The reparations problem occupied a large place in the political life of Weimar Germany. It has largely determined the policy of the Western powers for 15 years. The reparations issue alone has been discussed more than 600 times, with some meetings lasting many weeks. About 30 specially convened conferences were devoted in whole or in part to the issue of reparations. It is not surprising, therefore ,that there are a great many documents on this problem. 1
In the bourgeois historiography of reparative policy, two directions are distinguished. First, it supported and disseminated the version of the leaders of the Entente countries that their actions against Germany contributed to the peace and prosperity of Europe. 2 The other reflected the point of view of the bourgeois opposition and the Junkers, who were unwilling to make even a temporary compromise with the victorious powers .3 Many researchers have shied away from the political content of the issue, limiting themselves to covering the technical details of the conferences .4 Some of the works of historians of England and France are apologies for the policies of these countries .5 It is common to all bourgeois literature to ignore the anti-Soviet orientation of the reparative policy of the Weimar Republic and to obscure the contradictions between the main imperialist states.

In the literature of the USSR and the GDR, the question of reparations is covered in a number of general works and special studies that expose the true meaning of European economic policy as a program aimed at preparing Germany's attack on the USSR .6
The following review of parliamentary documents is intended to identify them in different ways:-

1 See, for example: "The Versailles Peace Treaty", Moscow, 1925; " German Reparations and the report of the Committee of Experts "(Collection of documents). Moscow, 1925: "Plan for solving the reparations issue". Reports of the commission of experts under the leadership of Dawes and McCann. Moscow 1925: "The Young Plan and the Hague Conference of 1929-1930". Documents and materials. Moscow 1931; "The reparations question and war debts". Moscow 1933; "Locarno Conference of 1925" (Documents). Moscow, 1959.

2 R. Dalberg. Die neue deutsche Wahrung nach dem Dawes-Plan. B. 1924; H. Haas. Auslandsanleihen und Reparationen. Jena. 1929; W. Salewski. Das auslandische Kapital in der deulschen Wirtschaft. Essen. 1930.

3 K. Helfferich. Freies Deutschland oder internationale Reparations- Provinz. B. 1924; W. D. Preyer. Die Dawes-Gesetze. Deutschlands wirtschaftliche Versklavung. B. 1925; "Zehn Jahre Versailles". Bd. 1 - 2. Hrsg. von Dr. H. Schnee. B. 1929; H. Schacht. Das Ende der Reparationen. Oldenburg. 1931; ejusd. Grundsatze deutscher Wirtschaftspolitik. Oldenburg. 1932.

4 J. M. Keynes. Economic consequences of the Versailles Peace Treaty, Moscow, 1924; V. M. Jordan. Great Britain, France and the German problem in 1918-1939 M. 1945.

5 D. Jackson. Post-war World, Moscow, 1937; A. Tardieu, Mir, Moscow, 1943.

6 E. S. Varga. The Dawes Plan and the World Crisis, Moscow, 1925. Osnovnye voprosy ekonomiki i politiki imperializma [Basic Issues of the Economy and Politics of Imperialism]. Moscow, 1953; A. Norden. Uroki germanskoi istorii [Lessons of German History], Moscow, 1948; V. V. Postnikov. USA and the Dawesization of Germany (1924-1929). Moscow, 1957; G. M. Trukhnov. The German question at the London Conference. Minsk.

page 192

positive aspects and shortcomings, their significance as sources on the history of reparative policy.

The peculiarity of Germany's economic position as a defeated country, weakened and disarmed by its rivals, brought the reparations problem to the forefront of the political life of the Weimar Republic. Naturally, the implementation of the reparative policy could not be the prerogative of any one department or ministry. Reparations issues were developed and submitted to the Reichstag for consideration by the Ministries of Economy and Reconstruction, and were coordinated and corrected by the Foreign Ministry. The problem of paying reparations was discussed in detail at the meetings of the Reichstag Standing Committees: foreign policy, foreign trade and economic affairs. In addition, the Reichstag established the Reich Economic Council, in which the leading industrial groups were represented. At the same time, according to the available data, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid the most attention to the reparations policy: It has been examined much more frequently in foreign policy debates than in the analysis of the annual budgets of the Ministries of Economy and Reconstruction, and the bulk of the material on reparations falls on meetings where statements from the German Government about the actions of the allied Powers were heard. In total, reparations issues occupied a significant place in the activities of the Reichstag. 57 of the 411 meetings of the Reichstag of the 1st convocation are devoted to the problems of reparations.

