions that prevailed among historians regarding the nature of the Szlachta statehood and the position of Poland in international relations at that time. Regardless of whether these opinions came from historiography, which tried to justify and justify the act of partitions, or from researchers who tried to find out the reasons for its decline in order to facilitate the revival of the nation, they all agreed in criticizing the foundations of the state system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth .1 As a result, the system of the Szlachta state of both the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries was treated in a clearly anachronistic way, that is, for the entire period of its existence, the role of only those factors that eventually became decisive for the failure of the experiment that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was in the sphere of statehood was emphasized.

It is not easy for historical science to free itself from this ballast of nineteenth-century views even today. Although numerous special studies provide a better understanding of historical reality, highlighting differences between individual stages of development or change in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, general works, especially in Western European and American historiography, often repeat previous opinions and superficial, and sometimes erroneous generalizations. This does not mean that the opposite point of view is justified, attempts to exaggerate the role of Poland at that time or attribute to it an exceptional character.

Neither the history of Poland nor the nature of its statehood was unusual (both in a positive and negative sense) in the part of Europe where Poles live, as it seemed to many historians. The experience of Poland is simply one of the possible ways of development to a modern state and society - not a dead end, but a path of development-and it is up to Researchers to find out how effective this path was. We will probably never get an unambiguous explanation: it is made impossible not only by the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also by the associated breakup of the national Polish territory, which forcibly and mechanically changed the conditions for the further transformation of this state.

The system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth grew out of the class monarchy, out of its typical dilemma: how can we find a form of state in which the power and freedom of the individual do not come into conflict? However, the person was understood only as those who formed a privileged stratum, in Polish conditions-the gentry, who argued about what was better: "slavery of order "or"disorderly freedom". As applied to the XVI century, we can already talk about the formation of the model of gentry Speech

1 A thorough analysis of these opinions was recently presented by G. Serejski: H. Serejski. Europa a rozbiory Polski. Warszawa. 1972,

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The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, sometimes called the model of Szlachta democracy 2 . It was a very specific "democracy": it covered no more than 10% of the population and did not apply to peasants and townspeople. If it were not for this last reservation, the system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would have been truly (in the conditions of the XVI century) democratic, because in not many European states of that time one can find a wider participation of the population in the government of the country.

Poland was not the only country in Central Europe where there were prerequisites for the emergence of this type of state. The same situation emerged at the beginning of the 16th century in the Czech and Hungarian kingdoms, and in some German lands. However, weakened by the Turkish invasion and internal strife, Hungary was unable to continue the path of development it had begun, although some elements of this path remained viable until the eighteenth century. The Czech Republic also faced an obstacle in the form of the Habsburg Monarchy, before which it was forced to bow in the XVII century. Internal strife in the empire, religious rivalry, and the predominance of small territorial rulers that grew out of it led (with some exceptions) to a weakening of the position of the estates.

The situation in Poland was different. As in many other European countries, the centralisation of the State has become the main problem in domestic politics. At the same time, it was not only about smoothing out the differences between individual regions (including the rapprochement of the state structure of Poland and Lithuania, which were previously connected by a personal union), but also about strengthening the main center of power so that it would be able to tame the arbitrariness of grandees and ensure more efficient use of fiscal resources and military capabilities of the state. It was, therefore, a question of goals similar to those that in most European states at that time were carried out by an absolute monarchy.

If in Poland things did not turn in this direction, the reason for this state of affairs in the sixteenth century cannot be seen in the apparent exceptional weakness of the royal power. Under the last Jagiellons, the place and rights of the monarch were not particularly different from what was observed in other class monarchies in Europe. Even the dynastic crisis caused by the fact that Sigismund Augustus did not leave a male descendant, and the unsuccessful first election of the king only slightly affected the weakening of the monarch's authority, although it is difficult not to take into account the actual reduction of his rights by the Henrician articles 3 . Nevertheless, even under the first two kings of the Vaz dynasty, the possibility of conversion in the direction of absolutism cannot be considered only in the categories of unfounded gentry fabrications. Both these two, and almost all the elected kings, tried to strengthen the position of the monarch at an opportunity. But their efforts remained futile. The balance of social forces in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was crucial.

From this point of view, the situation was different here than in Western Europe. Political maneuvering could take place exclusively within the framework of various groups of feudal lords. The townspeople, who played an incomparably more important role in such processes in Western Europe, were still far from being united internally in Poland. At the same time, their national identity was of great importance.-

2 "Historia panstwa i prawa Potsfci". Т. II. Warszawa. 1966, str. 45 n.

