In the autumn of 1916, the world press was literally flooded with reports of separate negotiations being conducted or being conducted between Russia and Germany. These reports appeared in connection with a secret meeting between a friend of the Chairman of the State Duma A.D. Protopopov and a banker F. Warburg. It is not difficult to see their abundance from the headlines of a Swiss newspaper alone for October 1916: 1 " German-Russian peace negotiations?", "Preparations for a separate peace", "Rumors of peace"," Towards a separate peace " .2 The propaganda organs of tsarist Russia issued refutations; the help of some foreign authors was also used for this purpose.

This is what a private professor at the University of Bern claimed, for example, in the autumn of 1916: "A few months ago, rumors spread that the vice-president of the State Duma, a member of the Russian parliamentary delegation sent to the countries allied with Russia, was negotiating a separate peace with Germany during his stay in Stockholm... In reality, the situation was as follows: Protopopov was invited to a Swedish family, where he met a German. When the latter began to talk about war and peace, Protopopov left the house. " 3 This refutation did not correspond to reality, as, indeed, the refuted publications themselves. The latter were also far from disinterested. The German and pro-German press exaggerated them, pushing Russia to conclude a separate peace.

The organs of the British imperialists (and those who interacted with them) also fanned the news of separate negotiations, hoping thereby to put Russia in a humiliated position in the post-war redistribution of the world in advance, and in the meantime to demand from it, as proof of loyalty, additional efforts to wage war. Amid the noise of newspaper reports about a separate Russo-German conspiracy, the British and French bosses managed to hold a secret Anglo - French-Russian conference in November 1916, which was profitable for them, at the Chantilly Castle near Paris. There, without agreeing to provide Russia with the necessary loans and supplies, the Western allies nevertheless imposed on it the decision to assign the already exhausted Eastern Front the main role in combat operations in the winter and spring of 1917.

At that time, some Russian figures were also willing to inflate reports about the collusion of tsarist diplomacy with the Kaiser's. One of the cadet leaders, P. P. Milyukov, speaking in the Duma on November 14, 1916, rhetorically asked: "Stupidity or treason?", before calling on a narrow meeting of his associates to support in every possible way any rumors about treacherous relations between the tsarist representatives and the external enemy .4
V. I. Lenin was in Swiss exile during this period. Given the dialectic of unfolding events, he paid considerable attention to

1 Dates are shown in the new style.

2 Berner Tagwacht, 9 - 21.X.1916.

3 Lifschitz F. Separatfrieden zwischen Russland und Deutschland? Bern. 1916, S. 8 - 9.

4 Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR [History of the Civil War in the USSR], vol. 1, Moscow, 1938, pp. 47-48; Krasny Archiv, 1933, vol. 1 (56), pp. 100-113.

page 80

the question of the possibility of a German-Russian separate peace. He devoted a number of articles to the problem of a separate world. In one of them, "On a Separate Peace," referring to newspaper reports about alleged negotiations between Russia and Germany and noting that "deception is possible," because these reports "cannot be verified on the merits of the matter," 5 Lenin analyzed the grounds for such a turn of events and came to an affirmative answer. Having stated that " in any case, the imperialist war cannot end in anything other than an imperialist peace, if this war does not turn into a civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for socialism," 6 Lenin pointed out clear signs of the search for such a peace in the ruling circles of Germany and Russia .7
Lenin began his article " Bourgeois pacifism and Socialist pacifism "with the section"The Turn in World Politics." "There are signs," he wrote, " that such a turn has come or is coming. Precisely: this is the turn from an imperialist war to an imperialist peace. " 8 Analyzing the possibility of Nicholas II and Wilhelm II concluding a secret agreement on a separate peace, Lenin noted: "Whether this assumption is true or not cannot be decided." But the fact that "negotiations on a separate peace between Germany and Russia were recently conducted,.. there can be no doubt about it. " 9 In his article "The Turn in World Politics" (January 31, 1917), Lenin again drew attention to the turn towards the imperialist world that had taken place. He wrote: "The fact of the turn to peace is important, the basic character of this world is important, and these two circumstances have already been sufficiently clarified by the previous development of events." 10
Thus, Lenin did not set out at that time to resolve the question of whether the reports about the official mutually binding Russo-German separate negotiations and their successful conclusion, which were being heavily inflated by the press, corresponded to reality. He solved a broader and more important task in writing these articles, exposing the predatory, imperialist nature of the war on the part of all the world Powers involved in it. Despite the hype of bourgeois propaganda, Lenin regarded the separate agreement between Russia and Germany not as a fait accompli, but as a real danger to the real cause of peace between peoples. Studying his works from the time of the First World War, it is not difficult to see that they exposed the imperialist nature of a separate peace not only of tsarism, but also of the Provisional Government : 11 in either case, the conclusion of such a peace would have poured water on the mill of imperialism.

As for the immediate question of tsarist Russia and Kaiser's Germany, we should recall Lenin's words about the class background of the problem of a separate peace between them: at that time, some people presented "the case as if the reactionaries in Russia wanted peace with Germany in general, and the 'progressive bourgeoisie' wanted the destruction of 'Prussian militarism' and friendship with the Soviet Union." "democratic" England. Lenin called it "a children's fairy tale adapted to the level of political infants." 12 Referring to the potentially conceivable variants of the imperialist policy of tsarism, Lenin spoke of the conclusion of a separate peace as the most tempting way out of this situation from the point of view of not only tsarism, but also Russian imperialism in general: "This is precisely how tsarism argues, and, we repeat, it argues correctly not only from a narrowly monarchical point of view, but also from a general imperialist point of view." 13 Hence, we should not draw a sharp line between the lines of tsarism and the liberal bourgeoisie in the question of a separate peace. At the same time, Lenin's instructions provide a key to understanding the ambivalent and indecisive position of Tsarism on this question: the latter was able to clearly understand both the urgent need for an early exit from the war and the need for an early exit from it.

5 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 30, p. 184.

6 Ibid., p. 191.

7 Ibid., p. 188-

8 Ibid., p. 241.

9 Ibid., pp. 243, 242.

10 Ibid., p. 340.

11 See ibid., vol. 32, p. 46, 49, 52, 97, 269, 282, 283.

12 Ibid., vol. 30, p. 188.

13 Ibid., p. 190.

page 81

the practical improbability of avoiding the catastrophe of the existing social order if a separate peace is hastily concluded. This left a specific imprint on the conduct of separate contacts.