The National Assembly. The Reichstag of the 1st convocation (1919-1924).

Accept or not accept the terms of the Treaty of Versailles? This was a question that was widely debated throughout Germany at the time. Right-wing parties, military organizations, and fascist demagogues, seeking to portray themselves as defenders of the nation, demanded resistance to the dictates of the Entente. Among the" politicians of catastrophes " stood out K. G. Gelferich, the main speaker of the nationalist faction on economic issues, the former Kaiser's Minister of Finance. A representative of the right wing of the Center, Ye, performed in the same key. Trimborn, who urged not to stop in foreign policy before extreme measures. The more" democratic " Catholic K. Fehrenbach warned the allied powers against taking too steep actions in relation to Germany, putting forward the argument that was repeated more than once - the threat of revolution. There were significantly more supporters of the "implementation policy" in the Reichstag of the 1st convocation, whose point of view was described by American President W. Wilson in the Senate as follows: "To accept in principle and reject in fact"7 . As a rule, they were more flexible figures who took into account the mood in the enemy camp and saw the bourgeois republic as a defender of their interests. Thus, Foreign Minister W. Simone (SPD) spoke about the imperialist opponents of Germany: "Some of them want to milk the cow, others-to slaughter it. Those who want to milk must enter into an agreement with us. " 8 However, there was no unity among the adherents of the "implementation policy" either. For example, B. Dernburg, G. Gothein, and G. Preis from the right wing of the Democratic Party faction voted against the Treaty of Versailles. Among these three, B. Dernburg, a trustee of the German-Asian Bank, was the most reactionary. R. Breitscheid, a speaker on foreign policy issues of the Social-Democratic group, expressed his fear in the National Assembly that failure to comply with the terms of the treaty would lead to the occupation of German territory by Entente troops and the radicalization of the masses. At the same time, supporters of the "implementation policy", as parliamentary documents show, were counting on a revision of the Treaty of Versailles in the future9 .

1959; N. V. Farbman. German imperialism is on its way to revising the reparations regulations of the Treaty of Versailles (1920-1922). "Yearbook of German History 1972", Moscow, 1973; L. I. Gintsberg. Revision of the Dawes plan and the Paris Conference of Experts 1929. "Yearbook of German History 1973". M. 1974; V. Graefrath. Zur Geschichte der Reparationen. B. 1954; W. J. Helbig. .Die Reparationen in der Ara Bruning. Zur Bedeutung des Joung-Planes fur die deutsche Politik 1930 bis 1932. B. 1962.

7 "History of Diplomacy", vol. 3, Moscow, 1965, p. 145.

8 "Deutscher Geschichtskalender", Jg. 36. Rd. 2, 4920, S. 40.

9 "Verhandlungen der Verfassungsgebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung". Bd. 327. B. 1920, S. 1127.

page 193

The debate in the Reichstag suggests that the rulers of the Weimar Republic hoped to achieve a softening of the terms of the treaty already at the Spa conference. The tactics of the German delegation were accurately expressed by Democrat O. Schiffer: "The Treaty pushes us to the ground and wants to kill us, but at the same time it wants to benefit from us. Thus, it gives the right to seek its revision. " 10 The reactionaries, led by Karl Gelferich, demanded that no documents should be signed in the Spa .11 The transcripts of the parliamentary debates reflect the position of the independent Social Democrats and KKE deputies regarding the Spa negotiations. Independent A. Henke bitterly ridiculed some bourgeois politicians who had high hopes for the conference: "Representatives of German capital are going to Spa to complain about the plight of the workers." 12 The communist K. Zetkin pointed out that in the future international imperialism will continue the crimes of German imperialism, for which the working class will have to pay the price .13
Parliamentary documents contain extensive material on the results of the Spa negotiations of July 5-16, 1920. As you know, the German delegation, well aware of the contradictions in the Entente camp, counted on success in the reparative struggle. On July 10, the" German king of coal and steel " G. Stinnes, invited to the delegation as an official expert, boldly declared that Germany would not give either coal for supplies, nor money, nor goods to fulfill reparations. However, in Spa, German imperialism met with decisive opposition from the Entente and was forced to retreat. Germany's supply of coal for reparations was estimated at 2 million tons per month. Chancellor Karl Fehrenbach, while complaining about the unequal position of the German delegation in Spa, warned that all efforts would have to be made to meet the conditions set for the country in Spa 14 . Foreign Minister V. Simone also confirmed the seriousness of the Entente's intentions to deprive Germany of economic power. At the same time, he believed that the Germans internally should not agree to Treaty 15 . K. Zetkin gave a Marxist assessment of the Spa negotiations, noting that " despite all the national contradictions, representatives of the propertied classes conferred there. After the negotiations, the income of not only French, but also German capitalists will go up. The shares of coal industry magnates will rise especially " 16 .

The documents of the Reichstag show that the Paris Conference of January 24-30, 1921, contrary to the expectations of the German government, did not reveal any tangible changes in the reparative "war". Reporting to the deputies, Simone complained that in Paris, the German delegation was presented with an ultimatum payment scheme, without asking or offering anything. According to the reparations commission, Germany was supposed to pay $ 226 billion. gold marks. Simone proposed to make up the cost of reparations payments by raising taxes on workers and peasants .17 By talking about the transformation of the worker's labor into hard labor, the minister tried to create the impression that the living conditions of German workers were entirely dependent on the intervention of foreign capital in the German economy. The illegality of such statements was fully revealed by the communist W. Stecker, who noted that in Germany, along with the need of the working people, the dividends of the rich are rapidly growing .18
Parliamentary documents reflect the political balance of power in the Reichstag after the Paris Conference. On March 12, 1921, in a speech by Simons, the government program was finally defined - the implementation of the Versailles Peace Treaty within the limits of what was possible, but no more than 19 . But the supporters of the" policy of catastrophes " also did not give up their positions. Trimborn (Center), supported by edi-

10 " Verhandlungen des Reichstags "(hereinafter-VdR). Bd. 344. V. 1920. S. 63.

11 Ibid., S. 144.

12 Ibid., S. 105.

13 Ibid., S. 161.

14 Ibid., S. 255.

15 Ibid., S. 256.

16 Ibid., S. 329.

17 VdR. Bd. 347. B. 1921, S. 2305.

18 VdR. Bd. 348. B. 1921, S. 268.

19 Ibid., S. 2847.

page 194

with like-minded people, he demanded the disruption of the "Paris diktat"20 . The Social Democrats and other supporters of the agreement with the victorious powers did not want to aggravate the situation and hoped that the Entente would eventually agree to a revision of the treaty. Therefore, SPD speakers argued, every opportunity for negotiations should be seized 21 .

