In the history of the more than 120-year struggle of the Polish people for independence, the turning point was the overthrow of tsarism in Russia, and then the victory of the October Revolution, as a result of which Poland found itself in the immediate neighborhood of the world's first socialist state. The revolutionary changes that have taken place in Russia have opened up new opportunities for the Polish people, and especially for the working class and the masses of the people, to fight for national and social liberation. Therefore, it is not surprising that so much attention has been paid to such a historical event as the October Revolution was for Russia, for Poland, and for all mankind in Soviet and Polish historiography and in the science of other countries. Nevertheless, the history of the October Revolution still inspires scientists to make new developments and generalizations. In particular, in the historiography of people's Poland, the problem of the influence of the October Revolution on the formation of social relations in the Polish lands at the end of the First World War, on the development of concepts of the future state by various political groups, and, finally, on the "internationalization of the Polish question" during the decisive period of the struggle for the restoration of independence in 1918, development of socio-political relations and class struggle in interwar Poland 1 .

1 A lot of publications on this topic have appeared in Poland in recent years. Among them deserve special attention: N. Jablonski. Narodziny Drugiej Rze-czypospolitej 1918-1919. Warszawa. 1962; ejusd. Znaczenie Rewolucji Pazdziernikowej dla ksztaltowania sic, bytu narodowo-panstwowego i stosunkow spolecznych w Polsce. "Rewolucja Pazdziernikowa a Polska". Warszawa. 1967; ejusd. Wielka Socjalistyczna Rewolucja Pazdziernikowa a Polska. Warszawa. 1967; ejusd. Lenin a polski ruch robotniczy i wyzwolericze dgzenia narodu polskiego. Warszawa. 1969; ejusd. Lenin a Polska. "W kregu inspiracji leninowskich". Wroclaw. 1971; F. Tych. Stosunek SDKPiL, PPS- Lewicy i KPRP do Rewolucji Pazdziernikowej. "Rewolucja Pazdziernikowa a Polska"; W. Stankiewicz. Wplyw Rewolucji Pazdziernikowej na ruch chlopski. Ibid.; W. Najdus. Polacy w rewolucji 117 roku. Warszawa. 1967; "Ksigga. Polakow uczestnikow Rewolucji Pazdziernikowej". Warszawa. 1957; "Polacy o Leninie". Warszawa. 1970; J. Torniсki. Problem leninowskiego hasla dyktatury proletariatu a migdzywojenna PPS. "Z pola walki", 1970, N 1; R. Jermolajewa, A. Manusiewicz. Lenin a Polski ruch robotniczy. Warszawa. 1976; A. Czubinski. Wybrane problemy polskiego i miedzynarodowego ruchu robotniczego. Warszawa. 1977; "Polska-ZSRR. Internacjonalistyczna wspolpraca-historia i wspolszesnosc". T. I. Warszawa. 1977. This volume contains, in particular, the following articles: N. Jablonski. Historia i wspolczesnosc; J. Sobczak. Wspolpraca SDKPiL z SDPRR i boJszewikami w latach 1906 - 1911; W. Toporowicz. Rosyjskie partie polityczne wobec kwestii polskiej w latach I wojny swiatowej, Revolucji Lutowej i Pazdziernikowej (1914 - 1917); B. Radlak. Partie socjalictyczne w Polsce a Rewolucja Pazdziernikowa; R. Jermolajewa. Polacy-internacjonalisci w Rewolucji Pazdziernikowej i wojnie domowej w Rosji w latach 1917 - 1920; W. Niewolina. Miedzynarodowka Komunistyczna i rewolucyjna wspolpraca RKP(b) z Komunistyczna Partia. Robotnicza Polski (1918 - 1923); A. Tymieniecka. Pola KPP i lewicy

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The position taken by Soviet Russia on the Polish question immediately after the victory of the October Revolution was logically derived from the program of the Bolshevik Party, which was developed 14 years before this historic event, and was based on Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution and Lenin's slogan on the right of nations to self-determination.

As you know, V. I. Lenin repeatedly dealt with Polish problems even before he arrived in Krakow in 1912. He had many reasons for that. One of them was the fact that a significant part of the Polish lands was part of tsarist Russia before the revolution. This meant that if the Bolshevik party had set itself as its main goal the overthrow of tsarism and the implementation of a social revolution in Russia, it should also have taken into account the Polish aspect and reacted positively to Poland's desire for independence .2 This was all the more necessary because the slogan of self-determination put forward by Lenin and the Bolshevik Party was an integral part of Lenin's general theory of the national question. In addition, Lenin's interest in Polish problems was dictated by the fact that the Kingdom of Poland, as the region belonging to Tsarist Russia that was most advanced to the west, was a relatively heavily industrialized region with a large working class and a developed labor movement, as well as a developed political life .3 These circumstances led to the fact that every movement in Russia directed against tsarism had to face the question of the attitude towards the political groups of the Kingdom of Poland. He also confronted the Bolshevik Party, especially since for the vanguard of the Russian proletariat, correct relations between the Russian and Polish working-class movements were very important.

The main principles of Lenin's program of the national question, which was implemented after the victory of the October Revolution, were, as is well known, adopted already at the Second Congress of the RSDLP. These principles also applied to the Polish question. In his 1903 work "The National Question in Our Program," Lenin recalled the statements of Karl Marx and Fr. Engels on the Polish question, 4 drew attention to the fact that during the period of imperialism and the impending social revolution in tsarist Russia, the Polish question ceased to play the exclusive role in Europe that the creators of scientific socialism had given it in the second half of the nineteenth century .5 Nevertheless, Lenin attached great importance to the Polish question. He proceeded first of all from an analysis of the general alignment of political forces in Europe and, in particular, in Russia, from the significance of the national question for the coming socialist revolution, and finally from the vital interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.