With the outbreak of the war, all ties between the ruling circles of Russia and Germany were by no means interrupted, especially since they were of a diverse nature. Lenin emphasized "how great is the mystery in which war is born." 14 The origin of the imperialist world is no less a mystery. The secret attempts of Germany and Russia to establish separate contacts can be traced almost from the very beginning of the First World War. These attempts were multi-layered, went through various channels, reflected the game of often conflicting interests. However, they are similar in one thing: the much more active role of Kaiser's Germany and the semi-passive position of tsarist Russia.

After the publication in France in 1962-1966 of more than 1,000 captured German documents from the Kaiser's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 it became possible to conduct a chronological comparison of German and Russian internal documents on this issue. On November 11, 1914, German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs G. von Jagow addressed F. Pourtales, who served as German Ambassador to St. Petersburg from 1907 to 1914, with a request regarding the possibilities of informing about the mood of the royal court and introducing discord into it. 16 On November 17, Pourtales reported that " the queen mother "(Maria Feodorovna She continues to keep in touch with her relatives in Denmark (she was an aunt of King Christian X of Denmark). It should be used to incite discord between the tsar's uncle Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich and Nicholas II 17 . Nikolai Nikolaevich, the supreme commander of the tsarist army, was considered by the Germans to be a staunch Francophile and a supporter of the war with Germany until its complete defeat; 18 the Tsarina-mother, being opposed to such a war, however, did not trust the Germans very much.

On November 19, German Chancellor T. Bethmann-Hollweg informed Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs A. Zimmermann that the chief of the German General Staff E. Falkenhayn raised the question of the need to conclude a separate peace with Russia, taking advantage of the situation that had developed at the front favorable for Germany; without a separate peace with Russia, Falkenhayn warned, the final victory in the war with the combined forces of the Entente are unattainable. Somewhat later, Falkenhayn warned against unduly weakening Tsarism by imposing unacceptably harsh peace conditions on it, and was disappointed to learn of the tsar's negative response to the German probe through the Danish king. Regarding the search for the object of a separate peace, Zimmerman held a slightly different opinion than Falkenhayn, believing that it would be more correct to pursue a separate peace with France. 19
On November 21, A. Ballin, a major German shipowner and director of the Hamburg - America steamship company, wrote to the Kaiser that the Danish king would not mind playing the role of intermediary in possible negotiations between William II and two other cousins of Christian X - the Russian tsar and the English king .20 Ballin received the information from H.-N. Andersen, a Danish businessman, director of an East Asian company, and a friend of Christian X. Andersen's trip to Petrograd, where Ballin had encouraged him to go to find out the situation, was delayed, since Christian X was not thinking of a separate peace, but of a general pacification .21
Meanwhile, another line of search for a separate peace with Russia is being revealed. Almost simultaneously, Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagov took steps to establish the Holy Spirit.-

14 Ibid., vol. 45, p. 318.

15 L'Allemagne et les problernes de la paix pendant la premiere guerre mondiale. Documents extraits des archives de I'Office allemand des Affaires etrangeres (далее - APP). Vol. 1 (VIII.1914 - 31.I.1917). P. 1962; vol. 2(1.II.1917 - 7.XI.1917). P. 1966.

16 Ibid., vol. 1, doc. 10, p. 10.

17 Ibid., doc. 12, p. 14.

18 Ibid., doc 411, p. 604.

19 Ibid., doc. 13, pp. 15 - 19; doc. 17, pp. 26 - 29.

20 Ibid., doc. 14, p. 20.

21 Ibid., doc. 21, pp. 31 - 34.

page 82

zey with Sergey Witte, former Finance Minister and then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia. During the period described, Witte was in disgrace, but he did not lose either his influence or his hopes of returning to power. Witte enjoyed a reputation as an opponent of the war: in the autumn of 1914, in connection with the death of his son in the war, he led the book. Konstantin Konstantinovich Witte sent him a letter containing an unequivocal proposal to end the war with Germany 22. On December 24, Yagov turned to the largest German banker R. Mendelssohn with a request whether he could restore his ties with Witte.

The next day, Bethmann-Hollweg sent a similar request to Ballin. Noting that Witte's influence in Petrograd was growing through Stockholm, Bethmann-Hollweg asked Ballin if, without compromising the German government and speaking only on his own behalf, he could "send Witte an inconspicuous sprig of peace?" 23. On December 28, Ballin reported that Witte was the most convenient contact for I. S. Melnik, a literary editor and translator whom Witte trusts as a personal friend 24 . Melnik had been receiving secret German subsidies for several years and was used to get information from Russia and handle the Scandinavian press. Less than three days later, Mendelssohn forwarded his letter to Witte through A. Taube, the Swedish envoy in Berlin, after presenting the draft to Yagov. In it, Mendelssohn pointed out that Witte can be calm about the fate of his deposit, stored in the Mendelssohn bank: once there is peace, "and I know that your way of thinking is similar to mine," Witte can use it as he sees fit.

On February 16, 1915, Mendelssohn informed the Jag that Witte was requesting that this deposit be transferred in his wife's name to a bank in Copenhagen or Stockholm. Yagov advises agreeing to transfer money to a neutral country, but in the name of some dummy person, and not Witte's wife. However, he insists on his translation option, apparently realizing that they want to turn him into an ordinary German agent. Regarding the end of the war, Witte expressed an opinion indicating that he was sympathetic to a separate peace, but interpreted it broadly: "The war was prepared in advance by your most evil overseas enemies... there should be a frank exchange of views between the two emperors, with proposals that would ensure the satisfaction and full guarantees of Russia and France ... but it is unacceptable to prolong the war, we must act quickly and energetically... family ties could help start negotiations. " 25
These are the main points of the Witte message, which is a document of "parallel" diplomacy .26 Witte's death put an end to Germany's attempts to use him for the purposes of a separate peace. However, contacts between representatives of German financial capital were continued in conversations between the largest industrialist G. Stinnes and the official of special assignments of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation I. I. Kolyshko.

On January 6, 1915, Christian X sent a letter to Nicholas II, which contained a proposal to send Andersen to Petrograd on January 27 . On January 23, Ballin, with the words

22 Ganelin R. S. Supporters of a separate peace with Germany in Tsarist Russia. In: Problemy istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy [Problems of the History of International Relations], L. 1972, p. 131.

23 APP. Vol. I, doc. 26, p. 38; doc. 25, p. 37.

24 With the mediation of Melnik, Witte published various works in Berlin directed against his political opponents (Ananyich B. V., Ganelin R. S. Experience in criticizing the memoirs of S. Yu. Witte. In: Voprosy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniya istorii SSSR [Issues of Historiography and Source Studies of the History of the USSR].

25 APP. Vol. I, doc. 2b, p. 39; doc. 47, p. 64.

26 This term is commonly used to refer to methods of private, group, usually non-documentary evidence-based informal diplomacy, through which interested circles probe directions that sometimes differ from the direction of official diplomacy. In tsarist Russia, not only the selfish interests of the Camarilles and the ambitions of certain ambitious individuals served as a breeding ground for such behind-the-scenes activities, but also the fact that there were significant groups among the Russian bourgeoisie and landlords who were objectively predisposed to collusion with Germany. For the origin of the term, see, in particular, "L'huinanite", 3. XI. 1963, p. 9.

27 APP. Vol. 1, doc. 34, p. 46.

page 83

Andersen informed Bethmann-Hollweg that the tsar had not yet responded to the King of Denmark. The Queen Mother informed Christian X that Nicholas II was hesitating, doubting the appropriateness of the answer. The Danish king is convinced that the tsar has informed the British about his letter and wants to know their reaction. Fearing to be suspected of promoting a separate peace between Germany and Russia, Christian X sent Andersen to England to investigate the situation. From letters from the Queen of England, and in particular from the Dowager Queen Alexandra of England, the Danish King's aunt, the latter was aware of her peaceful sentiments, and also that the English Secretary of State, E. Gray ,and the British Prime Minister, H. G. Asquith, were "eagerly interested in possible forms of peaceful rapprochement." 28
On February 1, 1915, the German envoy to Denmark, W. Brockdorf - Rantzau, reported to Berlin about a conversation with the Danish Foreign Minister, E. Schulz. Scavenius (Scavenius ' brother is a Danish envoy in Petrograd), who informed him of Nicholas II's response to Christian X. This letter is written in warm colors, but it mentions that one should strive not just for peace, but for lasting peace. The tsar agreed to receive Andersen at the end of February. Yagov makes the following comment to Brockdorf-Rantzau's report: "Obviously, Petrograd does not really need peace, perhaps counting on Italy and Rumania." 29 On April 9, Bethmann-Hollweg states that nothing positive has yet come of Andersen's efforts, who visited Petrograd and had a meeting with the tsar there. 30 31 . On the same day, Yagov considered the possibility of using the lady-in-waiting of the Russian Tsarina M. A. Vasilchikova, who was delayed in the family estate near Vienna due to the war, for contacts with the royal family. Its activities in the interests of a separate peace were directed by two persons. One of them, Prince V. Isenburg-Berlin of the management of the Benz automobile plants, thanks to his connections in the Grand Duchy of Hesse, where the Russian Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna was born, met both the tsarina and the tsar before the war. 32
Vasilchikova's letters to the tsar and tsarina are well known 33 . In covering Yagov, the main content of her messages were spells to make peace with Germany, since the victory of the latter is not in doubt and also promises Russia more favorable conditions than the victory of England. The responses from Petrograd consisted of expressions of gratitude for the letters hinting that the tsar was not inclined to break with the allies at present, although this was possible in the future. Vasilchikova through V. Isenburg advised Yagov that a letter to the queen should also be written by the latter's brother, Ernst-Ludwig of Hesse. The sending of such a letter was previously agreed upon by Jagov with Wilhelm II and carried out in April 1915 through Princess Margaret, daughter of Duke Karl (brother of King Gustavus V of Sweden) and Princess Ingeborg of Denmark. At the same time, Wilhelm II instructed Grand Duchess Louise of Baden to send the same letters to the royal house. The responses from Petrograd were sympathetic but evasive .34
On December 18, the "Daily Record" of the Russian Foreign Ministry mentioned Vasilchikova's arrival home via Sweden. On the same day, she was received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs S. D. Sazonov. She handed the Minister "a note drawn up on the basis of a conversation with the Grand Duke of Hesse, with whom she was staying for some time in Darmstadt, and from whom she brought two handwritten letters for the Sovereign Emperor and for the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. The first of these letters was not sealed, and on the instructions of the Grand Duke Maria Alexandrovna read it to the Minister"; "the commission of the last (Grand Duke. - I. D. ) was all the same, namely, to persuade the sovereign to make peace with Germany"; on December 31, the "Daily Entry" notes: "Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation".

28 Ibid., doc. 39, p. 54.

29 Ibid., doc. 43, pp. 59 - 60.

30 TsGAOR USSR, f. 601, op. 1, d. 602, ll. 7-9.

31 APP. Vol. 1, doc. 74, p. 93.

32 Ibid., doc. 75, p. 94.

33 Testes V. P. Romanov Policy on the eve of the revolution. (From the Entente to Germany). M.-L. 1926, pp. 11-19, 222-224.

34 APP. Vol. 1, doc. 75, pp. 94, 95.

page 84

Khvostov reported that, according to the instructions he had received, he had ordered the deportation of M. A. Vasilchikova to the Chernihiv province with the obligation to stay there on the estate of her sister Miloradovich." 35 So, the sounding of a separate peace through Vasilchikova was not crowned with success.

In the same months, Berlin tried to organize a probe with the help of other performers. 36 On June 3, 1915, Brockdorf-Rantzau informed Berlin from Denmark that Christian X had received a message from Nicholas P. It contained the following phrase:" My answer can only be negative "(it was about sending a trusted person to Copenhagen by the tsar for a" chance " meeting with the German envoy to Denmark). Brockdorf-Rantzau persuaded Skavenius, "of whose unconditional loyalty," Oya emphasized," I am now sure, " to persuade Andersen not to try to use hidden threats of Russian secession in England: in the context of the tsar's negative reaction to the sounding of a separate peace, such a method could be dangerous for Germany, and for Denmark as well also, because if a genuine agreement between England and Russia is consolidated, the English fleet may try to break into the Baltic Sea "with fatal consequences for Denmark." 37
On June 28, Brockdorf-Rantzau reported that two days earlier he had urged Andersen not to delay another trip to Petrograd. He said that he had had another conversation with Christian X. Prince Valdemar came in during the conversation. The king asked him to send a telegram to the Queen mother. On June 28, a reply was received from her: "Niki will be back in two weeks, happy to see our old friend Andersen anytime. I'm sending you an email. Minnie." On July 7, Andersen learned from Valdemar the contents of a letter sent by the Tsarina-mother: Maria Feodorovna was personally in favor of peace, adding :" but we can only conclude peace in agreement with our allies. " 38 During Andersen's stay in Russia (July 11 - 28), he had meetings with the Tsarina-mother, the tsar and Sazonov. Andersen did not find the tsar inclined to a separate peace.

On July 28, Bethmann-Hollweg reported to Falkenhayn: "For several months I have been probing Rossdue about a separate peace, but all the time I come across a negative answer." 39 On August 9, the German Minister of Naval Affairs, A. Tirpip, informed Bethmann-Hollweg that since the Anglo-Saxons were finally determined to fight Germany, it was necessary at all costs to take a course for an alliance with Russia and Japan. On the same day, Ballin reported on a conversation with Andersen, who reported on his July stay in Petrograd. When Andersen told the king that Christian X would probably have to stop trying to achieve peace, the king protested and expressed the wish that the Danish king would continue his efforts. Andersen, who had recently met Wilhelm II, conveyed a number of compliments from the Kaiser to the tsar. Nicholas II responded with similar compliments to William II. At the same time, he explained in detail the reasons for the breakdown of the meeting between him and Wilhelm that almost took place just before the war began: the German side presented an ultimatum with an excessively short time limit, only 12 hours, while the tsar was going to go by yacht to one of the German ports under the pretext of meeting his mother, who was returning from England, with the intention of seeing the Kaiser.

Andersen got the impression that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich had managed to promote a number of military men, supporters of his own line, to the tsar's entourage, and the tsar did not have enough strong-willed qualities to turn the wheel sharply. In an effort to show Andersen the complexity of the situation, the queen mother warned him that at the royal dinner to which Andersen was invited, she was going to start a conversation about peace: Andersen will see for himself what difficulties the tsar has to face. "During lunch, the old lady suddenly said: "When will we finally make peace?

35 Red Archive, 1928, vol. 6 (31), pp. 47-50.

36 Shatsillo K. F. To attempts of separate negotiations during the First World War (March-May 1915). - Voprosy istorii, 1970, N 9; Jackh E. Der Goldene Pflug. Lebenserte eines Weltburgers. Stuttgart. 1954, S. 302 - 310.

37 APP. Vol. 1, doc. 96, p. 116.

38 Ibid., doc. 112, p. 138.

39 Ibid., doc. 119, p. 146.

page 85

It's about time!" To this one of the Russian generals, with the general approval of his colleagues, replied that there would be peace only when Germany was defeated. The statement was made in such an energetic tone that there was no discussion of peace. " 40
On August 20, 1915, the "Daily Record" notes the arrival from Sweden with a "warm letter of recommendation from Neklyudov, the ambassador to Sweden", of the "Swedish banker Kulberger" 41, who asked M. F. Schilling, the head of the Chancellery of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if he knew that certain offers had been made to Neklyudov through bank officials about the world. "Baron Schilling replied that there could be no separate peace between Russia and Germany... In addition, Baron Schilling said that it was not a question of who should play the role of intermediary in the negotiations , whether it was a bank official, a diplomat, or any private person, but only that such an intermediary should have the proper authority on the part of the German government and also apply to the government representative of the Allies. Otherwise, there will only be empty conversations between irresponsible people, and not serious negotiations. " 42 The mission of the Swedish banker was not reflected in the German trophy documents; obviously, it should be attributed to the manifestations of private initiative.

On September 5, 1915, the tsar moved Nikolai Nikolaevich to the Caucasus and took the post of supreme commander-in-chief himself (on the Caucasian Front, Nikolai Nikolaevich tried to start negotiations for a separate peace with Turkey, but Enver Pasha informed the Germans about this, and the attempt to dislodge the weak link from the German coalition failed) .43 The move was then seen by many in Russia as a clear shift towards a separate peace with Germany .44 In fact, this did not happen. Moreover, the dynastic probing subsided, with Prince Valdemar reproaching the queen Mother, and Christians X-Nicholas II for disclosing information about Andersen's mission. The Tsarina-mother telegraphed to Copenhagen that there was no disclosure on her part, nor on the part of the tsar or Sazonov .45 In any case, the mutual trust between the people involved in the probe was undermined, especially since Andersen went to London after Petrograd.

On February 20, 1916, Yagov stated with regret that there was no sounding from the Russian side through K. Wallenberg, the Swedish foreign minister, and his brother did not follow. From the "Daily Record" it is clear that the financier M. Wallenberg repeatedly came to Petrograd and talked with the tsar on February 4 .46
In the spring of 1916, G. Stinnes actively joined the search for ways to achieve a separate peace with Russia. He told Bethmann-Hollweg about the preliminary steps he had taken to reach an agreement with Japan through negotiations between his son Stinnes and the Japanese consul and then the Japanese envoy in Stockholm from April 1. 47 On April 26, Jagov instructed the German envoy to Sweden, H. Lucius von Stedten, to agree to the cession of Tsingtao to Japan if it would help to persuade Russia to the world. On April 6, von Stedten reported on Stinnes ' upcoming meeting with the Japanese representative and asked whether the Pacific Islands should also be ceded (Stinnes objected, since there were rich phosphate deposits there). In the future, Stinnes ' independence went so far that Yagov was forced to advocate his removal from resolving such issues, because he was too concerned about the interests of his industry, demanding, in particular, a direct alliance with Russia instead of neutralizing it, which was more beneficial for Germany's diplomatic game at this stage. Soon Stinnes sharply opposed the machinations of a rival group of German industrialists led by A. Thiess-

40 Ibid., doc. 127, p. 155.

41 Red Archive, 1928, vol. 6 (31), p. 29.

42 Ibid.

43 APP. Vol. 1, doc. 306, pp. 433 - 434.

44 Red Archive, 1928, vol. 2 (27), p. 53.

45 APP. Vol. I, doc. 136, p. 167.

46 Red Archive, 1929, vol. 1 (32), pp. 5-6.

47 APP. Vol. I, doc. 228, p. 308.

page 86

companies that sought collusion with France through the purchase of the Brie iron ore basin and a number of other combinations 48 .

From the "Daily Record" it becomes clear that the Japanese informed Sazonov on May 6 about their negotiations with the Germans, although they did not mention the name of Stinnes 49 . On July 3, 1916, the "Daily Record" notes the signing of the Russo-Japanese treaty, and according to German captured documents, further sounding along the Japanese line is not traced. The Japanese representative in Sweden seems to have dropped a bit of the truth when he told Stinnes that Japan is interested in exhausting all the belligerent powers so that by the end of the war it will be part of a victorious coalition without having spent its own forces on victory .50
The repeated stay of Stipnes and his son in Sweden was also used by them for negotiations with the businessman and publicist Kolyshko. In the "Daily record" there is no information about these contacts. Obviously, they were established without informing the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (then headed by Sazonov). German documents describe this in detail. After Witte's death, the establishment of relations between representatives of German and Russian finance capital continued with the same persistence. Some of Russia's banking leaders were also arrested by the Russian authorities ("Such a promising figure as Rubinstein is interned in Petrograd," Bethmann - Hollweg reported to Wilhelm II). Kolyshko was not an accidental figure in the Ministry of Finance, nor was its head, P. L. Bark. Both of them are Witte's nominees. Kolyshko was clearly inclined to search for original ways to solve major state issues. Thus, in a memo to a Special Defense Conference, he proposed to buy up all the iron ore in Sweden, thereby depriving the German metallurgy of military raw materials .52
In Stockholm, Kolyshko spoke with his son Stinnes almost daily from May 13 to June 9 .53 Before leaving, Kolyshko had a three-hour conversation with B. V. Sturmer, who was appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia in early 1916, in the latter's private apartment No. 54 . According to Kolyshko, he told Sturmer that during his business trips to Stockholm, he met several Germans who were inclined to start a conversation about relations between Germany and Russia. Sturmer asked for closer contact with them and was not averse to learning about German peace conditions .55 The question of them caused sharp disagreements and friction in high German circles up to and including the Kaiser and the new chief of the German General Staff. 56 P. Hindenburg, unlike Falkenhayn, took a sharply anti-Russian position and disavowed the relatively moderate conditions worked out by the head of the Center Party in the Reichstag, M. Erzberger. But Kolyshko's negotiations as an unofficial representative of certain circles of the Russian bourgeoisie did not stop with the fall of the autocracy and can be traced from German captured documents up to May 1917, i.e., before his arrest in Russia.

From October 1916, the German side tried to establish contact with Milyukov, and from March 1917 - with A. F. Kerensky, 57 but did not achieve concrete results.

In the summer of 1916, a new round of Russian-German separate contacts took place - the unofficial diplomatic activity of A.D. Protopopov, more specifically, his conversation with Warburg in Stockholm. Protopopov, as a fellow chairman of the State Duma, was the head of the Russian "parliamentary" delegation,

48 Ibid., doc. 232, pp. 313 - 314; doc. 412, pp. 605 - 606.

49 Red Archive, 1929, vol. 1 (32), p. 35.

50 APP. Vol. I, doc. 244, pp. 327 - 329.

51 Ibid., doc. 306, p. 435.

52 TSGVIA USSR, f. 369, op. 1, d. 97, ll. 1-20.

53 APP. Vol. I, doc. 272, pp. 370 - 373.

54 The Fall of the Tsarist Regime, vol. 5, Moscow, 1925, p. 189.

55 APP Vol. 1, doc. 272, pp. 370 - 373.

56 Ibid., Vol. 2, doc. 92, p. 155.

57 Dyakin V. S. Russian Bourgeoisie and Tsarism during the Dog World War (1914-1917). l.1967, p. 283; APP. Vol. I, doc. 350, 377, 383, 384; vol. 2, doc. 16, 31, 32, 36, 50, 57, 85.

page 87

which left for the West on April 29, 1916 "at the invitation of the allied governments". According to Milyukov, the work of the delegation was conducted in an atmosphere of mutual trust and sincere mutual assistance among its members .58 However, the idyllic picture painted in Milyukov's public speech was far from reality. While maintaining an external decorum of unity, the members of the delegation essentially pursued opposite goals. One of them, R. R. Rosen, made such explicit Germanophile statements that the Russian Ambassador to France, A. P. Izvolsky, " informed him that his visit to France was undesirable. Rosen did not go further than England. " 59 Protopopov consistently represented the Pronikolaevsky line (later Protopopov said that "he doesn't have a program until he visits Stavka" 60).

In the course of conversations with representatives of the British ruling circles, he understood their desire to have a government in Russia with a more pronounced influence of the pro-Entente groups of the bourgeoisie. When Protopopov, faced with the unwillingness of the British government to provide financial support to Tsarism, asked E. Gray: "Has Russia lost its credit?", he was answered: "Russia and the Russian people have unlimited credit, and the Russian government has lost its credit." 61 From this it was possible to draw a conclusion about the need for the Russian side to show increased loyalty to the Entente. This is exactly how Milyukov interpreted the current situation, when he publicly stated at a meeting of the Duma's naval commission in July 1916: "Davshi... credit, I have to justify it " 62 .

Protopopov, obviously, made a different conclusion: is it possible to specify specifically on what conditions it is possible for Russia to conclude a separate peace with Germany, from which repeated probes were made in this regard? Clearly adhering to this conclusion, Protopopov cautiously probed the mood of other members of the delegation on this crucial issue of foreign policy at that time. During the delegation's stay in Paris, he came at one o'clock in the morning to A. I. Shingarev's hotel room and found out his political moods in private, under the guise of discussing the project of creating a new "non-partisan" newspaper, where such various figures as Milyukov, Shingarev, M. O. Menshikov, and others could work together under Protopopov's leadership. V. G. Korolenko, A.M. Gorky, A.V. Amfiteatrov et al. 63 . Shingarev categorically denied such a possibility, and from that moment Protopopov apparently decided to act at his own peril and risk only with the support of a member of the State Council, gr. D. A. Olsufyev, who was also inclined to conclude a separate peace.