By the spring of 1921, there was a rapprochement between Britain and France, which allowed both countries to come out with a common point of view on the issue of reparations. German counter-claims against the decisions of the Paris Conference were rejected. Under the pretext of deliberately delaying German reparations payments, the Allies occupied the Rhineland cities. On April 22, 1921, the German government issued a statement asking the United States to mediate, taking into account its growing influence on the European continent .22 The US rejected the offer of mediation, but advised Germany to draw up a new reparations scheme in order to continue negotiations. During the Reichstag debates, the Communists explained to the workers the essence of the"fulfillment policy". Thus, V. Koehnen stated that accepting the Entente's demands meant starvation for the German people and that foreign capital's ultimatum was aimed at suppressing the proletarian revolution in Germany .23 The Communists tried to convince the masses that the" policy of fulfillment "was just as contrary to the national interests of the country as the" policy of catastrophes", resolving inter-imperialist contradictions at the expense of the workers and peasants. The Communist group rejected the ultimatum. 24 O. Wels, on behalf of the Social Democrats, supported the signing of the ultimatum, although he clearly understood its consequences .25 The Democratic Party faction openly admitted that they did not come to a common opinion. 26 O. Hergt (National Party) declared the London demands unenforceable and demanded not to sign the ultimatum. 27 The rejection of the bill by the People's Party faction was announced by G. Stresemann on 28 . As a result of the government crisis, Fehrenbach's cabinet resigned. New Government of Ukraine. Two hours before the deadline for the ultimatum, Wirth notified the allies of the acceptance of conditions, the burden of which was to be borne by the poor strata of the population.

The bourgeoisie attacked the vital rights of the working people under the cover of nationalist chatter. The verbatim reports deal in particular detail with the question of "civil peace", which was preached by terry reactionaries. G. Bell (Center), resorting to the slogan of unity of the peoples of Europe, appealed to the right and left parties to unite to repel the aggression of the Entente 29 . The Communists were the only ones who did not succumb to the frenzy of bourgeois patriotism. E. Hellein (KKE), pointing out the hegemonic goals of French imperialism in Europe, stressed that there is nothing unusual in France's actions: in the capitalist world, the right is on the side of the strong .30
Unfortunately, the Reichstag documents pay little attention to such an important period in the history of the Weimar Republic as the eve of the signing of the Treaty of Rapalle. Only a few facts show that the failure to negotiate reparations prompted German diplomats to reconsider their attitude towards Soviet Russia. Thus, Wirth admitted in the Reichstag that the government repeatedly applied to the Bank of England for a loan of 500 million gold marks, but was invariably refused .31
From mid-1922, the right-wing press launched a noisy campaign against Wirth and Mi-

20 Ibid., S. 2849.

21 Ibid., S. 2851.

22 VdR. Bd. 349. B. 1921, S. 3377.

23 Ibid., S. 3649.

24 Ibid., S. 3650.

25 Ibid., S. 3631.

26 Ibid., S. 3640.

27 Ibid., S. 3632.

28 Ibid., S. 3631.

29 VdR. Bd. 350. B. 1921, S. 4261.

30 Ibid., S. 4279.

31 VdR. Bd. 352. B. 1922, S. 5558.

page 195

Nistra of Foreign Affairs V. Rathenau, accusing them of a " mad "desire to pursue a" policy of fulfillment." On June 23, Gelferich's fierce attack on Rathenau followed in the Reichstag. As you know, with the murder of Rathenau, the "execution" streak ended. On January 13, 1923, Franco-Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr region under the pretext of non-payment of reparations by Germany, carrying out the course long taken by the Paris Cabinet to strengthen French hegemony in Europe. The verbatim records of the parliamentary debates contain the responses of various social strata to this act of French imperialism and to the announcement by the Cuno Government of a policy of "passive resistance". The Communist faction resolutely opposed the nationalist propaganda of bourgeois leaders. P. Froelich proclaimed the struggle against the conquerors from class positions, pointing out that the time had come to strike at his own bourgeoisie. 32
The recordings of the Reichstag debates are evidence of the inconsistency of the Social Democrats on the question of reparations. For example, Breitscheid, who was considered an expert on international issues, advocated a "policy of implementation" under Wirth. When Kuno proclaimed "passive resistance," he spoke of the complete convergence of the government and social-democratic points of view .33
Parliamentary debates allow us to recreate the picture of the treacherous policy of monopolists, who trumpeted "civil peace" in the fight against the invaders and at the same time signed agreements with the industrial magnates of France behind the backs of the people. Thus, on August 10, 1923, P. Froelich cited in his speech a number of documents that testified to the collusion of several German firms with French capitalists .34 Another KKE MP, W. Stecker, refuted the right-wing slanderous accusations of collaboration between German Communists and French generals and pointed out the danger of an economic agreement between Stinnes and French capital, which is preparing a joint offensive against the German working class .35
The Reichstag of the 2nd and 3rd convocations (1924-1928). The deterioration of the domestic political situation and the downturn in the economy forced France to agree to the convening of an international conference. In addition, the United States promised to provide France with a loan of $ 100 million, subject to the settlement of the issue of reparations. Since the West had provided loans to Germany, it was interested in its ability to pay. Thus, the reorientation of German reparative policy after the Dawes Plan was implemented made a significant difference in the Reichstag's discussion of reparative issues compared to 1920-1924. As you know, the "Dawes plan" was temporary in nature, since it did not set the final amount of debt. However, it stipulated that a significant part of debt obligations should be covered by indirect taxes.