3 V. Chaplinsky presented this problem more broadly in several studies in the collection "On Polsce siedemnastowiecznej". Warszawa. 1966. S. Plaza wrote about Henrik's articles in more detail: S. Plaza. Proby reform ustrojowych w czasie pierwszego bezkrolewia. Krakow. 1969-

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Kinship: especially among the patricians, merchants of German origin associated with the Hanseatic League were numerous and influential. This made it easier for the gentry to remove citizens from influencing the activities of the most important authorities. The monarchs therefore had no choice but to exploit the antagonism within the gentry, mainly between the middle gentry and the magnates. The exceptionally strong economic position of the middle szlachta in the sixteenth century meant that this did not create the basis for strengthening royal power; on the contrary, the cooperation of Sigismund Augustus with the middle szlachta movement, which took place under the slogan "execution of rights", facilitated the final formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Elective kings, entangled in the incessant contradictions "between majesty and liberty" (as it was then called), were not able to secure a sufficiently strong support for either the average gentry, whose capabilities, however, noticeably weakened during the XVII century, or the magnates, divided into fiercely fighting groups. Attempts by the kings to use religious antagonisms for this purpose also failed. The rivalry between the Reformation and Catholicism, which left an unusually strong mark on the political life of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the sixteenth century, ended in an unexpectedly easy victory for Catholicism at the beginning of the next century. Sigismund III's efforts to use this process to strengthen his power did not give the king any positive results.

Under these conditions, the gentry was able to secure the rights and liberties that guaranteed it an unlimited opportunity to influence public life. Limiting the sphere of power of the monarch, the gentry from its national representation - the Sejm - created the main legislative body that controls the king. It also took the case to the point of freeing its proceedings from the control of other authorities, creating tribunals as the highest judicial instances. These principles of government, although limited to the interests of a single class, occupy a place of honor in the history of Europe among the earliest concepts on the basis of which the constitutional monarchy later grew up .4 What was striking, however, was that this concept was attempted not in a relatively limited area (as, for example, in Holland or even in England), but in the vast territory of the European lowlands, where such a system could only be maintained due to the exceptional number of nobles.

The dark side of this system was the unlimited use by the gentry of their socially privileged position by oppressing the peasants and inhibiting the development of the townspeople. This attitude of the nobility was no exception, but there were not many states in Europe where the good or evil will of a nobleman was equally decisive. There was also a lack of consistency in the structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the Seimas, which was to become the highest authority, the features that eventually proved to be the decisive reasons for its weakness were strengthened: unanimous decision-making, an unspecified order of meetings ,and the restriction of the independence of deputies by instructions. 5 The matter did not even reach the establishment of an institution that would take care of the implementation of Seimas laws.

4 J. Gierowski. Rzeczpospolita szlachecka wobec absolutystycznej Europy. "Pamietnik X Powszechnego zjazdu historykow polskich". T. II. Warszawa. 1971; see also: "Polska w epoce Odrodzenia. Konfrontacje historyczne". Warszawa. 1970, str. 125.

5 K. Grzybowski. Teoria reprezentacji w Polsce epoki Odrodzenia. Warszawa. 1959, passim. For a later period, the work of S. Olszewski is of fundamental importance: S. Olszewski. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej epoki oligarchi. Prawo-praktyka-teoria- programy. Poznan. 1966.

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resolutions. These issues were left to the sejmiks, without clearly regulating their relations with the Sejm, and this led to the fact that in the XVII century. they have become a body claiming the same rights as the central authority .6 The institution of resident senators (under the king) only two centuries later bore fruit in the form of a Permanent Council, and before that it was a body of control over the king, however, ineffective in comparison with various advisory bodies, which were already used by the central administration of many European states.

All these shortcomings were not yet striking in the sixteenth century, when it was not easy to find rationally organized states in Europe, and there are many examples of such inconsistencies. But when the system of government was later improved everywhere, reform efforts in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth stopped for more than a century and a half. The gentry considered that it had created almost the most perfect state on earth. In this situation, the above-mentioned shortcomings became factors leading to the disintegration of the state, which in the first half of the XVIII century was on the verge of anarchy. This was a fairly natural consequence of the shift of the main center of gravity to ensuring personal freedom (for representatives of the privileged class), especially when the magnates seized the dominant positions instead of the relatively homogeneous gentry.

The creation of a new model of State in Poland in the sixteenth century had profound international implications. First of all, it made possible the consolidation of the union with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, hitherto only a dynastic one. Apart from the elements of the international situation, especially the growing threat to Lithuania due to the policy of Ivan IV, the Union of Lublin in 1569 was based on the desire of the Lithuanian-Russian nobility to gain influence in the state similar to that of the Polish gentry. 7 It is difficult not to notice that the Union of Lublin also contained inconsistencies, which in the next century turned out to be very dangerous for the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. If the basic principle of the functioning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was to ensure the same freedoms and privileges for all the gentry inhabiting it, regardless of their nationality and religion, then a different attitude towards the Russian (Ukrainian and Belarusian) nobility was unjustified because it gave the state a dualistic rather than trialistic character. This led either to the alienation of this nobility from the surrounding other strata of the population (through polonization), or to nationwide separatist movements. Both of these tendencies were very quickly manifested in Ukraine : attempts to transform the state structure into a trialist one (agreements with B. Khmelnitsky, Gadyach) were made by the authorities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth late, only at the time of an open crisis.

The model of the Szlachta republic was still attractive outside the Polish-Lithuanian State in the 17th century and even at the beginning of the 18th century. Moldavian and Wallachian boyars turned to her in their quarrels with the gospodars or in attempts to reorganize their statehood. This model found an echo in both Hungary and the Czech Republic. Even in the German states closer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, such as Brandenburg or Saxony (during its personal union with Poland), the nobility referred to the example of Poland, which they complained about.

6 J. Gierowski. Seim generalny ksigstwa mazowieckiego. Wroclaw. 1947; J. Wlodarczyk. Sejmik wojewodztwa leczyckiego. Lodz. 1974.

7 There are no contemporary works on the Polish-Lithuanian Union. The most valuable comments on this topic have recently been made by Y. Bardakh: J. Bardakh. Krewo i Lublin. Z dziejow unii polsko-litewskiej. "Kwartalnik Historyczny", 1969, N 3, str. 583.

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Frederick William I of Prussia, warning that he would eradicate the Polish "I do not allow" from the nobility. And the most prominent "Polish-Saxon" Minister Ya. Flemming directly compared the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to a woman who is generally attractive, although not very successful in detail .8 Russian boyars also used the experience of the Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth several times - the last time, perhaps, still in the well-known "Conditions" presented to Anna Ivanovna - in their attempts to reform, which, however, were doomed to failure, since they did not have the support of the nobility independent of the monarch.

Poland's position in the international arena depended, however, not so much on the attractiveness of its state model as on its military capabilities and the success of its diplomacy. The actual assessment of the military capabilities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is not easy. Since the permanent income of the state was relatively modest and it was enough to hire in peacetime about 4 thousand soldiers in the second half of the XVI century, 18 thousand - in the 70s of the XVII century. and 24 thousand.. - in the XVIII century (since 1717), in the event of war, special decisions of the Sejm on taxes were necessary to increase the number of mercenaries. They were usually taken with difficulty and for a short period of time, generally not exceeding a year. While the sejms functioned relatively well, this only had a limited impact on the military capabilities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Under Stefan Batory, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth fielded up to 60,000 well-equipped recruited troops during military campaigns, making it one of the first powers in this part of Europe. In the first half of the 17th century, the authorities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth rarely made such a significant quantitative effort. A significant role was played then, however, by the so-called registered Cossack troops, numbering more than ten thousand people. There was also an increase in the combat capability of the soldier by equipping him with improved firearms (muskets), supporting him with more powerful field artillery, and finally deploying infantry with a slight decrease in the number of cavalry. However, cavalry, including heavy cavalry (Hussars), still played a very significant role in combat engagements. 9
But even then, acts of disobedience on the part of irregularly paid troops multiplied. In the second half of the 17th century, when due to the irregular convocation of sejms, the delay in paying salaries lasted for years (for example, after the end of the war with Turkey in 1683-1699). The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth owed the army about 33 million zlotys), the situation was getting worse and worse. True, hiring opportunities still fluctuated between 30-60 thousand people, but these figures clearly did not correspond to the situation in the armies of not only Western Europe, but even the nearest neighbors of the Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth: the Russian army exceeded 160 thousand, and the Habsburg army-120 thousand people. A more significant Cossack registry was out of the question, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could, however, put up to 30 thousand people, but their combat capability was low. However, over time, as the financial situation of the country worsened, the combat capability of hired soldiers also fell lower and lower. This is evidenced by the last period of the war with Turkey under Jan III Sobiesski, and especially the years of the Northern War10 .

8 The 1726 Flemming memorial is in the collection of the Saxon Library in Dresden.

9 "Zarys dziejow wojskowosci polskiej do roku 1864". T. I. Warszawa. 1965; B. Bаranowski. Organizacja wojska polskiego w latach trzydziestych i czterdziestych XVII w. Warszawa. 1957; J. Wiramer. Wojsko i skarb Rzeczypospolitej u schylku XVI i w piervvszej poiowie XVII w. "Studia i materialy do historii wojskowsci". Warszawa. 1968.