On June 30, 1915, Zimmermann ordered von Stedten to assist M. Warburg, who was traveling to Stockholm on a secret mission, performing along the way some tasks of currency and export-import order 64 . Warburg was the head of the Hamburg banking house, which had close ties to Russian banks before the war (his brother F. Warburg was the head of the Hamburg banking house). Warburg later met Protopopov). As the Russian envoy to Sweden informed Sazonov on August 28, 1915, M. Warburg

58 Red Archive, 1932, vol. 5-6 (54-55), p. 14; 1933. vol. 3 (58), p. 5. As it appears from archival documents, with Protopopov's knowledge, Kolyshko wanted to join the delegation as a columnist, but on the eve of his departure he was refused, having encountered opposition from Milyukov and A. Kolesnikov. I. Shingareva (TsGALI SSSR, f. 389, on. 1, 45, l. 275). The fact of Protopopov's acquaintance with Kolyshko was disputed by the White emigrant historian Melgunov, who claimed that "Protopopov never mentioned Kolyshko's name" (Melgunov S. P. The Legend of a separate world. Paris. 1957, p. 238).

59 RO GBL, f. 218, k. 306, d. 3, l. 637-638.

60 TsGALI SSSR, f. 389, op. 1, d. 46, l. 81.

61 The Fall of the Tsarist Regime, vol. 7, Moscow, 1927, p. 36.

62 Red Archive, 1933, vol. 3 (58), p. 5. In spite of his broadcast statements about loyalty to the Entente, the leader of the Cadet Party took advantage of his stay in Scandinavia to get an idea of the German peace conditions. According to his diary, in the summer of 1916 in Oslo, he had an "interesting conversation" with a doctor and publicist of the cadet type, Ya.K. Zavriev, "who had just been to Denmark, where he saw Lucius." In a conversation with Lucius, German peace conditions were discussed (TSAOR USSR, f. 579, op. 1, d. 3544, ll. 13-18).

63 The Fall of the Tsarist regime, vol. 7, p. 35.

64 APP. Vol. I, doc. Ill, p. 137.

page 88

He was identified by Germany as its possible representative in negotiations with Russia 65 . However, then, despite Wallenberg's assistance, the negotiations on a separate one. 66 events were not held in the world .

On July 8, 1916, the German envoy to Sweden sent Bethmann-Hollweg a report from F. Warburg about an informal conversation in Stockholm with Olsufyev and Protopopov. The meeting was arranged with the help of a Russian citizen living in Stockholm, M. S. Gurevich (at his apartment in the spring of 1917, Yolyshko and Erzberger met). Gurevich, obviously, was in some dependence on the Germans, because Warburg wrote in a report addressed to the German envoy: "Initially, it was assumed that Heinrich Bockelmann (German resident in Stockholm. - I. D. ). Since Bokelman had to leave Stockholm, Mr. Gurevich, on his initiative and with your consent, offered to meet me." The conversation took place in the hotel salon of L. S. Polyak (Pollak), a Russian industrial businessman. The Pole and his wife were passing through Stockholm. Olsufiev and Protopopov also traveled to Petrograd after being in Paris and London with the Duma delegation.

Initially, Warburg intended to meet only with Olsufyev. "However," Warburg writes, " when it came to the meeting with Olsufyev, which was delayed for an hour due to a malfunction of the car he was driving, I learned that Protopopov also wanted to participate in the conversation. On the one hand, it was sad, because in a single conversation you could hope to hear more. On the other hand, I find it interesting that both of my interlocutors did not consider it necessary to make a secret of the meeting and, as it were, mutually insured each other. Gurevich pointed out, not without humor, that two people who are fierce rivals inside Russia came together to talk to me: the conservative Olsufyev and the liberal Protopopov. The bourgeois Protopopov impressed me as a more worldly and self-confident man than the aristocratic Olsufiev, with his somewhat neglected appearance and somewhat nervous demeanor. In conversation, Protopopov was more animated and talkative than, unfortunately, the more taciturn Olsufiev. " 67
Warburg explained that he attached a detailed account of the conversation to his report, warning that in this entry he included certain points that he did not have time to discuss with Olsufyev and Protopopov, but discussed during the conversation with the Pole after Olsufyev and Protopopov left. When talking to the latter, Warburg, according to him, "tried in every possible way to show the benefits of continuing the war for England alone"; "I got the impression that both interlocutors mostly sympathized with my point of view about the futility of continuing the war, and this impression was strengthened after the second conversation with the Pole." Along with the union treaties, the main obstacle to Russia's conclusion of a separate peace is, as Warburg believed, "the difficulty of shifting the steering wheel to a different course": "Peace and the possible big shocks associated with it require a person in Russia with extraordinary willpower, independence of thought and great authority, even for a simple attempt to withdraw Russia from the war. Apparently, there is no such person in Russia."

The day after the interview, Warburg spoke with the Pole in the presence of Gurevich and "the smartest director of the Warsaw Commercial Bank", whose name Warburg did not give. On the evening of July 8, 1916, the Pole left for Petrograd and promised to give Olsufyev and Protopopov the contents of an additional conversation. On the Warburg report, Bethmann-Hollweg's receipt for reading it and Yagov's resolution were preserved: "The Russians asked Warburg a lot during the conversation, but they themselves, in fact, did not say anything." 68
Here are excerpts from Warburg's account of the conversation: - Do you think (Warburg. - I. D.), that it is time to end the war? "I believe that the continuation of the war will not significantly change its final outcome." - Why Ger-

65 Ganelin R. S. Russia and the USA, L. 1969, p. 114, Constantinople and the Straits. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1926, p. 377.

66 APP. Vol I, doc. 115, p. 141.

67 Ibid., doc. 281, p. 392.

68 Ibid., doc. 281, pp. 393, 39 L

page 89

the mania doesn't make any peace proposals? "As soon as Germany made concrete proposals, the Entente powers would be ready... they would take this as a sign of the economic exhaustion that has set in. I do not think that these powers would actually agree to peace talks before the results of the current offensive actions, as well as the size of the harvest in Germany, are revealed." "What about Prussian Poland?" "Prussian Poland does not exist at all. The province of Posen (Posen) is inextricably linked with Germany." - Courland and Lithuania? "Germany will no doubt claim to retain these areas for a long time." - How to solve the problem of compensation for war losses? "The issue of compensation for war losses could be partially resolved in the form of granting concessions to Germany by Russia. Germany could formulate its demands for monetary contribution more moderately, provided that a trade treaty favorable to it is concluded." 69
In St. Petersburg, shortly after the visit of the Russian parliamentary delegation to the West, a ministerial leapfrog unfolded, reflecting the failure of the regime and the inability of the leadership to make a definite decision on the most important issue of foreign policy. July 20, 1916 Sazonov, an ardent supporter of the nroantantov course, resigned for several reasons. Among them, not the least role was played by the firmness of his orientation, which denied the possibility of a diplomatic maneuver .70 The duties of the Minister of Foreign Affairs were assigned concurrently to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sturmer. He was familiar with the terms of a separate peace put forward by the German side since the spring of 1916, as a result of secret meetings between Stannes and Kolyshko that took place in Stockholm with his knowledge, but not on his own initiative. Protopopov's conversation with Warburg considerably clarified the nature of German peace conditions .71
Protopopov, with the assistance of Sturmer, gained access to Nicholas P. Initially, it was assumed that the tsar would listen to not only Protopopov, but also Milyukov after the trip of the parliamentary delegation, but Nicholas II "rejected Milyukov" 72. On August 3, 1916, a day after the conversation with the tsar, Protopopov told his brother about it: "Tsar A [lexander] D [mitrievich] (Protopopov. - I. D.) saw 2 times: in the morning on nesk [olku] min[ut] and in the evening from 7 to 8 and from 8 to 10 in VR [emya] lunch. The tsar offered cigarettes and talked very simply... The tsar found the conversation with Warburg interesting and A[lexander] D[Mitrievi]cha's answers correct. " 73
September 29, 1916 Protopopov was appointed manager of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and soon confirmed as a minister. On October 2, Bethmann-Yllweg informed the Kaiser that Protopopov's nomination allowed him to hope for favorable developments for Germany: Protopopov was friends with V. N. Kokovtsov, and this made it possible for Kokovtsov, whom Bethmann - Hollweg considered a person "personally close to me" and inclined to peace with Germany, to appear in the tsarist government. At the same time, Bethmann-Hollweg warned Hindenburg that the speedy publication of the German manifesto on the proclamation of the Kingdom of Poland, which he demanded, could disrupt the achievement of a separate peace with Russia; it was undesirable to publish the manifesto before the end of the ministerial crisis in Russia. On October 13, Hindenburg, by then chief of the General Staff, replied that he had no reason to seriously believe in an imminent collusion with Russia, and again insisted

69 Ibid., pp. 396 - 398.

70 TSAOR USSR, f. 601, op. 1, d. 1335, l. 3; TsGALI USSR, f. 389, op. 1, d. 46, l. 6.

71 the next day after his return R Russia Protopopov in conversation with the brother of a journalist S. D. Protopopov so concluded suggestions Warburg: "Serbia and Belgium[ia] freed, Lothar[ingia] returned from France, the Russian and Austria[Yi] Poland - learning[aeternae] of the Kingdom of Courland to Germany, ROS[FIC] - Bukovina and Galicia" (Chali SSSR, f. 389, op. 1, d. 45, l. 345). Protopopov's diary, from which this passage is given, was discovered and put into scientific circulation by the author of these lines (Diakonova I. A. Separate contacts between Tsarist Russia and Kaiser's Germany during the First World War. Moscow State University History Department. Graduate work. 1972).

72 TsGALI SSSR, f. 389, op. 1, d. 46, l. 5.

73 Ibid., pp. 14-17.

page 90

on the publication of the manifesto, because after that it will be easier to use Polish human resources to replenish the German army 74 .

As early as October 3, Bethmann-Hollweg reported to the Kaiser: "I am not yet able to fully assess Protopopov's appointment to the post of Russian Minister of the Interior. It is striking that an Octobrist has been introduced into the Russian cabinet, which has hitherto consisted entirely of reactionary elements. However, it would be premature to conclude that the left in Russia is also beginning to gradually move away from England. Personally, Protopopov can hardly be considered a friend of England. In July of this year, I had contact with Protopopov through a trusted person during his journey through Stockholm. The conversation did not produce any noteworthy result at the time, apart from the fierce attacks Protopopov was subjected to by the Russian press for his alleged negotiations with Germany. However, the fact that he received a ministerial portfolio after these attacks should not be ignored. " 75 On October 23, Bethmann-Hollweg wrote: "Sturmer is less Anglophile and less uncompromising than Sazonov. The introduction of Protopopov into the government seems to be a concession to constitutional elements and perhaps a sign that Sturmer would like to attract to the idea of peace the liberal elements that have been most militant so far"; Bethmann-Hollweg considered it significant that under the new Minister of the Interior, Russian censorship omitted N. N.'s book. Sukhanov's " Why are we at war?", which contained arguments in favor of a separate peace 76 . Protopopov served as Interior Minister, a key role in the brewing revolution, until the end of the tsarist regime. A successful landowner, a large textile manufacturer, who also did not disdain oil speculation, this hard-core businessman aspired to a political career on a national scale: "I will save Russia. I feel that I am called to get Russia out of trouble, to save it. " 77 Protopopov's self-confidence appealed to the tsar and tsarina, and they pinned hopes on him in terms of strengthening the stability of the regime and predicted him for the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers instead of the elderly N. D. Golitsyn. Protopopov, however, did not show any political talents. Nor did his elevation lead to any decisive turn of the state's wheel towards a separate peace, as the German Chancellor had hoped for to some extent.

On January 1, 1917, Lenin assessed the situation that had developed by that time as follows:: "The replacement of Sturmer by Trenev, the public declaration of tsardom that Russia's 'right' to Constantinople is recognized by all the allies, the creation by Germany of a special Polish state-these signs seem to indicate that negotiations for a separate peace ended in failure. " 78 At the end of January, Lenin returned to the question of a separate peace, recalling that the danger of a separate deal between Tsarism and Germany, which would be harmful to the real world, had not yet passed .79 After giving a possible version of the half-hearted but in principle affirmative response that could follow from the tsar, "directly or indirectly", to the kaiser's probing of a separate peace, Lenin wrote: "Whether there was such a conversation, it is impossible to know. And this is not essential. What is significant is that things have gone this way. " 80
Yes, events unfolded exactly as Lenin believed. Tsarism was increasingly manifesting its impotence to cope with the situation. In the winter of 1916/17, the imperialist war reached a point beyond which the prospect of ending it in an imperialist way - the victory of the Entente, supported by American imperialism, which pursued its own goals-began to loom for the rulers of Britain and France. Lenin wrote that from a military point of view, once the United States entered the war, "Germany's position is hopeless." 81 Total U-boat war, declared by Germany in January 1917, was a sign of the inevitability of direct military action.

