The diary of V. N. Lamsdorff, who devoted 40 years from his life (1844-1907) to the career of a professional diplomat, and at its final stage (1900-1906) became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, is very extensive. The scientific use of its contents became possible only after the Great October Socialist Revolution, and the study and publication of this peculiar source was partly hindered by the fact that Lamsdorf's notes were made in French with a plentiful inclusion of documentation in German and English. The diary for 1886-1892 was published in the 1920s-30s1 . The diary for 1893 was not found in the Lamsdorf Foundation (TSAOR USSR). An extensive manuscript for the last years covered in the diary (1894-1896) has not yet been published. It is stored in the Central State Academic Library of the USSR. Only a small number of pages have been translated and used as fragmentary publications .2 The author of these lines has attempted to translate pages covering the final years of the diary. The total volume of the Russian translation text is 978 typewritten pages. The following are some excerpts from Lamsdorf's diary entries for 1894, 1895, and 1896.

What is the content of the diary for the specified time, and what was Lamsdorff's goal in keeping his diary? He returned to this question repeatedly, as if reasoning with himself. Here is the most characteristic of his own responses: "My position gives me the opportunity to write down facts, to reveal the hidden sides of the historical game of cards; this may be useful in the future. How much research would then have to be done in secret and inaccessible archives to find out even a fraction of what I can easily do today by photographing, so to speak, my working day."3 Lamsdorff's" photographs " of his work, which were taken on a daily basis, are extremely interesting, since the author's awareness was high.

The specific content of the diary for the period under review can be mainly reduced to the following topics of interest to the historian: the specifics of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a kind of tsar's foreign policy office; the influence of dynastic relationships and the growing role of economic interests in foreign affairs; the situation within the ministry; contradictions between powers, their reflection in its use in foreign policy; relations with Germany, the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance, attempts by the German side to neutralize it; Middle Eastern problems; the Far Eastern node of international contradictions; reflection of the fear of the ruling circles before the revolution in diplomatic activities.

According to Lamsdorf's notes, the Russian Foreign Ministry continued to operate largely in the old-fashioned way at that time. The tsar's resolutions, the so-called "litters", served as the basis for guiding the actions of the minister and his subordinates. When a fundamentally important paper was returned by the tsar without any "litter", there was often confusion and hesitation in making a particular decision .4 The "litters" of tsars, especially Nicholas II, often struck Lamsdorf with their glory-

1 "Diary of V. N. Lamzdorff". 1886-1890. Vol. 1. M. -L. 1926; 1891-1892. Vol. 2. M. L. 1934.

2 "Red Archive", 1931, vol. 3 (46).

3 TsGAOR USSR, f. 568 (V. N. Lamzdorff), op. 1, 42, l. 30.

4 Ibid., 41, l. 24.

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indecisiveness and indecision bordering on complete failure. But these semblances of resolutions had to be listened to willy-nilly, and the temper of the tsar and his real capabilities carefully studied. Thus, Lamsdorff, who knew French and German well and English was worse, took into account that Nicholas II preferred to write letters to other monarchs that were of a personal nature, not in French, which was then traditional for diplomacy, but in English (since he studied this language and also received additional practice in it, because Tsarina Alexandra Maria Feodorovna, born Alice of Hesse, was brought up at the court of the British Queen Victoria). It is in the form of copies of the English text that Lamsdorff's diary records an exchange of letters in 1895 between Nicholas II and his cousin, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, who persuaded the tsar not to trust the French, 5 these Republicans who at one time "cut off the heads of the king and queen", and not so long ago allowed the Paris Commune 6 .

Along with the significant influence of dynastic relationships on international relations and diplomatic activity that continued during the years under review, the direct economic interests of the exploiting classes played an increasingly important role in Russia's foreign policy. This can be traced, in particular, by the activity of Finance Minister Sergei Witte reflected in the diary. And the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became very interested in such banking subtleties as disagreements between the Rothschilds of England and the Rothschilds of France, 7 or the premature disclosure of information about the loan being projected by Russia by the Russian banking businessman Rothstein. 8 The opinions of not only grain exporters, but also the industrial bourgeoisie regarding the contracts concluded by Russia were taken into account more carefully than before. "On the part of some groups of our industrialists, especially those dealing with wool, there are even sharp protests," the diary says about the German - Russian trade treaty of 1894.

According to the diary, the internal atmosphere in the Russian Foreign Ministry was rather heavy. Anonymous denunciations, careerism, intrigue flourished, even sending apocryphal letters abroad with someone else's signature. The authorities sanctimoniously monitored the religiosity of officials. Lamsdorff himself, who is Orthodox by religion, carefully lights lamps in front of icons at home and goes to the ministry church; however, he is outraged by such facts when a minister's companion stands at the entrance of this small church, clearly checking the presence of officials at the service, or when an overzealous priest of the ministry church tries to convert the Minister of Foreign Affairs. K. Girsa before his death from Lutheranism to Orthodoxy.

As a part-time member of the Cipher Committee, Lamsdorff was aware of the vulnerability of any encrypted correspondence and insisted on changing the keys to Russian ciphers more often to increase the secrecy of official telegraph exchange. However, the struggle to ensure secrecy was apparently somewhat formal: for example, when a servant brought Foreign Minister A. B. Lobanov - Rostovsky a purchase from a store wrapped in a copy of secret document 10, Lamsdorff began to get nervous, but calmed down as soon as he learned that this document was not one of those that were in the store. its management.

The diary pays considerable attention to the balance of power in the international arena and the possibility of exploiting contradictions between other powers; it notes, for example , the cooling of relations between Britain and Germany over South Africa, 11 and between England and the United States over Venezuela, 12 which is at some point in the history of the United States.-

5 Ibid., 42, l. 23.

6 Ibid., l. 50.

7 Ibid., 41, l. 12.

8 Ibid., l. 52.

9 Ibid., d. 37, l. 16.

10 Ibid., 41, l. 33.

11 Ibid., 42, l. 45.

12 Ibid., d. 43, l. 52.

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that time weakened the strength and activity of the anti-Russian policy of England. Realizing that the diplomacy of other countries is also inclined to use other people's contradictions and inflame them, the author of the diary carefully follows the contradictions within the Franco-Russian coalition that was developing and the behavior of third powers in relation to the real contradictions that existed within it, for example, on the issue of grain export. Lamsdorff and some of his colleagues were not at all in favor of excessively close contacts with France, considering that it was more profitable for Russia to maintain a balance and play the role of an arbiter between France and Germany. Lamsdorff was of the view that friendship with France "is like arsenic-in moderation it is useful, but at the slightest exaggeration it becomes poison." 13 At the same time , the author of the diary sharply denounces the short-sighted behavior of the Russian ambassador to Germany, Count N. D. Osten-Sacken, 14 who could not see in the falsified information the intrigue of the German ruling circles about the alleged collusion of Austria with France and England against Russia; this intrigue was intended to inspire the tsarist government with distrust of France.

Lamsdorff did not lose sight of the fact that Germany, like other powers, was playing an ambivalent game against Russia. The author of the diary reacts sharply in his notes to the disclosure by Germany of the secret Russian-German treaty of 1887, regarding it as "a treacherous maneuver designed to create an atmosphere of distrust" in Franco-Russian relations .15 In the diary noted the duplicity of German policy in the far East Affairs: on the one hand, Germany has strongly pushed Russian expansion in the East and the mouth of Wilhelm II declared its readiness to ensure in this case, the Russian Western border of16 , and on the other through its diplomats encouraged Japan not rush to withdraw from Liaodong Peninsula, captured during the Sino-Japanese war17 . The diary contains a lot of materials that tell about the events of the Sino-Japanese War. The author of the diary does not miss even such a fact as the emergence of a short-lived republic on Formosa (Taiwan), suppressed by the Japanese.

Much attention is paid to Middle Eastern issues in the diary. Along with questions about Egypt and Ethiopia, a significant place is given to the records of the Greek uprising against Turkish rule and the Armenian massacre in Turkey: "The people of Crete no longer understand anything about our position, and we consistently lose their trust and sympathy. Lobanov is still dominated by the idea of maintaining the status quo and delaying the fall of the Ottoman Empire. It remains questionable whether the means chosen for this purpose are the best. " 18 Based on the documentary data in Lamsdorf's diary, it is shown that the tsarist diplomacy (and Nicholas II personally), in order to delay the fall of the Ottoman Empire, was rather indifferent to the brutal massacres of the Sultan's authorities and local fanatics against the Armenian population of Turkey. The diary covers in detail the question of the possibility of landing Russian troops on the Bosphorus, which arose in 1895-1896. Lamsdorff was outraged by the loud campaign raised on this occasion by some organs of the Russian press, demanding the immediate capture of Constantinople. He himself considered on the basis of an assessment of the situation by the Chief of the General Staff, General N. N. ObruchevIt is clear that the capture of the Straits would indeed have dramatically improved Russia's chances of victory in the event of a war with Germany, since it would have released a huge number of troops; however, the Russian fleet in the Black Sea is insignificant compared to the English fleet already stationed at the entrance to the Dardanelles, and therefore the capture of the Straits, according to Lamsdorff, was practically impossible. The diary contains a number of statements, up to the report of the Russian military agent in Constantinople about the number of Turkish troops in the Straits and the favorable situation for mastering them. At the same time, it is said about the self-deception of Nicholas II, who distorted the real

13 Ibid., 42, l. 24.

14 Ibid., 44, l. 24.

15 Ibid., d. 46, l. 6.

16 Ibid., d. 41, l. 63.

17 Ibid., ll. 34, 62.

18 Ibid., 45, l. 7.

19 Ibid., 43, ll. 4-5.

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the balance of power: "They (the British - I. D.) will never dare to seize the Straits. However, we have 5 battleships in pairs in Sevastopol, " 20 claimed Nikolai P. In fact, according to Lamsdorf, the Black Sea Fleet did not have enough shells and even coal; out of 35 thousand troops formally allocated for the landing, only 8 thousand were suitable, and their morale left much to be desired: when trying to form a landing force, the Black Sea Fleet did not have enough ammunition. a team of volunteer hunters was not found. In addition, the British consul in Sevastopol was well informed about the state of the Black Sea Squadron 21 .

When studying the diary of this period, special attention is drawn to the stories that tell about the fear of the ruling circles before the revolutionary movement. There is even a specific calculation of the armed forces needed, according to Lamsdorff, to keep the population of St. Petersburg in subjection .22 It is characteristic that the author of the diary is interested in the situation in this respect not only within the Russian Empire. He reflects in his notes many facts of foreign life, not forgetting such as the non-appearance of socialists at the appearance of the Kaiser in the German Reichstag and the complaints of the German emperor about their subversive role, the cries of "Long live the Commune!" in the Paris cemetery, the statement of one of the defendants at the trial in France that his actions were intended to "it is the government of the bourgeoisie, the executioners of the petty people, and the scoundrels who will follow it and be more successful." Regarding the latest case, Lamsdorff applauds the French Government's statement that it will "act without any weakness and will be able to protect society" .23 The diary also shows that there was a behind-the-scenes coordination of measures to counter "subversive elements"between the Governments of the two Powers. Thus, the police of the French Republic gave the Russian police lists of Russian revolutionaries in France; the British police supplied the tsarist police with information about Polish political emigrants from Russia. The German kaiser wrote indignantly to the tsar that in a Parisian salon, a Russian general, in response to the question of what would happen if Russia collided with Germany, allowed himself to answer:: "We will be smashed to smithereens, well, then we will have a republic." 24
Lamsdorff kept a diary on the eve of such an important pass in history as the development of capitalism into its highest and last stage - imperialism. The author of the diary was a prominent representative of contemporary exploitative society, a loyal servant of the tsarist autocracy. At the same time, the material contained in the diary of this exceptionally knowledgeable statesman, who held the post of senior adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1886 to 1897, is of considerable value, since it itself exposes the dirty background of the diplomacy of the capitalist powers of the 90s of the last century. A decade separated Russia at that time from the Russo-Japanese war and the first Russian Revolution, two decades - from the First World War and the Great October Revolution. Nevertheless, the reader can find in the diary additional proofs of the historical validity of the subsequent course of events and of the sagacity of the revolutionary social-democracy, which even then managed to give a principled analysis of the general situation in the works of V. I. Lenin and later successfully solved in the interests of the working people the problem of getting out of the impasse into which the foreign and domestic policies of the exploiting classes were leading the country.

I. A. Dyakonova

*

Thursday, May 19, 1894 During tea, we talk to Zinoviev1 about Bulgarian affairs; I think he now understands perfectly well the gross mistakes that were made in his time. It comes out of his mouth to say that we are so strong

20 Ibid., 42, l. 17.

21 Ibid., 45, l. XVII / 250-14 (attachment).

22 Ibid., 43, l. 11.

23 Ibid., 37, l. 23.

24 Ibid., d. 42, l. 51.

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they were so entangled in the time of the late Battenberg 2 that there was no other way out but a sharp and painful crisis... We talk about the general demoralization in government areas and the ways of action that have been put on the agenda. Zinoviev's brother, who until last autumn had been governor of Tula, received one fine morning a very brief telegram announcing his transfer to Mogilev; he still does not know the reasons; a similar fate has befallen many others. Caning is once again widely used in the provinces. The governor of Orel, Mr. Neklyudov, had recently ordered that the peasants should be given up to 120 strokes; when he was informed that one of the unfortunate men's pulse had ceased to be felt after the 60th stroke, he gave orders to continue the execution, and the man died. The venality of such ministers as Durnovo 3, Krivoshei 4, Filippov 5 is well known; careerism prevails everywhere and all conscientiousness is absent. The sovereign sometimes allows rudeness in his remarks, especially in his notes on papers; rudeness is allowed in relation to statesmen whom he has chosen himself; and what is the environment of these dignitaries, who are mostly drawn from spheres not only dubious, but even disreputable. The questions that arise are no longer discussed in the Council of State and the Committee of Ministers, where they simply quarrel and say stupid impertinences to each other, as if at some gathering of uncouth louts. I tell Zinoviev that at the present time it is better to stay away from any ministerial post, and even the post of comrade minister. It is better to try to bring all possible benefits to the side and in the shade. He joins me in saying that he now appreciates the benefits of his peaceful post in Stockholm...

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 38, l. 13. In French.

Friday, May 20, 1894 ...New conversions of securities were carried out in accordance with imperial decrees. Economic crisis. One-on-one conversions sometimes lead to the idea that after changes in the value of old securities, it will also come to the announcement of a loss of value in new securities. Grain prices are falling, and the expectation of a good harvest inspires more fear than satisfaction. The ruin of the agricultural owners seems inevitable. Recently, the Minister of Agriculture and State Property was asked how to behave in the face of the growing crisis, and he replied:: "Reduce production". Here are the recipes we've reached...