10 J. Wimmer. Wojsko polskie w drugiej poiowie XVII w. Warszawa. 1965.

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So, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was only able to keep up with other European powers for less than a hundred years. The shortcomings of its political system were the reason why it did not dare to quickly implement military and fiscal reforms that could stop its regression. When they were passed at the Sejm in 1717, approving permanent taxes on all types of estates for the needs of the army, the reform was half-hearted and late. The size of the army was too low, given the threat from the many times larger armies of its neighbors, and the tax system was inefficient and . A long period of actual disarmament of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began, which ended only during the Four-year Sejm.

Similar reservations can be made about the functioning of Polish diplomacy. The seventeenth century was the period of the establishment of a permanent network of diplomatic missions in Europe, with France mainly serving as an example of newly organized diplomacy. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, the traditional rules were followed - sending short-term diplomatic missions with a clearly defined task. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did not stand out in this respect. Good diplomatic personnel were available in Poland already in the XVI century, under the last Jagiellons. However, the restriction of the King's freedom to conduct foreign policy by the Henrik Articles negatively affected the functioning of Polish diplomacy. In order to avoid the constant control of the Senate and Diet, the kings organized their own diplomatic service, which led to ambivalence of the political line and reduced the effectiveness of diplomatic efforts, especially when the monarch could not freely dispose of public funds intended for these purposes. This situation did not differ, however, from the situation prevailing in those class monarchies in which the estates acquired the right to exercise control over expenditures.

Nevertheless, it was the kings, for example, Vladislav IV, who first began to organize a network of (however small) permanent agents at the most important European courts. John III acted in a similar way, but this aroused the suspicion of the gentry. It came to the point that the Sejm stipulated for itself the right to send and receive embassies; at the same time, in order to complicate the king's contacts with foreign countries, it tried to prohibit foreign residents and ambassadors from staying in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for more than nine weeks. Both of these resolutions remained on paper due to the failure of the sejms, but formally they greatly restricted the monarch's freedom of action. At the same time, the gentry was not inclined to allocate the necessary sums for the diplomatic service, still being content to send short-term missions. As a result, Polish diplomacy throughout the 17th century was not successful in its actions, it lacked personnel sufficiently trained to perform its tasks.

But the real disaster for Polish diplomacy was the personal union with Saxony. August II received significant financial resources for the development of the diplomatic service in Saxony and therefore did not care about the development or modernization of Polish diplomacy. Under these circumstances, it is true that he had a well-developed diplomatic network in Europe, but it was subordinate to the Saxon centers of power and transmitted the information received to them. It was, therefore, the same as in England and Hanover during the period of their personal union, with the difference, however, that the distribution of roles was reversed. Under Augustus III Polish diplomatic figure-

11 J. Wimmer. Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie wojny polnocnej 1700-1717. Warszawa. 1956.

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The situation was already only sporadic, so that the last Polish king had to restore Polish diplomacy almost out of nothing. It was given a more modern character, but there were neither the means nor the opportunities for its full development.

The weakness of the Polish diplomatic service convincingly highlights the vices of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, especially at a time when decentralizing tendencies began to prevail in it and the time came for the rule of sejmiks and magnates. The lack of proper knowledge of the international situation caused a number of defeats that befell the Polish-Lithuanian State since the second half of the XVII century. The shortcomings of Polish diplomacy led to the fact that in times of danger it was not always possible to quickly link Poland with other states interested in maintaining the existing balance in this part of Europe, and major European conflicts were not used to strengthen the international position of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 12
A well-known explanation for the inability of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to make appropriate efforts in the field of military affairs and diplomacy in the seventeenth century can be found in the economic difficulties it was experiencing at that time: the deterioration of its trade balance due to lower prices for agricultural products and growing competition, and, consequently, the general relative impoverishment of the country, aggravated by the Nevertheless, doubts will remain as to whether economic difficulties are a sufficient explanation for this failure, and whether the same means could not have been used to achieve more effective results if the State apparatus was functioning properly. After all, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a relatively low-dynamic state, focused more on protecting its possessions than on expansion.

This tendency was clearly manifested in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries , when the international situation was most favorable for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The threat to its eastern and southern borders, which had persisted for a century, disappeared. After the lost War of Livonia and the death of Ivan IV, Moscow experienced a long dynastic crisis and a period of internal strife. The Romanovs were not yet capable of a more active foreign policy for a long time, and the boyars not without envy admired the liberties of the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. Internal difficulties were also experienced by the Habsburg state, where the claims of Hungarians and Czechs, dissatisfied with the counter-reformation and centralizing pressure, were increasingly voiced. These claims were soon to be reflected in the Czech Uprising and the Thirty Years ' War, which completely absorbed the forces of the empire. The power of the Ottoman state also weakened. Frequent changes on the sultan's throne, uprisings in the provinces could not but affect the military capabilities of the Port. The protracted Austro-Turkish war at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries was an eloquent measure of the weakening of both sides. The Turkish difficulties in managing a huge state were also evidenced by the liberation aspirations of the empire's lenniks: Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, and even the Crimean Khanate.