Polemicizing with the views of R. Luxemburg on the national question, with her negative attitude to the slogan of self-determination and the demand for the restoration of the Polish state, 6 Lenin in 1903 noted: "There is no doubt that class antagonism has now pushed national issues far into the background, but it cannot be categorically stated-

socjalistycznej w waiee o przyjazn mas pracujacych Polski zu Zwizkiem Radzteckim w okresie mifdzywojennym i i.). An attempt to compare and analyze the most important Polish publications concerning the topic of interest to us was made by J. Sobczak. Historiografia polska о Rewolucji Pazdziernikovej. "Dzieje Najnowsze", 1977, jNb 2.

2 H. Jablonski. Lenin a Polska, str. 13.

3 См.: "Polska klasa robotnicza". Tt. 1 - 7. Warszawa. 1970 - 1975; M. Zychowski. Polska mysl socjalictyszna XIX i XX wieku. Warszawa. 1976; "Dzieje buriuazjt w Pplsce". Warszawa. 1974.

4 "Marks i Engels on Polsce". Tt. 1 - 2. Warszawa. 1960.

5 See: V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 7, pp. 237-238.

6 М. Zychowski. Op. cit., str. 204 etc.

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wait without running the risk of falling into the doctrinaire attitude that it is impossible for a certain national issue to temporarily appear in the forefront of the political drama... Russian social-democracy does not tie its hands in the least. It takes into account all possible, even all conceivable combinations, when it puts forward in its program the recognition of the right to self-determination of nations. This program does not in the least exclude the possibility that the Polish proletariat should set as its slogan a free and independent republic of Poland, even if the probability of this being possible before socialism was absolutely negligible."7
Meanwhile, R. Luxemburg, proceeding from purely economic premises (the theory of "organic fusion"), dogmatically interpreted the mechanism of social development .8 It was of the opinion that the process of forming new nations that began in the era of capitalism, with the transition of free competition capitalism to its highest stage - imperialism-was already, in fact, over. In her opinion, the emerging economic ties, uniting individual countries, should have finally eliminated the possibility of forming new national states in the conditions of capitalism.

Lenin , in his polemic with Luxemburg, proved 9 that if in most countries of Western Europe the national question was resolved in the period between the French bourgeois Revolution of the late eighteenth century. and the Paris Commune of 1871, while in Eastern Europe and Asia this issue is still waiting to be resolved. Carefully analyzing the development of events in this region of the world, Lenin came to the conclusion that the era of bourgeois - democratic revolutions and national liberation movements began here only under the influence of the events of 1905 in Russia. That is why, correctly assessing the problem of national liberation movements in Russia, which were one of the most important factors in the revolutionary process, he so consistently defended the point on the right of nations to self-determination in the RSDLP program. There was another important reason why Lenin rejected Luxemburg's erroneous position on the national question and engaged in a sharp polemic against it. It was concerned with the proper development of relations between the Polish and Russian working classes. Lenin attached great importance to the joint revolutionary actions of the Polish and Russian proletariat and the masses of the people. In their militant alliance, he saw the consolidation of forces in the struggle to overthrow the autocracy and ensure the socialist revolution .10
Defining his position on the national question on the eve of the First World War, Lenin stated:: "This state of affairs presents the proletariat of Russia with a twofold, or rather a two-sided, task: the struggle against all nationalism, and first of all against Great-Russian nationalism; the recognition not only of the full equality of all nations in general, but also of equality in relation to State-building, i.e., the right of nations to self-determination, to secession; - and at the same time, and precisely in the interests of the successful struggle against all kinds of nationalism of all nations, defending the unity of the proletarian struggle and proletarian organizations, merging them as closely as possible into an international community, in spite of bourgeois aspirations for national isolation. Full equal rights of nations; the right of self-determination of nations; sia-

7 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 7, p. 239.

8 See: R. Luksemburg. Wybor pism. Tt. 1 - 2. Warszawa. 1959.

9 See: V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 25, pp. 257-320. See also: "Lenin o Polsce i polskim ruchu robotniczym". Warszawa. 1957.

10 See about this: "Essays on Revolutionary relations between the peoples of Russia and Poland. 1815-11917", Moscow, 1976; R. Jermolajewa, A. Manusiewicz. Op. cit.; J. Sobczak. Wspolpraca SDKPiL z SDPRR i bolszewikami w latach 1906 - 1911. "Polska-ZSRR".

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This national program is taught to the workers by Marxism, by the experience of the whole world and by the experience of Russia. " 11
Such a clear program on the national question, elaborated by Lenin on the basis of a Marxist analysis of concrete historical phenomena in Eastern Europe, including Russia, was not available to any workers ' party other than the Bolshevik party, either in the countries that divided Poland or in all of Europe. That is why the fact that even before the outbreak of the First World War the most revolutionary wing of the Russian working-class movement took up a position favorable to the cause of Polish independence was of great importance to the Polish working class and to the Polish people. This fact became especially evident at the outbreak of the First World War, when the Polish question, along with others, became an element of bargaining between the bloc of Central Powers and the Entente.