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 38, l. 14. In French.

Monday, November 6, 1895. I have barely finished my morning toilet when Prince Lobanov 6 calls me and I go down to him. He hands me the letter he received yesterday from Mr. Staal 7 and says: "Have you read this document? In order to prove that our press is unfairly attacking England, Staal fully justifies the British government." Last night, when I was looking through the papers returned by the emperor, I noticed a large question mark placed by the emperor in the margin of the paragraph where our ambassador writes:: "We can't bring any charges against England." I tell the prince so. "This document cannot be left unanswered, and I would like to ask you to think about the draft response. I have no intention of defending the language used by our newspapers, but it must be pointed out that the conduct of Salisbury 8 is far from perfect and is quite capable of arousing suspicion. We worked together, and when the Sultan finally agreed to our demands, Salisbury starts attacking him again and undermining his authority. Try to carry out reforms without having the necessary authority! The power of any government rests not only on its material strength, but also on the prestige it enjoys. Even here in St. Petersburg, wouldn't it take as many government agents to exercise effective power as there are residents in the city?" In this regard, ras-

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our noble prince's opinion strikes me as very strange; two or three well-armed regiments and one good battery of artillery are sufficient to bring to reason over a hundred thousand unarmed inhabitants. In this case, prestige is based on a very solid material force. Ultimately, the Prince wants me to write a letter that somewhat corrects what he sees as Mr. Staal's overly optimistic assessment of the position of the London cabinet; the letter should express a desire to maintain full agreement between the powers at this stage of Armenian affairs in order to make it easier for Turkey to carry out the reforms that it has agreed to, without pushing it to hurry and not complicating its task by undermining the authority of the authorities within the country. I'll get to work immediately. Having breakfast with Obolensky 9 . At 3 o'clock, before I go down to my usual tea, I send the Minister a draft of my letter to Mr. Staal, which is already ready by this time. At 6 o'clock Prince Lobanov expresses his desire to see me. I evidently understood his intention well, for he does not change anything in substance in the draft I have drawn up; but he does not restrain his passion for moving some words and making some euphonious additions; then, after reading the whole document to me with some emphasis, he says:: "Isn't it more pronounced now?" He looks pleased.

...Today, November 6, 1895, Prince Lobanov, without waiting for the replies from the Governments requested by our ambassadors, and without first submitting the draft to the Emperor, sent the following circular telegram to our representatives in Vienna, Berlin, Paris, London, and Rome:: "In accordance with the reasons set out in my telegram of November 4, I rejected the Austrian offer yesterday." He's basically right, but the way he does it is strange... Shishkin 10 brought unsatisfactory news from Sevastopol. Being acquainted with many of the old sailors, he came to it is believed that they were quite concerned about the mobilization order that came to them. Our warships seem to have neither good weapons, nor a sufficient supply of shells and coal. The maximum number of troops that could be transported from Sevastopol does not exceed 8000 people. Excessive and irrational austerity measures on the part of Admiral Chikhachev 11 (managing the Maritime Ministry) lead to the fact that our weapons do not reach the target. In addition, the state of mind of the young generation of our sailors leaves much to be desired. When a call for volunteers was made in connection with the recent mobilization orders, only one person showed up, so we had to draw lots to recruit the required number. All this is far from encouraging in the case of large operations. The Minister's companion received curious letters from Count Cassini in Peking . Our envoy to the Celestial Empire complains of a complete lack of instructions. While his colleagues are instructed frequently and in great detail, he himself has the opportunity to be guided only by short telegrams on individual issues. It asks us what our goals are and what we are waiting for to articulate our desires. Literally everyone, especially the French, used the situation to their own advantage, and we continue to take a pose of complete selflessness. At the moment, our prestige in China is very high, but the feeling of gratitude tends to be short-lived... Grand Duke Vladimir 13 returned this evening from Berlin, where he spent two days hunting. His Imperial Highness certainly had the opportunity to speak with Emperor Wilhelm, but we don't know anything about that. His Majesty the Kaiser only told our ambassador, Count Osten-Sakeyu, 14 after breakfast on the occasion of the Grand Duke's arrival, that he was charmed by the presence of "such a jolly hunting companion."

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 43, ll. 11-12. In French.

Friday, December 15, 1895 ...In the package of papers returned by the sovereign, which was brought to me only this morning, there is a telegram from Mr. Nelidov 15 , sent from Constantinople on December 13 (25).

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of his audience with the Sultan, who sends him tobacco and other presents. At the audience, they talked about Zeitoun 16 . Abdul Hamid 17 was apparently inclined to resort to the mediation offered by the ambassadors, but in the meantime news came that Zeitoun had been taken by the Turks, and the defenders of the city were trying to escape to the mountains. The package also contains Nelidov's mail, dated December 7 (19); the ambassador's personal letter is very pessimistic. He is convinced that Turkey will not be able to get out of the current crisis, and a decisive catastrophe can be expected at any moment. Apart from the unrest in Asia Minor and among the entire Christian population, the ambassador's concerns are mainly caused by the bitterness of the sultan's Muslim subjects. They begin to proclaim loudly that a civilized Europe, instead of speaking exclusively in favor of Christians, could take pity on them and free them from the despotism under which they are doomed to suffer. To all these elements of discord and hatred, the most terrible depletion of Turkish finances is now being added. Nelidov considers it his duty to warn that the current situation cannot continue for a long time and that the sultan is not able to cope with it. The Ambassador once again draws attention to the suspicious campaigning of his British colleague Sir Curry18 and to the continuing intrigues of the Anglo-Armenian committees, whose activities, whether sincere or insidious, only encourage disorder and perpetuate ruin in the unfortunate areas they claim to help. A secret letter from Admiral Chikhachev explains the sudden appearance of our Black Sea squadron on maneuvers.

/Confidential letter of Adjutant-General Chikhachev to Prince Lobanov, No. 304, December 14, 1895.

In order to bring the vessels of the Black Sea Fleet into full readiness, the following order has been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet and the Black Sea ports with His Imperial Majesty's permission. "The following vessels will raise the flag and start the campaign: the battleships Chesma, Catherine II, Sinop and 12 Apostles; the gunboat Kubanets, the mine cruisers Kazarsky and Griden, the mine transports Bug and Danube, and six destroyers. The chief Commander will raise the flag of the Vice Admiral; Rear Admiral Tchaikovsky will be appointed Chief of staff of the squadron, and Rear Admirals Walrond and Osteletsky will be appointed junior flagships. The first-class cruiser Pamyat Merkuriya and the stationary boats Terez, Uralets and Donets, located in Trebizond, Samsun and Constantinople, should join the squadron when they are released." In consequence of this order, the squadron began its campaign yesterday, December 12. I take this opportunity to inform Your Lordship, etc.//*.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 43, ll. 54-55. In French.

Monday, January 1, 1896. Among the dispatches sent to the emperor, there is a telegram from Prince Ferdinand of Coburg 19, which contains congratulations on the New Year. In my opinion, it would be sufficient to send the following message in reply, addressed to Prince Ferdinand in Sofia: "Very much touched by the feelings expressed to me by Your Grace, I sincerely thank you." Prince Lobanov invites me to see him again on this occasion and says: "The text of your response message sounds a little dry." I reply: "The fact is that in Bulgaria such congratulations are usually published and commented on, and in the current uncertain circumstances, it seems to me that some restraint should be shown." Prince Lobanov says: "But it is precisely in such a situation, which is still far from clear, that I would not like to discourage him, to distance him from me." "If he does not keep his promises, well, then, as they say, "we'll spit and rub", "but for now..." (this statement I considered worthy of taking note). After listening to Prince Lobanov, I suggested adding an answer to the draft text-

* Two lines - / / / / - indicate that the words enclosed between them are written in the original Russian.

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I send a telegram to Ferdinand in the following words: "...and I also send my best wishes to Your Lordship." "After all," I explain, " wishes can be very different." Prince Lobanov suddenly begins to laugh out loud and says: "Exactly so, absolutely so; add these few words to the text and send the package to the sovereign."

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 44, l. 4. In French.

Wednesday, January 24, 1896 ...The newspapers published the manifesto of Prince Ferdinand 21, announcing the upcoming baptism of Prince Boris. So, we have on our hands / / "krestshk"//! It remains to be seen whether we should be happy about this, and whether this creates a source of future very confusing complications for us. In order to save Princess Marie-Louise from the thunderous reproaches from Rome, 22 she was forced to leave Sofia. It will be interesting to see what will be the content of Prince Ferdinand's letter expected this evening?..

Zinoviev, coming to tea, agrees with my opinion that it is inappropriate for Prince Boris to convert to Orthodoxy in the current situation. We are bound to the fate of a poor two-year-old boy, especially if the sovereign agrees to take on the role of godfather. 23 I would be more inclined to recognize the father, at the request of the Bulgarians, than to adopt a son who will remain an unknown quantity for another 15 years! In addition, the role assigned to us does not correspond much to the dignity of Russia!.. In the evening I expect a post from Vienna, with a letter from the Prince of Eoburg, but there is no package yet... Late in the evening, the telegraph agency receives the text of the manifesto published by the KNPC of Coburg. I must say that in his manifesto, he does not show much respect for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 44, l. 14. In French.

Friday, February 2, 1896 ...Prince Lobanov calls me to his office, and I dress hurriedly and go. He shows a note from the Charge d'affaires of Great Britain, asking if their Majesties will agree to come to the embassy for the celebration during the coronation celebrations .24 The prince asks to write about this to Count Vorontsov 25, but the duty of reporting to the sovereign remains with him personally. I inform my superior that I intend to submit to him, for a report to the Emperor on Tuesday, a paper on the order to be observed in the accommodation of invited guests; the prince says: "There is something more urgent. Any minute now, I expect a message that a ceremony of Prince Boris's conversion to Orthodoxy has been held in Sofia. Then it will be necessary to immediately prepare a telegram to Nelidov so that he will inform the other ambassadors about this. As will be indicated in the telegram, from now on we have no objection to the Porte making the necessary demarches to recognize Ferdinand as Prince of Bulgaria. " 26 I go down to the office and from there send the prince a draft telegram, the text of which he immediately approves. The telegram says: "To Mr. Nelidov in Constantinople, to inform the other ambassadors. Since the solemn ceremony of Prince Boris ' conversion to Orthodoxy has taken place, the Emperor instructs you to inform the Turkish government that this accomplished fact removes, in our opinion, the main obstacles that have hitherto existed in the way of recognizing Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg as Prince of Bulgaria. From now on, we no longer see any obstacles to the court of the Suzerain taking appropriate steps to obtain consent to this recognition from all the powers that have signed the Treaty of Berlin." I present the draft I have drawn up to Obolensky, with a request that he keep it ready for his report as soon as the telegram expected by Prince Lobanov is received from Sofia...

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 44, l. 17. In French.

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Saturday, February 3, 1896 ...At about noon, the minister sends me a telegram from Sofia, which the emperor has just sent to him. The text reads: "To His Majesty the Emperor of All Russia. I have the honor to inform Your Majesty that the confirmation ceremony for Your Majesty's godson took place at noon today. His Holiness Exarch Joseph, in the presence of the Metropolitans of Tarnovo, Varna and Preslav, gave my son holy communion. Ferdinand". The telegram sent from Sofia yesterday afternoon was received here at 10 p.m., apparently at the time when the emperor was at the ball. Lobanov asks me for my draft telegram to Nelidov, which he approved yesterday. This morning, when I got out of bed, I wrote a note to Obolensky to remind him of this document. Now it turns out that the telegram has not yet been rewritten, it is being rewritten only now, hastily, and therefore it is delivered to Lobanov with a gross mistake: instead of the words "we don't see each other anymore" - "we don't see each other anymore". Lobanov sends the document to me, emphasizing the error. He never manages to distribute the circle of responsibility between us, and I don't like it. Meanwhile Obolensky arrives for breakfast; I am too ill to express my annoyance to him too harshly. I sit at home all day and don't see anyone. Despite my indisposition, I begin the tedious task of working out the order of placement of persons according to their rank during the coronation celebrations. Private telegraph messages convey interesting and even touching details of the ceremony held yesterday in Sofia. // In a good hour//. As the package of papers returned by the sovereign reaches me rather late, I am again forced to stay awake at night...

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 44, l. 18. In French.

Monday, April 1, 1896 ...The minister calls me, and I find him alone with the Italian Ambassador, to whom he introduces me. The ambassador came to ask how to arrange for the arrival of the Prince of Naples in Moscow on the day of the grand entrance. Italy refuses to allow our Red Cross team to enter Massaua 27 . Prince Lobanov instructs me to inform General Kaufman of this decision .28
TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 44, l. 23. In French.

Tuesday, April 2, 1896 ...Prince Lobanov calls me at 9.30 a.m. I find him again somewhat anxious; he thanks me for my note concerning the arrival of the Prince of Naples, and instructs me to send one telegram to General Kaufmann, and another to our ambassador at Constantinople. We are again talking about settling the issue of the ill-fated expedition of our Red Cross detachment to Abyssinia. I go down to the office. Soon Lobanov asks to come again. He tells me about the letters he received yesterday from Count Saken. I tell him that it seems to me that Mr. Herbett's aide - memoire 29 does not in the least contradict the view expressed in the telegrams sent to Mr. Staal on March 19. I am of the opinion that it is not really possible to take as a basis the Convention of 1888 on the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, 30 since the British made reservations to it during their occupation of Egypt; but what a misfortune! We will say that since their occupation continues indefinitely and the Convention of 1888 remains a dead letter, it is time for Europe to enact it. The difference in shades here is the same as between a white cap and a white cap, i.e. there is no difference at all. Lobanov agrees with this point of view. Then I turn to Sacken's second letter, which speaks of an attempt at rapprochement between England and France, and even of creating a kind of alliance of these two powers with Austria, like a coalition on the eve of the Crimean War. Anoto 31 is allegedly very active in creating such an alliance. All this nonsense was communicated to our ambassador by the mysterious Herr Holstein, 32 who was supposed to be a very influential adviser to the German Foreign Office. And the brave Osten-Sacken, who gullibly swallowed all this nonsense,

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he now expounds it with the most touching credulity in a top secret letter. "But this is absurd," Lobanov tells me, " true, I never thought Saken was an eagle, but still I never thought he was so weak-minded." "It occurs to me,"I reply," that Mr. Holstein is just trying to make a little fun of our ambassador." "If it is sometimes permissible to say something stupid like this without thinking enough, then why put it in writing and draw up such curious documents?" Lobanov laughs. "Generally speaking," he says, " I don't want the ambassadors to be eagles; it's enough that they are decent people." "The Eagles like to take the initiative too much, and it's always better that the leadership comes from here." "All the more so," I add, " since the ambassador's range of vision is inevitably relatively limited." The main thing is that he should be well-disciplined. I advise the Minister to wait for Saxnu's reply until he receives the Sunday mail, where there should be a reply from London; only then can the matter be considered urgent. Lobanov is already in full dress, with a white tie and a blue ribbon. He soon goes to report to the Winter Palace... At 2: 30 a.m., after returning from the palace, the minister calls me again. He hands over several documents and asks to send the package to the emperor by 4 o'clock; Lobanov himself will not be there at this time, he wants to leave. The Prince is in a good mood and informs me that the Emperor fully shares his assessment of Herbett's memorial; as for the second letter received from Sacken, the emperor said://"What kind of nonsense is this"//, to which the minister replied://"I think that Holstein wanted to make fun of Sacken, and at the same time inspire him with some distrust of France"//. Prince Lobanov also told me: "The Emperor told me that he had received a long letter from Queen Victoria, written in an impossible handwriting , from the Empress Mother 33 , via a courier on his way from Turby. The emperor said that he had spent the whole of yesterday deciphering the message together with the empress, and added://"The email also contains complaints about you. The Queen writes that it was much easier to do business with the kindest Nikolai Karlovich 35!"/ / . Lobanov laughs, talking about the old queen's displeasure, and I insert the following remark: "In essence, such complaints are the best compliment that Her Majesty the Queen could have paid you."

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 44, ll. 23-24. In French.

Monday, June 3, 1896 ...Lobanov complains that he has not received a response regarding the neutralization of the Suez Canal. I think that my friend Ionin 36 is right : in peacetime, the channel is free; in wartime, no convention can make it neutral.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 44, l. 46. In French.

Friday, August 2, 1896 ...This is Prince Lobanov calling. He begins to worry about the course of events in Crete 37 . It's about time. According to Onu 38, who comes every day for four o'clock tea, shortly after his arrival here, 3 or 4 weeks ago, he got the impression that the minister was determined to limit the demands of the Cretans, being convinced of the sufficient compliance of the rebels. Our chief positively sided with the Turks. He did not want to hear about the establishment of a consular commission on Candia 39, nor did he want to hear about the expansion of the four points with the reforms that the Porte had agreed to. Now that Porga has only half fulfilled its promises, and the resistance of the Cretans, who are receiving reinforcements from Greece, has brought the situation to an extreme, Prince Lobanov sets about studying the statements made by the rebels and trying to reach an agreement on new grounds that could be put forward by the powers, and perhaps even forced by them on both warring parties to the parties. The idea of creating a consular commission in Candia is beginning to take shape. However, Mr. Onu believes

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this is all too late. In his opinion, it was necessary to speak a firm language with the Turks from the very beginning. This is the first time that only Cretans are forced to suffer in such a crisis - all the atrocities committed by the Turks go completely unpunished. And it turns out that we, it turns out* that Russia has changed its role in this way! The people of Crete no longer understand anything about our position, and we consistently lose their trust and sympathy. Lobanov is still dominated by the idea of maintaining the status quo and delaying the fall of the Ottoman Empire. It remains questionable whether the means chosen for this purpose are the best. Mr. Onu, who knows the local conditions well,is very concerned about the developments. According to him, he is also struck by the new way in which the minister is able to tell you things that allegedly stem from his own beliefs, while these things were suggested to him and suggested only recently.

In the morning, I go down to the office several times to search the archives for the text of requests or demands as originally formulated by the Cretans. A moment of excitement. Then we find the necessary material in the reports of De Mericus 40, our consul in Cania 41 . These papers, which are kept in the Asiatic Department, are marked ad acta, in the handwriting of the noble Kapnistus .42
TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 45, ll. 6-7. In French.

Monday, August 5, 1896 ...Lobanov begins to seriously engage in Cretan affairs, which are becoming more complicated by the hour. Liechtenstein 43 and Montebello 44 come one after the other, bringing alarming news; the telegrams from Athens and Constantinople are very unpleasant ...He is always late, and when we are alone together, he confesses that he is leaving St. Petersburg the day after tomorrow very worried. The minister, in his present state, inspires him with little confidence: Prince Lobanov, full of pride and conceit, is capable of overreacting, biting the bit. Onu then goes back to the question of the sovereign's trip 45 . He doesn't understand how a reasonable person could have thought of going to Paris. In the city, the intention to go to Paris is explained either by Witte's influence, or by the advice of one or another person. I reply that I don't like and am saddened by this situation, when all the time there is a search for some inspirers. Where is our autocrat? I would rather see him do something bold and young than play the passive role that people so readily attribute to him on every occasion. As for Lobanov, I refrain from explaining the emperor's trip to Paris precisely because of his insistence. This question is very delicate: if we assume that it was Lobanov who advised the emperor to visit France, then apparently he took on a great responsibility; if we assume that the trip will take place contrary to his opinion, then this means that he enjoys the emperor's confidence much less than was once believed. Anyway, since he is accompanying their majesties to Paris, he is a supporter of the trip, at least from the official point of view. It is interesting that / / polit, obozr. Tatishcheva46//, published in the August issue //In the book of the Russian Messenger//, he preaches the necessity of visiting Paris by some Russian high official, who would visit various European countries at the same time, if only he wants to get acquainted with the true state of affairs, without causing discontent on the part of the only real friends...

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 45, l. 8. In French.

September 6, 1896 St. Petersburg***

Mr. Ambassador, I hope that Your Excellency will be tolerant of this letter, although no previous correspondence gives me any real information.-

* So in the original.

** To business (lat.).

*** Enclosed in the diary is a draft of Lamsdorf's letter to the Ambassador in Constantinople A. I. Nelidov.

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We are not entitled to such a message. As you know, I always have a hard time getting out of the deep shadows that I prefer to stay in. The sad circumstances of the moment have already forced me to assume the temporary duties of Minister, and this situation will probably soon be created again, in connection with the impending departure of Mr. Shishkin to Cherbourg, 47 so I have to answer at least a few lines to the mail that is willy-nilly addressed to me. First of all, I feel it my duty to say that no one is more sympathetic than I am to the hardships that are now being imposed on you, and no one pays such sincere tribute to the vigilance, energy and insight that you are constantly showing us examples of. In such circumstances, it is quite natural that I should place my forces at your complete disposal and hope to make at least a modest contribution to your great efforts to ensure the vital interests of Russia. Prince Lobanov, whom we all deplore, was of the opinion that if it is harmful in politics to see everything in black, then it is no less dangerous, of course, to lull yourself to sleep with illusions. It is better to consider the problems that arise in their actual and accurate form, striving to solve them in the least unfavorable conditions. Unfortunately, this is not the case here. In Breslau, we have just again agreed to support the rotten status quo of the Ottoman Empire at all costs, considering that the status quo is quite possible as long as there is agreement between the great Powers and none of them takes isolated actions. This does not prevent the fact that a powerful British squadron is stationed at the entrance to the Dardanelles, and the anarchy reigning in Turkey is reaching such limits that surprises that cannot be taken into account beforehand become not only possible, but even more likely, and moreover in the near future!

Since 1879, there has been talk of the absolute necessity for us to have a strong fleet on the Black Sea. The late minister learned from his colleagues in the naval and military departments that if necessary, we could capture the Bosphorus within 36 hours. But is this really the case? We are informed from extremely secret sources that our ships have no shells in Sevastopol, and that the British know this very well through their consul, from whom our gallant sailors are unable to conceal anything with their sincere frankness. I begged //Nikolay Pavlovich 48 / / Confidentially draw the attention of Admiral Tyrtov 49 to the above facts. But even assuming that our naval and land forces are in the best possible condition, who will order them to march on Constantinople? In such cases, everything depends on the speed of execution, and how do we ensure the necessary speed? In my humble opinion, any disturbing news that comes to us from you will have to seek approval from the concerned ministers, and then the highest order. Meanwhile, the imperial government is on vacation. There's absolutely no one to talk to right now. The time it will take to decipher a telegram from you, transmit it to the sovereign's place of residence, and decipher it there will delay the decision. This will be enough to disrupt everything and, in all likelihood, lose everything. I particularly fear for those days of sea-going or land-going when there is no means of communicating with the sovereign. God grant that nothing extraordinary may happen until the emperor arrives in Paris. I hope that the few minutes that are allocated from the overloaded program of the imperial trip to serious negotiations will allow us to see the position of the French government. However, I must tell you that the extremely energetic words attributed to Monsieur Hanoteau in Baron Morenheim's telegram 50 are very different from the language*

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, 45, ll. XVII-250- 13 - 14. In French.

* This is where the draft email ends.

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October 4, 1896 * Shishkin returned on October 3. He is very happy with the draft instructions that Apothecary and Apothecary have worked out, and he is in a hurry to send them to Darmstadt tomorrow. He saw the emperor only when he left Cherbourg for Paris. During the first few days of his stay in Paris, he had somewhat avoided meeting Hanaudot. The latter thought that this was due to Shishkin's fear that Anoto might demand a formal agreement, and reassured Shishkin. Then he presented his draft contract to Shishkin. It is not desirable that the emperor's stay in Paris should pass without achieving a practical result. The draft provides for sending the same instructions to all ambassadors, including the ambassadors of both powers in Constantinople. When Shishkin tells the emperor about this while moving to Paris, he expresses delight.//"Everything could have been fine without the bombing. Nelidov's reports frighten me; in his last letter (dated September 6), he even asks that he be allowed to call the Black Sea Squadron at his discretion; what is more, he wants to be the commander of the fleet, etc. In Paris, Shishkin does not see the tsar; his Majesty makes an appointment for him at Tsarskoye Selo. On the other hand, our monarch talks a great deal with Hanaudot at Versailles and publicly approves of his project to respond to the deplorable state of affairs in Turkey by expanding the rights of the Ottoman Debt Commission and adding a Russian representative to the said commission. I do not see any benefits for us in all this, so I ask Shishkin: "How are we going to become holders of bank bills? ""Well, yes," he replies, " and we will be able to use part of the amount due to us from Turkey as compensation for war losses in order to gain access to the commission. Anoto will soon send us a detailed overview of the state of the Ottoman debt, and all we have to do is gather precise information from the Asian Department about the current state of affairs with the payment of military compensation to us." I advise Shishkin to request relevant information in Constantinople. From Paris, Hanoteau and Shishkin sent a telegraphic message to both ambassadors in Constantinople, warning them of the impending expulsion of instructions. Our good interim minister is impatient to send the drafts of both circulars to Darmstadt by courier mail tomorrow, and we have to deal with the matter all day.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 46, l. XVII-251 -18. In French.

Friday, November 1, 1896 ...I am tormented by the thought of the letter I received last night from the Earl of Osten-Sacken. Our Ambassador seems to be fascinated by the declarations that Prince Hohenlohe and Baron Marschall have told him about beforehand, and which are scheduled to be published in the Reichstag in response to inquiries expected on Monday, November 4 (16). In these statements, they intend to admit that a secret treaty existed and that Germany refused to renew it precisely because of its secrecy. In this case, it would have been better, in my opinion, to publish the text of the agreement itself. If they believe that they are bound by an obligation to maintain absolute secrecy provided for in an outdated treaty, then they must maintain complete secrecy, as stipulated in article 5 of our 1887 agreement .54 I am drafting a telegram with the following content: "I have received a letter dated October 27. We cannot approve of the statements that Prince Hohenlohe and Baron Marshal are going to make in the Reichstag. The German Government has undertaken to keep secret not only the content but also the very existence of the treaty (see article 5). This is the only thing that should be stated, while emphasizing the uniqueness of those international agreements that are necessary in some cases and which, for reasons of State, can only take place on the explicit condition that even the very existence of such a treaty is kept completely secret. To say so now, when so much time had passed that the contract existed, would be to violate in the most obvious way the obligations assumed.-

* Draft version.

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government agencies. Linking the refusal to renew the contract with its secrecy is also not fair. Apparently, this is intended to imply that we were particularly interested in the secrecy of the treaty, while the preservation of secrecy was "mutually" stipulated by both contracting parties. You can make it clear to the Chancellor and Baron Marshal that their intended statements, as they were reported to you, would make a deplorable impression; moreover, in Russia they could be interpreted, especially by the press, as a treacherous maneuver designed to create an atmosphere of distrust."

I go down to the office at nine-thirty, and Shishkin comes in at ten. As always, he approves of everything I have done and asks me to prepare a telegram to the emperor, hoping to send it, with the text of the secret treaty of 1887 attached, by a four-hour courier to Tsarskoye Selo. I am preparing a telegram to the Consul in Nice and the Consul General in Genoa to warn them that Shishkin's letter will be sent by today's post, in which he informs Mikhail Girs 55 of the sovereign's decision on his marriage. I work from home. I leave the text of the telegram to Baron Osten-Sacken, so that I can read it to Obolensky when he comes to breakfast. It is downright terrible to have such a high level of responsibility on your own; this feeling is complicated by the fear of harming your boss, who gives me too much initiative and gives me unlimited confidence. I'm making up some papers with answers. Teplovsky arrives, still insisting that Prince Lobanov's will must be kept somewhere, as well as part of his money fortune.. Baron Rosen, our envoy to Belgrade, who the late Prince Lobanov had planned to transfer to Tokyo, is coming to visit. Uncertainty now reigns throughout our entire ministry. The usual tea, with the addition of Ionin to the usually collected ones. Nikonov is always late, and he is offended that Shishkin does not tell him anything definite about the emperor's response to Girs ' marriage projects... I work in the evening. In the package with the papers returned by the sovereign is my draft telegram, which has received approval. I have some doubts about the appropriateness of the secret telegram, and I am tormented by this.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 46, ll. 6-7. In French.

Saturday, November 2, 1896 ...I've been in the office since nine-thirty. I'm tidying up my safe, looking through the 1890 file on the renewal of our 1887 treaty. Shishkin arrives at 10 o'clock. We are talking about the expected arrival of Nelidov. Count Montebello, who was received by the sovereign the day before yesterday, on Thursday, came yesterday and told Shishkin that His Majesty continues to fully adhere to the main line of instructions agreed between Ashto and Shishkin, and that His Majesty hopes for the support of this line both from the Minister of Finance and our ambassador in Constantinople. This is interesting! The French ambassador, who had already visited me on Wednesday, again asked for a meeting yesterday, but I did not accept it, trying to go back into the shadows, since Shishkin again took over the leadership of the ministry. I am trying to prove to the acting Minister that, despite the line of conduct revealed by our monarch, one should not adhere too literally to the draft instructions developed with Anoto. From the very beginning, I advised not to consider these guidelines as a final version, but to allow them to be discussed. In terms of my internal moods, I am very far from admiring the projects developed, if they are considered from the point of view of Russia's interests. It would be better to suggest that Nelidov develop a counter-project, adhering to the same goal: to preserve the Ottoman Empire by improving its administration as much as possible, while at the same time not losing sight of figuring out what we will need to do in the event of a sudden, more or less imminent collapse of Turkey. It will be possible to find ground for developing a common point of view by assigning responsibility to the Minister of Finance (who, in my opinion, is absolutely right in this case) for rejecting the idea of Russia's participation in the Ottoman Debt Commission, as well as in the kind of political and financial commission that they intend to entrust with providing assistance to the Turkish administration...

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 46, l. -7. - In French.

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Sunday, November 3, 1896 ...I go down early to the chancellery and search the secret archives to find identical instructions given in 1891 -1892 to the ambassadors of Russia and France in Constantinople, as well as to find materials regarding the obligations assumed by the German government during the rejection of our secret treaty in 1890. I go to see Obolensky for a while, and Shishkin also enters. He tells us that Nelidov, who arrived yesterday, asked for an appointment with him, and the appointment is scheduled for 11 a.m. today, at the Ministry. Another mail arrived (courier Savinsky). There's nothing new there. Letter from Nicholas Girs 58; Hanaudot goes on to assure me that the emperor had quite definitely told him that he intended to appoint me as a minister's companion, and that Count Vorontsov had promised to do the same if he himself was appointed minister. In fact, it is simply ridiculous of Anoto to talk about me so much without ever seeing me in person; it is even possible that he has done me harm by talking about me. I had breakfast with Obolensky. Shishkin came to send a package to the emperor. Shishkin brings Nelidov's memo, in which he shows all the disadvantages of the Russian representative joining the Ottoman Debt Commission; as Shishkin tells us, the ambassador is so opposed to such a step, and in general to the program worked out in Paris, that he is ready to resign from his post rather than undertake such a pernicious policy. Shishkin sends this memorial note to the emperor. In the same package we put a telegraphic message from Count Osten-Sacken, saying that our warning seemed to have made the right impression in Berlin. The Marshal said that Bismarck had placed the Government in a position where it was necessary to say something; he could not deny the existence of the agreements of 1887, although he recognized our right to demand complete secrecy; it was obvious that he would take all measures to say only what was absolutely necessary and in the most cautious form. Negus Menelik60 informs by telegram addressed to the Emperor of the signing of the peace between Abyssinia and Italy on October 14 (26) 61 . The emperor has requested a draft reply telegram, which I am preparing... In the evening, the emperor returns// Shishkin's memorandum concerning the audience requested by Nelidov; there is a note on it: //Tuesday at 2 o'clock//. On the Ambassador's memo, His Majesty wrote: / / "The more I think about this matter, the more I think that we will make a major mistake by introducing our representative to the Council on the Ottoman Debt. This is Ganoto's idea that we must abandon." In the margins of the memorial note, the sovereign noted://"All that is said here is quite true"//. In a good hour! But then why was it necessary to give out certain promises in Paris and Versailles, why was it necessary to make a mark //"I fully agree" / / on the draft instructions reported in Darmstadt, why was it necessary to promise Count Montebello the day before yesterday, on Thursday, when receiving him in audience, that efforts would be made to convince Nelidov and Witte of the correctness of the idea expressed in the instructions? The young monarch changes his mind with terrifying speed. Today, he seems to be impressed by the work presented to him by the Finance Minister on Friday. On the telegram of Count Osten-Sacken, the sovereign wrote://"It seems to me that we can fully agree with the arguments of the Baron Marshal. In any case, we will not lose anything from the announcement of the previous agreement"//. This again contradicts what His Majesty said to Shishkin a week ago, when the emperor said that the secrets of our agreements of 1887-1890 should not be exposed.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 46, l. 8. In French.

Monday, November 4, 1896 As usual, I go down to my office at nine-thirty. Shishkin arrives, completely upset: "Where are we going, where are we going!" - he says. The reorganization of the Ottoman Debt Commission was a key point of the Anoto combination. The emperor seems to have pledged himself to support it, and now it turns out that he rejects it!

It seems to me that it is better to do this than to persist in a false step, but we should try to get out of such situations as decently as possible

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in a way that avoids our monarch being taken for some kind of weather vane that is not trustworthy. I am glad that I was able to persuade Shishkin to support the last two paragraphs of the Anoto project by including them in a special letter designed to reinforce the advisory nature of the instructions sent to Nelidov...

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 46, ll. 8-9. In French.

Tuesday, November 5, 1896 ...The Emperor finally decided to abandon the idea of including a Russian representative in the Commission of the Ottoman Debt and instructed us to inform interested persons about this. Shishkin apparently took advantage of this instruction to emphasize the fact that by retaining the last two paragraphs of identical instructions, despite Anoteau's request, and formulating them in a separate letter, he gave the instructions a consultative character consistent with Nelidov's considerations. In this connection, Shishkin told the Emperor that our ambassador, who will have the honor to introduce himself to the Emperor immediately after him, speaks in favor of certain actions of Russia and intends to ask His Majesty's permission to call the Black Sea Fleet directly to the Bosphorus at the appropriate psychological moment. The emperor had previously spoken out against such an idea, talking with Shishkin about Nelidov's letter of September 6 (18) during the move from Cherbourg to Paris. Today, he said://"Well, I can let him do that."// Then he added://"I'll listen to him"//. Shishkin tries to talk about prudence. He points out that right now our position is impeccable, with only England against us. However, the slightest mistake could put us again in the East in a situation similar to that of 1854. The sovereign objects: / / "They will never dare"//, adding //"We will deal with them"//. There is no reason to object to such instructions. At the same time, the emperor said that when drawing up a response to English proposals, it should be carefully emphasized that we do not want coercive measures against the sultan. //"That's what I wrote to my grandmother, Queen Victoria, yesterday"//. There is very little clarity in all this, and I cannot see any logical and practical conclusions from all that our kind acting Minister tells me. Shishkin tried to praise the Emperor for the effect of our telegram to Count Osten-Sacken; the speeches delivered yesterday by Hohenlohe and the Marshal were indeed irreproachable. However, the emperor contented himself with saying: // "I did not doubt it"//. Then the emperor showed a long letter from Kaiser Wilhelm, in which he called Bismarck a traitor, etc. etc. When Shishkin shows the emperor a translation of the Negus Menelik's letter, to which Leontiev wrote:62 dared to attribute: "Everything else will be passed on to you by Count Leontiev, who has my full confidence," the emperor apparently does not attach much importance to this fraudulent trick. At the same time, he says that it is time for Abyssinians and Leontiev to part ways. Shishkin made the journey to Tsarskoye Selo with General Bankovsky, 63 who looked very preoccupied. The Minister of War speaks of the sovereign as a man / / belligerent and arrogant//. When Shishkin says://"And above all, it seems to me that the emperor does not yet have stability of opinion. "/ / The Minister of War adds: / / " But of course, he consults with everyone: with grandfathers, aunts, mamma and all sorts of others; he is young and gives in to the look of the last person who spoke to him."// In addition, the minister sees few competent people in the tsar's entourage who can enlighten him. Vannovsky talks about the terrible mess in the administration in the Caucasus, where there is less security now than before its conquest. He allegedly suggested that the emperor appoint General Kuro - patkin there as governor-general, 64 but the emperor, apparently, insistently adheres to the candidacy of Count Vorontsov-Dashkov. In this regard, he is not too inclined to appoint the latter as chancellor. All this is extremely interesting.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 568, op. 1, d. 46, ll. 10-11. In French 8. Voprosy Istorii (Questions of History) No. 6.

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notes

1 Zinoviev I. A., Envoy to Sweden (1891 -1897).

2 Alexander Battenberg became Prince of Bulgaria in 1879 and abdicated in August 1886.

3 I. N. Durnovo, Minister of Internal Affairs (1889-1895), then Chairman of the Committee of Ministers (1895-1903)

4 A. K. Krivoshei, Minister of Railways (1892-1894), member of the State Council.

5 Filippov T. I., State comptroller (1889-1899).

6 Lobanov-Rostovsky A. B., Minister of Foreign Affairs (1895-1896).

7 Staal E. E., Ambassador to London (1884-1903).

8 R. Salisbury, British Prime Minister (1895-1902), until 1900 - simultaneously Minister of Foreign Affairs.

9 Obolensky V. S.-since 1886 Director of the Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

10 I. P. Shishkin, diplomat, since 1891 a companion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1896-1897 a manager of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

11 I. M. Chikhachev, Manager of the Maritime Ministry (1888-1896).

12 Cassini A. P., Envoy to China (1893-1898).

13 Vladimir Alexandrovich, Grand Duke, from 1884 to 1905 Commander-in-Chief of the Guard and the St. Petersburg Military District.

14 Osten-Sacken N. D., Ambassador to Berlin (1895-1912).

15 A. I. Nelidov, Ambassador to Turkey (1883-1897).

16 Zeitoun is a city in Asia Minor, in the Aleppo vilayet. The presence of a permanent Turkish garrison here caused repeated revolts of the Armenian population (in 1884, 1890, 1895-1896).

17 Abdul Hamid II, Sultan of Turkey (1876-1909).

18 Curry F., British Ambassador to Turkey (1893-1898).

19 Ferdinand I of Coburg, Bulgarian Prince (1887-1908), then Tsar of Bulgaria (1908-1918).

20 In January 1896, the issue of restoring diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, which had been severed in November 1886, was considered. Russia agreed to do this and recognize Ferdinand of Coburg as Prince of Bulgaria, provided that his son Boris was baptized according to the Orthodox rite. The uncertainty of the situation in these days was caused by the fact that Ferdinand was slow to find out whether the tsarist government really officially recognized him after the baptism of Boris. In addition, on January 2 (14), 1896, the Bulgarian prince's trip to Western Europe began. (For more information, see: A. K. Martynenko. Russian-Bulgarian relations in 1894-1902 Kiev, 1967).

On January 21-23 (February 4), 1896, the manifesto of Ferdinand of Coburg was published in Bulgaria, announcing the impending baptism of his son Boris according to the rite of the Orthodox Church.

22 Ferdinand of Coburg's wife, Marie-Louise, was an ardent Catholic.

On January 23-25 (February 6), 1896, Nicholas II sent a telegram to Ferdinand of Coburg, where he announced his consent to assume the role of godfather.

24 Refers to the upcoming coronation of Nicholas II in Moscow on May 18, 1896.

25 Vorontsov-Dashkov I. I., Minister of the Imperial Court and Estates (1881-1897).

26 According to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the Turkish Sultan was considered the suzerain of the Bulgarian Principality, so the recognition of Ferdinand of Coburg as Prince of Bulgaria was carried out through the Porte.

27 Massawa is a port in northern Ethiopia.

28 Kaufman M. P., Chairman of the Russian Red Cross Society (1883-1898).

29 Herbette J., French diplomat, Ambassador to Berlin (1886-1896).

30 Refers to the Constantinople Convention for the Free Navigation of the Suez Canal, signed on 17 (29) October 1888 by Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey and France. The Convention declared the idea of free use of the channel. It was declared open to commercial and military vessels of all countries both during the days of peace and during the war; the blockade of the canal and military operations in its area were prohibited (see: "Collection of treaties of Russia with other states 1856-1917", Moscow 1952).

31 Ganoto G., Minister of Foreign Affairs of France (1894-1895, 1896-1898).

32 F. A. Holstein, German diplomat, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1880-1906).

33 We are talking about the trip of the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna to visit her son Tsarevich George Alexandrovich, who was undergoing medical treatment in Turby (near Nice).

34 Victoria, Queen of England (1837-1901).

35 Mr. N. K., Minister of Foreign Affairs (1882-1895).

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36 Ionin A. S. Russian diplomat, privy councilor.

37 In March 1896, an uprising broke out in Crete against Turkish oppression; in May, the rebel committee appealed to the Greek population of the island to start an armed struggle against Turkey, for unification with Greece.

38 M. K. Onu, Minister to Athens (1890-1901).

39 Candia is the Italian name for the island of Crete.

40 Demerik N. N., Russian Consul in Kania in 1896.

41 Kania (Haiia) is a locality and bay on the island of Crete.

42 Kapnist D. A., Director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1891 -1897).

43 F. Lichtenstein, Ambassador of Austria-Hungary to Russia (1894-1898).

44 Montebello G., French Ambassador to Russia (1891 -1903).

45 This refers to the foreign trip of Nicholas II in August-October 1896.

46 Tatishchev S. S. diplomat, publicist and historian.

47 Minister of Foreign Affairs Lobanov, who had accompanied Nicholas II on a trip abroad, died suddenly on August 18 (30), 1896; a friend of the Minister of Foreign Affairs N. P. Shishkin left for France to further accompany the tsar.

48 This refers to N. P. Shishkin.

49 P. P. Tyrtov, Manager of the Maritime Ministry (1896-1903).

50 A. P. Morenheim, Ambassador to Paris (1884-1898).

51 The French Foreign Minister Hanoteau persuaded Nicholas II and Shishkin to approve joint instructions to the ambassadors of Russia and France in Constantinople, containing French proposals to which the tsarist government had previously refused to give its consent. The instructions were intended, in particular, to expand the competence of the Ottoman Debt Commission, established by the creditor Powers in 1881 after Turkey declared bankruptcy. At the same time, the tsarist government agreed to send a delegate to this institution, which until then it had ignored (see: V. M. Khvostov. The Middle East Crisis of 1896-1897 (Istorik-Marxist, 1929, No. 13; Istoriya diplomatii, vol. 2, Moscow, 1963, pp. 339-342).

52 Hohenlohe H., Chancellor of the German Empire (1894-1900).

53 Marshal von Biberstein, State Secretary of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1890-1897).

54 This refers to the so-called "reinsurance agreement" of 1887, signed in Berlin on 6 (18) June by the State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, G. Bismarck, and the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, P. A. Shuvalov.

55 Gire M. N., Envoy to Argentina and Brazil.

56 Teplov V. A., official of special assignments under the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

57 Nikonov M. N., Director of the Department of Personnel and Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

58 Mr. N. N., Secretary of the Embassy in Paris.

59 O. Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire (1871-1890).

60 Menelik II, Negus of Ethiopia (1889-1913).

61 This refers to the Treaty of Addis Ababa, signed on October 14 (26), 1896, which ended Italy's unsuccessful war with Ethiopia.

62 N. S. Leontiev, a retired Russian army officer who joined the Ethiopian Negus in 1896, was promoted to general and appointed ruler of the equatorial provinces of Ethiopia. He has repeatedly visited Russia as a member of the diplomatic missions of Ethiopia.

63 P.S. Vannovsky, Minister of War (1881-1898).

64 A. N. Kuropatkin, General, military officer, Governor of the Transcaspian region (1890-1898).

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