According to the verbatim reports, the German right - wing circles took advantage of the popular hatred of reparations. While the press of the Entente countries portrayed the Dawes Plan as a step towards pacifying Europe, nationalists in the Reichstag (for example, O. Hergt) claimed that the Dawes Plan represented only the interests of Germany's enemies .36 The National Socialists, who demagogically demanded the" rupture "of the Versailles Peace and the" liberation "of the German people, were faked as" friends of the people. " 37
The Reichstag documents give a fairly complete picture of the methods of foreign policy of the Stresemann government, which considered the main task of removing the label "main culprit of war" from Germany as the legal basis for reparations .38 Deftly playing on the contradictions between Britain and France, on the bogeyman of the "revolutionary" danger, Stresemann at the same time actively promoted economic rapprochement between the magnates of German and French heavy industry. March 7th

32 VdR. Bd. 357. R. 1923. S. 9434.

33 VdR. Bd. 359. B. 1923, S. 10596.

34 VdR. Bd. 361. B. 1923, S. 11805.

35 VdR. Bd. 359, S. 10585.

36 VdR. Bd. 381. B. 1924, S. 799.

37 VdR. Bd. 388. B. 1926, S. 4688.

38 VdR. Bd. 381, S. 166.

page 196

In 1923, he delivered a speech in the Reichstag addressed to England: "Even at the height of his glory, Napoleon did not concentrate in his hands such a force as modern France... The Rhine and the Ruhr are perhaps only the first steps towards strengthening French hegemony. " 39 Stresemann was well aware of the importance for the United States and England of ensuring the safety of American and British capital in Germany, which, in turn, was directly related to the withdrawal of French troops from the Ruhr. Based on this, the Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic hoped for the speedy liberation of the occupied regions .40
The Reichstag debates, which reflected the class struggle for and against the Dawes Plan, are an important source for the history of Dawesization. The rulers of the republic, signing a financial agreement, simultaneously roused the masses against it. Chancellor V. Marx (Center) directly indicated the intention to improve the economy with the help of foreign loans, but at the expense of workers .41 Right-wing parties also agreed with the Dawes Plan, viewing it as a "lesser evil." 42 To the end, the Communists were consistent, who characterized the Dawes Plan as an attempt by foreign capital, with the help of a part of the German bourgeoisie, to turn the German workers into a cheap tool for their enrichment .43 E. Telman 44 gave a sharp rebuke to the predatory agreement in his speech on August 28, 1924 .

Preparations for the signing of the Locarno Accords, which began in January 1925, were accompanied by loud phrases about peace. The parliamentary materials of that time show that the German Government, by proposing the conclusion of the guarantee pact, thereby made it necessary for the allied Powers to take it into account. At a meeting of the Reichstag on May 18, 1925, when discussing the budget of the Foreign Ministry, Baron W. Reinbaben, emphasizing the success of Weimar diplomacy, said: "The most important thing about the German government's proposal is that Germany's initiative allowed it to join the negotiations. It is impossible to continue negotiations against Germany or by excluding Germany. " 45 Breitscheid, a foreign policy adviser to the SPD board, who carried out unofficial assignments for Stresemann in Brussels and Paris, expressed the same sentiment.: "The fact that a guarantee pact was signed with Germany averted the danger of a guarantee pact against Germany." 46
Reports of the Reichstag debates show that some Social Democrats were under unjustified illusions about the confluence of the Rapallo and Locarno lines. For example, Breitshade saw the security pact as a continuation of the policy of " mutual understanding and implementation." As a pacifist, he linked Germany's entry into the League of Nations with the refusal to revise the Versailles Treaty by force of arms , 47 but at the same time demanded an equalization of armaments between Germany and the victorious states .48 Unlike the Treaty of Versailles, the Locarno Agreements were concluded with Germany as an equal country. Chancellor H. Luther emphasized in the Reichstag that with the adoption of the treaty, "the ground disappears for a policy of demands and ultimatums." 49 He was pleased to point out that the liberation of the occupied regions is near 50. K. Fehrenbach solemnly proclaimed from the rostrum: "Locarno - the end of the era of sanctions and violence" 51 .

Parliamentary documents refute the untenable version of bourgeois historiography about the Locarno Agreements as a step towards European peace. On November 23, 1925, Luther assured the deputies that Germany would regain the right to self-determination.-

39 VdR. Bd. 358. V. 1923, S. 9977.

40 VdR, Bd. 381, S. 780.

41 Ibid., S. 771 - 773.

42 Ibid., S. 835.

43 Ibid., S. 891.

44 Ibid., S. 1025 - 1027.

45 VdR. Bd. 385. B. 1925, S. 1917.

46 VdR. Bd. 387. B. 1925, S. 4623.

47 Ibid., S. 3393.

48 VdR. Bd. 385, S. 1892.

49 VdR. Bd. 388, B. 1926, S. 4476.

50 Ibid., S. 4476.

51 Ibid., S. 4507.

page 197

lonial possessions 52 . In Locarno, draft security agreements were also drawn up between France, Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, Luther did not fail to point out that these treaties are not part of the Locarno system .53 At the same time, O. Chamberlain, through his ambassador, advised Stresemann to talk less about the eastern borders in order to obscure Locarno's true goals.

The transcripts of the debates reveal to some extent the circumstances that made it possible for Germany to revise the reparations decisions. First, its ruling circles did not stop intimidating France with the possibility of Anglo-German cooperation. For example, A. Zapf (People's Party) said: "There is a definite turn in European politics. It is not a utopia at all, but a real possibility that one day the English fleet may join the struggle for the freedom of the German Rhine."54 The prospect of an Anglo-German rapprochement forced France to agree to Germany's admission to the League of Nations. The representative of the People's Party, E. Scholz, stressed in this regard that joining the League of Nations automatically eliminates the question of Germany's guilt in unleashing the war and casts doubt on the legal basis of reparations. 55 Thus, Germany's entry into the League of Nations legitimized all previous violations of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Reichstag of the 4th and 5th convocations (1928-1932). The work of the Weimar Parliament during this period took place in the context of the emerging trend towards the final elimination of reparations payments and the restoration of Germany to its former borders. Already on January 30, 1928, Stresemann demanded in the Reichstag the complete evacuation of the Rhineland. His position on the revision of the Dawes Plan was formulated in a memorandum of November 23, 1928, as follows: "Germany considers that the final settlement of the reparations question is possible only if Germany is able to make the payment from its own economic resources and without the threat of a decline in the standard of living of the German people."56 . At a conference of experts convened on February 11, 1929, at the request of Germany, under the chairmanship of the American banker O. Jung, Reichsbank President Ya. In an ultimatum, Schacht raised the issue of reducing reparations payments.

As is clear from the Reichstag transcripts, bourgeois politicians embellished the anti-popular "Jung Plan" adopted in August 1929 at The Hague conference on the final settlement of reparations. The adoption of the " Jung Plan "was not conceived by them without the simultaneous cleansing of the Rhineland by the Allied forces. 57 In contrast to the "Dawes Plan", the "Jung plan" set the final amount of reparations - 113.9 billion. stamps. However, he abolished deductions from the profits of industry, shifting the entire burden of payments to the workers. In this case, both the Communists and the Social Democrats were right when they agreed that the new treaty would further strengthen the oppression of the masses .58 A noisy demagogic campaign against the "Jung plan" was launched by the National Socialists. In particular, V. Reventlov urged not to link the adoption of the " Jung plan "with the cleansing of the Rhineland, since the fulfillment of reparative obligations will not be easier because the Rhine will again become a German state. 59 The Nazi F. Stehr intimidated that the implementation of the "Young plan" would lead to a reduction in the social security fund 60 .

The speeches of the Communist deputies showed the people the true goals of the new reparative plan. "Jung's advertised plan," said F. Haeckert, "is undoubtedly an exploitative plan, since it is quite clear that it is just as impossible to implement as Dawes' plan."61 . The Communists revealed the driving motives

52 Ibid., S. 4479.

53 Ibid., S. 4481.

54 Ibid., S. 4629.

55 Ibid., S. 4509.

56 "The Young Plan and The Hague Conference of 1929-1930", p. 3.

57 VdR. Bd. 425. V. 1929, S. 2854.

58 Ibid., S. 2818, 2830.

59 Ibid., S. 2861.

60 VdR. Bd. 426. B. 1930, S. 3177.

61 Ibid., S. 3306.

page 198

the Nazi demagogic campaign. Thus, Stecker noted that the shadowy opposition of the extreme right was due to the fact that a simple majority in the Reichstag was sufficient for the adoption of the "Jung plan", and not 2/3 of the votes 62 . The Communist Party described the Nazi plebiscite against the "Jung plan "as a deception of the people: reactionary circles helped to adopt the" Dawes plan "and enriched themselves, and now they want to play the role of liberators of the people . 63 E. Thelmann showed what consequences the" Jung plan " will have for workers and peasants. It will not bring relief, but it will help to increase the profits of capitalists. From the pocket of the same workers, a debt of 17 billion rubles will be paid. stamps on the Dawes Plan. If the "Jung plan" will really bring relief, as bourgeois speakers claim, then why is the bourgeoisie making the strongest attack on the standard of living of the working people just now? E. Telman drew the attention of deputies to the fact that in recent weeks it is planned to introduce new taxes in the amount of 400 million marks. In addition, he continued, the government is developing a scheme for additional taxes in the amount of 900 million marks. The adoption of the "Young Plan" will increase the already huge unemployment rate .64
The future proved the foresight of the Communist Party leader. The Jung Plan was not a panacea for all ills. According to Y. Kuchinsky, the provision of agricultural products to the population in 1932 was only 1/4 of the level of 191365 . Foreign Minister J. Curtius, speaking on February 11, 1930, with a report on the results of the Hague Conference, recognized that the Germans would have to bear too much financial burden for the liberation of the Rhineland .66 The Social Democrats, on the other hand, interpreted the "Jung plan" only as a means of putting the shaky budget in order, 67 and did not want to admit that its adoption was a stage of enslaving the German working class.

The Reichstag of the 6th and 7th convocations (July-November 1932). With the transformation of the Nazi faction in the Reichstag into the strongest parliamentary activity, they were systematically obstructed. Sabotage of reparations has increased. The Hoover moratorium suspended the payment of contributions, and when the fascists came to power, it actually stopped. Due to the short duration of the Reichstag of the 6th and 7th convocations and the obstruction by the Nazis, the value of parliamentary reports as sources for studying the reparative policy of the Weimar Republic sharply decreases.

62 Ibid., S. 4014.

63 Ibid., S. 3349.

64 Ibid., S. 3931 - 3936.

65 J. Kuczynski. Darstellung der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1917/18 bis 1932/33. B. 1966, S. 17.

66 VdR. Bd. 426, S. 3903.

67 Ibid., S. 3912.

page 198

Permanent link to this publication: