The question of the war economy of nazi Germany has already found considerable coverage in the Soviet historiography of World War II. Of particular importance in this regard are the collections of materials from the Nuremberg trials of the main German war criminals, which reveal the role of German monopolists in the development and implementation of aggressive plans of the Nazis. Published in 1965-1966, the publication contains materials from additional trials of major German war criminals, which also relate to the role of leading German monopolies in the preparation and implementation of these sinister plans. 1 Brief coverage of the main issues of the military economy of nazi Germany is given in the " History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945 " (Moscow, 1960 - 1965). A number of Soviet authors deal with certain aspects of this topic .2 Some works show the role of individual monopolies in the system of the fascist dictatorship, 3 as well as the development of state-monopoly capitalism in Germany during the war years as a whole .4 Much attention is paid to the study of the Nazi war economy by historians of the GDR. In their monographs, articles, and collections of documents, they expose the criminal activities of German monopolies. A deep assessment of the role of the latter in unleashing and prolonging the war is given, in particular, in the "History of the German Labor Movement" 5 . A number of works by historians of the GDR are devoted to the role of individual concerns .6 They expose the aggressive plans of these countries.

1 "The Nuremberg trials of major German war criminals". Collection of materials in seven volumes. M. 1957-1961; "The Nuremberg trial of the main German war criminals". Collection of materials in three volumes, Moscow, 1965-1966.

2 n. Voznesensky Cathedral. Military economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1948; P. Belov. Voprosy ekonomiki v sovremennoi voine [Issues of Economics in the Modern War]. Moscow, 1951; A. Elbakiani. Economic defeat of Germany in the war against the USSR, Moscow, 1955. Telegin. Military and economic preparation of fascist Germany for the war against the USSR. Krasnodar, 1966; I. M. Faingar. Essay on the Development of German Monopoly capital, Moscow, 1958, et al.

3 K. Mikulsky. Krupp Concern, Moscow, 1959.

4th place Khmelnitskaya street. The development of state-monopoly capitalism in Germany during World War II. "German Imperialism and the Second World War", Moscow, 1961.

5 "Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung in acht Bauml;nden". B. 1966; см. также: W. Bleуer, K. Dreсhsler, G. Fouml;rster, G. Hass. Deutschland 1939 - 1945. B. 1967; W. Bleуеr. Totaler Krieg und totale Monopolmacht. Der Staatsmonopolistische Verschmelzungsprozess zwischen Monopolorganen und faschistischem Staat im Weltkrieg. "Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft", 1966, N 6; "Fall 5". Anklageplauml;doyer. Ausgewauml;hlte Dokumente, Urteil des Flick-Prozesses mit einer Studie über Arisierungen des Flick-Konzerns. B. 1965.

6 H. Radant. Kriegsverbrecher Konzern Mansfeld. B. 1957; ejusd. IG-Farbenindustrie AG und Südosteuropa 1938 bis zum Ende des zweiten Weltkrieges. "Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte. 1967". T. I. B. 1967; J. Schmelzer. Unternehmen Südost.

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monopolies in relation to the Soviet Union, the countries of South-Eastern Europe, plans to establish a fascist "new order" in Europe. E. Seeber's monograph 7 analyzes the use of forced labor by foreign, mainly Polish, workers in the war economy of Nazi Germany. An assessment of the policy of German monopolies is also contained in the speeches of historians of the GDR at the XIII International Congress of Historical Sciences, held in August 1970 in Moscow. This issue was discussed, in particular, in a speech by K. Drobisch and D. Eichholz, which contained generalized data on the use of forced labor by foreign workers in Germany during the war years, without which "German imperialism would not have been able to continue its war for a long time after its strategy of lightning war failed" 8 .

A significant number of works on the war economy of Nazi Germany were published by bourgeois historians. The leitmotif of almost all their publications is the desire to silence the criminal role of monopolies in unleashing war. An example is a book prepared by the German Institute for Economic Research (FRG), the authors of which do not say a word about the place of monopolies in the system of the fascist dictatorship and their responsibility for the war .9 Bourgeois historians tend to present the entire military and economic policy of Nazi Germany as "the result of Hitler's sole decisions." Thus, they defend the thesis of his sole responsibility for the war and the defeat of Germany. The English author A. Milward is one of the defenders of this "concept" 10 . Considering the Fuehrer to be the supreme authority on military economics, this bourgeois historian ignores the fundamental question of the role of monopolies. The memoirs of the former Hitler's Minister of Armaments and Military Production A. Speer are kept in the same spirit 11 . This active executor of the aggressive plans of German imperialism tries to present himself as almost an "oppositionist" towards Hitler and diligently repeats the legend that" one single person " led Germany to war and disaster.

Familiarity with the literature shows that the problems of the war economy of Hitler's Germany require further study. Their research will reveal even more deeply the close connection between the actions of the German monopolies and the crimes of the fascists against humanity. This article analyzes the measures taken by the Nazis to concentrate the German military economy from the summer of 1943 to July 1944, when German military production reached its climax, and the role of monopolies in the economic and political life of the country increased dramatically.

As a result of the defeat of the German-fascist troops at Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge, a radical change occurred during the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole. The enemy suffered huge losses in manpower and equipment and was forced to switch to strategic defense. "The defeats suffered by Germany in the Soviet-German war-

Südosteuropapläne der IG-Farbenindustrie. Wolfen. 1966; S. Quilitsсh. Zur verbrecherischen Rolle der IG-Farben während der faschistischen Agression gegen die Sowjetunion. "Juni 1941". B. 1961; W. Schumann. Das Kriegsprogramm des Zeiss-Konzerns. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus und der faschistischen Politik der Neuordnung Europas und Ostasiens während des zweiten Weltkrieges "Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft", 1963, N 4.

7 E. Seeber. Zwangsarbeiter in der faschistischen Kriegswirtschaft. B. 1964.

8 K. Drobisch, D. Eichholt z. Die Zwangsarbeit ausländischer Arbeitskräfte in Deutschland während des zweiten Weltkrieges. M. 1970, S. 13.

9 "German industry during the war of 1939-1945", Moscow, 1956

10 A. Milward. Die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft 1939 - 1945. Stuttgart. 1966.

11 A. Speer. Erinnerungen. (West) Berlin. 1969.

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on the May front, they caused a crisis in the entire fascist camp. There was an acute shortage of human reserves, and the industry was working with great effort to somehow make up for the losses in equipment and weapons. " 12 The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, the Nazi rulers pursued a course to continue it. Measures to expand military production were also a reflection of this adventurous course. To ensure its growth and make up for the losses of the Wehrmacht, the ruling circles of Germany took the path of conducting "total mobilizations", expanding the forced theft of labor from the occupied territories and further concentrating the military economy.

Measures for state regulation of the military economy, which began shortly after the Nazis came to power, were an integral part of the military policy of the Nazi ruling circles. When the Second World War began, Germany already had a well-established military economy, in which leading positions were occupied by magnates of financial capital. The most important positions in the state apparatus were also in the hands of monopolists or their agents. During the war, the Nazis not only did not restrict monopolies, but, on the contrary, created an even more favorable environment for providing them with maximum profits. This policy was determined by the class nature of the fascist state, which represented a terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary and most aggressive elements of financial capital. During the war, the Nazis introduced new measures for state-monopolistic regulation of the military economy. In March 1940, the Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition was established, which gradually took the place of the main body in regulating the German military economy. In 1941-1942. imperial cartel associations of iron, coal, artificial fiber and others emerged, headed by monopolists. In March 1942, the Gauleiter of Thuringia, Fr. Sauckel was appointed General Commissioner for the use of labor. He was charged with providing the war economy with labor, mobilizing it both inside Germany and in the territories it occupied.

Especially important was the formation in the spring of 1942 of committees and " rings "(associations), the system of which was extended " to the entire military economy. At the same time, in the spring of 1942, the Nazi authorities created the Armament Council under the Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition, which included large monopolists and representatives of the armed forces command13 . In addition, a "central planning authority" was established as part of the "four-year plan". The implementation of these and other measures to regulate the military economy helped to further strengthen the position of the financial elite, ruin and oust small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. The "total mobilization" proclaimed in January 1943 dealt a serious blow to the inte-

12 " History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945". Vol. III. M. 1964, p. 601.

13 For more information about the system of committees and "rings", see: G. F. Zastavenko. Deployment of military production in Nazi Germany after the failure of the "lightning" war. "Military-historical Journal", 1962, N 12; W. Bleyer. Totaler Krieg und totale Monopolmacht. "Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft", 1966, N 6. The Armament council included such major industrialists as Bucher (AEG), Kessler (Bergmann-Electricitetswerke), Rechling (Vereinigte Stahlwerke), Pleiger (Hermann Goering-Werke), Renert (Rheinmetall-Borsig), Pensgen (Steel Trust) and Zang Field Marshal Milch, Colonel General Frohm (Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army), Admiral General Witzel (High Command of the Navy), General Thomas (High Command of the Wehrmacht) and General Ritter von Leeb (High Command of the Land Army) (see " Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung". Bd. 5. B. 1966, S. 320).

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resam owners of small and medium-sized enterprises. "The fascists closed new tens of thousands of small businesses, craft workshops and shops. Their owners were forced to work in large military enterprises. But even medium-sized enterprises, which the large monopolistic associations did not consider important in military terms, had to limit their production and give up their labor." 14
In order to increase the production of weapons and other military products, on June 18, 1943, a decree was issued on the closure of"irrationally operating enterprises of the military industry." In accordance with this, the Reich Minister of Armaments and Ammunition and the highest authorities were given the power to issue orders to suspend the work of enterprises that were not fully engaged in performing the decisive tasks of the military economy or did not perform them at all. The decree applied not only to Germany, but also to the occupied countries. Small and medium-sized enterprises fell under the category of "irrationally working" primarily. Large entrepreneurs, with the help of connections with the Hitler elite, sought to preserve and expand their production facilities.

An important link in the restructuring of the German economy under the sign of "total war" was the measures to centralize the use of electricity for the needs of military production. On August 6, 1943, a decree was signed, according to which the Inspector General of Water Management and Electricity (he was concurrently the Minister of Armaments and Ammunition Speer) was granted the right to dispose of structures, materials and personnel of energy enterprises during the war. This decree primarily affected the interests of small enterprises, which increased the energy supply to the military industry, which was under the control of the largest monopolies. The concentration of energy supply enterprises not only did not affect the interests of monopolists, but, on the contrary, strengthened their positions due to the subordination of smaller enterprises to them. Giant electric companies AEG, Siemens & Galske and others have been given new opportunities to extract profits. The so-called "workers' communities " meant in practice the subordination of small and medium-sized enterprises to the largest monopolies. Taking into account the sharp contradictions between the owners of enterprises included in the "workers ' communities", Speer called on the participants of such associations to eliminate any disputes among themselves. He demagogically declared: "Financial and capitalist considerations should no longer play any role. Who at this time wants to earn more than usual on the supply of electricity when performing new tasks, that military speculator." In fact, the Nazi authorities fully ensured the interests of monopolies in this area, especially since the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production itself (as the reorganized Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition began to be called in the autumn of 1943) was dominated by representatives of financial capital.

Of particular importance was the decree of September 2, 1943 on the concentration of the military economy, which provided for a significant expansion of the functions of the Minister of Armaments and Military Production. He was also given responsibility for the production of raw materials and products of industry and handicrafts, which had previously been the responsibility of the Minister of Economy .15 Specifying the decree of September 2, Goering, in an order issued two days later, demanded: "extend the powers granted to my General Commissioner for Military Affairs-

14 "Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung". Bd. 5, S. 340.

15 "Nachrichten des Reichsministers für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion" (далее - "Nachrichten"), N 29, 15.IX.1943, S. 313 - 314.

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to the Minister of Armaments and Military Production (that is, to the Minister of Armaments and Military Production - G. Z.), to all questions of production, since they are not subject to the jurisdiction of other authorized persons appointed by me. " 16 The decree of 2 September was also extended to Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg, Lower Styria, Carinthia and Kraina, the Bialystok district and the Dolsky "general government". The Minister of Armaments and Defense Production was responsible for the supply of raw materials and the production of military products in these areas. The Minister of Armaments and War Production was authorized to give instructions to the Reich Commissars, army commanders, and other representatives of the German administration regarding all military production activities in the remaining occupied territories. If these actions could affect foreign policy issues, they required prior approval by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The decree of September 2 formalized the situation that actually developed in the German military economy. The dominant position in the entire economy of the country was occupied by the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production, which was entrusted with performing a significant part of the functions of the Ministry of Economy, which transferred most of its staff to the Speer Ministry. The Ministry of Economy remained responsible for the supply of consumer goods to the civilian population, for foreign trade, it performed the functions of the highest control body for credit institutions and was responsible for financing the economy. As a result of the changes issued by the decree of September 2, the office of the "four-year plan", headed by Goering, was also somewhat relegated to the background, although officially his functions as commissioner for the "four-year plan" remained unchanged. The main thing was that the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production was given great opportunities in managing the military economy, which took decisive positions in the entire economy of the country.

Due to the need for a further increase in the production of weapons and ammunition, the Nazi military-economic authorities took new steps to make better use of the available opportunities. Along with the pursuit of labor, these authorities put forward a demand for further centralization of military production and the closure of less "profitable" enterprises, that is, small and medium-sized ones. In a directive to the heads of armament and military production enterprises at the end of 1943, Speer pointed out: "For 1944, a further increase in the production of German weapons is envisaged. If we want to contain the enemy's level of material superiority, such an increase in production must be achieved. Only the concentration of production at the most necessary facilities can bring us the necessary increase in the production of weapons. In the less important branches of military production, restrictions and closures must be carried out in order to be able to provide the necessary labor, machinery, etc. to military production. Therefore, many business leaders will have to make heavy and severe sacrifices." Speer called for the growth of arms production despite all difficulties 17 . These issues were repeatedly raised by the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production in the future. Speer's directive letter of 19 February 1944 to the Main Committees and "rings" about their responsibility for planning stated that it was necessary to correctly and most effectively use the necessary amount of labor, raw materials, electricity, auxiliary materials

16 Ibid., S. 314.

17 "Nachrichten" N 33, 24.XII.1943. S. 1.

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and provide enterprises with the necessary supplies and transport. The issue of developing and improving special planning methods was particularly acute in order to further concentrate all production resources for the production of military products .18
On April 20, Speer issued an order to reorganize the operation of enterprises. "On the basis of section 2 of the decree on the concentration of the war economy of September 2, 1943, "it said," I have issued an order to stop the production of articles that are not urgently necessary for the further conduct of the war, and to transfer the labor force freed up as a result to the production of the most necessary, militarily important products". This task was entrusted to the Speer-appointed Commissioner-General for Industrial Relocation .19 In accordance with this, enterprises that were curtailing production had to switch to the production of military products according to new technical documentation. Speer demanded that cooperation be provided for joint production on the basis of cooperative production of "folding" and "deploying" enterprises. The concentration of military production corresponded to the interests of monopolists who made huge profits in the war. The fascist state created increasingly favorable conditions for the largest monopolies, since they usually owned the so-called unfolding enterprises. The concentration of military production contributed to the strengthening of the role of financial capital magnates in the economic and political life of the country.

Essential to the further concentration of military production was Goering's order of 20 June transferring the armament production of the German Air Force to the responsibility of the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production20 . In this regard, Field Marshal E. Milch, who served as Inspector General of the Air Force, was appointed Speer's deputy and Chief Commissioner for Armament of the Air Force. The role of the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production has further increased 21 . In accordance with the order of June 20, the individual service of orders of individual branches of the armed forces by enterprises that produced weapons for several branches of the armed forces was soon canceled, and the production capacity restriction that had existed at these enterprises until then was lifted. Almost simultaneously, in order to better meet the needs of the military industry, Speer and Sauckel reached an agreement on closer cooperation between their subordinate departments. It provided that the distribution of labor in the production of weapons and military materials would be carried out on the basis of joint directives. The presidents of regional labor exchanges were required to immediately implement the decisions of the chairmen of military-industrial commissions on the mobilization of additional labor and the relocation of personnel.

The most important organs of the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production were the Main committees and "rings". By the summer of 1944, the leadership of the leading branches of the military industry was concentrated in the hands of 21 main committees responsible for production, and

18 "Nachrichten" N 35, 27.III 1944, S. 359 - 360.

19 "Nachrichten" N 38, 9.IV.1944, Anlage 1.

20 "Nachrichten" N 40, 21.VII.1944, S. 409.

21 The aviation industry has become the largest branch of military production. In the first half of 1944, its output accounted for 42% of the value of all the country's military output ("German Industry during the War of 1939-1945", p. 104).

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12 "rings", whose duty was to ensure the production of weapons with the necessary supplies. Special commissions were also created to improve various types of weapons. Designers of companies and representatives of military branches participated in them on equal rights. They were headed, as a rule, by leading industrial designers, who were given the right to make the final decision on the issue of improving a particular type of armament. Their decision could only be reversed by the commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, the Minister of Armaments and Military Production, and in some cases by the Fuhrer himself .22 Of great importance was the creation under the General Commissioner for Armaments and Military Production of so-called planning departments for certain branches of the military economy, which were supposed to prepare solutions for centralized planning and coordination of production for military needs. In this regard, the scope of activity of the Main Committees was expanded, which were fully responsible not only for the production of products, but also for planning in their field of production23 . As a result of these measures, the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production took the main place in the leadership of the military industry. Decisive positions in the Ministry, the Armament Council, the Main Committees and the "rings" were taken by the largest monopolists who pushed the country to continue the war. The slogan "war to the bitter end" has become the alpha and omega of the policy of the ruling circles of Germany.

The dominance of monopolies, whose self-serving interests often contradicted each other, was ultimately the main reason why the Nazis could not more effectively use Germany's powerful military-economic potential to increase military production during the critical months of the war. The management structure of the military economy combined a system of bureaucratic bodies of state leadership, in which monopolists and their henchmen held decisive positions, with a system of "personal responsibility" of entrepreneurs. As early as August 10, 1942, entrepreneurs were granted extraordinary powers under the "personal responsibility" system in accordance with Speer's order. In a speech on June 9, 1944, to the senior officials of his Ministry, Speer explained that the military industry management bodies are only given such powers as are absolutely necessary for their activities. Otherwise, in accordance with the system of "personal responsibility", entrepreneurs are given the widest freedom of action. "So," Speer said, " I consider the main committees and rings only as part of the system of personal responsibility of entrepreneurs in industry. In no case should the necessary orders and instructions on production management be allowed to pass by the head of the enterprise. He is the head of his company... You should never stop the head of the enterprise from giving orders. " 24 Thus, the system of" personal responsibility " meant nothing more than the transfer of military production to the entrepreneurs themselves. To a large extent, the organs of state-monopoly capitalism were only a supplement to the" personal responsibility " of entrepreneurs. In Nazi Germany, the system of "personal responsibility" and direct participation of entrepreneurs in the bodies that managed the war economy meant subordinating state bodies to monopolies that used Them to their advantage.

22 "Nachrichten" N 39, 24.VII. 1944, S. 399.

23 "Nachrichten" N 35, 27.III.1944, S. 359. Speer's order of October 29, 1943.

24 "Nachrichten" N 39, 24.VI 1.1944, S. 400 - 403.

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The magnates of industry and banking brought the entire economy under their rule, putting it at the service of the war and extracting colossal profits. The largest monopolists were at the head of the most important military-economic bodies. A characteristic feature of this process was that key positions in economic life and the state apparatus were taken over by a small group of monopolists. So, P. Pleiger, one of the leaders of the Hermann Geringwerke concern, headed the Imperial coal industry association, sat on the armament council and was a member of the supervisory boards of two dozen joint-stock companies. The main representative of the large steel, machine-building and military concerns of Mannesman, Kleckner and others was W. Zangen - a member of the board of the Imperial Iron Association, a member of the armament Council, a member of the industrial council under the General command of the Land Forces (OKH) and head of the main equipment and general equipment committee of the Wehrmacht. A major German industrialist, A. Rechling was chairman of the Imperial Iron Association, a member of the Armament Council, and head of the Main Iron mining committee. Flick, the head of the eponymous concern, sat on the board of the Imperial Iron Association and at the same time on the board of the Imperial coal Association, was a member of the supervisory Board of AEG, the Dresden Bank and other industrial and financial associations. Representatives of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke concern occupied dominant positions in all bodies: E. Pensgen represented this concern in the armament council and was also an expert in the Imperial iron Association; V. Roland served as deputy chairman of the Imperial Iron Association and at the same time was chairman of the main committee for tank production; A. Fegler was a member of the Armament and Industrial Council at OKH. A representative of the Goering concern, W. Keppler, was a member of the supervisory boards of a number of firms, simultaneously held the posts of Commissioner for economic affairs under the Fuhrer and State Secretary for special assignments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was the head of the so-called central office of economic and political organizations of the Nazi Party .25 The General Commissioner for special issues of the chemical industry was the General Director of the IG Farbenindustry concern, K. Krauch, who was also the head of the"imperial Department for economic development". O. Ambros, a member of the Board of IG Farbenindustry, was appointed head of the "special committee C" (means of chemical warfare), the main committee on gunpowder and explosives. The same Ambros headed the rubber production department in the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production26 . G. Kerl, one of the leaders of the Hermann Geringwerke concern, who was also a member of the supervisory boards of a number of companies, was appointed head of the Raw materials department of the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production in 1943. The representative of the monopolists, General G. Thomas, headed the military-economic department of the headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKB) and at the same time served as the head of the armament Department in the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production. As a result, the most important military and economic bodies were in the hands of monopolists. Prominent figures of the concerns were appointed "fuehrers" of the war economy ("Vervirtschaftsfuehrer"). They were given extraordinary powers. Relying on them, monopolists carried out the following operations:-

25 W. Вleyer. Op. cit, S. 911; "Braunbuch. Kriegs- und Naziverbrecher in der Bundesrepublik und in Westberlin". B. 1968, S. 33, 48.

26 See The Nuremberg Trials of Major German War Criminals. Collection of materials in three volumes, vol. I. M. 1965, pp. 599, 760.

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effective dominance in certain areas of the economy. Their orders and directives were enforced with the same commitment as those of the military authorities.

The implementation of state-monopoly measures to regulate the military economy contributed to the further concentration of capital in Germany. This is evidenced, in particular, by the following data. In 1933, there were 679 joint-stock companies in the country with a capital of 5 million marks and above, with a nominal capital of 15.2 billion marks. In 1939, the number of joint - stock companies amounted to 660, their nominal capital was 16 billion rubles (73.8% of the total share capital). In 1943, there were 896 joint-stock companies with a nominal capital of $ 24.9 billion (78.8% of the total share capital). marks (83.3% of the total share capital) 27 . The growth in the number of large joint-stock companies and their capital resulted from the expansion of the sphere of domination of German monopolies at the expense of the occupied countries. The concentration of capital within Germany was achieved as a result of the destruction and displacement of small and medium-sized enterprises, the seizure of enterprises in occupied countries, and the increased exploitation of workers, especially those forcibly removed to Germany. Leading positions among monopolistic associations were occupied by 30 largest industrial concerns-IG Farbenindustri, Steel Trust, Hermann Geringwerke, AEG, Siemens & Galske, Mannesman, Friedrich Krupp, Flicka Concern, Klecknerwerke and others. The concentration of the war economy and the transformation of the Ministry of Armaments and Military Production into the governing center of the entire military economy could not, however, eliminate the sharp contradictions between the monopolists. "The competition between them for the most lucrative posts in the Speer Ministry and the most lucrative orders for armaments now continued at a higher level." 28
The war was a gold mine for monopolists. The profits of the IG Farbenindustry group, which dominated the chemical industry, reached gigantic proportions. In 1943, the group made a profit of 822 million marks, which is six times higher than its profit in 1932 and the amount of the group's capital in 1926. Military concerns made huge profits from exploiting the slave labor of foreign workers and prisoners of war forcibly taken to Germany. By the end of May 1943, 12.1 million cars were stolen in Germany. foreign workers and prisoners of war. The number of workers in the factories of IG Farbenindustry reached 200 thousand people in 1944-1945, including about 100 thousand forcibly hijacked. The Kleckner Group, which was at the top of the financial oligarchy, increased its initial capital three to four times between 1933 and 1943. The assets of the joint-stock company Rheinmetall-Borsig (Berlin) increased from 298 million marks in 1939 to 568 million marks in 1943. Its net profit during this time increased from 3.5 million marks to 5.25 million marks. The capital of the Flick group by the end of the war was 3 billion rubles. stamps. In addition, this concern controlled other enterprises with a capital of 10 billion rubles. stamps. In terms of capital, Flick's group was second only to IG Farbenindustry, the Steel Trust, and the Krupp Group. The balance sheet of the AEG group increased from 598 million marks in 1939 to 1,050 million marks in 1943. The Management Board of the concern distributed 7.6 million marks to shareholders in 1939/40 and 13.2 million marks in 1942/43. 29 Joint-stock company balance sheet

27 I. M. Faingar. Decree, op., p. 396.

28 "Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung". Bd. 5, S. 340.

29 Ibid.; "The Nuremberg trial of the main German war criminals", vol. 3. Moscow, 1966, p. 698; G. Baumann. Owners of West German Monopolies, Moscow, 1954, p. 4. 49; "Die Grossunternehmen im Deutschen Reich. 1944. Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften". Bd. 1. B. 1944, S. 348; Bd. 2, S. 1464.

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Siemens-Schuckert (Berlin) in 1939 amounted to 532 million marks, in 1942 - -803 million marks. At the same time, the value of the company's assets increased from 170.7 million marks to 329.4 million marks. The annual net profit was about 10 million marks. The capital of the joint-stock company "Dynamite Nobel" (Pressburg) in 1939 was 224.1 million crowns, in 1941 -368 million crowns. Profit increased from 8 million kronor to 14.7 million kronor, respectively. At the same time, the value of the joint-stock company's own property was 96.4 million kronor in 1939 and 200.6 million kronor in 1941, which is more than doubled. Krupna's profits during the years of the fascist dictatorship reached 2 billion rubles. stamps. The group's enterprises employed 250,000 workers, including 70,000 foreign workers, 21,000 prisoners of war, 21,000 interned Italians (1943-1944), 5,000 Germans-prisoners of concentration camps and political prisoners of other nationalities. The profits of Deutsche Bank, Germany's most powerful bank, have reached enormous proportions. Its balance was 27,147 million marks in 1939, and 55,497. 5 million marks in 1943. The bank's Management Board distributed net profit to shareholders in 1939-105.3 million marks, in 1943-379.5 million marks 30 . Deutsche Bank, like other major banks, was closely associated with military-industrial concerns and joint-stock companies. Its supervisory board included the magnates of the Steel Trust, Kleckner, Mannesman, IG Farbenindustry and other monopolies. During the Second World War, the bank's board seized the largest banks and a number of industrial enterprises in the occupied countries.

As a result of the measures taken by the Nazis, the concentration of monopolistic capital increased even more. The Speer Ministry " has become a kind of trust on a gigantic scale with unlimited rights. All senior positions in it were transferred to a narrow group of trusted representatives of the most powerful military-industrial concerns. Perestroika, carried out after the defeat of the German-Fascist troops at Stalingrad, completed the system of military state-monopoly capitalism in Germany, which then began to gradually tend to collapse. " 31 The mobilization of resources in Germany and in the occupied countries, total mobilizations, increased exploitation of workers, mass theft of labor from the occupied territories and the concentration of the war economy allowed the Nazis to increase military production from the beginning of 1942 to July 1944 by more than three times. At the same time, tank production increased almost sixfold, reaching its highest level in December 1944. However, Germany could not overtake the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in this respect. The Soviet Union quickly recovered from the losses suffered in the first years of the war and achieved a decisive superiority over Germany in the production of weapons and ammunition. So, from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1945, 12 million rifles and carbines were produced in the USSR, and in Germany for 1941-1944 - 7.5 million, submachine guns - 6 103 thousand and 1 247 thousand, respectively, hand and machine guns-954.5 thousand and 617 thousand, mortars-347.9 thousand. and 68 thousand, field guns (75 mm and higher) - 97768 and 44800, tanks and self-propelled guns-95099 and 53800, combat aircraft-108028 and 78900 32 . And this is despite the significant superiority of Germany in steel production and mining

30 V. Ulbricht. To the history of modern Times, Moscow, 1957, p. 253; see "The Nuremberg Trial of the main German war Criminals", vol. 3, p. 619; K. Mikulsky. Krupp Concern, Moscow, 1959, p. 4. 49; "Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften". Bd. 4. 1944, S. 3 693.

31 E. L. Khmelnitskaya. Decree, op., p. 202.

32 " The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941 -1945. A brief history", Moscow 1970, p. 571.

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coal. Annual steel production in 1940-1944 in Germany, together with the occupied countries, amounted to 31-32 million tons (in the USSR, 18 million tons were smelted in 1940, 8 million tons in 1942, and 11 million tons of steel in 1944), and coal production - 390-460 million tons (the USSR produced 154 million tons in 1940, 63 million tons in 1942, and 121.5 million tons in 1944) .33 Thus, the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it had less production capacity and raw materials and lost important economic areas in the first period of the war, was able to use its resources more effectively for the needs of the war than Nazi Germany. This was based on the superiority of the socialist system over the state-monopoly organization of Nazi Germany. The expulsion of the German-Fascist troops from the territory of the USSR, the opening of the second front in the West, and the collapse of the fascist bloc led to a sharp weakening of Germany's military and economic capabilities. The collapse of the German-fascist plans of 1941-1942 and 1943-1944 demonstrated the complete bankruptcy of the adventurist strategy of the Nazis, an integral part of which were measures to concentrate the military economy.

33 Ibid., p. 570.

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