None of the States that divided Poland and were at war in 1914 intended to resolve the Polish question in accordance with the desire of the Polish people for independence. In fact, each of them only wanted to expand its territory by annexing new Polish lands. At the same time, the armies of the three states that divided Poland, which put about 2 million Poles under arms and launched offensive operations on Polish lands, were not indifferent to the position of the Polish soldiers and the Polish population. Therefore, each of these powers tried to guarantee the favor of the Polish population, or at least to ensure its neutral position in a difficult military situation. And although the Polish question was not the main subject of dispute between the states that divided Poland, each of them tried to get a "Polish trump card".

Tsarist Russia, which had set as its military goal the weakening of Germany, the defeat of the Habsburg Monarchy and the possession of the Straits on the Black Sea, put forward the following program in relation to Polish lands: annexation of the regions along the Lower Neman and in Eastern Galicia, annexation of the eastern part of Poznań, Silesia and Western Galicia to the future Poland connected with Russia .13 These intentions of the autocracy, coordinated with its allies - Britain and France, were expressed in the manifesto of August 14, 1914, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, addressed to the Poles. 14 The manifesto proclaimed the unification of all Polish lands under the scepter of the tsar and at the same time promised to change the forms of administration of Polish lands. This manifesto, as well as subsequent documents signed by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, was regarded by Polish bourgeois political parties operating with the support of tsarist Russia as a symptom of a positive solution to the Polish question .15 R. Dmowski and other representatives of the National Democratic Party expressed their conviction that the aforementioned position of tsarist Russia on the unification of all Polish lands would be approved by the states that are in alliance with Russia, and this, in turn, would create prerequisites for a positive solution of the Polish question after the end of the World War. Meanwhile, for tsarist Russia, even in the event of a victorious end to the war for it and its Western allies, the manifesto of Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich was only the basis for Russia's demands on the Polish question at the future peace conference.

11 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 25, pp. 319-320.

12 S. Kieniewicz. Historia Polski 1795 - 1918. Warszawa. 1968, str. 514.

13 W. Toporowicz. Sprawa polska w polityce rosyjskiej. Warszawa. 1973, str. 18.

14 K. W. Kumaniecki. Odbudowa panstwowosci polskiej. Najwazniejsxe doku-menty. 1912-styczen 1924. Warszawa-Krakow. 1924, str. 27.

15 См.: R. Dmowski. Polityka polska i odbudowanie paiistwa. Warszawa. 1925.

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Meanwhile, military operations took an unfortunate turn for tsarist Russia. In 1915, as a result of the summer offensive of the Central Powers, the tsarist troops were forced to leave the Kingdom of Poland. From then until the end of World War I, all ethnically Polish lands were under German and Austro-Hungarian occupation. Nevertheless, to the very end, tsarism did not abandon either the Kingdom of Poland or the concept of uniting all Polish lands under its own rule. When the ethnically Polish lands were seized by Germany and Austria-Hungary, tsarism and all the bourgeois parties in Russia began to put forward the slogan of "liberation" and "independence" of Poland. These slogans were, of course, another attempt to evoke a favorable mood among the Polish population in an unfavorable military situation for Russia. At the same time, it was an attempt on the part of the autocracy to hide its aggressive goals from the Russian people.

Of all the political parties in Russia, only the Bolshevik party strongly condemned these goals. The Bolshevik Party revealed their imperialist, aggressive nature, hidden under the slogans of " the desire to bring freedom to the enslaved peoples." Lenin, in his article published in February 1916, "On a world without Annexations and on the independence of Poland as slogans of the Day in Russia," left no shadow of doubt as to what was really behind the slogans put forward by the ruling circles. He stated that behind the slogans proclaimed by the Russian bourgeoisie and tsarism about a world without annexations, independence of Poland, etc., lies the desire of the imperialist and conservative forces in Russia to regain the Polish lands lost as a result of the military defeats it suffered from the Central Powers. Therefore, Lenin pointed out, Russian social-democracy and the entire camp of revolutionary forces must expose these false slogans of tsarism, for they signify the desire to continue the war and justify its conduct. 16
In fact, the tsarist government, despite its desire to return to Polish lands, was in no hurry to develop the foundations of autonomy for Poland. For two years, the future status of the Kingdom of Poland was discussed in the ministerial circles of St. Petersburg. The government's most far-reaching proposals went no further than granting Poles limited self-government and expanding the use of their native language. Only in connection with the act of November 5, 1916, in which Germany and Austria-Hungary announced the creation of an unspecified Polish state and recruitment in the Kingdom of Poland, did tsarist Russia begin to emphasize more clearly the demand for a "free Poland" consisting of all the parts captured during the partitions of the three powers. It was said that Poland would have a special structure and an army, but would remain under the rule of tsarism. Despite this, until the end of tsardom, the Russian authorities of that time did not want to define exactly their program on the Polish question .17
The position of tsarist Russia on the Polish question was significantly reflected in the attitude of its allies - England and France. 18 In France, where Polish emigration of various political trends was strong, feelings of sympathy for the Polish people were demonstrated. The cause of restoring an independent Poland also found a certain number of supporters here. However in French-

16 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 27, pp. 246-249.

17 W. Toporowicz. Sprawa polska w polityce rosyjskiej, str. 225; J. Holzer, J. Molenda. Polska w pierwszej wojnie swiatowej. Warszawa. 1963, str. 141 - 143.

18 H. JabIonski. Narodziny Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, sir. 13 etc.; R. Dmowski. Op. cit.

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In European politics, the need to preserve the Franco-Russian alliance was brought to the fore. France was forced to do this by economic, political, and military - strategic considerations. France tried at all costs to keep Russia in a state of war with Germany. Fearing the threat of German troops entering Paris in the event of Russia's withdrawal from the war or its defeat, which, in turn, would pose a threat to large French investments in Russia, France was ready to take into account any position of tsarist Russia on the Polish question. A similar position was taken by Britain, for which Russia was a political and military ally necessary for the military and economic weakening of Germany. Like France, Britain did not want to spoil relations with the tsarist government, which in the Entente camp reserved for itself the exclusive right to resolve the Polish question. Therefore, for the Entente states, the Polish question was only an internal matter of Russia. Even shortly before the fall of tsarism, the French government still recognized Russia's right to freely define its western borders .19
As mentioned above, in 1915 German and Austro-Hungarian troops occupied the Kingdom of Poland. The fact that the Central Powers had captured this area forced them to deal with the Polish issue, especially since they were trying to use Polish recruits to continue the war. At first, however, there was a lack of agreement in the views of Berlin and Vienna on the solution of the Polish question .20 Austro-Hungarian politicians supported the unification of the Kingdom of Poland with Galicia within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. This decision was also supported by Polish Galician politicians who rallied in the Central National Committee 21 . Meanwhile, the" Austro - Polish " decision was strongly opposed by the German ruling circles. In Germany, the concept of creating a buffer state was considered, which included the territory of the former Russian part of Poland and was completely subordinate to the Reich22 .

The bargaining between Berlin and Vienna over the question of the Kingdom of Poland ended at the moment when Germany in 1916 lost hope of concluding a separate peace with tsarist Russia and faced the problem of preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front. In these circumstances, it was of great importance for the Central Powers, whose human potential was already running out, to receive Polish recruits. Therefore, they counted on attracting the Poles to their side. This purpose should have been served by the act of November 5, 1916, already mentioned above, announcing the decision of two emperors-Wilhelm II and Franz Joseph-to create the Kingdom of Poland. This decision in the form of identical manifestos was signed by the Governors-General-German General Bezeler in Warsaw and Austrian General Cook in Lublin. Both manifestos declared that it was decided to "create an independent state with a hereditary monarchy and a constitutional system" from the lands taken from Russia .23 As it follows from mani-

19 P. Renouvin. La crise europeenne et la premiere guerre mottdiale. P. 1948, P. 409.

20 A thorough study was devoted to this issue by L. Grosfeld. Polityka panstw centralnych wobec sprawy polskiej w latach pierwszej wojny swiatowej. Warszawa, 1962. Among the works in German, the monograph by F. Fischer deserves attention, in particular. Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegspolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914 - 1918. Dusseldorf. 1961.

21 См. J. Holzer, J. Molenda. Op. cit., str. 66 etc.; W. Lipinski. Walka zbrojna о niepodleglosc Polski 1915 - 1918. Warszawa. 1935.

22 См.: J. Fajewski. "Mitteleuropa". Studia z dziejow imperializmu niemieckiego w dobie pierwszej wojny swiatowej. Poznafi. 1959; J. Knebel. SPD wobec sprawy polskiej (1914- 1918). Warszawa. 1967.

23 The contents of the manifesto are given by K. W. Kumaniecki. Op. cit.; See also L. Grosfeld. Tzw. akt 5 listopada. "Kwartalnik Historyczny", 1954, N 2.

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However, this state with undefined borders was supposed to have its own army, connected with the "allied" powers, that is, with Germany and Austria - Hungary. The manifesto did not even mention the fate of the Poles in the Polish territories captured during the partitions of Prussia and Austria; this meant that both emperors considered the fate of the Prussian part of the Polish lands and Galicia an internal matter of their states.

Polish society accepted the act of November 5 with mixed feelings. Most of the bourgeois parties were ready to take advantage of the new situation and interpret this act in a broad sense. Only the so-called activists, that is, political groups oriented towards the Central Powers, as well as the majority of landowners and clergy, saw in the act of November 5 a turning point in the history of the struggle for the solution of the Polish question with the support of Germany and Austria-Hungary .24 The left wing of the workers ' movement, represented mainly by the SDKPiL and the PPS-levica, qualified the act of November 5 as a maneuver of the Austro-German occupation authorities, aimed at obtaining recruits from the Kingdom of Poland and being a new violation of the right of the Polish people to freedom .25
Despite the fact that the occupation authorities, in accordance with the act of November 5, agreed to the creation in January 1917 of the Soviet Union. The Provisional State Council, which included representatives of the Polish bourgeois parties and was to become a surrogate for the Polish Sejm or Provisional Government, was increasingly reserved and even hostile to the Central Powers. The recruitment of volunteers for the "Polish Wehrmacht" completely failed. Soon even Pilsudski and his legions refused to take the oath of allegiance to the brotherhood in arms with the troops of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The problem of the so-called oath crisis has led to a sharp escalation of the conflict between Polish society and the occupation authorities. Pilsudski himself was arrested by the Germans in July 1917 and interned in Magdeburg. At the same time, in the wake of discontent with the policy of the occupation authorities, revolutionary sentiments began to grow in the country. The revolutionary actions of the proletariat of the Kingdom of Poland were directed both against the occupation authorities and against the Polish propertied classes.

The act of November 5, as well as attempts to create a surrogate of Polish state power, completely subordinate to the German and Austrian governors-General, was not recognized by any other country except the Central Powers. After the act of November 5, the tsarist government protested, not recognizing the rights of Germany and Austria-Hungary to create a Polish state and conduct recruitment in it. This protest was joined by the governments of France and England, thus giving tsarism a free hand in resolving the Polish question.

All this shows that none of the states that divided Poland and were in a state of imperialist war, as well as none of the states allied to Russia or Germany and Austria-Hungary, did not give the Polish people prospects for restoring their own statehood. "The Polish question-how to correctly emphasize

24 Н. Jablonski. Polityka Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej w czasie wojny 1914- 1918. Warszawa. 1958, str. 237 etc.

25 See: F. Tych. PPS-Lewica w latach wojny 1914 - 1918. Warszawa. 1960; J. Kan- cewicz. SDKPiL wobec zagadnien wojny, rewolucji i niepodleglosci Polski w latach 1914 - 1918. "Ruch robotniczy i ludowy w Polsce w latach 1914 - 1923". Warszawa. 1960.

26 This problem already has a large literature. W. Lipinski. Op. cit.; H. Jablonski. Polityka Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej; J. Holzer, J. Molenda. Op. cit., etc. have written about this in great detail.

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Mr. Yablonsky-only a very significant change in the international situation, but not in the form of a tilt in the chances of military victory in the direction of one or the other coalition, could have brought it to the European stage on a different scale than before. Decisions at that time may have been different, but it is difficult to talk about independence. Only a revolution in one of the states that divided Poland could change its position. " 27
Such changes in the existing balance of power were made by the events that took place in Russia as a result of the February Revolution of 1917. The overthrow of tsarism, the rise to power of new political forces, the emergence of a center of revolutionary power in the form of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies, on the one hand, and the bourgeois Provisional Government, on the other, were of great importance for the Polish question and for the development of the international situation in general. For Polish political parties, from the left to the right, the essential question was what position the new government in Russia would take in restoring the Polish state, whether the Provisional Government would be able to hold on, or whether the Soviets would take full control of the country. For the politicians of England and France, as well as the United States, which entered the war in April 1917, the problem of fundamental importance was the preservation of Russia as an ally of the Entente. This was all the more important for the Entente states, since at that time there was a real possibility of Russia's withdrawal from the war due to the progressive growth of anti-war sentiment among the country's population and in the army. France was especially interested, for purely military reasons, in the new Russian authorities continuing military operations, since otherwise the Central Powers could transfer their forces from the Eastern Front to the Western and launch a victorious offensive on the French front. These considerations led to the fact that, despite the pressure of Polish emigrant political centers in Paris , London and Washington, 28 after the overthrow of tsarism, the Entente states still made their decisions on the Polish question dependent on the development of the situation in Russia, on whether it would remain an ally of the Entente.

Meanwhile, shortly after its constitution, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies, reflecting the position of the revolutionary Russian proletariat, issued an appeal to the Polish people on March 14(27), 1917, declaring:: "The tsarist regime, which for a century and a half oppressed the Polish people simultaneously with the Russian one, has been overthrown by the combined forces of the proletariat and the troops. Informing the Polish people of this victory of freedom over the All-Russian gendarme, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies declares that the democracy of Russia is based on the recognition of the national and political self-determination of peoples, and proclaims that Poland has the right to be completely independent in state and international relations. " 29
The appeal of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies corresponded in spirit to the right of nations to self-determination. It recognized, without any restrictions or conditions, the right of the Polish people to independence and State sovereignty. This was the most far-reaching declaration on the Polish question, which in this respect cannot be compared with any of the above statements.

27 Н. Jablonski. Znaczenie Rewolucji Pazdziernikowej dla ksztaltowania sig bylu narodowo-panstwowego i stosunkow spolecznych w Polsce, str. 25.

28 See: R. Dmowski. Op. cit.; M. Leczyk. Komitet Narodowy Polski a Ententa i Stany Zjednoczone 1917 - 1919. Warszawa. 1966; J. Pajewski. Wokol sprawy polskiej, Paryz- Lozanna-Londyn. 1914 - 1918. Poznan. 1970.

29 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", Vol. I. February 1917-November 1918, Moscow, 1963, p. 26.

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neither with the act of November 5 issued by Germany and Austria-Hungary, which aimed at creating a Polish state dependent on the Central Powers, nor, finally, with the statements of representatives of the Entente governments, which, as already noted above, interpreted the Polish question as an internal matter Russia. The weight of the declaration of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies was also given by the fact that it came from representatives of revolutionary Russia.

The Provisional Government could not ignore the appeal of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. Therefore, at first it behaved with restraint, creating only the Liquidation Commission for the Kingdom of Poland headed by A. Lednicki30 . However, under the pressure of the general situation, it was forced to determine its position on the Polish question. In a proclamation issued on March 17(30), 1917, the Provisional Government called for the restoration of "an independent Polish state formed from all the lands inhabited in the majority by the Polish people." But at the same time, the proclamation stipulated that the future Polish state should be united with Russia in a "free military alliance" and that "the Russian Constituent Assembly will have to finally seal the new fraternal alliance."31 As can be seen from these formulations, the Provisional Government did not stand on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination, reserving the possibility of making a decision on the Polish question in the future. The appeal of the Provisional Government was thus a retrogression in comparison with the appeal of the Petrograd Soviet. However, despite the reservations of the Provisional Government and the declarative nature of the Petrograd Soviet's appeal, both of these documents had a great impact on the situation of Poles in Russia, who mostly sided with the revolution, creating their own political organizations and military units, 32 and on the political situation in Poland, and in general on the so-called internationalization of the Polish question.

Russia's allies, Britain, France and Italy, fully endorsed the position of the Provisional Government, as set out in the appeal of March 17(30), 1917. In the future, they also did not intend to impose their own opinion on the Polish issue on Russia. Nevertheless, the very fact of the fall of tsarism gave them greater freedom to use the "Polish trump card". It was now necessary, especially for France, both politically and militarily. France, fighting hard against the Central Powers, could count on the sympathy of the Polish people, who were under German-Austrian occupation. After all, the military successes of France could bring the prospect of his release closer. And the French government, due to uncertainty about the development of the situation in Russia after the fall of tsarism there, tried to secure an influential position in resolving the Polish question. This goal was served, in particular, by the creation of the center of the Polish armed forces in France and their use on the Western Front.

Following this, in the second half of 1917, the governments of France, Britain, Italy, and the United States recognized the Polish National Committee established by anti-German supporters as an unofficial representation of Polish interests in the West .33 The occupation authorities in Poland did not remain indifferent to these measures. In September 1917, the two Governors-General agreed to the creation of the

30 See ibid., pp. 34-35.

31 Ibid., pp. 35-36.

32 See W. Najdus. Op. cit.; R. Jermolajewa. Op. cit.

33 M. Leczyk. Op. cit.; J. Pajewski. Wokol sprawy polskiej.

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"Polish state power". It was supposed to consist of a Regency Council (before the king was enthroned and the government was established) and a State Council as a legislative body. In practice, this Polish government was only responsible for education and the judicial system. It also had an impact on the activities of local self-government. However, the Polish population ignored the orders of this government, since it acted according to the will of the occupiers. 34
Under these circumstances, the final solution of the Polish question depended on the direction of further changes in the alignment of political and social forces in Central and Eastern Europe, and above all on the direction of the further development of the revolution in Russia.

In accordance with Lenin's strategy and tactics, the working masses of Russia, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, carried out a revolutionary coup in October 1917, overthrew the Provisional Government and took power into their own hands. The October Revolution, being a turning point in world history, was also crucial for the cause of Poland's independence. One of the first legislative acts issued by Soviet Russia was the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, published on November 3(16), 1917. It proclaimed: "(1) The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; (2) the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to secession and the formation of an independent state; (3) the abolition of all and sundry national and national-religious privileges and restrictions; and (4) the free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia."35 It was a general declaration that provided the basis for the Council of People's Commissars to draft specific decrees on the national question, including the Polish one. The significance of this document, despite the fact that the ethnographic Polish lands were then under German-Austrian occupation, was enormous. It consisted in the fact that the Soviet government recognized without reservations the right of the Polish people to self-determination, and the slogan of self-determination of all peoples had a great power of influence on the peoples enslaved by Germany and Austria-Hungary in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as by imperialist states in other parts of the world.

Thus, thanks to the victory of the October Revolution, the cause of the independence of the Polish people found the full support of the new political forces of Russia. These forces, led by the Bolshevik Party, spoke out both against the treatises concluded by tsarism on the partitions of Poland, and against the ambiguous promises of the Provisional Government regarding the restoration of the Polish state. This fact caused at the same time a further evolution of the position of the Entente powers on the restoration of the Polish state, which had previously been so sensitive for their Russian ally, which was favorable from the point of view of the interests of the Polish people. Since then, the leading politicians of the Western powers could openly proclaim the slogan of freedom of Poland without much fear, which won them the sympathy of Poles and all opponents of the Central Powers. On January 5, 1918, British Prime Minister D. Lloyd George said to representatives of the British trade unions:"We believe that an independent Poland, including all exclusively Polish elements who wish to become part of it, is an urgent need to stabilize the life of Eastern Europe." 36 A few days later, on January 8, 1918, US President W. Wilson, offering his "peace program" of 14

34 J. Holzer, J. Molenda. Op. cit., str. 229 etc.

35 "Decrees of Soviet Power", vol. I. M. 1957, p. 40.

36 Cit. by: R. Dmowski. Op. eit, str. 318.

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13 proclaimed: "An independent Polish State should be established, which should include the territories where the undisputed Polish population lives, and have guaranteed free and safe access to the sea, and its political, economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by the international covenant" 37 .

These hasty declarations of the statesmen representing the main imperialist Powers of the West were, of course, dictated not only by the desire to resolve the Polish question. Their main concern was to win the sympathy of the Poles and other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe in order, on the one hand, to complicate the situation of the Central Powers by arousing the aspirations of the enslaved peoples for independence, and, on the other, to counteract the influence of the socialist revolution on the masses outside Soviet Russia.

Of great importance for the future fate of the Polish question was the fact of Soviet Russia's withdrawal from the imperialist war, which corresponded to the Leninist principles of the Bolshevik Party's policy, as well as to the general will of the masses of the people. Peace negotiations between representatives of the Soviet Government and Germany and Austria - Hungary began in December 1917 and, after great difficulties, were completed in March 1918. The Soviet side demanded that the troops of the Central Powers leave the territories captured in the east, and the population living there decide their fate by referendum .38 The central Powers reserved for themselves the right to decide the future of the lands they occupied, which, according to German plans, were to be included in the political and economic system of so-called Central Europe .39 During the Brest-Litovsk talks, one of the main contentious issues was the Polish issue. The Soviet Government, by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, renounced Russia's rights to the Kingdom of Poland and demanded the same from the Central Powers. At that time, however, Soviet Russia was still unable to put its own point of view on the Polish question into practice. Therefore, despite the conclusion of the Brest Peace, the Central Powers still occupied the Kingdom of Poland, considering it as their conquered possession.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government, following the previously proclaimed "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia", issued a decree on August 29, 1918, in which it stated:: "All treaties and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire concerning the partitions of Poland, in view of their contradiction to the principle of self-determination of nations and the revolutionary legal consciousness of the Russian people, which recognizes the Polish people's inalienable right to independence and unity, are hereby irrevocably repealed."40 This act not only confirmed the long-proclaimed position of Lenin and the Bolshevik Party on the question of the right of the Polish people to self-determination, but also eliminated the legal basis of the documents of the other states that divided Poland. This was all the more significant because, since mid-1918, the old monarchies of the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns, exhausted by the imperialist war and undermined from within by the rising revolutionary tide,

37 See: K. W. Kumaniecki. Op. cit.; M. Seyda. Polska na pfzelomie dziejow. Fakty i dokumenty. T. 2. Poznaii. 1931, str. 272.

38 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", Vol. I, pp. 303-304; S. Kieniewicz. Op. cit., str. 541.

39 J. Pajewski. "Mitteleuropa".

40 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", vol. I, pp. 418-419.

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they were clearly declining. Under these circumstances, the treatises on the partitions of Poland, which had already been crossed out by Soviet Russia, were to lose their binding force. Thus, under the direct and indirect consequences of the October Revolution, the balance of power in Europe changed and the necessary international conditions were created for the Polish people to gain independence.

An important factor, along with the change in the international situation under the influence of the October Revolution, was the growth of internal forces in Poland, which never put up with divisions and sought to revive the Polish state. These forces were aware that the partitions were a disaster for the Polish people. After all, the invaders persecuted all manifestations of Polish national life, the Polish language, school, culture, hindered the development of the Polish intelligentsia, made it difficult or impossible for Poles to access many important professions and administrative posts in public relations. The Polish masses experienced double oppression - national and social..However, despite the persecution and difficulties created by the governments of the countries that divided Poland, all this time there was a cultural connection between the three parts of the divided country, the consciousness of belonging to a single people. During the period of foreign rule, in the era of a difficult liberation struggle against the invaders, the modern Polish nation was finally formed .41
The vast majority of the Polish population sought to throw off the foreign yoke. Since the uprising of T. Kosciuszko (1794), every generation of Poles has consistently participated in the national liberation struggle. The Kosciuszko uprising, the Napoleonic Wars, the November uprising of 1830, the Galician events of 1846, the revolution of 1848, and finally the January uprising of 1863-these are the stages of the national liberation struggle, the national aspirations of the Poles, which testify to the unquenchable, active will of the people to have their own state. However, these efforts did not bring the desired result. The leaders and politicians who led them generally failed to mobilize all the potential forces of the people to fight for freedom. Historical experience has shown that only new, progressive social forces can ensure Poland's freedom and future. A century of struggle for the restoration of independence proved that "not among the governments", but "among the peoples" of Europe, the Polish question could find faithful allies, that the cause of national liberation was closely linked to the idea of progress not only in the country, but throughout Europe.

After the January uprising of 1863, in which the Szlachta elements for the last time in Polish history advanced to the forefront of the people's liberation struggle, the only force capable of leading the nation was the working class, its organized movement. Only the working class broke out of the political stagnation that followed the defeat of the 1863 uprising in Poland. During the turbulent years of the revolution of 1905 and 1907, other social strata - the peasantry and the intelligentsia-joined the direct struggle against tsarism, following the proletariat.

The success of all political programs in the conditions in which Poland found itself from the end of the eighteenth century until 1918 was determined not only by internal factors. It was more dependent on the situation in the states that divided Poland. Hence the great significance of the political alliances that Polish progressive forces formed with the corresponding groups within the states that divided Poland. Only the working-class movement transferred it to Polish soil.

41 См. T. Lepkowski. Polska-narodziny nowoczesnego narodu. 1764 - 1870. Warszawa. 1967.

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the idea of international solidarity of the oppressed and exploited brought to life new international relations, which were to serve as a support for the Polish liberation efforts. The connections formed between the Polish and Russian proletariat, between the Polish and Russian revolutionary movements, were of great importance.

The foresight of Lenin and the Polish revolutionaries that the victory of none of the belligerent camps, which both the Pilsudciks and the Endeks had hoped for, could bring Poland complete independence was also fully justified. The October Revolution brought about a truly radical change in the international situation. The Polish people owed their liberation primarily to their own efforts in the struggle for independence, but the conditions for the success of this activity were created by the revolutionary wave that swept through Europe in 1917-1920, which first eliminated tsarism, and then the Habsburg and Hohenzollern states - the three forces that divided Poland.

Without waiting for international decisions, even before the end of hostilities, the Polish population began to eliminate the hated German-Austrian occupation authorities. On November 7, 1918, the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic was established in Lublin. The Lublin Government, in its manifesto to the people, proclaimed the "Polish People's Republic" and laid the foundation for an independent Polish state .42 In reality, it was a bourgeois-landlord state in which national liberation was not accompanied by social liberation. One of the natural aspirations of the emerging Polish state was the desire to unite the entire national territory within its borders. The landlords and bourgeoisie identified this concept with an attempt to restore the so-called historical territory of the Polish state in the east. Acting in the interests of Polish landlords from the eastern regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the then" head of state " Pilsudski put Poland on the path of eastern expansion. As a result, the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 had a negative impact on the fate of interwar Poland and on the consciousness of the people.

The propertied classes, striving for expansion to the east, were simultaneously unable to effectively fight for the western and northern lands. Decisions on the issue of Poland's border with Germany after World War I were made at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. These decisions, as well as the formation of the western borders, were seriously influenced, along with the Polish diplomatic actions, by the Greater Poland Uprising in December 1918 and the three Silesian uprisings of 1919, 1920, and 1921.43 All these armed movements testified to the ardent desire of the Greater Polish and Silesian population to reunite with their homeland. Thanks to the position of the Poles who inhabited these lands, Greater Poland and part of Upper Silesia returned to Poland.

The territorial structure immediately put Poland in a difficult position. In the west, it was supposed to defend itself against attempts by German revanchism, which laid claims to Pomerania, Greater Poland and Silesia; in the east, it played a certain role in the anti-Soviet sanitary cordon. These factors, combined with the foreign policy concepts of the ruling circles, led to the fact that Paul-

42 N. Jab! on ski. Narodziny Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918 - 1919; A. Ajnenkiel. Od rzqdow ludowych do przewrotu majowego. Zarys dziejow politycznych Polski 1918-1926. Warszawa. 1968.

43 See: T. Jgdruszczak. Polityka Polski w sprawie Gornego Slgska 1918 - 1922. Warszawa. 1958.

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The sha of 1918-1939 was permanently in a state of uncertainty and weakness.

After the restoration of independence, the process of unification of the regions of the country that were under the rule of different states after the partitions of Poland, as well as the national and cultural integration of Polish lands, began. Three parts of the Polish territory were merged and turned into a single state body, each of which belonged to another state during the partitions of Poland. There were conditions for the gradual erasure of regional differences, which arose as a result of the fact that the modern Polish nation was formed within the framework of three state organisms that were alien to it. However, this process was not completed during the interwar twenty years .44 Integration processes in the field of culture and everyday life were relatively faster, which was reflected in the formation of a common Polish culture; the impact of this culture on the population also increased. The school played a big role here. The educational system was polonized, unified, and significantly expanded, although it was still privileged at the secondary and higher levels of education. There was a further development of literature, art, and theater, which represented not only the traditions of gentry and middle-class culture, but also the growing strength of proletarian culture.

In the struggle for the restoration of the Polish state, for its democratic social image, a huge part" was taken by the broad masses of the people, united in peasant and workers ' parties. However, a specific feature of the development of the Polish workers ' movement was that its revolutionary wing was not yet fully in agreement with Lenin's slogan of self-determination of peoples. The leaders and activists of the SDKPiL and PPS-Levitsy, and after their unification in December 1918 - K. RPP, although they worked closely with the Bolshevik Party and maintained direct contact with Lenin, had their own, unrealistic point of view, especially on the national question. From the beginning of the First World War, they were of the opinion that an imperialist war would be the prologue of a world socialist revolution. 45 After the victory of the October Revolution, they were convinced of the need for a direct assault on capitalism in Poland. Therefore, the Polish revolutionaries denied the need for any transitional stages of the struggle within the capitalist system, for example, the struggle for democratic peace and political freedoms, for the restoration of their own state.

This position of the revolutionary left wing on the question of the restoration of the Polish State did not stem from its rejection of the problem of national liberation. Members of the Polish revolutionary parties-SDKPiL, PPS-levitsy, and then KPP-have repeatedly proved their commitment to national traditions, patriotism and dedication in the struggle for the benefit of the broadest masses of their people. However, in concrete historical conditions, when after the victory of the October Revolution there were real chances for the restoration of the Polish state, the Polish revolutionaries ' denial of the Leninist slogan of the right of nations to self-determination and their opposition to the creation of an independent state subsequently limited the influence of Polish communists on the broad masses, who even had high hopes for the bourgeois state. Lenin did not approve of the position of the Polish Communists at that time, blaming them for having instead,

44 См.: J. Zarnowski. Spoleczenstwo Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918 - 1939. Warszawa. 1973.

45 B. Radlak. Op. cit, str. 312.

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In order to act in the direction of accelerating the process of polarization in Polish society, they are essentially slowing it down .46
In the initial period of its operation, the CPT was not yet in a position to review its erroneous position on the national question. Its programmatic principles and practical activities were still heavily influenced by the concepts of Luxemburgianism. Therefore, in the years 1918-1920, the Polish Communists acted confident of the inevitable approach of the world socialist revolution, which would bring a solution to all national and state problems. However, after the defeat of the revolutions in Germany and Hungary, after the first signs of stabilization appeared in the capitalist world and the split in the international labor movement deepened, 47 and Poland was finally formed as a bourgeois-landowner state , the Polish communists, under the influence of Lenin's teaching and the experience of the Comintern, 48 worked out at their Second Congress in 1923: a new program of the socialist revolution in Poland. They took the position that all the problems of the country can be solved only by overthrowing the bourgeois-landlord power and introducing a socialist system through social revolution, and Poland's economic and political dependence on the imperialist powers inevitably leads the country to the loss of sovereignty and independence.

Among all the political forces of the nation, only the CPP was the party that most consistently fought for social justice in the interwar twenties, introducing the ideas of Marxism-Leninism to the Polish labor movement. It was the only party that from the very beginning linked the question of the future of the Polish people with the forces of progress and socialism around the world, with friendly relations with the Soviet Union. It was a party that educated groups of selfless fighters for the people's Poland, drawing the necessary conclusions from Lenin's teachings and the ideas of the Great October Revolution.

46 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 38, pp. 161-162.

47 J. Tomicki. Dzieje II Migdzynaioddwki. 1914 - 1923. Warszawa. 1975.

48 W. Niewolina. Op. cit.

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