74 APP. Vol. 1, doc. 337, p. 488; doc. 344, p. 512; doc. 346, p. 516.

75 Ibid., doc. 338, p. 490.

76 Ibid., doc. 350, pp. 522 - 523.

77 The past. Book 21. Pg. 1923, p. 238.

78 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 30, p. 242.

79 Ibid., p. 341.

80 Ibid., pp. 341, 342.

81 Ibid., vol. 32, p. 271.

page 91

clashes between Germany and the United States. The official entry of the United States into the war took place on April 6, 1917, and American ground forces were intended for operations against Germany in large numbers only from the summer of 1918. In anticipation of this, Russia's Western allies would benefit from mercilessly exhausting the human and material resources of their Russian ally.

In those circumstances, what were the foreign policy capabilities of tsarism and its ability to maneuver on a large scale? "The intense desire of the leading imperialist circles in Germany for an alliance with Russia against Britain was already determined several months ago," Lenin noted in January 1917. As a result of almost continuous probing on the German side, tsarism found itself aware of the German terms of the separate agreement, though vague, but disastrous (taking into account the internal situation of Russia). It was necessary for Tsarism to make significant amendments to them. But this could not be achieved otherwise than by achieving preliminary successes on the fronts of war , holding back the brewing revolution at home, and obtaining financial support from outside, especially from American capitalists, among whom there were influential Germanophile circles.

This is exactly what Tsarism tried to do. At the Petrograd Inter-Allied Conference of February 1-20, 1917, he promised the Allies to launch a major offensive no later than the beginning of May 1917, and before that he planned to organize several partial offensive operations. Protopopov, the" savior of Russia", was charged with streamlining, first of all in the capital, the food supply of the population ("carrot"), increasing the combat capability of the police and gendarmerie ("whip"). At the same time, attempts were made to rely on American loans. 84 Tsarism has not achieved any notable success along any of these lines. He was forced to go with the flow, reacting passively to events. Meanwhile, the battle between the two world coalitions required urgent solutions. In mid-December 1916, N. N. Pokrovsky, who was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, publicly confirmed Russia's loyalty to the Entente in response to Germany's demagogic open offer to the belligerent powers to sit down at the negotiating table on December 12. 85 At the same time, the tsar, as supreme commander-in-chief, addressed the troops with an order in which he emphasized that the hour of peace "has not yet arrived".

In the autumn of 1916, the British and French raised an increased fuss about the" separate collusion " between Russia and Germany, while simultaneously sabotaging the military supply of their ally. In this regard, the tsarist army could count on military success only at the expense of further waste of human resources. The losses were so great that in January 1917, the conscripts of 1919 had to be mobilized ahead of schedule. The prospect of collusion with Germany and a revision of the system of alliances was increasingly remote. The bloody tangle of World War II turned out to be so tight that it was no longer possible for the ruling circles of Russia to untie it in a separate way to Germany. We should add that secret and also incomplete negotiations for a separate peace were conducted during the First World War between virtually all the belligerent powers, and all of them were anti-national in nature, with the aim of concluding an imperialist agreement to prepare for new predatory redistribution of the world.

After the February Revolution, a new moment emerged in the backroom contacts between the Western powers: preparations for participation in the fight against the revolution. Less than three months after the fall of tsarism, the pope conveyed to Western leaders, including Bethmann-Hollweg, his opinion on peace: "Whether an angel or a devil will come out of Russia is still unclear... Those who would have performed under the flag

82 Ibid., vol. 30, p. 243.

83 Moreover, successes of a more significant scale than during the Brusilov offensive in the summer of 1916. In the course of this offensive, after revealing its limited capabilities, Warburg outlined to Protopopov the conditions that practically threatened Tsarism with catastrophe.

84 Ganelin R. S. Russia and the USA, p. 134.

85 On December 24, 1916, the brother of Minister Protopopov writes in his diary: "Germany's note of peace did not elicit a positive response... "Prices" are still too different, and it is unlikely that we are close to a deal" (TsGALI USSR, f. 389, op. 1, d. 46, l. 165).

page 92

world, would be the rulers of Europe... The governments of all the countries of the continent must understand that the hard fist of socialism is raised above their heads. " 86 At that time, the Anglo-German collusion was no longer the Russo - German one, but the Anglo-German one. Lenin immediately appreciated a new version of the backroom deal: imperialism, he pointed out shortly before the Great October Revolution, " wavered between a war to victory and a separate peace against Russia... Only our victory in the insurrection will break the game of a separate peace against the revolution, break it by openly offering a fuller, more just, more intimate peace in favor of the revolution. " 87
As can be seen from the above, the German side played an active role in attempts to achieve a separate withdrawal of Russia from the war. The initiative was almost entirely left to her, but did not bring decisive results, since the freedom of action of the parties was limited by a number of political and economic factors. Because of disagreements between Germany's powerful monopoly groups and because of contradictions between it and its allies, the German side was unable to accurately formulate its own conditions for a separate peace at any stage of the probe. The actions of the leadership of tsarist Russia were constrained not so much by discord within bourgeois-landlord circles and the restraining influence of the Entente allies, as by the situation at the fronts and, above all, by the growth of the working-class movement within the country. In the end, clandestine contacts remained incomplete, and the tendencies toward a separate peace remained unrealized.

Contrary to the false claims of the enemies of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin strongly opposed the idea of a separate peace both during the years of tsardom and during the months of the Provisional Government, for if the rule of the exploiting classes continued, such a peace would inevitably be in the interests of imperialism. The conclusion of a separate peace by tsarist Russia (as well as its continuation of the war to the "victorious end") could ultimately only lead in foreign policy terms to a regrouping of forces in the system of imperialist coalitions, further linking Russia in imperialist combinations. A study of the complex issues related to the separate peace negotiations between Tsarist Russia and Kaiser's Germany makes it possible to once again verify Lenin's scientific foresight. Tsardom and the Russian bourgeoisie, entangled in the contradictions resulting from their anti-people policies, found themselves completely bankrupt and led the country into a dead end, the only real way out of which was the socialist revolution.

86 APP. Vol. 2, doc. 109, p. 181.

87 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 34, pp. 243, 245.

page 93

Permanent link to this publication: