Education in Germany should be so controlled as to completely eliminate Nazi and militaristic doctrines and make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

(Potsdam Agreement, section IV, section 7).

Ostkunde-school of Oriental studies, constantly improving the promotion of its ideas, is on the heels of Ostforshung-university "Oriental studies".

As you know, the revival of Ostforschung was announced in 1952 by the leader of neo-Fascist historiography G. Aubin, and at the same time the prominent West German Medievalist G. Ludat called for modifying it, recognizing the Slavs as the subject of "European" history. Such a step required a certain rejection of fascist racial and geopolitical schemes. It was a forced response to the success of Marxist Slavic studies. Support for the old, untenable schemes threatened the Ostforschers with a rapid defeat in the ideological and political struggle against communism. The Ostforschung perestroika began; it also extended to the West German version of the bourgeois concept of Russian history, which eventually received the most complete embodiment in the works of G. Steckl1 .

Call for perestroika

The call for a similar restructuring of school education came ten years after Mr. Ludat's speech. It was voiced in the work of G. Terke, who, not fearing reproach for "being guided by a pragmatic postulate dictated by the political situation", proposed to reconsider the one-sided "German-Roman interpretation of history" 2 . The author looked through a lot of West German school history textbooks and found in them not only gross factual errors, but also many other things: inattention to the history of pre-Petrine Russia, and the lack of information about its internal history up to 1861, and ignoring the history of Russian culture, and echoes of racist schemes, etc.

* "Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War". Documents and materials. Vol. III. Moscow, 1947, p. 342.

1 See V. T. Pashuto. Ostforschung is being rebuilt. "Criticism of the West German Ostforschung". Collection of articles, Moscow, 1966, pp. 141-150. Professor G. Steckl reflects on his history lessons. Voprosy Istorii, 1968, No. 8, pp. 30-48.

2 H. Y. Terke. Die russische Geschichte in den Lehrbuchern der hoheren Schulen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Braunschweig. 1962, S. 2.

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From the educational thematic plans given by G. Terke of the five West German states, as well as West Berlin, which is not part of Germany, one can get an idea of the level of historical training of German schoolchildren in the middle of our century. These plans are imbued with the idea of Russia's historical exclusivity: its backwardness since the early Middle Ages, about which it is said - " The Kievan state: the Slavic basis, the Norman upper layer. Communication with Europe through Byzantium and the Eastern Church", and up to modern times - " Revolutions: the anarchist Revolution of 1905 ...Bolshevism and the traditions of Ancient Russia", and in the section on "trends in the foreign policy of the USSR" there is an item - "attachment to the foreign policy of tsarism" 3 .

These thematic plans also include standard questionnaires for schoolchildren, where we read: "what foreign forces shaped Ancient Russia?", " to what extent did the absence of Western European influence and the Renaissance contribute to the separate development of Russian culture?", "ask your music teacher to tell you the content of Lortzing's opera "The Tsar and Zimmerman", " what happened that tsarist power collapsed so unexpectedly in 1917?", "to what extent did Leninism abandon the foundations of Karl Marx's state philosophy?", "study the loss of German colonial space in the Middle Ages from the attached map (on the topic of World War II! - V. P.)" 4 .

G. Terke draws two conclusions from his observations on textbooks and plans in his book, which are shared by the author of the preface to it, the well-known ostforscher V. Philip. One conclusion is for the good: factual errors must be eliminated; the other is for the evil: textbooks need to be improved from a special point of view. According to V. Filippov, this revision should be done on its own, since the "dogmatic constraint of Soviet historians" supposedly excludes the possibility of cooperation with them .5 This argument of V. Philippe is untenable, it is refuted, in particular, by the example of cooperation of Soviet historians-teachers with French 6 . As for the substance of the revision of textbooks, it is a question of reflecting in them the concept of" Europeanization " of Russia .7 According to this concept, Russia is a country alien to the "West", identified with "Europe", its features are so peculiar that even the "Europeanization" initiated by Peter I with German participation could not overcome them, and in the end they became the basis for the victory of Bolshevism.

V. Filip sees a significant drawback of the textbooks of the 50s in that they do not reveal these "main features and essence of interrelations" in Russian history. He argues that "Russia's relations with the rest of Europe from the eleventh to the sixteenth century were incomparably weaker than the relations of European countries among themselves," and therefore it is necessary "to give a general (grobe) overview of Russian history in one place in each textbook," so that as its principle until the end of the sixteenth century. "Russian Orthodox piety emerged" and the need for Russia's perception from the 17th century became clearly visible. "a new principle, namely, the foundations of modern European thinking", and "in a few phrases" should highlight the differences "in the perception of Western European spiritual wealth by the state during the Peter's Revolution and the opposition at the end of the XVIII century." In addition," it should be clearly presented "to young Bundesburgers and" socio-political-

3 Ibid., S. 79 - 80, 81.

4 Ibid., S. 88 - 90.

5 Ibid., S. 1.

6 A.M. Sakharov. Conference of French and Soviet historians to discuss school textbooks. "History of the USSR", 1967, N 4, pp. 176-179.

7 On the essence of the concept of "Europeanization" of Russia, see: V. T. Pashuto. The origins of the German neo-fascist concept of Russian history. Voprosy Istorii, 1962, No. 10, pp. 61-79.

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This is why we need" the great originality of the history of Russia", for example, the absence of feudalism and estates, especially the townspeople, and so on.: "Without an explanation of these fundamental relationships, it is impossible to understand the Bolshevik chapter of history and obtain a sober political judgment." 8
Terke himself (understandably deeply imbued with "sober political judgment") he also believes that Russian history went on "for centuries in complete isolation from Western Europe" and that even the "Europeanization" of the eighteenth century did little to change "one-sided Russian development", but since "modern Russia, including Soviet Russia, is something historically grown up", it would still be a harmful extreme to " start Russian history only since 1813, 1772, or even 1700. " In short, the main thing to do in textbooks is to link the present with the past in such a way as to impose on Soviet society a false pedigree, false historical traditions that are alien to the rest of the world. "A competent choice of significant events and trends, highlighting the priority lines that connect the past and present , is one of the main requirements and at the same time one of the main difficulties in depicting Russian history."9
Let's see what is written about our country in textbooks for German schoolchildren 10 .

Revanchism Training

From Rurik to Pultava. We refer to the book "Fundamentals of History", intended for third-and higher-level schools, that is, for students in grades 7-9. First of all, the main scheme - the Great German one - is striking, according to which all material is presented in two aspects: "Germany and Europe" and then "Europe and humanity"11 . We read about Russia for the first time in the section devoted to the Middle Ages, where there is a paragraph with the eloquent title "Non - German states", among them-England, France, Northern Europe, Eastern Europe and Byzantium. Literally the following is written about Russia: "On the ancient trade route from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, shortly after the middle of the 9th century, the Swedish Vikings-the Varangians, or Rus (Rurik) - founded a state in Novgorod. Their spread to the south led to the emergence of the Grand Duchy of Kiev, which in the tenth century was Christianized from Constantinople (Byzantium) and adopted Orthodoxy. In 1037, Kiev became the center of the archdiocese. It was a significant cultural center until the Mongols destroyed the state, which was shattered by battles for the throne in 1239. " 12 This is how the "non-German" state, which played a primary role in Europe at that time, is depicted.

On another occasion, Russia is mentioned in the section "The World Empire of the Mongols": "The Mongols in their onslaught on the West conquered the Russian principalities-

8 H. Terke. Op. cit., S. 1. A few years ago, W. Philipp denounced the chauvinistic tendencies of the Ostforschung of Hitler's times, reflected in the works of G. Aubin, E. Maschke and others (see W. Philipp. Nationalsozialismus und die deutsche Uni-versitat. Veroffentlichungen der Freien Universitat Berlin. West-Berlin. 1966, S. 43 - 62). Below we will see how the same ideas are still viable, only in a modified form.

9 H. Terke. Op. cit., S. 2,3.

10 Soviet historiography has repeatedly dealt with this topic: see A. Ya. Shevelenko. Antihistoric and revanchist tendencies in German school textbooks. "Teaching History at school", 1959, N 6, pp. 109-113; "Uchitelskaya gazeta". 16. XI. 1963; A.M. Sakharov, I. P. Rakhmanova, M. R. Tulchinsky. On the coverage of the history of the USSR in school textbooks and manuals of the Federal Republic of Germany "History of the USSR", 1969, N 3, pp. 188-203.

11 "Grundztige der Geschichte". Oberstufe. Ausgabe B. Textband I. Von der Urzeit bis zuiri Zeitalter des Absolutismus. Ed. H. G. Fermis u. a. Verlas M. Diesterweer. 1966 S. 161.

12 Ibid., S. 127.

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va around (so! - V. P.) Moscow, in 1240 also Kiev". Nothing is said about the struggle of the Russian and other peoples of Europe, and the battle of the Poles with the Mongols at Legnica is described as follows: "From defensive battles, the battle of Liegnica in 1241, in which the Polish-German army was destroyed, especially cut into the consciousness of descendants (it should be: descendants of revanchists. - V. P.)" 13. This is written despite the lack of sources that can confirm any significant participation of German soldiers in this battle, which became fatal for the color of Polish chivalry .14
The following plot is the traditional praise of the Hanseatic League and German Eastern colonization, 15 as a popular phenomenon that was the result of "the overpopulation of old Germany"; it is not bad to say about the conquered population that survived from the swords of chivalry: "They were able and inclined to join the higher German economic forms"; 16 here it is casually noted that "the theory of the extermination of the Prussians is incorrect"; the positive role of Germany in the history of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary is also noted, and the German conquests in Lithuania are justified by the need to"eliminate the Lithuanian wedge between Courland and Prussia"17 . So the brutal and bloody history of the German feudal colony, the Order that lasted in Prussia until 1466, and in Livonia until 1561, when it was swept away by the stronger nation-states of Eastern Europe, is turned into a sweet but revanchist fairy tale for children. It is not by chance that those Ostforschers to whom truth is more precious than the prestige of revanchist historiography should have finally agreed with the conclusion of Soviet science, which tore the veil of cultural registration and mission from the Order and Hansa, the instruments of German imperial expansion in Eastern Europe .18
We meet Russia again in the section " Empire at the end of the Middle Ages (1378-1519)". In the section "Northern and Eastern Europe", this is how the formation of the Russian centralized state is described: "At the beginning of the XIV century, one of the members of the ruling family in Moscow (founded around 1150 ) was assigned to collect tribute for the khan from Northern (instead of North-Eastern) Russia. His successors, who adopted the title of "grand dukes", succeeded in subjugating most of the principalities to Moscow. So Moscow became the center of the state and, after the fall of Constantinople, the center of Orthodoxy. Grand Duke Ivan III of Moscow conquered (instead of reunited) the trading republic of Novgorod in 1448 (instead of the Boyar Republic in 1478) and shook off the Tatar rule around 1480... He brought about the state unity of Russia, which then acted as the successor (instead of the center for the reunification of the lands that had previously fallen under the power of V. P.) of Poland and Lithuania. " 19
This story is no less impressively presented in another series of textbooks - " Pictures from World History. Historical scenes, sources and concepts". The textbooks in this series are a selection of sources - excerpts from chronicles, reports of contemporaries, and excerpts from the works of historians. The notebook devoted to absolutism contains a general sketch (probably one of those that V. Filip dreamed of) of the history of Russia since ancient times. So: "Thanks to a particularly high income from

13 Ibid., S. 128.

14 G. Labuda. Wojna z Tatarami w roku 1241. "Przeglgd Historyczny". T. I, zesz. 2. Warszawa. 1959, str. 189 - 224.

15 "Grundzuge der Geschichte", S. 133 - 135.

16 Ibid., S. 136.

17 Ibid., S. 139 - 141.

18 Cm. G. Stokl. Osteuropa und die Deutschen. Hamburg. 1967, S. 102 - 103.

19 "Grundzuge der Geschichte", S. 152.

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by selling grain, honey, and wax, the princes of Moscow became prosperous and quickly consolidated their power in the struggle with their neighbors." When they conquered Tver with the" help " of the Tatars and "bought" other lands, the Mongols gave them the title of grand dukes .20 Hence, in these books (not counting errors) there is neither Russia's struggle for independence, nor its internal history, nor the history of the peoples who were already part of it, nor culture (even the Kremlin and Rublev!); where geographical discoveries are described, the exploits of Russian explorers are not mentioned, 21 nor are they reflected on the map .22
Once again we come across Russia in the section "Time of religious wars and battles for the world domination of the Habsburgs". In point B - "The time of Philip II" - there is a paragraph "Non-German states of Europe around 1600", dedicated, in addition to Russia, to the Netherlands, England, Sweden, Livonia, Poland. Russia, we read here, "entered European politics" under Ivan the Terrible, who, fighting in all directions, reached Siberia and the Caucasus, but lost in Livonia. As a predecessor of Peter I, he "considered it necessary to fertilize Russia with European civilization and therefore attracted specialists from the West" 23 .

The textbooks also paid attention to Russian absolutism. The time of absolutism is divided into two stages: the first, when Europe lived under the hegemony of France under Louis XIV, and the second (1688-1740), when it developed under the sign of restoring the balance of the great powers. Here is the text about "the transformation of Russia as a result of the Northern War into a European great power". Its highlight, of course, is the message about the successful war for Russia and the battle of Pultava, when Russia"for the first time defeated a great power with the help of vast space, devastation of its own territory and winter." 24 In" Pictures from World History", swamps are also added to this list of" reasons "for the victory: 16,000 Swedes (should have been about 38,000) and 45,000 Russians (should have been about 42,000) were active at Poltava, and what" the Russians did not do, they finished the swamps and General Winter " 25 . Thus, Russia became a great power in order to "play the role of the flank force of the continental state system, like England in the West." 26
From " Pultava."to Barbas . Russian absolutism, if you follow the textbooks, also does not resemble European one and "was, in essence, a despotism that recalled the state forms of the Eastern Roman Empire and was adopted during the long rule of the Mongols." However, a more detailed narrative reveals the vagueness of the authors ' ideas about it. Despotism grew out of the personal power of the tsars, it "did not appear as a result of the long overcoming of the feudal state (so! - V. P.) and class rights to power, but brutally achieved

20 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte". Historische Szenen. Quellen und Begriffe. Hf. 8. Das Zeitalter des Absolutismus. S. Post. Verlag M. Diesterweg. Frankfurt a. Main-Berlin - Bonn-Munchen. 1967, S. 29.

21 A. A. Preobrazhensky. Russian Geographical discoveries of the XVI-XVII centuries. "World History", Vol. IV. Moscow, 1958, pp. 98-101 (see map in the same place).

22 "Grundzuge der Geschichte", S. 165, 167.

23 Ibid., S. 182.

24 Ibid., S. 208.

25 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 8, S. 29; cf.L. G. Beskrovny. Strategy and tactics of the Russian Army in the Poltava period of the Northern War. "Poltava". Collection of articles, Moscow, 1959, pp. 52-53.

26 "Grundzuge der Geschichte", S. 208. In the volume of sources relating to this period ("Grundzuge der Geschichte". Ausgabe B. Historischpolitischj Quellenbuch. Bd. I. Von der Urzeit bis zum Zeitalter des Absolutismus. Ed. R. Weirich, G. Burch u. a. Verlag M. Diesterweg. 1966), the system of presentation of the material is the same: the baptism of Vladimir and the Russian people - within the framework of the Byzantine paragraph (p. 177-178), Moscow - the third Rome (p.182), Russia under the rule of the Mongols (p. 224), the despotism of the Russian tsars (p. 336-341).

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having overcome the influence and resistance of the nobility (der Groben) of the country, when a significant ruling person was at the helm of power." Peter I, although he built the state "on the Western model" (there is no question of internal prerequisites for transformation, of course), again applied despotism and, having suppressed the resistance of the Streltsy, his own son and the church, "created Caesarepapism" from the "fusion of church and state power"27 . The author ignores the bourgeois tendency in such measures of Russian absolutism as secularization, development of bureaucracy, etc. In "Pictures", the matter is brought to the point of absurdity: Peter builds European Russia alone, because "the nobility, clergy and people passively, and sometimes actively, resisted Europeanization"28 ; only one of the figures is given, and that is very doubtful: 200 thousand people allegedly died on the construction of St. Petersburg , 29 which is why no one wanted to to settle in this accursed city, which, however, did not prevent it from taking by 1726 the place of Arkhangelsk in the export-import of Russia. 30
The history of Russia in the 18th century is also mentioned in connection with the Seven Years ' War and the partitions of Poland. Frederick's Pyrrhic victory over Russia at Zorndorf (1758) is noted, but the king's flight from the battlefield of Kunersdorf and the entry of Russian troops into Berlin (1760) are forgotten, it is only said that Frederick was lucky and after the death of Queen Elizabeth, according to the peace treaty with Russia and Austria, Prussia was established as the fifth great power Europe. The partitions of Poland are covered from the point of view of Prussia's struggle with the "hostile embrace" of Russia and Austria, and in general "both German (so!-V. P.) great powers" - Austria and Prussia - sacrificed Poland to the "Russian onslaught on the West"31 . The fact that Prussia got most of the Polish lands, along with Warsaw, does not bother the authors of the textbook.

If Frederick was lucky at the end of the Russo-Prussian war, then Russia, according to the textbook, was no less lucky during the Russo-French war. In the center of the notebook "Napoleon and the Rise of Europe" is the story of a brilliant person who, due to her illegitimate origin, was forced to fight continuously. Russia, which crushed Napoleon's empire and freed Europe from his tyranny, could not be completely bypassed, and it is mentioned in the paragraph "Russia intervenes", which deals with the death of the despotic Catherine, the murder of the mad Paul, and the accession of Alexander I, an ally of England, who proclaims the "liberation of the oppressed lands"32 . But then, in a strange way, Prussia turns out to be at the center of events not Russia, but Prussia: after Austerlitz, the end of the German empire came (1806), after Tilsit, Alexander "abandoned his Prussian ally", although he saved Prussia from complete destruction when the French occupied Berlin and the royal government took refuge in Konigsberg .33 It was here, fortunately for Russia, that the Prussian representative K. Stein appeared at the imperial court, who "had a great influence on Alexander" and, firstly, urged him to restore Germany, and secondly, when Napoleon reached Moscow, "constantly begged the tsar", "who sought solace in the Bible", "do not enter into mi-

27 "Grundzuge der Geschichte". Textband, S. 209. Cf. the article by the famous ostforscher M. Hellmann "Freedom, peace, state and Law in the self-consciousness of Russia" imbued with the same thoughts in the collection "Das Bildungsgut der hoheren Schule" intended for teachers. Geschichtliche Reihe. Bd. IV. Ereignisse und Linien europaischer Geschichte. Hrsg. K. Rudiger. 1962.

28 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 8, S. 35.

29 For construction costs, see: S. P. Luppov. History of the construction of St. Petersburg in the first quarter of the XVIII century. Moscow-L. 1957, pp. 81, 94.

30 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte". Hf. 8, S. 38.

31 Ibid., S. 74 - 78.

32 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 10. Napoleon und der Aufstand Eurooa/ W. Trog. 1967, S. 29.

33 Ibid., S. 40, 55.

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ra " 34 . There are no words for it, Karl Stein is an outstanding figure in the national revival of Germany, 35 but why belittle the role of Russia in this revival?

Instead of the Patriotic War of 1812, schoolchildren are offered the history of Napoleon's offensive on Moscow; the actual basis is the same: the figures of losses in the Battle of Borodino are distorted: 60 thousand (should have been 38.5 thousand) Russians and 28 thousand (should have been 58.5 thousand) French 36 . In the future, Kutuzov allegedly feared a meeting with Napoleon, but tried to surround him. The words of the emperor are given about the "Scythians" who burned Moscow, and that the climate is the culprit for his defeat 37 , and to eliminate possible doubts, the date is inserted in the chronological table.: "November 11, 1812-the beginning of winter frosts" 38 . True, it is said in passing that "the people were called everywhere," but there were no words to condemn Napoleon and his satellites for the ruin inflicted on Russia. Instead, two pages are devoted to describing the hardships and sufferings endured by German soldiers in "wild" Russia, where they were sent by the Prussian king as part of Napoleon's troops .39 In the European campaign - the actions near Leipzig and other battles - Blucher appears in the foreground, 40 although the works of historians of the GDR and the USSR very fully reveal the role of Russian troops as the core of the armed forces that liberated Europe from Napoleon's yoke. 41 The whole story is worthily crowned by Napoleon's prophecy, expressed in the words: "In a hundred years Europe will be either Cossack or Republican." 42
One of the most odious is the notebook "National and Industrial Revolution". The presentation here is constructed in the form of the antithesis of two "forces of the future": the" West "in the image of a rapidly progressing North America and the" East " in the form of Russia mired in the savagery of tsarism .43 This is done in the spirit of the convergent world's "modernization" theories, according to which the October Revolution is portrayed as an ordinary event among the stages of the "Atlantic revolution" marked by the American liberation, French political, and British industrial revolutions44 . There is no Russia with its initial accumulation, Ural industry, the first steam locomotives, steamships, economic and social projects, and finally, Russia, a significant part of which (Novorossiya, the Volga region, the North Caucasus), unlike Prussia, after the reform of 1861, will follow the American path of agricultural development .45 There is no Lobachevsky, no Pushkin, no Glinka-no science, no literature, no music. What is there? There are vulgar anecdotes from the lives of tsars and landlords.

34 Ibid., S. 69, 72.

35 See articles by G. Scheel, E. I. Druzhinina, A. L. Narochnitsky, R. Raeder, and others. in the joint work of historians of the GDR and the USSR "The Liberation War of 1813 against Napoleon's rule", Moscow, 1965, pp. 38, 60, 159, 280.

36 See L. G. Beskrovny. The Patriotic War of 1812, Moscow, 1962, pp. 396-397.

37 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 10, S. 76.

38 Ibid., S. 97.

39 Ibid., S. 74 - 75.

40 Ibid., S. 86.

41 See L. G. Beskrovny. To the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig. "The War of Liberation in 1813 against Napoleonic rule", pp. 94-95.

42 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 10, S. 94.

43 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 11. Die nationale und die industrielle Revolution. W. Trog. 1966, S. 59, 63, 65.

44 See F. Straube. Die GesetzmaSigkeit der sozialistischen Revolution und ihre Negligierung durch westdeutsche burgerliche Ideologen. "Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin. Gesellschaftliche u. sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, Jg. 17, 1968, Hf. 2, S. 157 - 165.

45 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 16, p. 216; vol. 17, p. 70, 130; see also E. I. Druzhinina. V. I. Lenin on the development of capitalist relations in the southern and southeastern suburbs of European Russia. "Actual problems of the history of Russia in the feudal era". Collection of articles, Moscow, 1970, pp. 375-397.

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Here is how, for example, the Decembrist uprising is presented: "A group of Western-liberal officers tried to achieve a constitution. The moment seemed right. Constantine, Alexander's brother, was shouted out as tsar, and no one knew that he had long since abdicated in favor of his younger brother Nicholas. When Nicholas was announced, ordinary soldiers were very concerned about this replacement: "We swore an oath to Konstantin, and Nikolai is holding him under arrest. We only have one soul, and we can't swear allegiance to another every week." They shouted " Hurrah for Konstantin!" and on the orders of the liberal officers also "Hurrah for the Constitution!", and they thought that this was the name of Konstantin's wife. Nicholas appeared on horseback and announced to the people that he was the rightful tsar. "Children, I can't kiss all of you, but this one is here for all of you" - and he kissed one old man, and the people passed his embrace and kiss on. However, the instigators did not retreat until they were dispersed by buckshot. "A good start to the reign," the king said sadly. "The throne is spattered with blood." 46 The spirit of this book expresses the argument that " in Europe, Russia was viewed with suspicion. No major decision could have been made without it ... " 47 . So, from book to book, schoolchildren are taught the idea of Russia as a wild and monstrous country that threatens Europe.

This is also continued in the notebook "National States and World Powers", where in the paragraph" Russian Souls "it is written that Russian peasants, mostly serfs, were in the position of dogs, which is confirmed by the text of the memoirs of a certain village priest, whose acquaintance called his servant"Barbas" 48 .

From "Barbas" to "Sergius Dmitrievich". A notable feature of the same notebook is a large anti-communist excursion. The author has dispensed with the Paris Commune in his story, but I decided to talk about the Manifesto of the Communist Party in order to simply and clearly refute its ideas. Such simplicity is not found in the university ostforschers G. von Rauch, B. Meissner or K. Menert, who operate with clever concepts, omissions, and scientific overexposures. Here everything is school-like clear, and this text is worth quoting. The ideas of Marxism are "rejected by opponents for the following main reasons":

"1. Marx too one-sidedly reduced all the events of history to economic causes only." Thus Karl Marx was immediately transformed into a vulgar economist, who, of course, has nothing to refute, 49 especially since German schoolchildren do not know such words of Engels: "According to the materialist understanding of history in the historical process, the decisive moment in the final analysis is the production and reproduction of real life. Neither Marx nor I have ever said more. If someone distorts this statement in the sense that the economic moment is the only determining moment, then he turns this statement into a meaningless, abstract, meaningless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the course of the historical struggle is also influenced and in many cases mainly determined by the form of its various moments of superstructure. " 50
46 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 11, S. 66 - 67.

47 Ibid., S. 67.

48 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 12. Nationalstaaten und Weltmachte. S. Rost. 1966, S. 6.

49 Cf. blagogluposti about the slave dependence of the working people of socialist countries on the economic laws of Karl Marx; P. Rodl. Der Mensch im kommunistischen Weltsystem. "Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht". Zeitschrift des Verbands der Geschichtslehrer Deutschlands, hrsg./K. D. Erdmann - F. Messerschmid. Verlag E. Klett. Stuttgart. 1961, Jg. 12, S. 579 - 584.

50 K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 37, p. 394.

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"2. His thesis about the class struggle as an essential content of human history is too strong a re-evaluation and simplification of it." It is not denied that there are classes, but in addition "various other groups have emerged: families, tribes, religious communities, races, and states." What a charm these tribes, communities, families, and races are that have emerged "beyond that" and not before that, and states, apparently, are also "beyond that"! The Bundeskind will indeed think that the evil Marx denied the family and race, tribe and state.

"3. The claim that only communists are called to represent the interests of the proletariat is not based on the assignment of the workers: on the contrary, they were not asked about it at all and did not use the usual form of free choice in the West." So the schoolboys will remain convinced that the Communists are not the vanguard of the proletarians; nor do they know that a congress of freely elected Soviet representatives has called the Communists of the world's first socialist country to power. And who can plant doubts in their minds that the form "common in the West" represents in essence the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie? 51
"4. The goal of the communists-to seize power everywhere in the world and eliminate the non-communist order-would lead to long-term exacerbations." It is said in a hollow voice, but a schoolchild should guess that these exacerbations will be worse than those caused in Europe by NATO, in the Near East by Israel, and around the world by the United States.

And finally, "5. A classless society is a utopia. Better conditions in human society can also be achieved in another way, as the development over the past hundred years has proved: for example, instead of class struggle relations, there is a partnership between the employer and the employees. " 52 It would only be necessary to add: "Equally subject to the emergency laws." What if a schoolboy suddenly asks why so many workers ' demonstrations have been shot in the last hundred years and not a single demonstration of employers? However, the pathetic anecdote of the coverage of Marxism in school textbooks has already attracted the attention of 53 .

Attempts to refute Marx are not the main thing in this book; the central figure is Bismarck, who acts in the interests of "Europe" against the background of a failing Russia. Under him, "there was strength where there was weakness in central Europe." 54 Under the guise of denouncing Russian expansion (the goals of which were supposedly already defined by Peter I) and the threat of its onslaught through Berlin to Vienna, 56 the Chancellor's Russian policy is extolled at the Berlin Congress, and in general, "Europe did not stumble"57 . Another thing is Russia, which after the predatory reform and the murder of Alexander II from the zemstvo "first stage of self-government" returned again to the system of a "police state" 58 . There is no talk here of revolutionary situations or the development of the revolutionary-democratic movement.

When it comes to "imperialism and the First World War",

51 For a recent critique of bourgeois views, see H. Jung. Die Marxistische Klassentheorie und ihre Kritiker. Sammelband "Marxismus in unserer Zeit". Frankfurt a Main. 1968, S. 50 - 63.

52 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 12, S. 82.

53 E. Dillmar. Marxismus in deutschen Schulbiichern. Padagogik und Schule in Ost und West. "Zeitschrift der Lehrervereinigung". Dtisseldorf. 1967, Jg. 15, Hf. 9, S. 306 - 311.

54 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 19, S. 94.

55 Cp. "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 8, p. 40. Peter the Great allegedly identified "three shock directions of Russian foreign policy, which were maintained until the twentieth century: in the west-to the Baltic Sea, in the south - to the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf, and in the east - to the Pacific Ocean."

56 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 12, S. 100.

57 Ibid., S. 96 - 98, 108.

58 Ibid., S. 8.

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The material about the aggravation of contradictions (including colonial ones) between the great powers is selected in such a way that Germany is not blamed for unleashing a bloody international conflict. It turns out that first Germany falls into political isolation due to the rapprochement between Russia, France and England ; 59 then the arms race begins, and the war party wins in Russia. Personally, Nicholas II did not want war, but because of the steps taken by the Austrian government, he announced mobilization, which "forced" Germany to go to active action. 60 And this book has its own climactic episode. The Russian government decides whether there should be a war or not, and finally Nicholas II gives a fateful order to Sazonov: "Sergius Dmitrievich, call the chief of the General Staff that I am ordering general mobilization." 61
From "Sergius Dmitrievich" to the fables of "the exiles". The further into the forest - the more firewood. The books devoted to the epoch begun in October are even more, if possible, low-grade. From the notebook "Great Crises" we learn that the tsarist government fell "because of the inability to solve the problems that arose in connection with the development of industrialization and the penetration of Western political ideas"62 . The main goal of the author is to denigrate the Bolsheviks and their leader V. I. Lenin. The Bolsheviks are depicted, first of all, as opponents of the peasantry: the Soviets were dominated by the party of moderate socialists, "which primarily concentrated the peasants, who demanded the division of the landlords' lands. But (so! - V. P.) they were energetically pressed by the radical socialists, the Bolsheviks, who purposefully sought the dictatorship of the proletariat, the communist revolution. " 63 The events are depicted as if the dictatorship of the proletariat did not solve the peasant question in Russia, nor did it save the country from the impending catastrophe.

The Bolsheviks are presented as enemies of democracy. This is how their actions are interpreted in the period from February to October (the book refers to the "Russian November revolution of 1917") and during the dispersal of the "parliament". There is no mention of the Bolshevik struggle for the formation of the political army of the proletarian revolution in the book, but with the help of quotations from Trotsky, the events are presented as if Lenin sacrificed democracy in the name of the dictatorship, the Constituent Assembly, which has already "adopted a resolution on the foundations of democratic and socialist Russia"64 . An author who writes in the spirit of Martov-Kautsky 65 does not care that the proletarian dictatorship is the highest form of democracy, that the Constituent Assembly reflected the old correlation of class forces, and not the new one that found expression in the Soviets. The authors use the words "dictatorship" and "party dictatorship"to frighten students in every possible way. 66 Lenin pointed out that violence for the protection of workers' rights takes the place of the "rights" of exploiters , 67 and later explained that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible except through the Communist Party."68 Finally, "the dictatorship of the proletariat is not possible." there is only violence against exploiters, and not even mainly violence. " 69
59 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 13. Der Imperialismus und der Erste Weltkrieg. J. Hoffmann. 1965, S. 29, 38.

60 Ibid., S. 45, 55,58.

61 Ibid., S. 56.

62 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 14. Die grofien Kxiesen. J. Hoffmann. 1964, S. 1.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., S. 10, 11.

65 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 37, p. 282.

66 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 14, S. 11 - 13.

67 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 30, p. 73.

68 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 43, p. 42.

69 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 39, p. 13; cf. vol. 38, p. 385; see also E. N. Gorodetsky. Lenin-the founder of Soviet Historical Science, Moscow, 1970.

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The contrast between the February Revolution as a democracy and the October Revolution as a dictatorship is typical of textbooks whose aim is to slander the idea of the power of the working class, which supposedly "begins its rule with economic ruin" 70 and its rule with "war and terror"71 . About sabotage, about white terror, about the intervention of 14 powers, the authors remain silent. The fruits of such" enlightenment " of schoolchildren are obvious. In a survey of 2,711 high school students in Germany, 90% could not explain what the dictatorship of the proletariat is. This is also evident from the fact that only 10% chose the relatively appropriate item of the deliberately anti-Soviet questionnaire: "preparing a life worthy of a person", the rest emphasized the items: "method for obtaining labor", "system of domination to destroy freedom", "state security system introduced by Stalin", " form of power provided for communist world domination " 72 .

The subsequent internal history of the U.S.S.R. (the U.S.S.R., in fact, is not worth talking about, since the problem of nation-building is deliberately ignored) is also grossly distorted. Economic development is depicted as "forced" collectivization, as an exhausting overstrain of the people. It masks the fact that the implementation of the first five-year plan (there is a mention of it) and the mobilization of all the forces of the people were urgently needed by a country that lived in a capitalist environment, and that history allowed it a short period of time for construction: in 1941, the troops of nazi Germany invaded the USSR.

In the sections of the book devoted to the foreign policy of the USSR, an attempt is made to portray the October Revolution as a local event, after which the rest of the world continued to live as if nothing had happened. However, this is not very successful: the role of the USSR in international history is constantly increasing, and authors have to write about it, although in their own way. Here they go for another forgery, drawing an analogy between fascism and communism. The same idea permeates the material of German history: the student is offered a detailed political biography of Hitler 73, and under the heading "Enemies of Democracy at work" is told about the activities of fascists and communists.

Soviet foreign policy is also completely distorted. The enormous efforts of the USSR to preserve peace in Europe are ignored. The Soviet Union is credited with attempting to prevent the Weimar Republic from establishing "friendship" with the "West"in Locarno by using the Treaty of Rapallo .74 The aggressive, anti-Soviet nature of the Locarno Treaty is not hidden. The attached map shows the losses of "German-Austria" in the First World War. Among the" losses " are South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine.

Material about the Second World War in the notebook " National Socialism and the Second World War. 1933-1945 " is centered around Hitler. From its text, it turns out that it was not the treacherous Munich agreement, but the Soviet-German pact that opened the way for Hitler to go to war. The great significance of the Battle of Stalingrad is belittled, as in the paragraph " Re-

70 H. G. Fernis, H. Haverkamp. Grundzuge der Geschichte von der Urzeit bis zur Gegenwart. Verlag M. Diesterweg. Frankfurt a. Main-Berlin-Bonn. 1962, S. 307.

71 C. Hagener. Geschiehte unserer Welt. Bd, III. Braunschweig. 1964, S. 52; see also: F. Drewitz. Tendenzen der "politischen Bildung und Erziehung" in Westdeutschland. "Vergleichende Padagogik". B. 1965, Hf. 1, S. 14 - 17.

72 R. Rausch. Zeitgeschichte und Nationalbewusstsein (Schule und Staat in der Gesellschaft). Wiesbaden. 1964, S. 13.

73 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 14, S. 61 - 71.

74 Ibid., S. 73.

75 See "History of Foreign Policy of the USSR", Part I (1917-1945), Moscow, 1966, p. 215; cf. Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (1928-1932). Moscow, 1968, p. 256 et seq.

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decisive battles " it is compared with the naval battle of Midway. The catastrophe that the German army suffered at Stalingrad is depicted as a personal miscalculation of Hitler, a miscalculation that could not have happened. Anonymous letters from German soldiers to their families from near Stalingrad are chosen in such a way that their authors are portrayed as romantic heroes who die with honor .76 The reader should be moved to forget that these" heroes " and others like them have killed millions of people! The same purpose - to belittle the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union to the victory - is served by the claim that only supplies from the United States allowed the USSR to "stay on the surface" 77 . The facts show (they are also recognized by American historians) that there were no significant deliveries until March 1942; in the subsequent period, deliveries from the United States and England increased and played a role, but not decisive, because in terms of the main types of weapons (guns, aircraft, tanks), they never exceeded 2 - 10% produced in the USSR 78 . The last stage of the war, according to the textbook , is not the liberation of Europe from Hitler's tyranny, but the struggle of the Germans with "hostile armies". Finally, the border on the Oder and Neisse is not defined at all in Potsdam, and this matter was allegedly postponed until the signing of the peace .79 The treaty concluded between the Governments of the USSR and Germany is intended to put an end to such falsifications of the spirit and letter of Potsdam.

And there is no need to wait for peace, as follows from the last notebook, expressively entitled " Humanity without peace." Humanity, according to the author of this book, continues to live from war to war; the list of wars and conflicts includes indiscriminately liberation, revolutionary wars, and external imperialist adventures; there is no peace on earth, and it is hardly possible, why is the last paragraph called "Peace" on earth?..". it serves as a psychological preparation for war.

It is futile to search here for the internal history of the U.S.S.R., for information about its economic and cultural progress, if the armament of the FRG appears as a factor that allegedly inclined the Soviet government to a policy of peaceful coexistence and refraining "from further revolutionary expansion." 80 The Marshall Plan is praised, and Bonn democracy is signed, although liberal-bourgeois publicists themselves, and such prominent ones as K. Jaspers, admit that parliamentary democracy "does not function at all" in Germany, and its so-called "freedoms" are a fiction .81 The history of the GDR and the feat of German workers freed from the yoke of capital 82 are presented in a distorted light .

And in this notebook, revanchism cuts the eye, starting with the map " The maximum area of German power (not seizures! - V. P.) in the Second World War "83 and ending with the paragraphs" Exile and post-war suffering"," The Lost Homeland","The Polish population in the German eastern regions". In the textbook there were no words for denouncing the fanatical acts-

76 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 15. Der Nationalsozialismus tmd der Zweite Wettkrieg. 1933 - 1945. H. Grosche. 1966, S. 75.

77 Ibid., p. 98; the same is repeated below: "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 16. Welt ohne Frieden. 1945 - 1965. H. Grosche, 1966, S. 1.

78 R. Snyder, E. Furniss. American Foreign Policy. N.Y. 1954, p. 584; "History of Foreign Policy of the USSR", Vol. I (1917-1945), pp. 393-396; for more information, see: B. I. Marushkin. Istoriya i politika [History and Politics], Moscow, 1969, pp. 291 et seq.; cf. Memoirs and Reflections, Moscow, 1969, p. 742.

79 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 15, S. 114, 115.

80 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 16, S. 58.

81 K. Jaspers. Antwort. Zur Kritik meiner Schrift "Wohin treibt die Bundesrepu-blik?". Munchen. 1967, S. 11, 62 - 67.

82 For more information, see S. Dernberg. A brief history of the GDR, Moscow, 1965.

83 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 16, S. 2.

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Fascism's efforts to deport, exploit, and exterminate peoples, but it uses figures about German residents resettled from native Slavic lands. In the post-war years, this manipulation of the figures of those who died during resettlement became one of the means of revanchist propaganda, and the so-called number of victims ranges from 800 thousand to 3.2 million. A study by the Polish scientist S. Szymitzek showed that these speculations on the feelings of the people are unfounded. According to the calculations of a Polish scientist, this number is 556 thousand people .84
The textbook is full of descriptions of the "inhumane acts" of Russians, Czechs, and others. These descriptions are collected in the section "Exiles tell", where the same technique is repeated as when describing the Battle of Stalingrad, but the place of anonymous soldiers is occupied by "one woman", "one priest", "one student", "one resident", etc. All of them repeat about the cruelties in the Russian camps, about rapes, about the barbarism of Russian soldiers, and, finally, that in Silesia, the Poles, seeing off the evicted Germans, asked them not to worry, promising to protect their goods until the restoration of German power. "When you return, you will find everything safe," 85 they said. There are five pages devoted to these fables, which is more than a cold-blooded description of Fascist atrocities in the occupied countries.

These are the textbooks of bourgeois nationalism, neo-fascist revanchism, and anti-communism .86 Where are the roots of such a course in the education of the Federal Republic of Germany?

The Roots of toxic Obscurantism

Let us turn to the theorists of" Oriental studies " (Ostkunde), to the works of G. Stadtmuller, E. Lemberg, E. Lehmann and others like them. In his book "Historical Oriental Studies", G. Stadtmuller called for expanding historical education "by including the German and European Orient", emphasizing that Ostkunde has a perspective not as a special educational discipline, but only as a "teaching principle". The book is intended for history teachers, to whom the author tries to "show how the attitude of the Germans towards the eastern neighboring peoples became the fate" for both sides of the conflict . As in Ostforschung, here arguments about the alleged coincidence of German-Slavic destinies are accompanied by attempts to reject the real historical Slavic community. "We deliberately avoid the expressions 'Slavs', 'Slavonic', and 'Slavic world' as meaningless and misleading." We can talk about the" Slavs "until about the tenth century, and later there was only a "ghost of uniformity", and all the talk about the "Slavic world", "about the German-Slavic neighborhood" is nothing more than the fruit of "thoughtlessness", because "there is only German-Polish, German-Czech, German-Slovak, German-Croatian, German-Slovenian neighborhood"88; that the idea of a Slavic community permeates both Slavic and non-Slavic sources.-

84 St. Schimitzek. "Vertreibungsverluste"? Westdeutsche Zahlenspiele. W. 1966, S. 14, 154.

85 "Bilder aus der Weltgeschichte", Hf. 16, S. 18, 19.

86 And when a polemical opus directed against the pedagogy of the GDR asserts that in the" pluralistic society " of Germany, the teacher has the freedom to choose textbooks, this, of course, is true only in the sense that the teacher can choose between the publications of E. Klett, M. Diesterweg and others like them. See H. Geiuler. Geschichtsbuch und Geschichtsunterricht in Mitteldeutschland. "Welt der Schule", Jg. 19, Munchen, 1966, N 6, S. 249 - 256.

87 G. Stadtmtiller. Geschichtliche Ostkunde. Bd. I. Die Zeit bis zum Jahre 1914. Munchen-Stuttgart. 1963, S. 7.

88 Ibid., S. 8.

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metskiye 89, the author simply ignores. With the help of this kind of technique, G. Stadtmuller was not difficult to portray the German Empire and German colonization as the core of the history of Eastern Europe. This idea, as well as the apology of the latest German imperialism of the 90's, was very quickly introduced into school practice.

You can get an idea about the ways of this implementation from the yearbook "Ostkunde in teaching". It is edited by the same people who are in the "Bundesar - beitsgemeinschaft fur deutsche Ostkue" (Bundesar-beitsgemeinschaft fur deutsche Ostkue) - the most active anti-communists E. Lemberg, E. Lehmann, G. Raupach and others .91 By the way, this department also includes the chairman of the central revanchist organization - the Union of the Exiled. The preface to the first volume (1963) of the yearbook states that the Ostkunde's goal is to foster a "state consciousness", and "at school, a stronger focus is required on the German East, as well as beyond it - on the neighboring peoples in the East"92 .

Let's look through this remarkable publication. In it, we will find an article by E. Lehmann and A. Schettler praising "Federal Governance"in every way .93 Leading people in Germany, in connection with the Ostkunde decade, stressed that it arose under direct pressure from the "unions of the exiled", and drew attention to the Nazi past of E. Lemberg, E. Lehmann and others, who, as it turned out, actively planted fascist ideas during the occupation of Czechoslovakia .94
And here is what a certain G. Wilhelmi writes in the yearbook in the article "Updating the state consciousness is the central task of the German Ostkunde": our youth "need to reveal political events primarily of the recent past and present, in order to promote the development of a healthy political instinct", more precisely - "a clear goal", and quite precisely- "all-German consciousness". "the disintegration of national unity and the total evasion of participation in the German destiny are obvious," and "only unconditional requirements for upbringing and education can build a dam here; if political education is understood as a state-civil educational act, then it must include:.. such concepts as homeland, people, nation, and its history. The democratic apparatus has so far proved insufficient for this task. " 96
Propagandists from Germany (including Deutsche Welle and other voices of the "free world") only the youth of the U.S.S.R. call for national nihilism, for the struggle against "conformism," etc., but the youth of West Germany, disregarding the framework of the "democratic apparatus," they try to rally around nationalist slogans.

89 See P. Gorlich. Zur Frage des Nationalbewufitseins in Ostdeutschen Quellerides 12. bis 14. Jhts. Marburg-Lohn, 1964, S. 119, 210-211; V. D. Korolyuk. On the question of Slavic self-consciousness in Kievan Rus and among the Western Slavs in the X-XII centuries. "History, culture, folklore and ethnography of Slavic peoples", Moscow, 1968.

90 G. Stad tmtiller. Geschichtliche Ostkunde. Bd. 11. 20. Jahrhundert. Munchen. 1963.

91 For more information about some of these figures, see: V. I. Salov. Sovremennaya zapadnogermanskaya burzhuaznaya istoriografiya [Modern West German Bourgeois Historiography], Moscow, 1968.

92 "Ostkunde imUnterricht". Ein Jahrbuch fur gesamtdeutsche Fragen. Bd. 1. Hannover-Linden. 1963, S. 5.

93 E. Lehman n, A. Schettler. Zehn Jahre Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft fur Deutsche Ostkunde in Unterricht Ibidem, S. 58 - 75.

94 См. "Neue Kommentare", Jg. 7, 1964, N 19. Frankfurt a. Main. 1964.

95 H. Wilhelmi. Erneuerung des Staatsbewufttseins - eine zentrale Auf gabe der deutschen Ostkunde. "Ostkunde idUnterricht". Bd. I, S. 9.

96 Ibid., S. 10; cp. Prof. H.Wilhelmi. Die Ostkunde in der politischen Bildung. "Deutsche Ostkunde". Jg. 7, 1961, N 2, S. 25 - 35. With the help of slogans of "social" and "national" solidarity, G. Wilhelmi and others like him hope to make the "skeptical generation" a tool of irresponsible politicians. Cf. F. Schultheis. Die politische Bildung und die Parteien. "Geselchaftliche Erziehung", 1963, Hf. 2, S. 76 - 80.

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Then G. Wilhelmi formulates four guiding theses of Ostkunde; "1. Ostkunde is the path to the spiritual restoration of the destroyed whole, meaning our people; 2. Ostkunde ...it tries to put our state-civic thinking in order again, when the experiences and destinies of the nation that have become history can awaken modernly realized tasks for the future... 3. Ostkunde is the participation of young people in education, domestic political education, and all secondary and higher schools dictated by the educational conscience. 4. Ostkunde is not a subject among the subjects of study, but an educational action that transcends them. It acts as a teaching principle and should be applied as such. As an instruction that permeates all educational subjects, it opens the way to a moral and political attitude, without which we have no right to release young people into public life today." Future generations of Bundesnemish Ostkundlers are preparing for the perception of the most important moral principle, which states:: "Education is a policy of the first rank!"97, which has long been expressed most precisely in two words: "Zum Befehl!"("I'm listening!"). This is the core of that peculiar social science, which, under the Ostkunde brand, should educate the people in the spirit of anti-communism, prepare for war in the name of the black plans of the Bundeswehr. "How does the Western world imagine the end of the dispute with the Eastern world without this fertilization of education by politics!" - exclaims the author. Fortunately, not all German teachers are ready to pull the yoke of Ostkunde 98 , and Wilhelmi does not spare any anger when he attacks them.

The saddest thing is that this has already happened once in German history. I can't help but recall The Return, a novel by E. M. Remarque, a writer who brilliantly recreated the interwar history of Germany. Returning from the front of the First World War, the hero of the novel Ernst became a teacher. But, having learned all the falsity of the cause for which he shed blood, he is not able to teach. So Ernst stands in front of the kids, remembering the horrors of the war, and thinks: "What can I teach you?.. Or should I take you to a green and gray geographical map, swipe it with my finger, and tell you that love was killed here? Explain to you that the books you hold in your hands are nets that trap your trusting souls in a dense thicket of phrases, in a barbed wire of false concepts? Here I stand before you, sullied and guilty, and I would rather not teach you, but pray to you: remain as you are, and do not allow the warm glow of your childhood to be fanned into a sharp flame of hatred. " 99 Ernst quit teaching, not wanting to raise misanthropes. But many, driven by need, did not abandon, contributing to the fact that in the end fascism moved millions of Germans blinded by hatred into a bloody campaign.

"All this must be expressed in such a way," continues Mr. Wilhelmi, " in order to clear the air for our demand. We are forced to once again strive for national self-esteem, and knowledge of the Eastern homeland is the foundation of any political education. " 100 The revanchists ' main focus is on the politically unsophisticated youth. "Today, everyone understands that not only for the sake of political dignity, but also for the sake of the place that the German should take in the world,

97 Ibid., S. 12.

98 There is a common sense among teachers in Germany that "self-criticism" alone is not enough to improve textbooks: "the participation of Soviet experts is required" (W. Bergsdorf. Muhsamer Kampf gegen Vorurteik. Schulbucher im internationalen Vergleich. "Echo der Zeib. Recklinghausen, 2.VI.1968).

99 E. M. Remarque. Return. L. 1959, p. 387. How history repeats itself can be seen from the talented book by T. Valentine: Th. Valentin. Die Unberatenen. 1963 (russkoe izd.: T. Valentin. Without a mentor, Moscow, 1969).

100 H. Wilhelmi. Op. cit., S. 13.

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first of all, we must seek protection from the terrible ignorance of East German soil among young people. " 101
Nor is there any doubt about the consequences for the Bundesbürger, who has mastered the Ostkundler instructions: "No one can then avoid understanding that belonging to one nation imposes on each individual a natural duty, in the performance of which he must exercise." 102 Well, where better to practice than in the Bundeswehr? In a word-zum Befehl!

Ostkunde's task is to overcome the "dualism" that still exists in the political thinking of its fellow citizens, introducing revanchist views of the" exiled " among the indigenous population. They will form the hitherto absent concept of political education .103 The main obstacle in the way of the Ostkundlers is communist pedagogy, the outstanding achievements of which in the USSR and the GDR cause fear and impotent anger of revanchist enlighteners .104 In many central and provincial pedagogical journals, such as " History in Science and Teaching "(ed. by E. Klett. Stuttgart), " Society, State, Education "(ed. by E. Klett - M. Diesterweg), and in special publications they denigrate education in the USSR and the GDR 105 .

Ostkunde, masquerading as the idea of cultural rapprochement, seeks to poison the schools of the whole of Europe with its poison, In" his circle " E. Lemberg in the report "German Oriental studies is European studies" formulated this in these words: Ostkunde "should no longer be the romantic history of the motherland, should not remain primitive anti-communism; with all the necessary amendments and additions, the historical history of The paintings should not be limited to perspective only, they should depict and analyze modernity, first of all its supranational problems and tendencies; they should integrate Ostkunde into a comprehensive political enlightenment. " 106
Of course, these ideas are presented to integral pedagogical allies in a more respectable form. Let's take a look at the book by O. E. Schulddekopf "20 years of revision of school textbooks in Western Europe". It's not easy for the author. How can he talk about Ostkundel's European problems, when his opponents, such as Andre Malraux, consider "Europe" a fiction, and others, like Henri Masi, if they recognize it, then only within the limits west of the Rhine. O. E. Schulddekopf has to act in the guise of Ostkundler, proving that Bach's fugues and fugues are not true? Weimar refers to Europe 107, and at the same time, with reference to Goethe, convince colleagues that world history now, more than ever, needs to be rewritten. He tries to persuade them to think about creating a kind of integral pedagogy. Complaining that "the long-overdue historical opportunities for' Europeanizing the teaching of history ' are still not being used enough,"he suggests "developing a European curriculum, that is, such a canon."

101 Ibid., S. 15.

102 Ibid.

103 E. Lehmberg. Ostkunde: Em unbewaltigtes Problem der politischen Erziehung. "Deutsche Ostkunde. Westostdeutsche Blatter fur Erziehung und Unterricht", 1966, Jg. 12, N 1, S. 1 - 9.

104 This is well shown in a paper written by R. Beyer, H. Hohn, H. G. Hofmann, and F. Weitendorf and the book "Milit/ristisches Gift in der westdeutschen Schule" published by the Central Pedagogical Institute of the GDR. B. 1961; H. Geist. Antikommumsmus und Schule. "Antikommunismus. Verbrechen ohne Chance". B. 1967, S. 268 - 274.

105 H. J. Terke. Die deutsche Geschichte in den Lehrbtichern der Sowjetunian. Son-derdruck aus dem International Jahrbuch fur Geschichtsunterricht. Bd. 9. Braunschweig. 1963.

106 From the report of E. Lemberg, delivered in Pfingsten (on the" Day of the Sudeten Germans") in 1967, Sudetendeutsche Zeitung, Jg. 17, F. 19, 12. V. 1967, S. 9.

107 O. E. Schulddekopf. 20 Jahre Schulbuchrevision in Westeuropa 1945 - 1965. Braunschweig. 1966, S. 10.

108 Ibid., S. 87.

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of the historical facts of world history, which every child of every state of Europe should know"; these facts will be presented in the "textbook of European history, as a manual for teachers of all Europe" 109 . Knowing the works of the Ostkundlers, you can easily imagine this textbook, the main part of which will be the history of Germany, and the integral allies will be scattered in small paragraphs under the characteristic names "non-German states".

What the implementation of Ostkunde leads to in Germany itself can be seen, for example, by the definition given to the concept of "fatherland" by the Munich Student Corporation: "Our homeland is the common destiny of the German people, with whom we are connected by a sense of love. Our fatherland is Germany. By Germany we mean the area of Central Europe that is inhabited by Germans and from which they were illegally expelled. " 110 Sociologists from the GDR have found that German schoolchildren psychologically perceive Russians as enemies, responsible for all the troubles experienced in modern times by Germany. 111 These are the fruits of the enlightenment.

There will be even more of them, since at the request of the "Union of Exiles" the training of osjundler specialists at universities is being expanded: the "Pedagogical Study of the East" under the leadership of O. Anweiler is concentrated at the University of Bochum 112, the "German Institute for Pedagogical Research" in Frankfurt am Main is headed by E. Lemberg, in Hamburg there is an International Pedagogical Institute (director Egren), formally affiliated with UNESCO, which, however, is not responsible for its activities or for its printed products. The Institute, with the active participation of E. Lemberg, has been working intensively in recent years to infiltrate the pedagogy of the socialist countries 113 and so on.

The program, journalism and slogans of neo-fascists clearly show the ideas and aspirations that exist in secret in Ostforschung and Ostkund .114 After all, the "Union of the Exiled", which unites 29 "fellow countrymen" and 50 resettlement organizations, numbering up to 3 million people, is a reserve of neo-fascism .115 Praising the" nobility of German traditions", the neo-Nazi press even attacks existing textbooks, seeing them as slandering the "glorious past". "The poisoned souls of our children. Anti-German propaganda fabrications under the guise of a course in German history "116-this is how the German National Newspaper and Soldiers' Newspaper characterizes the situation. Ostforshers, who like to talk about "Soviet pan-Slavism" with exaggerated pathos, for some reason do not sound the alarm about the statements of the neo - fascist historiographer G. Grabert that nationalism is a natural response of the "defeated" to the victors .117 On the pages of

109 Ibid., S. 88. The Ostkundlers continue to meet with their French counterparts.

110 K. Kolling. Jugend und Vaterland. "PadagogiK und Schule", Hf. 8, 1967, S. 264.

111 H. Becker, R. Beyer. Zur geistigen Manipulierung der westdeutschen Schuljugend. "Vergleichende Padagogik". B. 1968, Jg. 4, Hf. 4, S. 342 - 359.

112 S. Prokop. Zum Charakter der neugegrundeten Universitat Bochum. "Staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus und Hochschulwesen in Westdeutschland". B. 1966, S. 454- 468.

113 See E. Lemberg. Die Darstellung Osteuropas im deutschen Bildungswesen. Hamburg. 1968.

114 K. F. Werner. Das N. S. Geschichtsbild und die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft. Stuttgart. 1967.

115 A. Blank. Neo-Nazism: Modernity and History lessons. Kommunist, 1968, No. 10, pp. 81, 88.

116 "Die vergifteten Seelen unserer Kinder. Antideutsche Propagandalugen als Lehr-fach der deutschen Geschichte". "DeutscM National-Zeitung und Soldatenzeitung". Munchen. 1.III.1969.

117 H. Grabert. Siegen und Besiegte. Der deutsche Nationalismus nach 1945. Tubingen. 1966, S. 8, 225, 318.

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neo-fascist newspapers justify Hitler's war against the USSR as a preventive one, 118 and there is nothing to say about the distant past. Here they understand the ideas of the Polish-German community in their own way, when they write that Mieszko I himself, the founder of the Ancient Polish state, was a German .119 Here the condemnation of fascism is seen as an "anti-German lie" and a "self-destruction" of "national feeling"; here they openly declare that what is needed is not a struggle for peace, but an "equal right for all", that is, the right to win the war; here they revile existing textbooks, but not for revanchism, but for the fact that they are supposed to they bind the teacher by hand: "History books, collections of sources and historical maps do not leave him any freedom in interpreting the third Reich", do not allow him to clearly say that "people always killed each other", that "the Germans could not be tried in Nuremberg", etc .120. Not surprisingly, in the near future, the "blond beast" will reappear in the West German school 121 .

Well, we need to improve our own training courses, showing more broadly and vividly the importance of Russia in the history of Europe, the importance of mutual cultural and other ties between Russia and other countries, describing the commonality of its and European, world patterns of socio-economic and political development, the role of Russian figures in the history of European culture and world civilization.

Historians and scholars should pay as much attention to Ostkunde as to Ostforschung. We need to help our pedagogical community (as well as the progressive teachers of Germany) to better understand the ideological essence of the works of those who inherited the slogan: "The teacher wins the war". We need the sober vigilance of both politicians and scientists - all those who care about peace: Caveant consules!

118 U. Walendy. Schuld am Russlandfeldzug. Sowjetische Eingestandnisse. "Deutsche Nachrichten". Hannover. 18.VII.1969.

119 "Piasten-germanischer Herkunft. Neue Forschungsergebnisse uber das Herrschergeschlechb. "Deutsche Nachrichten". Hannover. 28.VII.1967.

120 H. Menzel. Gleiches Recht fur alle? "Deutsche National-Zeitung" (Munchen). 16.II.1968.

121 NDP members ' views on Russian history may be the subject of a special article.

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