It was in the interests of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to use the weakening of its neighbors in such a way as to prevent the dangers that threatened them for a long time. It could provide assistance to those forces in neighboring countries that represented decentralizing tendencies there.-

12 "Polska sluzba dyplomatyczna". Warszawa, 1966; see also: Z. Wojcik. Zmiana w ukladzie sil politycznych w Europie srodkowo-wschodniej w drugiej polowie XVII wieku. "Kwartalnik Historyczny", 1960, N 1, str. 26 и статью того же автора в кн.: "Polska XVII wieku. Konfrontacje historyczne". Warszawa. 1969.

13 "Polska w okresie drugiej wojny polnocnej". T. II. Warszawa. 1957.

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The bos sought to achieve independence or use the attractive power of the Polish model of state to help instill it in other countries. This was the rare moment when the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could even claim to prevail in this part of Europe.

The achievement of these goals, however, exceeded the capabilities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This was primarily influenced by the pacifist attitude of the majority of the gentry, who were happy with their position and not inclined to expansionist initiatives, which, in their opinion, could only benefit the king or a small group of magnates. The nobles were ready to defend the state territory, by which they understood the territory outlined by the borders of the Jagiellonian monarchy. But it was not capable of long-term, consistent striving to achieve a certain goal, nor of enduring the hardships of war for a long time, even if it understood the need for war. There were also differences between the interests of the Polish line of the Waz dynasty, which was focused on the return of the Swedish throne, and the interests of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Baltic policy throughout the 16th century was the most important direction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's foreign policy, and this corresponded to its economic needs. The successes achieved (the subjugation of princely Prussia and Livonia) seemed to have fulfilled the main goals: mastering the coast with the ports that are most important for the economy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and securing freedom of trade in the Baltic Sea .14 A personal union with Sweden through the election of Sigismund Sh to the Polish throne could strengthen this position, at most-lead to some kind of Polish-Swedish condominium on the Baltic Sea. When it was broken, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did not intend to help Sigismund III in the conquest of the Swedish Kingdom. Nevertheless, the king's skillful use of the question of the fate of disputed Estonia eventually dragged the Polish-Lithuanian state into long wars with Sweden. It was Sweden, not the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that grew during these wars into the first power in Northern Europe.

These wars contributed to the loss of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of most of its Baltic conquests of the XVI century. At first, almost all of Livonia was lost, the reconquest of which, after the capture of Riga by Gustavus Adolphus in 1621, exceeded the capabilities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Later, Polish domination of the Vistula estuary was threatened, and only the involvement of the Szczweds in the Thirty Years ' War prevented serious losses in the area. Finally, the great and devastating Swedish invasion of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1655, although it did not lead, however, to the supposed subordination of all Poland and Lithuania to Charles X Gustav, or to the division of their territories, contributed, however, to the loss of Polish sovereignty over princely Prussia. Already in 1618, with the consent of Sigismund III, the rulers of Brandenburg assumed the throne of Konigsberg, which was still dependent on Poland, and then, using the threat of the Swedish invasion to the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they achieved recognition of their sovereignty in princely Prussia by the Velyavsko-Bydgoszcz Treaty of 1657 .15
Attempts to activate Polish politics in other regions ended in failure or only temporary success. So, despite the weakening of the Turkish state, the Polish campaigns to Moldova and Wallachia, which were aimed at NASA, did not bring lasting results-

14 S. Bodniak. Polska-Baltyk za ostatniego Jagiellona. "Pamiftnik Biblioteki Kornickiep. 1946; see also: W. Czaplinski. Polska a Baltyk w latach 1632-1648. Wroclaw. 1952; B. N. Florea. Russo-Polish relations and the Baltic issue of the late XVI-early XVII centuries. Moscow, 1973.

15 "Polska w okresie drugiej wojny poinocnep. Т. I-III. Warszawa. 1957.

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It is necessary to wait there for the gospodars dependent on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and carry out changes in the structure of these principalities. These campaigns only hindered the efforts to unite these principalities and Transylvania, undertaken mainly by Mihai the Brave, and became one of the causes of the open Polish-Turkish conflict, which the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth politicians so carefully avoided throughout the XVI century .16 It put Poland in an exceptionally difficult position, and although it ended this time in a compromise, it indirectly affected the loss of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of Livonia. This war was also connected with the intervention of Sigismund III in defense of the emperor at the beginning of the Thirty Years ' War, when detachments of lisovchikav sent to Transylvania forced Bethlen Gabor to retreat from Vienna. All this action, undertaken by the king in the name of the interests of Catholicism and his own dynastic aspirations (the return of Sweden with the help of the Habsburgs), only helped to strengthen the Habsburgs ' position. Sigismund III did not even manage to bargain for a part of Silesia for his helpfulness, although some Polish politicians pointed out the extremely favorable opportunity for the return of this long-standing Piast inheritance, which was opened by the Habsburg conflict with the Czech Republic. Until the end of the Thirty Years ' War, however, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth failed to take advantage of the internal weakening of the empire, and even after the death of the last prince of Szczecin, it could not effectively defend the long-standing Polish rights to Western Pomerania and allowed the division of this principality between Sweden and Brandenburg .17 The persistent preservation of the alliance with the emperor only plunged the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into conflicts with actual or potential members of the Protestant camp, and the receipt of Vases (for a very short time) in the form of a fief of the Opole-Racibor Principality in Silesia was, in fact, a negligible reward for services rendered to the Habsburgs18 .

Crucial to the future of this part of Europe, however, was the failed attempt to interfere in Russia's internal affairs. The maximum projects put forward by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth assumed the union of both states by either a real union on the model of the Polish-Lithuanian one, or a personal union by electing Sigismund III or his son to the royal throne. Although the Russians did not reject the possibility of dynastic ties (which, however, was already the case earlier, when the Rurikids were nominated for the Polish throne during the first free elections), due to differences in social development, gentry liberties did not become such a magnet for them as for Lithuanians. When religious and cultural - political contradictions were added to this, it was necessary to abandon the dreams of the union. The campaign against Moscow, undertaken, however, despite the obvious fears of the majority of the gentry, 19 soon acquired a conquering character. The Polish-Lithuanian troops that entered the Kremlin behaved as if they were in a conquered country, and the detachments sent into the depths of Russia carried out looting and violence with all their ruthlessness. This only led to the development of a national liberation movement against the invaders, compromised their slogans, and strained relations between the Russians, on the one hand, and the Poles and Lithuanians, on the other, to an unprecedented degree. This is the state

16 V. Majewski presented these problems most extensively recently: W. Majewski. Cecora. Warszawa. 1971.

17 W. Czapiinski. Polska, Prusy i Brandenburgia za WJadyslawa IV. Wroclaw. 1947.

18 J. Leszczynski. Wladyslaw IV a Sla_sk w latach 1644 - 1648. Wroclaw. 1969.

19 A new light on this question was shed by J. Maciszewski's monograph: J. Maciszewski. Polska a Moskwa 1603-1618. Warszawa. 1968. On the Szlachta way of thinking from this point of view, many considerations can be found in the work of the same author: J. Maciszewski. Szlachta polska i jej panstwo. Warszawa. 1969,

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hostility reinforced the annexations carried out as a result of the war. The threat of retribution loomed over the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a reality that grew as the power of the Russian state grew stronger and at the same time Poland weakened during the 17th century.

We have already tried to draw attention to the factors that led to the fact that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not capable of gaining a dominant international position. These included the shortcomings of the political system, the divergence of the dynastic interests of the monarchs, the state and the Catholic Church, and the way of thinking of the gentry society, especially the middle gentry, whose desires were fully satisfied with the existing state of affairs. As a result, the results achieved were out of proportion to the size and resources of the state. This had an unfavorable effect on the international situation of Poland, which remained, in fact, outside the system of European unions (except for the rather dynastic connection of the Vases with the Habsburgs) and isolated. But this gentry policy of exclusion from major European conflicts, which reached its climax in the reign of Vladislav IV, did not prevent the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from becoming the object of the expansionist policy of its neighbors, whose military potential grew with the development of their economy and the modernization of the military apparatus. In the middle of the 17th century. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to pass the exam for readiness to defend its possessions.

The turning point was the uprising led by Khmelnitsky in 1648 and the Ukrainian crisis. The uprising not only clearly revealed where the weakest link in the organization of the multinational Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lay, but also highlighted its military and fiscal shortcomings. However, it turned out that Ukraine was not able to win back its independence. However, its social elite found enough patrons-Crimea, Porto, and eventually Russia-who promised it the same rights and freedoms that the Poles had spared for it. There was a Ukrainian-Cossack problem that occupied European diplomacy until the beginning of the next century, the problem of the future and the organization of the Dnieper territories. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was no longer able to solve this problem on its own, but managed to exploit the contradictions between its rivals in this area. By entering into an alliance alternately with the Crimea and the Port, then with Russia, it managed to keep under its rule a significant part of the Dnieper Ukraine. This was a temporary and half-hearted solution, which, by the way, did not give any rights to the Ukrainian society or at least to the Cossacks in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the border line drawn in 1667 in the Andrusov Treaty concluded with Russia became stronger than expected .20 More importantly, this compromise not only eased tensions between the two states, but also made it possible for them to form alliances and cooperate in the wars with Turkey and the Swedes.

The Ukrainian crisis and the failures in the war with Russia also affected the situation in the north-western lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which became the object of the Swedish intervention already mentioned. True, the impulse of all the people - peasants, townspeople and gentry - led to victory over the invaders, but the long-term war played a disastrous role in the history of Poland, destroying its economic well-being for many years .21 The fact that they managed to defend their independence and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth got out of a very difficult situation with territorial integrity.-

20 For the eastern policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during this period, see: Z. Wojcik. Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza. Warszawa. 1959; ejusd. Miedzy traktatem andruszowskim a wojng tureckg. Warszawa. 1968.

21 See note 13.

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It was recognized by the gentry as proof that the organization of their State was capable of carrying out its main tasks and that reforms were not necessary. But even if we take into account that in the middle of the XVII century. If the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth still had sufficient strength of stability, then it was by no means sufficient to successfully defend its possessions simultaneously on the Baltic Sea and on the Dnieper. It soon turned out that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not capable of successful defense even in one sector and could not wrest from the hands of the Turks the areas lost in 1672 .22
Poland's international position was weakening before our very eyes. True, it was still saved by such remarkable, though only momentary, military victories as Hotin or Vienna, but more and more often in the reports of diplomats from Warsaw, the motif of "unhappy Poland"typical of the declining state appeared. It is no coincidence that it was during this period that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began to get involved more often in various alliances and leagues, starting with the anti-Swedish with the emperor, Brandenburg and Denmark, and the anti-Turkish Holy League and ending with the anti-Swedish Northern League. Initially, the Habsburgs remained the most important ally; maneuvers against them and the search for support in the face of France did not give tangible results. Later, an increasingly important role was played by the union with Russia - the cornerstone of the policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the XVIII century, which, however, only until the Northern War retained the character of an equal partner.

At the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth once again has an unexpected chance to regain its long-standing position thanks to a personal union with Saxony. 23 Saxony was one of the most economically developed parts of the empire, with substantial revenues and a relatively large and well-equipped army. Although class rights and privileges were preserved in it to a much greater extent than in neighboring Prussia - Brandenburg, the position of its rulers by the end of the XVII century was noticeably strengthened, and it was clear that the Saxon electors were clearly striving for absolutism. The Wettins were preparing to compete with both the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs, and it was the possession of the throne in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that was to become the springboard for their plans to obtain the Swedish and imperial crown. United under the sceptre of Augustus II, Saxony, Poland, and Lithuania became a factor that, given the still insufficiently established balance of power in this part of Europe, could play a primary role. Even without serious financial reforms, the combined army of these countries would reach 80-100 thousand people.

These were, however, prerequisites that did not take into account the most important point: there were too many differences between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Saxony for it to come to their actual close cooperation in the international arena. First of all, the absolutist tendencies characteristic of Augustus II and his Saxon entourage became an insurmountable obstacle to it. Repeated conflicts between the king and the gentry, internal collapse in the country during the war with Charles XII, anti-royal intrigues of large magnate families very soon negated all the benefits that a personal union could bring. While Saxony tried to conduct a more active policy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth sank deeper into lethargy, becoming a real pain-

22 J. Wolinski. Z dziejow wojny i polityki w dobie Jana Sobieskiego. Warszawa. 1960.

23 J. Gierowski. W cieniu ligi poJnocnej. Wroclaw, 1971; see also J. Staszewski. O miejsce w Europie. Warszawa. 1973.

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the object of trade and the territory used by other states.

However, European states already in the second half of the XVII century. learned to use the weaknesses of the structure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to implement their plans. Even then, the first international treaties appeared, which aimed, in particular, to preserve the inviolability of the nobles ' liberties, to prevent the strengthening of the monarch's power, and above all to protect the principle of free election of the king. The first such treaties were concluded by Brandenburg and Sweden in 1667, later-by Russia and Austria, Austria, Brandenburg and Sweden. In the 18th century, such treaties became the rule: all the neighbors of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth bound themselves to protect the "golden liberty", not stopping at direct intervention in the internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, just to preserve the existing situation there.

International relations in the regions closest to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth have also developed unfavorably. If in the 17th century it was possible to speak about a certain balance of power between its neighbors, then during the first decades of the 18th century Sweden was excluded from their circle, Turkey's position significantly weakened, but Russia and Austria were formed as the most important powers, and a little later Prussia, which directed their expansion primarily to Polish lands. The weakened Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth failed to take advantage of the conflicts that separated these states during the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years ' War, did not help Saxony in its struggle with Prussia, and finally waited for the alliance of Frederick II with Catherine II, which was to decide its own fate. The elimination of the link between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Saxony, a link that in the legitimist "Europe of Kings" was a kind of defensive shield for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the election of Stanislaw August Poniatowski as king were the consequences of this union , 24 which led to the first partition of Poland.

It is difficult to speak in these circumstances about the international role or position of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which for many writers of the Enlightenment was only a frightening example of backwardness and anarchy, a creation that is most incompatible with the principles of rational organization of society. 25 But in these extremely unfavorable conditions of foreign interference and pressure, the corruption of magnates, and the narrow traditionalism of the majority of the gentry, the task of transforming the deformed Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into an orderly and rationally organized, enlightened Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was begun. It was prepared by a thorough education of society, undertaken in the name of Enlightenment slogans and necessary in a country where it was not the enlightened ruler, but the enlightened sejm that had to decide on reforms. This task was prepared by the public education modernized by the educational commission, the propaganda activities of the press and literature, the patronage of the royal court and those political groups that were aware that the implementation of reforms is a matter of life and death for the state .26 The principles of reform were developed by entire generations of Polish political writers, from S. Dunin-Karwicki in the early 18th century to Yu. Vybitsky, S. Stashits and G. Kollontay 27 . The revival of the country's economy after a century of stagnation, changes in the social structure, especially urban development, should have made it easier to implement these principles.

24 W. Konopczynski. Fryderyk Wielki a Polska. Poznan. 1947.

25 H. Serejski. Op. cit., sir. 40 nn.

26 B. Lesnodorski. Dzielo Sejmu Czteroletniego. Krakow. 1949.

27 W. Konopczynski, Polscy pisaxze polityczni XVIU wieku. Warszawa. 1966.

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These measures resulted in the activities of the Four-year Sejm (1788-1792) and the modernization of Polish statehood, including the adoption of the Constitution on May 3. On the path of the "peaceful revolution", as contemporaries said, a new model of the state was prepared, which, using the example and experience of other countries and the advice of Enlightenment philosophers, was at the same time a continuation and development of the old model of the XVI century; The new model of the state was its continuation, since it did not destroy long-existing institutions, but tried to improve their. At the same time, it was also its development, since it not only introduced new bodies (for example, civil-military commissions in voivodeships), but - and this was most important - broke with the principle of the szlachta monopoly on political rights, allowed a significant part of the townspeople to join them, and took the peasants under the guardianship of public law.

Thus, the Four-year Sejm began the process of modernization of the state, which in most countries took place under the leadership of an enlightened monarch. The way was opened for the transition from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to a constitutional monarchy. At the same time, a significant strengthening of the armed forces and a revival of diplomatic activity began. Poland has once again emerged as a worthy partner in international relations .28
The work of reform was not, however, completed. Outside intervention followed, and soon after, the second and third sections; the latter was preceded by the desperate rush of Kosciuszko's rebellion. According to the will of the participants of the partitions, the very name of Poland was to be erased from the map of Europe once and for all. On the continent, where at that very time there was a relentless struggle between revolutionary France and the absolutist monarchies defending the old order, there was no room to implement the path indicated by the Four-Year Diet. The changes that the "peaceful revolution" brought with it could be as dangerous for despots as the examples and slogans distributed from Paris.

Twice in the course of three centuries, Poland managed to create an original model of a state in which individual freedom would not be threatened by the omnipotence of power. The first model, which ensured the rights of only one stratum - the gentry, successfully competed with other estate monarchies. In an absolutist environment, it has been deformed; however, it has turned out that an excess of freedom can be just as dangerous for the state as an excess of the rights of power. The second model, which was already oriented on a broader social basis, could not be consolidated. The state was abolished because the society that lived in it wanted to be governed differently from its neighbors. Meanwhile - and in this respect I would be prepared to argue with many historians-when considering the genesis of modern bourgeois states in Europe, in which one of the most essential elements is the formally growing participation of wider sections of the population in the management of public affairs, the Polish experience and proposals were no less important than the improvements introduced by absolutism.

28 Another thing is that the choice of an ally made at that time - Prussia, and indirectly-England-caused and causes many reservations among historians, a significant part of whom skeptically assesses the sincerity of Prussia's then allied intentions.

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