To the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory

The final chord of the Soviet offensive in 1944, the last major operation of the summer-autumn campaign of that year, was the defeat of the enemy group in the Arctic, the expulsion of fascist troops from the territory of the Murmansk region and the liberation of Northern Norway. The Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, carried out by the troops of the Karelian Front (Commander - General of the Army, and then Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov) and the Northern Navy (Commander-Admiral A. G. Golovko) in October 1944, was of great strategic importance, was characterized by close interaction of all branches of the armed forces, and showed high training of Soviet soldiers and sailors in the conduct of military operations in extreme conditions.

The Kola Arctic was the extreme right flank of the huge Soviet-German front, which was covered by the troops of the 14th Army and the naval forces of the Northern Fleet. Since the first days of the war, the battles in the Arctic have acquired national and even international significance. Already on July 18, 1941, J. V. Stalin wrote in a personal message to W. Churchill about the creation of a united front against the Germans in the North, in the Arctic. 1 Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy during the war, emphasized that " communication routes with the allies, military and national economic transportation along the Northern Sea Route, the importance of the ice - free port of Murmansk, huge natural resources-these and many other reasons forced us to pay special attention to the North during the war." 2 Therefore, the battle in the Arctic, which ended with the defeat of the German-Fascist troops, was not a local event. The Kola Peninsula was of vital importance for the whole country, since in the North there were sea communications connecting the USSR with the outside world.

The fighting in the Far North immediately, in the summer of 1941, took on the character of a well-organized resistance. The regiments of the 14th army, together with the border guards, courageously met the pressure of superior enemy forces. And although the Soviet soldiers were forced to withdraw from the state border in a number of areas, this retreat was insignificant: 25-30 km in the Murmansk direction, 75-80 km in the Kandalaksha direction. In the Arctic, there was also the only section of our western land border that the enemy did not overcome. Pravda wrote about this fact at one time: "The heroic defense of the Arctic will go down in the history of our people as one of the most striking, most important events in the history of the Arctic.-

1 Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. T, I. M. 1976, p. 19.

2 Kuznetsov N. G. Na flotakh boevaya trev. M. 1971, p.220-221.

page 25

memorable pages. Here the enemy was stopped in the fall of 1941. Here is a section where the enemy did not manage to cross the line of our state border during the whole war. " 3
In the 40 years that have passed since the defeat of the German-Fascist troops in the Arctic, the literature on this topic has been constantly enriched and replenished. A huge amount of factual material and previously unused documents have been introduced into scientific circulation. The history of the defeat of the German - Fascist troops in the Arctic region is reflected in fundamental works on the history of the USSR and the CPSU, on the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and the Second World War4 . They provide basic assessments of the actions of the Karelian Front and the Northern Fleet in 1941-1944. Together with other works on the history of the Great Patriotic War, they serve as a starting point for further development of the problem. One of the first monographic works exploring the course of the Soviet Army's struggle in the Arctic in 1941-1944 was published more than 20 years ago .5 A number of works cover the history of the Northern Fleet in the Great Patriotic War, show the active role of aviation in military operations in the Arctic 6. Literature on this topic is regularly published in Murmansk 7 .

When analyzing the events and military operations in the Arctic, it is also impossible to do without memoir literature, which continues to be continuously replenished. Some authors refer only in passing to the events of the war in the Far North, while others have devoted entire books to the battles in the Arctic .8 Collections of documents and monographs have also been published that reveal the foreign policy aspect of events in the Soviet Arctic, where the interests of not only Germany and the USSR, but also Finland, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, the United States and other countries collided .9 Documentary collections about the North-West of the USSR during the war are also of considerable value for studying the topic .10
They do not ignore the history of military operations in the Soviet Arctic and in the West. Special activity in this direction

3 Pravda, 6. XII. 1944.

4 History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945 Vol. 4. M. 1962, pp. 367-372; History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Vol. 5, book 1. M. 1970, pp. 536-537; History of the USSR from ancient times to the present day. Vol. X. M. 1973, pp. 535-536; History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. Vol. 9. Moscow, 1978, pp. 148-153.

5 Rumyantsev N. M. Rout of the enemy in the Arctic (1941-1944). Moscow, 1963.

6 Vayner B. A. Northern Fleet in the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1964; Kozlov I. A., Shlomin V. S. Krasnoznamenny Northern Fleet, Ed. 3-E. M. 1983; Inozemtsev I. G. Krylatye zashchitniki Severa, Moscow, 1975; et al.

7 1200 days and nights of Fishing. Murmansk. 1970; Partisan bonfires. Murmansk. 1973; On the Kandalaksha direction. Murmansk. 1975; Budanov V. F., Dubrovin N. P. Rear of the right flank. Murmansk. 1976; Voronin A. A. Murmansk in the fire of war. Murmansk. 1979; In the battles for the Soviet Arctic. Murmansk. 1982; In combat-Marine Corps. Murmansk. 1984; and others.

8 Veshezersky G. A. At the cold rocks, Moscow, 1965; Kurzenkov S. G. Pod nami-zemlya i morye, Moscow, 1967; Meretskov K. A. Na sluzhbe narodu, Moscow, 1968; Kislyakov V. P. Na sopkakh Zapolyar'ya. Syktyvkar, Moscow, 1968; Kolyshkin I. A. In the depths of the polar seas, Moscow, 1970; Kuznetsov N. G. UK. soch.; Kupriyanov G. N. From the Barents Sea to Ladoga, Moscow, 1972; Starikov V. G. On the verge of life and death. Izhevsk. 1972; Khudalov Kh. A. At the edge of the continent, Moscow, 1974; Frolov V. A. On the protection of the northern borders. In: Unforgettable. Memories of the Great Patriotic War. Petrozavodsk. 1974; Golovko A. G. Together with the Fleet. Ed. 2-E. M. 1979; Shtemenkos M. General Staff during the war. Book 1. Ed. 2-E. M. 1981; Khrenov A. F. Mosty k pobede [Bridges to Victory], Moscow, 1982; Zhukov G. K. Memoirs and Reflections. In 3 vols. Ed. 5-E. M. 1983; et al.

9 Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. Doc. and m-ly. Vol. II. M. 1946; Noskov A.M. Scandinavian bridgehead in the Second World War. M. 1977; et al.

10 Arkhangelsk Oblast v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny [The Arkhangelsk Region during the Great Patriotic War]. Arkhangelsk, 1975; Karelia during the Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. Doc. and m-ly. Petrozavodsk. 1975; Murmansk region in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Collection of doc. and m-lov. Murmansk. 1978.

page 26

Revanchist circles in Germany are showing up. Events in the Kola North are dealt with to varying degrees in the memoirs of the commander of the German 169th Infantry Division K. Ditmar, chief of staff of the fascist 20th mountain Army Gen. G. Helter, in the books of Quartermaster General of the mountain corps "Norway" V. Hess and Gen. V. Erfurt, in military treatises of the commander of German troops in North of Gen. L. Rendulich 11 .

Thus, the topic of the collapse of the plans of Nazi Germany in the Arctic has already received more or less wide coverage. However, a number of issues, including such important ones as the moral and political unity of the front and rear in the Arctic, the interaction of land, naval and air forces during the defensive battles of 1942-1943, and the activities of the Murmansk City Defense Committee during the war, have not yet been sufficiently reflected in the literature. Such issues as the periodization of military operations and the alignment of forces, certain moments of the summer-autumn battle of 1941, the specifics of the defensive battles of the troops of the 14th and 19th armies in 1942-1944, the military-political results of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, etc. also need to be clarified and developed in more detail. Unable to address all of these issues, the author has focused on just a few of them.

Military operations in the Murmansk Region began later than on the Western and Northwestern Fronts: on June 29, 1941, in the Murmansk direction and on July 1, in the Kandalaksha direction. The most critical days of the defense of the Far North were in September 1941. Since October, the enemy could no longer continue the offensive and was forced to go on the defensive. Military operations on the land front of the Arctic were fully completed in October-November 1944. Consequently, the chronological framework of military operations in the Arctic is limited to two dates: June 29, 1941 and October 29, 194412, vol. e. they lasted for 3 years and 4 months. Events in the Far North are usually divided into three main stages: defensive battles that drained the German selected divisions of blood (from June 29 to September 22, 1941); positional defense with continuous sorties and counter-offensives (from October 1941 to September 1944); September-October 1944, when the troops of the Karelian Front in cooperation with The Northern Fleet defeated the enemy first in the Kandalaksha direction, and then in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation. At each of these stages, certain forces participated in military operations, formed a different ratio of them, and had their own plans of both strategic and tactical nature.

The rulers of nazi Germany, preparing for war against the USSR, tried to take into account the conditions of military operations in the Far North 13 . Selected Mountain Yeager and SS formations, well-armed and equipped, were concentrated here. To help them, the 5th Air Fleet was attached, and a specially created naval group "Nord"operated at sea. The directive of the General Command of the German Land Forces (OKH) of January 31, 1941 stated that the army "Norway" reports directly to the supreme Command of the armed forces. In addition to Norwegian defense tasks

11 Dittmar К. Battiem in the Arctik Circle. - Military Review, 1950, N 8; Hess W. Eismeerfront. 1941. Heidelberg. 1956; Erfurth W. Der Finnische Krieg. 1941 - 1944. Wiesbaden. 1950; Rendulich L. Management of troops, Moscow, 1974.

12 This chronology is somewhat arbitrary, since fighting began on a number of border posts in the North before June 29, 1941. On the other hand, in November 1944 there were still some battles with the Nazis in Northern Norway.

13 F. Halder wrote that as early as January 16, 1941, the issue of "conditions in the area of Petsamo - Murmansk (May - painful scourge - mosquitoes)" was discussed among others (F. Halder). Military Diary, vol. 2, Moscow, 1969, p. 319).

page 27

regardless of the possible landing of the British, this army was assigned the following tasks: "From the beginning of the operation, and if necessary earlier, to invade the Petsamo area and reliably defend it together with Finnish troops against attacks from land, sea and air. Of particular importance is the retention of nickel mines, which are extremely important for the German military economy (Operation "Reindeer"); the troops available to surround Murmansk, which is a strong base for offensive operations of the enemy's land, sea and air forces. In the future, if the available forces allow, to capture Murmansk (Operation "Black-brown fox") " 14 . In addition to the two operations named in this document ("Reindeer" and "Black Fox"), at the beginning of the war in the Arctic, another operation was developed - "Blue Fox": an offensive on Murmansk from two sides - from the west (by the mountain jaeger corps "Norway") and from the south, after the exit 36th Army Corps to Kandalaksha.

To implement these plans, the German command at the beginning of the war in the Far North had the following forces: in the Murmansk direction, and it was first mentioned in the Sovinformburo report for June 30, 1941, two mountain rifle divisions of the Norway Corps were advancing. The mountain rangers were supported by three artillery divisions, signal and sapper battalions, road units, etc .The total number of those advancing on Murmansk, where the Germans expected to be in the first days of July, was 27.5 thousand people. 15 In July 1941, the German 36th Army Corps, which included the 169th Infantry Division, the SS Nord Brigade, five artillery divisions, three sapper battalions, and so on, went on the offensive in the Kandalaksha direction. The invaders threw more than 40 thousand soldiers and officers against the Soviet troops covering the Kuolayarvi - Alakurtti - Kandalaksha railway. They were actively supported by aviation 16 .

German-Finnish troops were opposed by units of the 14th Army of the Northern and then Karelian Front. In June 1941, two divisions were moved directly to the border: the 14th Rifle Division in the Murmansk direction, and the 122nd Division in the Kandalaksha direction. The second echelon consisted of the 52nd and 104th Rifle divisions. These units were understaffed, and the Germans in the first days of the offensive had a significant superiority in men and equipment. So, in the two divisions covering Murmansk, there were only 12,5 thousand people, i.e. 2 times less than in the German mountain Officer corps. Lieutenant-General V. A. Frolov commanded the 14th Army. Divisions of the Murmansk direction at the beginning of hostilities were headed by Major-Generals A. A. Zhurba and N. N. Nikishin. Two divisions of the Kandalaksha direction were consolidated into the 42nd Rifle Corps (commanded by Major General R. I. Panin). The formations of the 14th Army were supported by the 1st Tank Division (Major General V. I. Baranov) and the 1st Mixed Aviation Division (Colonel I. L. Turkel). From the sea, the 14th Army was supported by the Northern Fleet. On the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas, parts of the 23rd fortified region (Colonel D. E. Krasilnikov) were stationed.

The first period of military operations in the Arctic took place in unfavorable conditions for the Soviet Army: on the side of the enemy there was a significant preponderance in military forces, its 5th air Fleet dominated the air, and the German troops had detailed PLA systems-

14 Cit., in: Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, 1959, N 1, p. 90.

15 Noskov A.M. UK. soch., p. 147.

16 Rumyantsev N. M. UK. soch., pp. 48-49.

page 28

great experience of the war in Europe. The German strike on June 29 was taken over by the outposts of the Murmansk Border District (commander K. R. Sinilov) 17 and battalions of two rifle regiments advanced to the border. Since the construction of fortifications on the border was not completed, and the Germans, using a five-to six-fold advantage in a number of areas, acted by detours, there were some losses and confusion. The commander of the 137th Mountain Rifle Regiment, Colonel Hengl, boastfully reported on June 30, 1941, that "resistance can only be counted on from individual pockets." 18 The same opinion was shared by the fascist generals operating in the Kandalaksha direction. K. Ditmar reported that "the 6th Finnish Division, advancing from the south, and the 169th German division from the north were surrounded... two Soviet divisions " 19 . He was echoed by the head of the German military mission at the Finnish headquarters, Lieutenant General V. Erfurt:" As a result of nine days of fighting at Kairala, the 46th Russian Army Corps was defeated and destroyed. " 20
But the Fascist generals were wishful thinking. Already in July, the enemy met with an ever-increasing rebuff - the training and steadfastness of Soviet soldiers, the endurance and knowledge of commanders, mass-political and educational work of political workers affected. The summer of 1941 was spent in continuous fighting. The Germans tried to encircle our units and destroy them, our divisions tried to bleed the enemy dry, not to allow him to break into the depths of the territory of the Kola Peninsula. In September, decisive battles for the Arctic took place in the area of the Lysaya and Voita mountains in the Kandalaksha direction and in the valley of the Zapadnaya Litsa River in the Murmansk direction. The enemy suffered heavy losses. The Germans failed to cut the Kirov Railway at Kandalaksha, capture Murmansk and the Northern Fleet bases. In three months, the Nazis advanced only a few dozen kilometers from the border. In the Kandalaksha direction, the enemy lost about 25 thousand people, all tanks and a significant part of artillery in three months of fighting .21 At Murmansk only in the September battles of 1941, the losses of the fascists amounted to 12 thousand people .22
Thus, in the summer battles of 1941 in the Arctic, the Gorno-Hungarian units of the army "Norway" were defeated, and the skills of soldiers and officers of the Red Army were tempered. Military skill, tactical skill and the personal example of our unit commanders helped stop the enemy at Murmansk and Kandalaksha. The defeat of the Nazis in the North would have been unthinkable without the extraordinary courage, perseverance and mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers.

The Northern Fleet provided invaluable assistance to the ground forces. In the amphibious operations of the summer of 1941, the North Sea soldiers I. M. Sivko, A. P. Tortsev, V. P. Kislyakov distinguished themselves - one of the first Heroes of the Soviet Union, who received this title in the summer of 1941. Amphibious landings from ships of the Northern Fleet in the rear or on the flanks of the advancing enemy played an important role in the defense of the Soviet Arctic. As V. Hess wrote, only against the landing force landed on July 14, 1941 in the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa Bay, the German command threw 25 infantry companies, 8 artillery batteries, and several bomber squadrons .23 For the first time in world history, the Northern Fleet began to practice amphibious landings during the Oboro period.-

17 In October 1941, he was appointed military commandant of Moscow.

18 Cit. by: Rumyantsev N. M. UK. soch., p. 34.

World War 19. 1939-1945. Collection of Articles, Moscow, 1957, p. 137.

20 Cit. according to: Rumyantsev N. M. UK. soch., p. 56. It is, apparently, about the 42nd corps.

21 Ibid., p. 57.

22 Rumyantsev N. M. UK. soch., p. 47.

23 Hess W. Op. cit., S. 92 - 93.

page 29

V. Hess recognized that "thanks to the landing of paratroopers, the initiative remained in the hands of the Soviet troops for a long time." 24
In October 1941, the Nazi command set a new tactical task for the army "Norway":" To start carrying out preparatory measures in order to finally take possession of Murmansk, the Rybachy Peninsula and the Murmansk Railway next year " 25 . To achieve these goals, two operations were developed, codenamed "Salmon Fishing"and " Meadow". In Directive No. 44 of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command (OKB) of July 21, 1942, Hitler ordered: "Now it is also necessary to cut off the northern supply line connecting the Soviet Union with the Anglo-Saxon powers. Such a line is primarily the Murmansk Railway, which supplies materials from America and England mainly during the winter months. The importance of this supply line increases again if the time of year and weather conditions prevent successful operations against convoys in the North. " 26
But after the defeat near Moscow, the Germans failed to carry out these operations, although preparations for them were extensive. From the beginning of 1942, the fascist army "Norway" was transformed into the 20th Mountain Army. The Norway Corps was renamed the 19th Mountain Rifle Corps. It consisted of the 2nd and 6th Mountain Rifle divisions, the 139th Mountain Rifle and 388th Infantry regiments, and various reinforcement units. [27 ]

There were also changes in the organization of the Soviet troops. On the basis of the Kandalaksha task force, the 19th Army (Major General S. I. Morozov, then G. K. Kozlov) was deployed, and the 26th Army (Major General N. N. Nikishin) was created to defend the Kestenga and Ukhta directions. The 14th Army was commanded by Major General V. I. Shcherbakov, who knew the theater of operations well from the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Parts of the Karelian Front received uninterrupted supplies: the Obozerskaya Railway (from the Belomorsk station of the Kirov Railway to the Obozerskaya station of the Northern Road) 28 was put into operation .

In order to strengthen the defenses of Murmansk, the Kirov and Obozersk Railways, offensive operations were launched in the Murmansk and Kesteng directions in April - May 1942. The plan of our command in the Murmansk direction was to bypass the enemy from the southern flank with the forces of the 10th Guards Division, the 72nd marine brigade and the 6th separate ski brigade and strike north to connect with the 12th Marine Brigade, which was landed from the Northern Fleet ships on the southern shore of Motovsky Bay. The offensive began on April 28, 1942, but since the artillery and aviation of the 14th Army failed to suppress the enemy's defense units, it developed slowly. And then the unexpected happened: the air temperature dropped sharply, a prolonged blizzard began, all roads were covered, and the delivery of ammunition and food to the advancing units stopped. A special correspondent of Sovinformburo, a well-known Soviet writer Yevgeny Petrov, who was then in the Arctic, wrote: "The blizzard lasted for three days. The fighting continued unabated. They have lost momentum, of course, but the very fact that they were conducted gives you a sense of urgency.

24 Cit. by: Kuznetsov N. G. UK. soch., p. 231.

25 Dashichev V. I. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism, vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, pp. 252-253.

26 " Top secret! Only for command!". Strategy of Fascist Germany in the war against the USSR. Doc. Moscow, 1967, p. 385.

27th World War. 1939-1945, p. 142; Rumyantsev N. M. UK. soch., p. 65.

28 Simonov K. M. Raznye den voiny [Different Days of War], vol. 2, Moscow, 1977, p. 113.

page 30

an idea of the unprecedented bitterness in history with which this titanic war of life and death takes place. " 29 The offensive did not give the expected result, although the enemy was dealt a significant blow: he lost about 5 thousand soldiers and officers.

In the future, the defense of the Soviet troops in the Arctic took place along the line of the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa Lip - Lake Long - Lake Varsyarv (in the Murmansk direction) and along the Upper and Lower Verman water line (in the Kandalaksha direction). Even during the period of more or less stable defense in 1942-1943, military operations were not passive. Only the 10th Guards Rifle Division conducted 150 local battles during the defense period .30 The Sovinformburo reported on one of them on August 4, 1943: "A unit of Captain V. I. Kopyrin attacked an enemy stronghold. The soldiers broke into enemy trenches and destroyed up to a company of Nazis in hand-to-hand combat."

Local battles, active actions of reconnaissance groups, a widespread sniper movement-all this allowed the Soviet command in the Arctic to have the initiative, to keep the enemy in constant tension. The former commander of the 14th Army, V. I. Shcherbakov, wrote about this on the 20th anniversary of the defeat of the Germans in the Arctic: "A distinctive feature of our defense was its continuously increasing activity. From the very first days of the war, the defenders of the Arctic began to control the fascist thugs, went to their rear and attacked their flanks, making hundreds of kilometers of off-road crossings in the tundra in severe northern weather, overcoming steep, rocky heights, rapid mountain rivers and treacherous swamps. Hero of the Soviet Union Said Aliyev and Vasily Dubinin showed unsurpassed valor in hot battles with the Nazis. Glorious feats marked the path of the scouts of the Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitry Pokramovich and many other soldiers, entire units " 31 .

In all the events related to the defense and defeat of the German-fascist troops in the Arctic, the organizing and leading role of the Murmansk Party Organization, headed by the first secretary of the Regional Committee of the VKSCHB, a member of the Military Council of the Northern Fleet and the 14th Army, chairman of the Murmansk City Defense Committee M. I. Starostin, was reflected. The Murmansk regional party organization called on the workers of the Kola Peninsula to protect their native land from the encroachments of the enemy, and gave the navy and army half of its communists and three-quarters of the Komsomol members .32 The Communists took the lead in creating defensive lines on the approaches to Murmansk, Polyarnoye, Kandalaksha, Kirovsk and other cities, and in transferring all industry to work for the production of military products. Military production was established at the enterprises of the Murmansk region, and at such purely peaceful ones as the mechanical workshops of the commercial port or the Apatit plant. In Murmansk, grenades, mines, and fuses were produced. Here, an original type of mortar was constructed, which was highly appreciated at the front 33 .

Military supplies, strategic supplies, and food supplies from the Allies passed through Murmansk. The Murmansk commercial Port handled 1.7 million tons of imported cargo during the war years, handled 351 ships and shipped almost 13 thousand wagons with 34 cargoes to the interior of the country . In which cases

29 See Literaturnaya Gazeta, 9. V. 1973.

30 Khudalov Kh. A. UK. soch., p. 104.

31 Polyarnaya pravda, 21. X. 1964.

32 Essays on the Murmansk organization of the CPSU. Murmansk, 1969, p. 229.

33 Party Archive of the Murmansk region (PAMO), f. 1, op. 1, d. 365, l. 14.

34 Romanov B. S. Prichaly muzhestva [Prichals of Courage]. Murmansk. 1977, p. 194.

page 31

how Murmansk residents worked, an extract from the magazine of the MPVO of the commercial port shows: "On March 24, 1942, at 17 o'clock, enemy bombers suddenly flew in and dropped many high-explosive bombs, of which 25 fell in the central part of the port. At 18: 45, a second raid was carried out and another 19 high-explosive bombs were dropped... In the first raid, 43 people were killed, 14 seriously wounded and 17 lightly wounded. In the second raid, 3 were killed, 1 was seriously wounded, and 3 were lightly wounded. " 35
Alongside the port workers, the railway workers of the Kirov Main Line, whose capture was the most important goal of the Fascist command, worked shoulder to shoulder . 36 The Germans declared dozens of times that the railway was disabled and ceased to function. However, this was not true. This was stated in January 1942 on his return from the USSR by the British Foreign Minister A. Eden in a speech on the London radio: "Part of our journey took place on the railway that Goebbels says was cut. From my own experience, I can say that Goebbels is wrong - the railway is in perfect order, undamaged, and running smoothly and well. " 37
The Kirov Railway, like the cities of Murmansk and Kandalaksha, was located throughout the war in the frontline zone. As I. D. Papanin wrote, " the enemy bombed day and night, in good and bad weather. The Nazis raised their bombers from the nearest airfields in Norway and Finland and after 15-20 minutes appeared over the city " 38 . In total, in 1941-1944, only within the Murmansk region, 1070 air raids were carried out on the road and 34 thousand bombs were dropped, i.e. an average of 100 - 120 bombs fell on each kilometer of the road .39 Murmansk is just behind Stalingrad and Sevastopol in terms of the number of enemy bombs dropped per inhabitant. Only in the first two years of the war, 182.3 thousand incendiary and 4.1 thousand high-explosive bombs fell on the city, 792 raids and 194 bombings were made. There were 22,695 lighters and 513 high-explosive bombs for every square kilometer of the city's territory. Four bombs were dropped on each Murmansk resident .40
The defense of the Arctic gives an example of the monolithic unity of the front and rear. All the cities of the Murmansk region were located in close proximity to the front line, and enterprises, including local industry, worked entirely for the army and navy. Having evacuated women, children and the elderly, the workers of Murmansk, Kirovsk, Monchegorsk, and Kandalaksha concentrated all their efforts on meeting the needs of the front and fleet: they built defensive structures, repaired combat and transport vessels, delivered military cargo, produced weapons, serviced hospitals, and extinguished fires.

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the Soviet Government, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command paid close attention to the defense of the Arctic and provided it with comprehensive assistance. When the Nazis tried to destroy Murmansk from the air and cut off communication on the Kirov Railway, large formations of anti-aircraft artillery and several aviation regiments were sent to the North. The Northern Fleet received constant replenishment of military equipment.

35 TSGANKH SSSR, f. 8045, op. 3, d. 923, l. 14.

36 In German and other Western European and American sources, the Kirov Railway appears as the Murmansk Railway.

37 Cit. by: Leningradskaya Pravda, 9.1.1942.

38 Papanin I. D. Ice and Flame, Moscow, 1977, p. 269. The author of the book was then the authorized representative of the GKO for transportation in the North.

39 Murmansk Region during the Great Patriotic War, p. 15.

40 PAMO, f. 1, op. 2, d. 163, l. 12; f. 79, op. 2, d. 888, l. 21.

page 32

The soldiers of the Arctic Region, the workers of the Murmansk region, felt the full and constant support of the entire Soviet people, and this gave them strength in the fight against fascism. In the winter of 1941/42, military units from Siberia arrived here for reinforcements. In the autumn of 1942, a delegation of workers of the Krasnoyarsk Territory headed by the secretary of the Regional Committee of the CPSU(b) K. U. Chernenko visited the cities of the Kola Peninsula and the 14th Army .41 In turn, the Northerners also took an active part in the fate of the country. Thousands of Murmansk residents participated in the defense of Moscow and Leningrad, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk.

1944 in the Arctic began with active actions of units on the defensive, partisan campaigns in the rear of the enemy 42 . The soldiers and commanders of the Karelian Front, the sailors of the Northern Fleet and all the working people of the Murmansk region received with great joy the news of the defeat of the German-Fascist troops near Leningrad. When the Svir-Petrozavodsk offensive was launched in June 1944 and Soviet troops approached the borders of Finland on the Karelian Isthmus, it became clear that the full liberation of the Soviet Arctic from the Nazi invaders was on the agenda.

On September 4, 1944, our troops launched an offensive in the Kandalaksha direction, and soon units of the 6th SS Division were surrounded in the Kuusamo area. By the end of September, the enemy was defeated in this direction, and the troops of the 19th Army reached the Finnish border. But the German front in northern Finland and Norway continued to strengthen. Hitler's command intended to hold the nickel mines in the Pechenga area until the end, as well as the naval and air bases in Liinahamari, Luostari and Kirkenes. The total length of the front was more than 60 km, and the depth of the enemy's defense was 50 kilometers. The commander of the 10th Guards Rifle Division, Kh. A. Khudalov, recalled the fortifications of the enemy's "Lapland Wall" : "Even now, after more than three decades, I see this strip of enemy fortifications stretching for tens of kilometers: rock-cut emplacements, full-profile trenches with powerful stone parapets " 43 .

The Germans especially strongly reinforced the line on the Western Face (length-40 km, depth-8 km) and on the isthmus of the Sredny Peninsula (length-9 km, depth-3 km). All enemy strongholds were adapted to a circular defense. Fortifications cut into the rocks were invulnerable even to heavy shells and half-ton bombs. Dense minefields and wire entanglements, reinforced concrete emplacements and granite outcroppings stretched for tens of kilometers from north to south. In three years, the heights dominating the defense area were turned into mountain and impregnable fortresses. The German command intended to defend the areas captured in 1941 at any cost. This was confirmed by the order of the commander of the 2nd German mountain infantry division: "We are ordered to hold the front despite the political changes in Finland. This means that the front will be held, because we need nickel and copper. " 44 To fulfill these tasks, the German command allocated 53 thousand people (3 divisions and 4 brigades) for the defense of the "Lapland Wall".-

41 In the battle for the Motherland, 29. X. 1942.

42 Two partisan detachments operated in the Murmansk direction - "Bolshevik of the Arctic" (commander A. S. Smirnov) and "Soviet Murman" (commander S. D. Kuroyedov). In addition, several partisan detachments, assembled in the Arkhangelsk and Vologda regions, fought in the Kandalaksha and Kestenga directions.

43 Khudalov Kh. A. UK. soch., p. 162.

44 Cit. by: Golovko A. G. UK. soch., p. 226.

page 33

more than 750 guns and mortars, 160 aircraft. They were supported by ships of the German Navy 45 .

The operation to liberate the Arctic and expel the Nazis from the Far North of the USSR began to be developed at the very beginning of 194446 . It involved the 14th Army under the command of Lieutenant-General V. I. Shcherbakov (97,000 men, 2,100 guns and mortars, 126 tanks), as well as ships and formations of the Northern Fleet. From the air, the offensive was supported by the 7th Air Army (Colonel-General I. M. Sokolov), consisting of six air divisions (747 aircraft) and naval aviation of the fleet. The Northern Fleet Air Force (Major General E. N. Preobrazhensky) allocated 275 aircraft for the operation .47 The area of breaking through the enemy defenses was planned between the lake. Chapr and a height of 237.1 with a total length of 9 kilometers. The main blow was delivered by Soviet troops from the area south of the lake in the direction of Luostari and Petsamo. In cooperation with the Marines and ships of the Northern Fleet, it was planned to encircle and destroy the 19th German Corps in the Titovka area and clear the Soviet Arctic from the enemy.

The Petsamo-Kirkenes operation was conducted during a period of rapid reduction in the polar day - it was necessary to train troops, especially incoming reinforcements, to act in the conditions of night battles. The offensive was planned over very rough terrain, without roads, through swamps, lakes, and rapid rivers. The weather was unstable and cold, there were frequent rains with snow and fog, the air temperature fluctuated around zero degrees. The troops of the 14th Army carefully prepared for the offensive. Officers practiced future battles on staff exercises. The infantrymen learned to penetrate the enemy's battle formations, to advance immediately behind the artillery barrage. Mortar men were shooting at the squares of the future counteroffensive. Signalmen were trained in targeting and maintaining a stable connection. Sappers were preparing to overcome minefields. Special attention was paid to party and political work in the army.

September 29, 1944 The Stavka approved the offensive plan, and K. A. Meretskov assigned the division and corps commanders of the 14th Army the combat task: "To encircle and destroy the enemy with a frontal strike combined with a detour of the light corps." 48 On the morning of October 7, 1944, Soviet artillery rained hundreds of tons of deadly metal on the Germans. The artillery preparation lasted 2 hours and 35 minutes. Suddenly, a wind blew in from the sea, fog rolled in, and sleet began to fall. Due to difficult weather conditions, well-thought-out air training did not take place, although small groups of aircraft made 229 sorties that day.

Following the artillery barrage, the infantry of the 131st (commanded by Major General 3. N. Alekseev) and 99th (commanded by Major General S. P. Mikulsky) rifle corps moved forward. The 14th Rifle Division broke through the enemy's defenses south of Lake Baikal. Chapr, with battles forced the Titovka river. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 10th Guards Division reached the bridge over the Titovka River near the lake. Laya. In these fierce battles, Mikhail Ivchenko performed his immortal feat - he closed the embrasure of the bunker with his body, died, ensuring the offensive of his unit. Soldiers and officers of the 126th Army made a heroic march around enemy positions during the offensive operation.

45 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 9. p. 148. The total number of Germans in Northern Finland and Norway reached 200 thousand people.

46 Meretskov K. A. UK. soch, pp. 365-374.

47 History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. Vol. 9, p. 149.

48 Noskov A.M. UK. soch., p. 214.

page 34

light rifle corps of Colonel V. N. Solovyov. People were walking on the tundra off-road, loaded with weapons, ammunition, food. His wet clothes turned to ice in the biting wind. You couldn't light fires to dry and cook food - the enemy wouldn't know about the march. "A hike through the tundra is in itself a heroic feat, which is only possible for a Soviet soldier, infinitely devoted to his military duty, to his homeland," Pravda wrote on December 6, 1944.

On the evening of October 9, the commander of the Karelian Front, K. A. Meretskov, clarified the combat tasks of the troops: to capture Luostari and Pechenga as soon as possible, to intercept the road from Zapadnaya Litsa to the border. To pursue the retreating enemy, a task force of Lieutenant-General B. L. Pigarevich's troops was put into battle, paratroopers landed and an offensive began from the Sredny Isthmus. On October 10, the 155th Rifle Regiment of the 14th (then 101st) Guards Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ya. N. Povarenkov, was the first to block the main road along which the Germans were retreating from Western Litsa. The enemy attacked the units of the regiment with all their forces. Here, in the battalion of V. P. Skrygin, on October 11, machine-gunners N. S. Ashurkov and A. F. Bredov performed a feat. They defended the high ground that dominated the area from the Germans who launched a counterattack to the last round, to the last grenade. When reinforcements arrived, the entire hill was littered with the corpses of the Nazis. Both machine gunners were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union (A. F. Bredov - posthumously) .49
On October 15, 1944, Soviet troops broke into Pechenga. The order of the Supreme Commander-in - Chief stated: "The troops of the Karelian Front broke through the strongly fortified German defenses north-west of Murmansk and today, October 15, with the assistance of ships and amphibious units of the Northern Fleet, captured the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) - an important naval base and a powerful stronghold of German defense in the Far North." 50 In this area, more than three thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy were surrounded and destroyed. During the first week of fighting, Soviet troops advanced 60-65 km to the west, captured important strongholds, eliminated the enemy's coastal defenses, and captured large trophies. Already at the first stage of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, the names of hundreds of heroes of the battle for the liberation of the Soviet Arctic became known. All the regiments fought bravely, and entire formations distinguished themselves.

The second stage of the Soviet offensive in the Arctic began on October 18. The battle for the nickel mine area unfolded. In the battles in the North, the Soviet command abandoned the tactic of" gnawing through " the enemy's long-term defense, and imposed a maneuverable war on the enemy with close interaction of the ground forces, aviation and navy. The tactics of encircling and bypassing enemy strongholds became dominant in the actions of the ground forces. G. Helter wrote: "The powerful offensive of the Russians, who wanted to solve the problem with one blow, supported by massive artillery fire, tanks and assault aircraft, could not, of course, resist any front of strong points. Outnumbered, specially trained to fight in the roadless tundra and specially armed enemy infantry seeped through the wide gaps of the front of the guard, bypassed strong points, leaving them (if they were not destroyed by fire) to the second echelon, part of the co-

49 Now there is a bronze monument to Anatoly Bredov in the center of twice-decorated Murmansk.

50 Orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union M. 1975. p. 250.

page 35

they were surrounded and eliminated. " 51 A big surprise for the Germans was the appearance of Soviet tanks in the Arctic. The effectiveness of their actions can be judged by the following example. The T-34 tank under the command of Junior Lieutenant A. M. Asriyan destroyed 12 bunkers, 40 vehicles with people and cargo, 10 passenger cars and up to one hundred Germans with cannon, machine gun and tracks in the battles for Petsamo .52
After the capture of Liinahamari (October 13), Petsamo (October 15) and the nickel mining area (October 22), the 14th army was assigned the task of developing the offensive in the north-western and western directions, starting a liberation campaign in Northern Norway, capturing the cities of Kirkenes and Neiden, and reaching the Nautsi area. Four corps participated in the liberation of Northern Norway (the 99th and 31st on the right flank and the 126th and 127th light Corps on the left). And here the battles were clearly maneuverable. Commander of the 20th German Army Rendulich noted: "I took part in many military operations on various sectors of the Eastern Front. But nowhere, with the exception of the battle of Orel, which was fought under normal terrain conditions, were so many crisis situations and difficult situations created in the lower, regimental, corps and army levels as when the mountain army was separated from the enemy. Nowhere did the commanders of units and subunits have to face such numerous difficulties, which constantly required even the commanders of small units to make independent decisions. " 53
On the morning of October 25, advanced units of the Soviet Army broke into Kirkenes. The city was on fire, an iron ore processing plant blown up by the Germans lay in ruins, and the port was destroyed. To supply the civilian population, our command handed over to the Kirkenes authorities 38 tons of bread and crackers, 25 tons of vegetables, 4.5 tons of butter, 3 wagons of flour, a wagon of fish, etc. Many Norwegians remember the Soviet soldiers who liberated the province of Finmarken. In the center of Kirkenes stands a monument with the inscription " Brave Soviet soldiers in memory of the liberation of Kirkenes. 1944". Nor have the Norwegians forgotten the words of King Haakon VII on June 30, 1945: "The war was won by the Red Army on the Eastern Front. It was this victory that led to the liberation of Norwegian territory in the North by the Red Army... The Norwegian people accepted the Red Army as a liberator. " 54
The last order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with gratitude for the military actions during the liberation of the Soviet Arctic and Northern Norway was signed on November 1, 1944. On the same day, Moscow for the fourth time saluted the troops of the Karelian Front and the sailors of the Northern Fleet with 24 artillery volleys from 224 guns. Thus ended the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation. More than 50 units and formations received honorary names of Pechenga and Kirkenes. 70 battalions, regiments, divisions, ships, formations were awarded military orders. Dozens of servicemen, including 26 sailors and paratroopers, became Heroes of the Soviet Union. In commemoration of the victories won and in memory of the heroic defense of the Arctic in 1941-1944. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal "For the Defense of the Soviet Arctic", which was awarded not only to participants in battles, but also to many home front workers (a total of 330,790 people) .55
51 Holter H. Armee in Arktic. Bad Nauheim, 1953, S. 45.

52 Istoriya ordena Lenina Leningradskogo voennogo okruga [History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District], Moscow, 1974, p. 427.

53 Rendulich L. UK. soch., p. 191.

54 Izvestiya, 5. VII. 1945.

55 30 years of national feat. Murmansk. 1975, p. 43.

page 36

The Petsamo-Kirkenes operation was the result of a deep plan of the Soviet command, high military skill of the officers and selfless courage and bravery of the soldiers. Detour maneuvers of large formations off-road, the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in the tundra, landing troops in the deep rear of the enemy, a combination of strikes from land, sea and air put the enemy in a hopeless position and forced them to quickly withdraw.

During the 19-day battle, the 14th Army advanced to the west up to 150 km, liberated the Pechenga region and Northern Norway. Our losses amounted to 15,773 people, including 2,122 people who died in the battles for the freedom of Norway. The enemy lost only about 30 thousand people killed. The North Sea Fleet sank more than 150 enemy ships in the fall of 1944. In total, during the fighting in the Arctic, Nazi Germany lost about 100 thousand soldiers and officers, almost 2 thousand aircraft, more than 800 combat and transport vessels .56 The German soldier, deprived of his usual tank, mechanized and air support in the Arctic, turned out to be weaker than the Soviet soldier, who was inspired by love for the Motherland, hatred for the enemy, self-righteousness and the native land itself. On the side of the Soviet troops was a huge moral and political superiority.

The victory in the Arctic allowed the workers of the Kola Peninsula to start a peaceful life, to begin the revival of the economy of Murmansk. Military units that participated in the defeat of the Germans were released for use on other fronts. The defeat of the German-Fascist troops in the Arctic showed the increased and comprehensive skill of Soviet soldiers, their high morale, endurance and mass heroism. The victory of our army and navy in the Arctic region enriched Soviet military art with valuable combat experience, which has not lost its significance even today.

The West still falsifies the history of military operations during the Second World War in the Soviet Arctic. At the same time, there is a tendency to embellish the victories of the Wehrmacht at the initial stage of the war and hide the true reasons for its defeat - at the final stage. Even such an objective factor as the geographical environment is taken into account and evaluated differently in memoirs, documents and works published in Germany. So, at the beginning of the war, Lieutenant General Dietl noted that the Russians can stubbornly resist "because of the favorable terrain for defense." And his successor as army commander, Rendulich, when describing the events of 1944, states something else: "The terrain gives the attacking side great opportunities to implement its initiative." 57 Justifying the failure of the "blitzkrieg" in the Arctic, W. Erfurt wrote that the fascist troops "were defeated by the special natural and climatic conditions of the Arctic... Long summer days and difficulty sleeping, rough primitive terrain with lakes, swamps and mosquitoes, endless polar nights and melancholy forests. All this caused fear and moral depression in everyone who was here for a certain period of time." 58
And yet the truth about the battles in the Arctic Region is also evident in bourgeois works. Thus, G. Helter estimates the summer offensive of 1941 on Murmansk as follows: "As a result of this operation, the German and Finnish troops managed only to regain the border areas occupied by the Russians. Such was the pitiful result of a campaign that had set itself the lofty goal of depriving the Soviet Union of all its members.

56 History of the Second World War. 1939-1945, vol. 9, p. 152; 30 let narodnom podvigu, p. 40.

57 Rendulich L. UK. soch., p. 189.

58 Erfurth W. Op. cit., S. 48, 61.

page 37

Union of the most important, shortest, year-round functioning artery of overseas imports " 59 .

There are objective pages in the memoirs of German General A. Buchner: "We soon discovered that before us were the best Soviet troops from Siberia and the northern regions of the USSR, who had high moral and combat qualities, adapted to the harsh climate, rough terrain of the north and fantastically stubborn in battle... The offensive on Murmansk had to be suspended. It was quite clear that we had grossly underestimated both the terrain and the enemy. " 60
But much more often, Western historians are not averse to distorting the picture of the battles in the Arctic, and if they cannot prove the unprovable, then at least silence the essence of these events. In the three-volume edition " The War of Norway. 1940-1945", which has a total of 2500 pages and is written by A. D. Dahl, the former head of the Norwegian military mission in Northern Norway, less than two pages are devoted to the defeat of the German-Fascist troops in the Arctic. In this essay there is not a word about the heroic campaign of the light rifle corps of the 14th Army in Neiden and Nautsi, about the USSR's gratuitous assistance to the population of Northern Norway. But the author admires the actions of the German side in 1944:" This retreat was a fantastic achievement both in terms of planning and in terms of its implementation " 61 .

The objective and truthful presentation of the course of military operations in the Soviet Arctic during the Second World War continues to face Soviet historians as acutely as ever. It is becoming particularly topical in the current international situation. At a time when the strategic armament reserves of the aggressive NATO bloc are being concentrated in Norway, and large-scale maneuvers are constantly being conducted in the North Atlantic, studying the experience of waging war in the circumpolar regions is becoming extremely important. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" states that this victory "showed the superiority of Soviet military science and art, a high level of strategic leadership and combat skills of our military personnel." 62 All this was fully manifested in the events in the Arctic, where the plans of Nazi Germany were completely destroyed.

59 Cit. po: Polyarnaya pravda, 29. X. 1980.

60 Buchner A. Attack in the Tundra. - Military Review, 1956, N l, S 99, 108.

61 Cit. by: Liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War. Ed. 2-E. M. 1974, p. 261.

62 Pravda, 17. VI. 1984.

page 38

Permanent link to this publication: